---
summary: "CLI reference for `openclaw security` (audit and fix common security footguns)"
read_when:
  - You want to run a quick security audit on config/state
  - You want to apply safe "fix" suggestions (permissions, tighten defaults)
title: "Security"
---

# `openclaw security`

Security tools (audit + optional fixes).

Related:

- Security guide: [Security](/gateway/security)

## Audit

```bash
openclaw security audit
openclaw security audit --deep
openclaw security audit --deep --password <password>
openclaw security audit --deep --token <token>
openclaw security audit --fix
openclaw security audit --json
```

Plain `security audit` stays on the cold config/filesystem/read-only path. It does not discover plugin runtime security collectors by default, so routine audits do not load every installed plugin runtime. Use `--deep` to include best-effort live Gateway probes and plugin-owned security audit collectors; explicit internal callers may also opt into those plugin-owned collectors when they already have an appropriate runtime scope.

The audit warns when multiple DM senders share the main session and recommends **secure DM mode**: `session.dmScope="per-channel-peer"` (or `per-account-channel-peer` for multi-account channels) for shared inboxes.
This is for cooperative/shared inbox hardening. A single Gateway shared by mutually untrusted/adversarial operators is not a recommended setup; split trust boundaries with separate gateways (or separate OS users/hosts).
It also emits `security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic` when config suggests likely shared-user ingress (for example open DM/group policy, configured group targets, or wildcard sender rules), and reminds you that OpenClaw is a personal-assistant trust model by default.
For intentional shared-user setups, the audit guidance is to sandbox all sessions, keep filesystem access workspace-scoped, and keep personal/private identities or credentials off that runtime.
It also warns when small models (`<=300B`) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled.
For webhook ingress, it warns when:

- `hooks.token` reuses an active Gateway shared-secret auth value (`gateway.auth.token` / `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN` or `gateway.auth.password` / `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD`)
- `hooks.token` is short
- `hooks.path="/"`
- `hooks.defaultSessionKey` is unset
- `hooks.allowedAgentIds` is unrestricted
- request `sessionKey` overrides are enabled
- overrides are enabled without `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes`

If Gateway password auth is supplied only at startup, pass the same value to `openclaw security audit --auth password --password <password>` so the audit can check it against `hooks.token`.
Password-mode reuse is an audit finding for compatibility; rotate one of the secrets instead of expecting Gateway startup to reject that configuration.

It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when `gateway.nodes.denyCommands` uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries (exact node command-name matching only, not shell-text filtering), when `gateway.nodes.allowCommands` explicitly enables dangerous node commands, when global `tools.profile="minimal"` is overridden by agent tool profiles, when write/edit tools are disabled but `exec` is still available without a constraining sandbox filesystem boundary, when open groups expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards, and when installed plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.
It also flags `gateway.allowRealIpFallback=true` (header-spoofing risk if proxies are misconfigured) and `discovery.mdns.mode="full"` (metadata leakage via mDNS TXT records).
It also warns when sandbox browser uses Docker `bridge` network without `sandbox.browser.cdpSourceRange`.
It also flags dangerous sandbox Docker network modes (including `host` and `container:*` namespace joins).
It also warns when existing sandbox browser Docker containers have missing/stale hash labels (for example pre-migration containers missing `openclaw.browserConfigEpoch`) and recommends `openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all`.
It also warns when npm-based plugin/hook install records are unpinned, missing integrity metadata, or drift from currently installed package versions.
It warns when channel allowlists rely on mutable names/emails/tags instead of stable IDs (Discord, Slack, Google Chat, Microsoft Teams, Mattermost, IRC scopes where applicable).
It warns when `gateway.auth.mode="none"` leaves Gateway HTTP APIs reachable without a shared secret (`/tools/invoke` plus any enabled `/v1/*` endpoint).
Settings prefixed with `dangerous`/`dangerously` are explicit break-glass operator overrides; enabling one is not, by itself, a security vulnerability report.
For the complete dangerous-parameter inventory, see the "Insecure or dangerous flags summary" section in [Security](/gateway/security).

Intentional standing findings can be accepted with `security.audit.suppressions`.
Each suppression matches an exact `checkId` and can be narrowed with
`titleIncludes` and/or `detailIncludes` case-insensitive substrings:

```json
{
  "security": {
    "audit": {
      "suppressions": [
        {
          "checkId": "plugins.tools_reachable_permissive_policy",
          "detailIncludes": "Enabled extension plugins: gbrain",
          "reason": "trusted local operator plugin"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

Suppressed findings are removed from the active `summary` and `findings` list.
JSON output keeps them under `suppressedFindings` for auditability.
When suppressions are configured, active output also keeps an unsuppressible
`security.audit.suppressions.active` info finding so readers can tell the audit
was filtered. Dangerous config flags are emitted one flag per finding, so
accepting one dangerous flag does not hide other enabled flags that share the
same `config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags` checkId.
Because suppressions can hide standing risk, adding or removing them through
agent-run shell commands requires exec approval unless exec is already running
with `security="full"` and `ask="off"` for trusted local automation.

SecretRef behavior:

- `security audit` resolves supported SecretRefs in read-only mode for its targeted paths.
- If a SecretRef is unavailable in the current command path, audit continues and reports `secretDiagnostics` (instead of crashing).
- `--token` and `--password` only override deep-probe auth for that command invocation; they do not rewrite config or SecretRef mappings.

## JSON output

Use `--json` for CI/policy checks:

```bash
openclaw security audit --json | jq '.summary'
openclaw security audit --deep --json | jq '.findings[] | select(.severity=="critical") | .checkId'
```

If `--fix` and `--json` are combined, output includes both fix actions and final report:

```bash
openclaw security audit --fix --json | jq '{fix: .fix.ok, summary: .report.summary}'
```

## What `--fix` changes

`--fix` applies safe, deterministic remediations:

- flips common `groupPolicy="open"` to `groupPolicy="allowlist"` (including account variants in supported channels)
- when WhatsApp group policy flips to `allowlist`, seeds `groupAllowFrom` from
  the stored `allowFrom` file when that list exists and config does not already
  define `allowFrom`
- sets `logging.redactSensitive` from `"off"` to `"tools"`
- tightens permissions for state/config and common sensitive files
  (`credentials/*.json`, `auth-profiles.json`, `sessions.json`, session
  `*.jsonl`)
- also tightens config include files referenced from `openclaw.json`
- uses `chmod` on POSIX hosts and `icacls` resets on Windows

`--fix` does **not**:

- rotate tokens/passwords/API keys
- disable tools (`gateway`, `cron`, `exec`, etc.)
- change gateway bind/auth/network exposure choices
- remove or rewrite plugins/skills

## Related

- [CLI reference](/cli)
- [Security audit](/gateway/security)
