---
summary: "Secrets management: SecretRef contract, runtime snapshot behavior, and safe one-way scrubbing"
read_when:
  - Configuring SecretRefs for provider credentials and `auth-profiles.json` refs
  - Operating secrets reload, audit, configure, and apply safely in production
  - Understanding startup fail-fast, inactive-surface filtering, and last-known-good behavior
title: "Secrets management"
sidebarTitle: "Secrets management"
---

OpenClaw supports additive SecretRefs so supported credentials do not need to be stored as plaintext in configuration.

<Note>
Plaintext still works. SecretRefs are opt-in per credential.
</Note>

<Warning>
Plaintext credentials remain agent-readable if they are stored in files the
agent can inspect, including `openclaw.json`, `auth-profiles.json`, `.env`, or
generated `agents/*/agent/models.json` files. SecretRefs reduce that local blast
radius only after every supported credential has been migrated and
`openclaw secrets audit --check` reports no plaintext secret residue.
</Warning>

## Goals and runtime model

Secrets are resolved into an in-memory runtime snapshot.

- Resolution is eager during activation, not lazy on request paths.
- Startup fails fast when an effectively active SecretRef cannot be resolved.
- Reload uses atomic swap: full success, or keep the last-known-good snapshot.
- SecretRef policy violations (for example OAuth-mode auth profiles combined with SecretRef input) fail activation before runtime swap.
- Runtime requests read from the active in-memory snapshot only.
- After the first successful config activation/load, runtime code paths keep reading that active in-memory snapshot until a successful reload swaps it.
- Outbound delivery paths also read from that active snapshot (for example Discord reply/thread delivery and Telegram action sends); they do not re-resolve SecretRefs on each send.

This keeps secret-provider outages off hot request paths.

## Agent-access boundary

SecretRefs protect credentials from being persisted in supported config and
generated model surfaces, but they are not a process-isolation boundary. If a
plaintext credential remains on disk in a path the agent can read, the agent can
bypass API-level redaction by using file or shell tools to inspect that file.

For production deployments where agent-accessible files are in scope, treat
SecretRef migration as complete only when all of these are true:

- supported credentials use SecretRefs instead of plaintext values
- legacy plaintext residue has been scrubbed from `openclaw.json`,
  `auth-profiles.json`, `.env`, and generated `models.json` files
- `openclaw secrets audit --check` is clean after the migration
- any remaining unsupported or rotating credentials are protected by operating
  system isolation, container isolation, or an external credential proxy

This is why the audit/configure/apply workflow is a security migration gate, not
just a convenience helper.

<Warning>
SecretRefs do not make arbitrary readable files safe. Backups, copied configs,
old generated model catalogs, and unsupported credential classes must be treated
as production secrets until they are deleted, moved outside the agent trust
boundary, or protected by a separate isolation layer.
</Warning>

## Active-surface filtering

SecretRefs are validated only on effectively active surfaces.

- Enabled surfaces: unresolved refs block startup/reload.
- Inactive surfaces: unresolved refs do not block startup/reload.
- Inactive refs emit non-fatal diagnostics with code `SECRETS_REF_IGNORED_INACTIVE_SURFACE`.

<AccordionGroup>
  <Accordion title="Examples of inactive surfaces">
    - Disabled channel/account entries.
    - Top-level channel credentials that no enabled account inherits.
    - Disabled tool/feature surfaces.
    - Web search provider-specific keys that are not selected by `tools.web.search.provider`. In auto mode (provider unset), keys are consulted by precedence for provider auto-detection until one resolves. After selection, non-selected provider keys are treated as inactive until selected.
    - Sandbox SSH auth material (`agents.defaults.sandbox.ssh.identityData`, `certificateData`, `knownHostsData`, plus per-agent overrides) is active only when the effective sandbox backend is `ssh` for the default agent or an enabled agent.
    - `gateway.remote.token` / `gateway.remote.password` SecretRefs are active if one of these is true:
      - `gateway.mode=remote`
      - `gateway.remote.url` is configured
      - `gateway.tailscale.mode` is `serve` or `funnel`
      - In local mode without those remote surfaces:
        - `gateway.remote.token` is active when token auth can win and no env/auth token is configured.
        - `gateway.remote.password` is active only when password auth can win and no env/auth password is configured.
    - `gateway.auth.token` SecretRef is inactive for startup auth resolution when `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN` is set, because env token input wins for that runtime.

  </Accordion>
</AccordionGroup>

## Gateway auth surface diagnostics

When a SecretRef is configured on `gateway.auth.token`, `gateway.auth.password`, `gateway.remote.token`, or `gateway.remote.password`, gateway startup/reload logs the surface state explicitly:

- `active`: the SecretRef is part of the effective auth surface and must resolve.
- `inactive`: the SecretRef is ignored for this runtime because another auth surface wins, or because remote auth is disabled/not active.

These entries are logged with `SECRETS_GATEWAY_AUTH_SURFACE` and include the reason used by the active-surface policy, so you can see why a credential was treated as active or inactive.

## Onboarding reference preflight

When onboarding runs in interactive mode and you choose SecretRef storage, OpenClaw runs preflight validation before saving:

- Env refs: validates env var name and confirms a non-empty value is visible during setup.
- Provider refs (`file` or `exec`): validates provider selection, resolves `id`, and checks resolved value type.
- Quickstart reuse path: when `gateway.auth.token` is already a SecretRef, onboarding resolves it before probe/dashboard bootstrap (for `env`, `file`, and `exec` refs) using the same fail-fast gate.

If validation fails, onboarding shows the error and lets you retry.

## SecretRef contract

Use one object shape everywhere:

```json5
{ source: "env" | "file" | "exec", provider: "default", id: "..." }
```

<Tabs>
  <Tab title="env">
    ```json5
    { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "OPENAI_API_KEY" }
    ```

    Supported SecretInput fields also accept exact string shorthands:

    ```json5
    "${OPENAI_API_KEY}"
    "$OPENAI_API_KEY"
    ```

    Validation:

    - `provider` must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$`
    - `id` must match `^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{0,127}$`

  </Tab>
  <Tab title="file">
    ```json5
    { source: "file", provider: "filemain", id: "/providers/openai/apiKey" }
    ```

    Validation:

    - `provider` must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$`
    - `id` must be an absolute JSON pointer (`/...`)
    - RFC6901 escaping in segments: `~` => `~0`, `/` => `~1`

  </Tab>
  <Tab title="exec">
    ```json5
    { source: "exec", provider: "vault", id: "providers/openai/apiKey#value" }
    ```

    Validation:

    - `provider` must match `^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$`
    - `id` must match `^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/#-]{0,255}$` (supports selectors such as `secret#json_key`)
    - `id` must not contain `.` or `..` as slash-delimited path segments (for example `a/../b` is rejected)

  </Tab>
</Tabs>

## Provider config

Define providers under `secrets.providers`:

```json5
{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      default: { source: "env" },
      filemain: {
        source: "file",
        path: "~/.openclaw/secrets.json",
        mode: "json", // or "singleValue"
      },
      vault: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-vault-resolver",
        args: ["--profile", "prod"],
        passEnv: ["PATH", "VAULT_ADDR"],
        jsonOnly: true,
      },
    },
    defaults: {
      env: "default",
      file: "filemain",
      exec: "vault",
    },
    resolution: {
      maxProviderConcurrency: 4,
      maxRefsPerProvider: 512,
      maxBatchBytes: 262144,
    },
  },
}
```

<AccordionGroup>
  <Accordion title="Env provider">
    - Optional allowlist via `allowlist`.
    - Missing/empty env values fail resolution.

  </Accordion>
  <Accordion title="File provider">
    - Reads local file from `path`.
    - `mode: "json"` expects JSON object payload and resolves `id` as pointer.
    - `mode: "singleValue"` expects ref id `"value"` and returns file contents.
    - Path must pass ownership/permission checks.
    - Windows fail-closed note: if ACL verification is unavailable for a path, resolution fails. For trusted paths only, set `allowInsecurePath: true` on that provider to bypass path security checks.

  </Accordion>
  <Accordion title="Exec provider">
    - Runs configured absolute binary path, no shell.
    - By default, `command` must point to a regular file (not a symlink).
    - Set `allowSymlinkCommand: true` to allow symlink command paths (for example Homebrew shims). OpenClaw validates the resolved target path.
    - Pair `allowSymlinkCommand` with `trustedDirs` for package-manager paths (for example `["/opt/homebrew"]`).
    - Supports timeout, no-output timeout, output byte limits, env allowlist, and trusted dirs.
    - Windows fail-closed note: if ACL verification is unavailable for the command path, resolution fails. For trusted paths only, set `allowInsecurePath: true` on that provider to bypass path security checks.

    Request payload (stdin):

    ```json
    { "protocolVersion": 1, "provider": "vault", "ids": ["providers/openai/apiKey"] }
    ```

    Response payload (stdout):

    ```jsonc
    { "protocolVersion": 1, "values": { "providers/openai/apiKey": "<openai-api-key>" } } // pragma: allowlist secret
    ```

    Optional per-id errors:

    ```json
    {
      "protocolVersion": 1,
      "values": {},
      "errors": { "providers/openai/apiKey": { "message": "not found" } }
    }
    ```

  </Accordion>
</AccordionGroup>

## File-backed API keys

Do not put `file:...` strings in the config `env` block. The `env` block is
literal and non-overriding, so `file:...` is not resolved.

Use a file SecretRef on a supported credential field instead:

```json5
{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      xai_key_file: {
        source: "file",
        path: "~/.openclaw/secrets/xai-api-key.txt",
        mode: "singleValue",
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    providers: {
      xai: {
        apiKey: { source: "file", provider: "xai_key_file", id: "value" },
      },
    },
  },
}
```

For `mode: "singleValue"`, the SecretRef `id` is `"value"`. For
`mode: "json"`, use an absolute JSON pointer such as
`"/providers/xai/apiKey"`.

See [SecretRef credential surface](/reference/secretref-credential-surface) for
the config fields that accept SecretRefs.

## Exec integration examples

<AccordionGroup>
  <Accordion title="1Password CLI">
    ```json5
    {
      secrets: {
        providers: {
          onepassword_openai: {
            source: "exec",
            command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/op",
            allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
            trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
            args: ["read", "op://Personal/OpenClaw QA API Key/password"],
            passEnv: ["HOME"],
            jsonOnly: false,
          },
        },
      },
      models: {
        providers: {
          openai: {
            baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
            models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
            apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "onepassword_openai", id: "value" },
          },
        },
      },
    }
    ```
  </Accordion>
  <Accordion title="Bitwarden Secrets Manager (`bws`)">
    Use a resolver wrapper when you want SecretRef ids to map to Bitwarden
    Secrets Manager item keys. The repository includes
    `scripts/secrets/openclaw-bws-resolver.mjs`; install or copy it to an absolute
    trusted path on the host that runs the Gateway.

    Requirements:

    - Bitwarden Secrets Manager CLI (`bws`) installed on the Gateway host.
    - `BWS_ACCESS_TOKEN` available to the Gateway service.
    - `PATH` passed to the resolver, or `BWS_BIN` set to the absolute `bws`
      binary path.

    ```json5
    {
      secrets: {
        providers: {
          bws: {
            source: "exec",
            command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-bws-resolver.mjs",
            passEnv: ["BWS_ACCESS_TOKEN", "PATH", "BWS_BIN"],
            jsonOnly: true,
          },
        },
      },
      models: {
        providers: {
          openai: {
            baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
            models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
            apiKey: {
              source: "exec",
              provider: "bws",
              id: "openclaw/providers/openai/apiKey",
            },
          },
        },
      },
    }
    ```

    The resolver batches requested ids, runs `bws secret list`, and returns
    values for matching secret `key` fields. Use keys that satisfy the exec
    SecretRef id contract, such as `openclaw/providers/openai/apiKey`; env-var
    style keys with underscores are rejected before the resolver runs. If more
    than one visible Bitwarden secret has the same requested key, the resolver
    fails that id as ambiguous instead of choosing one. After updating config,
    verify the resolver path:

    ```bash
    openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec
    ```

  </Accordion>
  <Accordion title="HashiCorp Vault CLI">
    ```json5
    {
      secrets: {
        providers: {
          vault_openai: {
            source: "exec",
            command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/vault",
            allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
            trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
            args: ["kv", "get", "-field=OPENAI_API_KEY", "secret/openclaw"],
            passEnv: ["VAULT_ADDR", "VAULT_TOKEN"],
            jsonOnly: false,
          },
        },
      },
      models: {
        providers: {
          openai: {
            baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
            models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
            apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "vault_openai", id: "value" },
          },
        },
      },
    }
    ```
  </Accordion>
  <Accordion title="password-store (`pass`)">
    Use a small resolver wrapper when you want SecretRef ids to map directly to
    `pass` entries. Save this as an executable in an absolute path that passes
    your exec-provider path checks, for example
    `/usr/local/bin/openclaw-pass-resolver`. The `#!/usr/bin/env node` shebang
    resolves `node` from the resolver process `PATH`, so include `PATH` in
    `passEnv`. If `pass` is not on that `PATH`, set `PASS_BIN` in the parent
    environment and include it in `passEnv` too:

    ```js
    #!/usr/bin/env node
    const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");

    let stdin = "";
    process.stdin.setEncoding("utf8");
    process.stdin.on("data", (chunk) => {
      stdin += chunk;
    });
    process.stdin.on("error", (err) => {
      process.stderr.write(`${err.message}\n`);
      process.exit(1);
    });
    process.stdin.on("end", () => {
      let request;
      try {
        request = JSON.parse(stdin || "{}");
      } catch (err) {
        process.stderr.write(`Failed to parse request: ${err.message}\n`);
        process.exit(1);
      }

      const passBin = process.env.PASS_BIN || "pass";
      const values = {};
      const errors = {};

      for (const id of request.ids ?? []) {
        const result = spawnSync(passBin, ["show", id], { encoding: "utf8" });
        if (result.status === 0) {
          values[id] = result.stdout.split(/\r?\n/, 1)[0] ?? "";
        } else {
          errors[id] = { message: (result.stderr || `pass exited ${result.status}`).trim() };
        }
      }

      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ protocolVersion: 1, values, errors }));
    });
    ```

    Then configure the exec provider and point `apiKey` at the `pass` entry path:

    ```json5
    {
      secrets: {
        providers: {
          pass_store: {
            source: "exec",
            command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-pass-resolver",
            passEnv: ["PATH", "HOME", "GNUPGHOME", "GPG_TTY", "PASSWORD_STORE_DIR", "PASS_BIN"],
            jsonOnly: true,
          },
        },
      },
      models: {
        providers: {
          openai: {
            baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
            models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
            apiKey: {
              source: "exec",
              provider: "pass_store",
              id: "openclaw/providers/openai/apiKey",
            },
          },
        },
      },
    }
    ```

    Keep the secret on the first line of the `pass` entry, or customize the
    wrapper if you want to return the full `pass show` output instead. After
    updating config, verify both the static audit and the exec resolver path:

    ```bash
    openclaw secrets audit --check
    openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec
    ```

  </Accordion>
  <Accordion title="sops">
    ```json5
    {
      secrets: {
        providers: {
          sops_openai: {
            source: "exec",
            command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/sops",
            allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
            trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
            args: ["-d", "--extract", '["providers"]["openai"]["apiKey"]', "/path/to/secrets.enc.json"],
            passEnv: ["SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE"],
            jsonOnly: false,
          },
        },
      },
      models: {
        providers: {
          openai: {
            baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
            models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
            apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "sops_openai", id: "value" },
          },
        },
      },
    }
    ```
  </Accordion>
</AccordionGroup>

## MCP server environment variables

MCP server env vars configured via `plugins.entries.acpx.config.mcpServers` support SecretInput. This keeps API keys and tokens out of plaintext config:

```json5
{
  plugins: {
    entries: {
      acpx: {
        enabled: true,
        config: {
          mcpServers: {
            github: {
              command: "npx",
              args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
              env: {
                GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN: {
                  source: "env",
                  provider: "default",
                  id: "MCP_GITHUB_PAT",
                },
              },
            },
          },
        },
      },
    },
  },
}
```

Plaintext string values still work. Env-template refs like `${MCP_SERVER_API_KEY}` and SecretRef objects are resolved during gateway activation before the MCP server process is spawned. As with other SecretRef surfaces, unresolved refs only block activation when the `acpx` plugin is effectively active.

## Sandbox SSH auth material

The core `ssh` sandbox backend also supports SecretRefs for SSH auth material:

```json5
{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      sandbox: {
        mode: "all",
        backend: "ssh",
        ssh: {
          target: "user@gateway-host:22",
          identityData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_IDENTITY" },
          certificateData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_CERTIFICATE" },
          knownHostsData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS" },
        },
      },
    },
  },
}
```

Runtime behavior:

- OpenClaw resolves these refs during sandbox activation, not lazily during each SSH call.
- Resolved values are written to temp files with restrictive permissions and used in generated SSH config.
- If the effective sandbox backend is not `ssh`, these refs stay inactive and do not block startup.

## Supported credential surface

Canonical supported and unsupported credentials are listed in:

- [SecretRef Credential Surface](/reference/secretref-credential-surface)

<Note>
Runtime-minted or rotating credentials and OAuth refresh material are intentionally excluded from read-only SecretRef resolution.
</Note>

## Required behavior and precedence

- Field without a ref: unchanged.
- Field with a ref: required on active surfaces during activation.
- If both plaintext and ref are present, ref takes precedence on supported precedence paths.
- The redaction sentinel `__OPENCLAW_REDACTED__` is reserved for internal config redaction/restore and is rejected as literal submitted config data.

Warning and audit signals:

- `SECRETS_REF_OVERRIDES_PLAINTEXT` (runtime warning)
- `REF_SHADOWED` (audit finding when `auth-profiles.json` credentials take precedence over `openclaw.json` refs)

Google Chat compatibility behavior:

- `serviceAccountRef` takes precedence over plaintext `serviceAccount`.
- Plaintext value is ignored when sibling ref is set.

## Activation triggers

Secret activation runs on:

- Startup (preflight plus final activation)
- Config reload hot-apply path
- Config reload restart-check path
- Manual reload via `secrets.reload`
- Gateway config write RPC preflight (`config.set` / `config.apply` / `config.patch`) for active-surface SecretRef resolvability within the submitted config payload before persisting edits

Activation contract:

- Success swaps the snapshot atomically.
- Startup failure aborts gateway startup.
- Runtime reload failure keeps the last-known-good snapshot.
- Write-RPC preflight failure rejects the submitted config and keeps both disk config and active runtime snapshot unchanged.
- Providing an explicit per-call channel token to an outbound helper/tool call does not trigger SecretRef activation; activation points remain startup, reload, and explicit `secrets.reload`.

## Degraded and recovered signals

When reload-time activation fails after a healthy state, OpenClaw enters degraded secrets state.

One-shot system event and log codes:

- `SECRETS_RELOADER_DEGRADED`
- `SECRETS_RELOADER_RECOVERED`

Behavior:

- Degraded: runtime keeps last-known-good snapshot.
- Recovered: emitted once after the next successful activation.
- Repeated failures while already degraded log warnings but do not spam events.
- Startup fail-fast does not emit degraded events because runtime never became active.

## Command-path resolution

Command paths can opt into supported SecretRef resolution via gateway snapshot RPC.

There are two broad behaviors:

<Tabs>
  <Tab title="Strict command paths">
    For example `openclaw memory` remote-memory paths and `openclaw qr --remote` when it needs remote shared-secret refs. They read from the active snapshot and fail fast when a required SecretRef is unavailable.
  </Tab>
  <Tab title="Read-only command paths">
    For example `openclaw status`, `openclaw status --all`, `openclaw channels status`, `openclaw channels resolve`, `openclaw security audit`, and read-only doctor/config repair flows. They also prefer the active snapshot, but degrade instead of aborting when a targeted SecretRef is unavailable in that command path.

    Read-only behavior:

    - When the gateway is running, these commands read from the active snapshot first.
    - If gateway resolution is incomplete or the gateway is unavailable, they attempt targeted local fallback for the specific command surface.
    - If a targeted SecretRef is still unavailable, the command continues with degraded read-only output and explicit diagnostics such as "configured but unavailable in this command path".
    - This degraded behavior is command-local only. It does not weaken runtime startup, reload, or send/auth paths.

  </Tab>
</Tabs>

Other notes:

- Snapshot refresh after backend secret rotation is handled by `openclaw secrets reload`.
- Gateway RPC method used by these command paths: `secrets.resolve`.

## Audit and configure workflow

Default operator flow:

<Steps>
  <Step title="Audit current state">
    ```bash
    openclaw secrets audit --check
    ```
  </Step>
  <Step title="Configure and apply SecretRefs">
    ```bash
    openclaw secrets configure --apply
    ```
  </Step>
  <Step title="Re-audit">
    ```bash
    openclaw secrets audit --check
    ```
  </Step>
</Steps>

Do not treat the migration as complete until the re-audit is clean. If the audit
still reports plaintext values at rest, the agent-access risk is still present
even when runtime APIs return redacted values.

If you save a plan instead of applying during `configure`, apply that saved plan
with `openclaw secrets apply --from <plan-path>` before the re-audit.

<AccordionGroup>
  <Accordion title="secrets audit">
    Findings include:

    - plaintext values at rest (`openclaw.json`, `auth-profiles.json`, `.env`, and generated `agents/*/agent/models.json`)
    - plaintext sensitive provider header residues in generated `models.json` entries
    - unresolved refs
    - precedence shadowing (`auth-profiles.json` taking priority over `openclaw.json` refs)
    - legacy residues (`auth.json`, OAuth reminders)

    Exec note:

    - By default, audit skips exec SecretRef resolvability checks to avoid command side effects.
    - Use `openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec` to execute exec providers during audit.

    Header residue note:

    - Sensitive provider header detection is name-heuristic based (common auth/credential header names and fragments such as `authorization`, `x-api-key`, `token`, `secret`, `password`, and `credential`).

  </Accordion>
  <Accordion title="secrets configure">
    Interactive helper that:

    - configures `secrets.providers` first (`env`/`file`/`exec`, add/edit/remove)
    - lets you select supported secret-bearing fields in `openclaw.json` plus `auth-profiles.json` for one agent scope
    - can create a new `auth-profiles.json` mapping directly in the target picker
    - captures SecretRef details (`source`, `provider`, `id`)
    - runs preflight resolution
    - can apply immediately

    Exec note:

    - Preflight skips exec SecretRef checks unless `--allow-exec` is set.
    - If you apply directly from `configure --apply` and the plan includes exec refs/providers, keep `--allow-exec` set for the apply step too.

    Helpful modes:

    - `openclaw secrets configure --providers-only`
    - `openclaw secrets configure --skip-provider-setup`
    - `openclaw secrets configure --agent <id>`

    `configure` apply defaults:

    - scrub matching static credentials from `auth-profiles.json` for targeted providers
    - scrub legacy static `api_key` entries from `auth.json`
    - scrub matching known secret lines from `<config-dir>/.env`

  </Accordion>
  <Accordion title="secrets apply">
    Apply a saved plan:

    ```bash
    openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json
    openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --allow-exec
    openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --dry-run
    openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --dry-run --allow-exec
    ```

    Exec note:

    - dry-run skips exec checks unless `--allow-exec` is set.
    - write mode rejects plans containing exec SecretRefs/providers unless `--allow-exec` is set.

    For strict target/path contract details and exact rejection rules, see [Secrets Apply Plan Contract](/gateway/secrets-plan-contract).

  </Accordion>
</AccordionGroup>

## One-way safety policy

<Warning>
OpenClaw intentionally does not write rollback backups containing historical plaintext secret values.
</Warning>

Safety model:

- preflight must succeed before write mode
- runtime activation is validated before commit
- apply updates files using atomic file replacement and best-effort restore on failure

## Legacy auth compatibility notes

For static credentials, runtime no longer depends on plaintext legacy auth storage.

- Runtime credential source is the resolved in-memory snapshot.
- Legacy static `api_key` entries are scrubbed when discovered.
- OAuth-related compatibility behavior remains separate.

## Web UI note

Some SecretInput unions are easier to configure in raw editor mode than in form mode.

## Related

- [Authentication](/gateway/authentication) — auth setup
- [CLI: secrets](/cli/secrets) — CLI commands
- [Environment Variables](/help/environment) — environment precedence
- [SecretRef Credential Surface](/reference/secretref-credential-surface) — credential surface
- [Secrets Apply Plan Contract](/gateway/secrets-plan-contract) — plan contract details
- [Security](/gateway/security) — security posture
