diff --git a/extensions/qqbot/src/engine/api/token.test.ts b/extensions/qqbot/src/engine/api/token.test.ts
index 2f88f2f1b76..7389fa4c760 100644
--- a/extensions/qqbot/src/engine/api/token.test.ts
+++ b/extensions/qqbot/src/engine/api/token.test.ts
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ describe("QQBot token manager", () => {
       url: "https://bots.qq.com/app/getAppAccessToken",
       auditContext: "qqbot-token",
       capture: false,
+      policy: {
+        hostnameAllowlist: ["bots.qq.com"],
+        allowRfc2544BenchmarkRange: true,
+      },
       init: {
         method: "POST",
         headers: {
@@ -54,6 +58,25 @@ describe("QQBot token manager", () => {
     expect(release).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
   });
 
+  it("passes the RFC2544 SSRF allowance to the token fetch (regression for #88984)", async () => {
+    mockGuardedTokenResponse('{"access_token":"token-1","expires_in":7200}', {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+    });
+
+    await expect(new TokenManager().getAccessToken("app-id", "secret")).resolves.toBe("token-1");
+    expect(fetchWithSsrFGuardMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        url: "https://bots.qq.com/app/getAppAccessToken",
+        auditContext: "qqbot-token",
+        policy: {
+          hostnameAllowlist: ["bots.qq.com"],
+          allowRfc2544BenchmarkRange: true,
+        },
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
   it("does not cache access tokens forever when expires_in is unsafe", async () => {
     vi.useFakeTimers();
     vi.setSystemTime(new Date("2026-05-29T12:00:00.000Z"));
diff --git a/extensions/qqbot/src/engine/api/token.ts b/extensions/qqbot/src/engine/api/token.ts
index 299da9a0b4f..05325452522 100644
--- a/extensions/qqbot/src/engine/api/token.ts
+++ b/extensions/qqbot/src/engine/api/token.ts
@@ -12,13 +12,31 @@ import {
   resolveExpiresAtMsFromDurationSeconds,
   resolveTimestampMsToIsoString,
 } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/number-runtime";
-import { fetchWithSsrFGuard } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/ssrf-runtime";
+import { fetchWithSsrFGuard, type SsrFPolicy } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/ssrf-runtime";
 import type { EngineLogger } from "../types.js";
 import { formatErrorMessage } from "../utils/format.js";
 
 const TOKEN_URL = "https://bots.qq.com/app/getAppAccessToken";
 const DEFAULT_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS = 7200;
 
+/**
+ * Host-scoped SSRF policy for the QQ Bot token endpoint.
+ *
+ * `TOKEN_URL` is a hard-coded `https://bots.qq.com/...` constant, so this
+ * relaxation only ever applies to that single host. Fake-IP proxy stacks
+ * (sing-box, Clash, Surge, WSL2 DNS, etc.) routinely map `bots.qq.com` into
+ * the RFC 2544 benchmark range `198.18.0.0/15`, which the default SSRF
+ * guard blocks. We mirror the existing media-path pattern
+ * (`QQBOT_MEDIA_SSRF_POLICY` in `../utils/file-utils.ts`) so the relaxation
+ * stays narrowly host-scoped instead of weakening the global default.
+ *
+ * See https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/issues/88984.
+ */
+const QQBOT_TOKEN_SSRF_POLICY: SsrFPolicy = {
+  hostnameAllowlist: ["bots.qq.com"],
+  allowRfc2544BenchmarkRange: true,
+};
+
 interface CachedToken {
   token: string;
   expiresAt: number;
@@ -234,6 +252,7 @@ export class TokenManager {
         url: TOKEN_URL,
         auditContext: "qqbot-token",
         capture: false,
+        policy: QQBOT_TOKEN_SSRF_POLICY,
         init: {
           method: "POST",
           headers: {