diff --git a/docs/gateway/security/index.md b/docs/gateway/security/index.md
index 467cdb371a9..d30f5f8c708 100644
--- a/docs/gateway/security/index.md
+++ b/docs/gateway/security/index.md
@@ -127,8 +127,9 @@ High-signal `checkId` values you will most likely see in real deployments (not e
 | `gateway.http.no_auth`                        | warn/critical | Gateway HTTP APIs reachable with `auth.mode="none"`                     | `gateway.auth.mode`, `gateway.http.endpoints.*`               | no       |
 | `gateway.tools_invoke_http.dangerous_allow`   | warn/critical | Re-enables dangerous tools over HTTP API                                | `gateway.tools.allow`                                         | no       |
 | `gateway.tailscale_funnel`                    | critical      | Public internet exposure                                                | `gateway.tailscale.mode`                                      | no       |
-| `gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth`            | critical      | Insecure-auth toggle enabled                                            | `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth`                         | no       |
+| `gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth`            | warn          | Insecure-auth compatibility toggle enabled                              | `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth`                         | no       |
 | `gateway.control_ui.device_auth_disabled`     | critical      | Disables device identity check                                          | `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth`              | no       |
+| `config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags`          | warn          | Any insecure/dangerous debug flags enabled                              | multiple keys (see finding detail)                            | no       |
 | `hooks.token_too_short`                       | warn          | Easier brute force on hook ingress                                      | `hooks.token`                                                 | no       |
 | `hooks.request_session_key_enabled`           | warn/critical | External caller can choose sessionKey                                   | `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey`                                | no       |
 | `hooks.request_session_key_prefixes_missing`  | warn/critical | No bound on external session key shapes                                 | `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes`                             | no       |
@@ -153,6 +154,16 @@ keep it off unless you are actively debugging and can revert quickly.
 
 `openclaw security audit` warns when this setting is enabled.
 
+## Insecure or dangerous flags summary
+
+`openclaw security audit` includes `config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags` when any
+insecure/dangerous debug switches are enabled. This warning aggregates the exact
+keys so you can review them in one place (for example
+`gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true`,
+`gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth=true`,
+`hooks.gmail.allowUnsafeExternalContent=true`, or
+`tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly=false`).
+
 ## Reverse Proxy Configuration
 
 If you run the Gateway behind a reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, Traefik, etc.), you should configure `gateway.trustedProxies` for proper client IP detection.
diff --git a/src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts b/src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts
index 61be61fafdd..92a3d1e5c40 100644
--- a/src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts
+++ b/src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts
@@ -72,6 +72,40 @@ type SubsystemLogger = ReturnType<typeof createSubsystemLogger>;
 
 const DEVICE_SIGNATURE_SKEW_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
 
+type ControlUiAuthPolicy = {
+  allowInsecureAuthConfigured: boolean;
+  dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth: boolean;
+  allowBypass: boolean;
+  device: ConnectParams["device"] | null | undefined;
+};
+
+function resolveControlUiAuthPolicy(params: {
+  isControlUi: boolean;
+  controlUiConfig:
+    | {
+        allowInsecureAuth?: boolean;
+        dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth?: boolean;
+      }
+    | undefined;
+  deviceRaw: ConnectParams["device"] | null | undefined;
+}): ControlUiAuthPolicy {
+  const allowInsecureAuthConfigured =
+    params.isControlUi && params.controlUiConfig?.allowInsecureAuth === true;
+  const dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth =
+    params.isControlUi && params.controlUiConfig?.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth === true;
+  return {
+    allowInsecureAuthConfigured,
+    dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth,
+    // `allowInsecureAuth` must not bypass secure-context/device-auth requirements.
+    allowBypass: dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth,
+    device: dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth ? null : params.deviceRaw,
+  };
+}
+
+function shouldSkipControlUiPairing(policy: ControlUiAuthPolicy, sharedAuthOk: boolean): boolean {
+  return policy.allowBypass && sharedAuthOk;
+}
+
 export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {
   socket: WebSocket;
   upgradeReq: IncomingMessage;
@@ -337,62 +371,74 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {
         const hasTokenAuth = Boolean(connectParams.auth?.token);
         const hasPasswordAuth = Boolean(connectParams.auth?.password);
         const hasSharedAuth = hasTokenAuth || hasPasswordAuth;
-        const allowInsecureControlUi =
-          isControlUi && configSnapshot.gateway?.controlUi?.allowInsecureAuth === true;
-        const disableControlUiDeviceAuth =
-          isControlUi && configSnapshot.gateway?.controlUi?.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth === true;
-        // `allowInsecureAuth` must not bypass secure-context/device-auth requirements.
-        const allowControlUiBypass = disableControlUiDeviceAuth;
-        const device = disableControlUiDeviceAuth ? null : deviceRaw;
-
-        const hasDeviceTokenCandidate = Boolean(connectParams.auth?.token && device);
-        let authResult: GatewayAuthResult = await authorizeGatewayConnect({
-          auth: resolvedAuth,
-          connectAuth: connectParams.auth,
-          req: upgradeReq,
-          trustedProxies,
-          allowTailscaleHeaderAuth: true,
-          rateLimiter: hasDeviceTokenCandidate ? undefined : rateLimiter,
-          clientIp,
-          rateLimitScope: AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET,
+        const controlUiAuthPolicy = resolveControlUiAuthPolicy({
+          isControlUi,
+          controlUiConfig: configSnapshot.gateway?.controlUi,
+          deviceRaw,
         });
+        const device = controlUiAuthPolicy.device;
 
-        if (
-          hasDeviceTokenCandidate &&
-          authResult.ok &&
-          rateLimiter &&
-          (authResult.method === "token" || authResult.method === "password")
-        ) {
-          const sharedRateCheck = rateLimiter.check(clientIp, AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET);
-          if (!sharedRateCheck.allowed) {
-            authResult = {
-              ok: false,
-              reason: "rate_limited",
-              rateLimited: true,
-              retryAfterMs: sharedRateCheck.retryAfterMs,
-            };
-          } else {
-            rateLimiter.reset(clientIp, AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET);
+        const resolveAuthState = async () => {
+          const hasDeviceTokenCandidate = Boolean(connectParams.auth?.token && device);
+          let nextAuthResult: GatewayAuthResult = await authorizeGatewayConnect({
+            auth: resolvedAuth,
+            connectAuth: connectParams.auth,
+            req: upgradeReq,
+            trustedProxies,
+            allowTailscaleHeaderAuth: true,
+            rateLimiter: hasDeviceTokenCandidate ? undefined : rateLimiter,
+            clientIp,
+            rateLimitScope: AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET,
+          });
+
+          if (
+            hasDeviceTokenCandidate &&
+            nextAuthResult.ok &&
+            rateLimiter &&
+            (nextAuthResult.method === "token" || nextAuthResult.method === "password")
+          ) {
+            const sharedRateCheck = rateLimiter.check(
+              clientIp,
+              AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET,
+            );
+            if (!sharedRateCheck.allowed) {
+              nextAuthResult = {
+                ok: false,
+                reason: "rate_limited",
+                rateLimited: true,
+                retryAfterMs: sharedRateCheck.retryAfterMs,
+              };
+            } else {
+              rateLimiter.reset(clientIp, AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET);
+            }
           }
-        }
 
-        let authOk = authResult.ok;
-        let authMethod =
-          authResult.method ?? (resolvedAuth.mode === "password" ? "password" : "token");
-        const sharedAuthResult = hasSharedAuth
-          ? await authorizeGatewayConnect({
-              auth: { ...resolvedAuth, allowTailscale: false },
-              connectAuth: connectParams.auth,
-              req: upgradeReq,
-              trustedProxies,
-              // Shared-auth probe only; rate-limit side effects are handled in
-              // the primary auth flow (or deferred for device-token candidates).
-              rateLimitScope: AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET,
-            })
-          : null;
-        const sharedAuthOk =
-          sharedAuthResult?.ok === true &&
-          (sharedAuthResult.method === "token" || sharedAuthResult.method === "password");
+          const nextAuthMethod =
+            nextAuthResult.method ?? (resolvedAuth.mode === "password" ? "password" : "token");
+          const sharedAuthResult = hasSharedAuth
+            ? await authorizeGatewayConnect({
+                auth: { ...resolvedAuth, allowTailscale: false },
+                connectAuth: connectParams.auth,
+                req: upgradeReq,
+                trustedProxies,
+                // Shared-auth probe only; rate-limit side effects are handled in
+                // the primary auth flow (or deferred for device-token candidates).
+                rateLimitScope: AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_SHARED_SECRET,
+              })
+            : null;
+          const nextSharedAuthOk =
+            sharedAuthResult?.ok === true &&
+            (sharedAuthResult.method === "token" || sharedAuthResult.method === "password");
+
+          return {
+            authResult: nextAuthResult,
+            authOk: nextAuthResult.ok,
+            authMethod: nextAuthMethod,
+            sharedAuthOk: nextSharedAuthOk,
+          };
+        };
+
+        let { authResult, authOk, authMethod, sharedAuthOk } = await resolveAuthState();
         const rejectUnauthorized = (failedAuth: GatewayAuthResult) => {
           markHandshakeFailure("unauthorized", {
             authMode: resolvedAuth.mode,
@@ -421,35 +467,46 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {
           sendHandshakeErrorResponse(ErrorCodes.INVALID_REQUEST, authMessage);
           close(1008, truncateCloseReason(authMessage));
         };
-        if (!device) {
-          if (scopes.length > 0 && !allowControlUiBypass) {
+        const clearUnboundScopes = () => {
+          if (scopes.length > 0 && !controlUiAuthPolicy.allowBypass) {
             scopes = [];
             connectParams.scopes = scopes;
           }
+        };
+        const handleMissingDeviceIdentity = (): boolean => {
+          if (device) {
+            return true;
+          }
+          clearUnboundScopes();
           const canSkipDevice = sharedAuthOk;
 
-          if (isControlUi && !allowControlUiBypass) {
+          if (isControlUi && !controlUiAuthPolicy.allowBypass) {
             const errorMessage =
               "control ui requires device identity (use HTTPS or localhost secure context)";
             markHandshakeFailure("control-ui-insecure-auth", {
-              insecureAuthConfigured: allowInsecureControlUi,
+              insecureAuthConfigured: controlUiAuthPolicy.allowInsecureAuthConfigured,
             });
             sendHandshakeErrorResponse(ErrorCodes.INVALID_REQUEST, errorMessage);
             close(1008, errorMessage);
-            return;
+            return false;
           }
 
-          // Allow shared-secret authenticated connections (e.g., control-ui) to skip device identity
+          // Allow shared-secret authenticated connections (e.g., control-ui) to skip device identity.
           if (!canSkipDevice) {
             if (!authOk && hasSharedAuth) {
               rejectUnauthorized(authResult);
-              return;
+              return false;
             }
             markHandshakeFailure("device-required");
             sendHandshakeErrorResponse(ErrorCodes.NOT_PAIRED, "device identity required");
             close(1008, "device identity required");
-            return;
+            return false;
           }
+
+          return true;
+        };
+        if (!handleMissingDeviceIdentity()) {
+          return;
         }
         if (device) {
           const derivedId = deriveDeviceIdFromPublicKey(device.publicKey);
@@ -625,7 +682,7 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {
           return;
         }
 
-        const skipPairing = allowControlUiBypass && sharedAuthOk;
+        const skipPairing = shouldSkipControlUiPairing(controlUiAuthPolicy, sharedAuthOk);
         if (device && devicePublicKey && !skipPairing) {
           const formatAuditList = (items: string[] | undefined): string => {
             if (!items || items.length === 0) {
diff --git a/src/security/audit.test.ts b/src/security/audit.test.ts
index 3585a7b69a3..8e6a04725a9 100644
--- a/src/security/audit.test.ts
+++ b/src/security/audit.test.ts
@@ -707,7 +707,12 @@ describe("security audit", () => {
       expect.arrayContaining([
         expect.objectContaining({
           checkId: "gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth",
-          severity: "critical",
+          severity: "warn",
+        }),
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          checkId: "config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags",
+          severity: "warn",
+          detail: expect.stringContaining("gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true"),
         }),
       ]),
     );
@@ -728,10 +733,40 @@ describe("security audit", () => {
           checkId: "gateway.control_ui.device_auth_disabled",
           severity: "critical",
         }),
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          checkId: "config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags",
+          severity: "warn",
+          detail: expect.stringContaining("gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth=true"),
+        }),
       ]),
     );
   });
 
+  it("warns when insecure/dangerous debug flags are enabled", async () => {
+    const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {
+      hooks: {
+        gmail: { allowUnsafeExternalContent: true },
+        mappings: [{ allowUnsafeExternalContent: true }],
+      },
+      tools: {
+        exec: {
+          applyPatch: {
+            workspaceOnly: false,
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    };
+
+    const res = await audit(cfg);
+    const finding = res.findings.find((f) => f.checkId === "config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags");
+
+    expect(finding).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(finding?.severity).toBe("warn");
+    expect(finding?.detail).toContain("hooks.gmail.allowUnsafeExternalContent=true");
+    expect(finding?.detail).toContain("hooks.mappings[0].allowUnsafeExternalContent=true");
+    expect(finding?.detail).toContain("tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly=false");
+  });
+
   it("flags trusted-proxy auth mode without generic shared-secret findings", async () => {
     const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {
       gateway: {
diff --git a/src/security/audit.ts b/src/security/audit.ts
index 294110158f4..8d4b3427f13 100644
--- a/src/security/audit.ts
+++ b/src/security/audit.ts
@@ -114,6 +114,30 @@ function normalizeAllowFromList(list: Array<string | number> | undefined | null)
   return list.map((v) => String(v).trim()).filter(Boolean);
 }
 
+function collectEnabledInsecureOrDangerousFlags(cfg: OpenClawConfig): string[] {
+  const enabledFlags: string[] = [];
+  if (cfg.gateway?.controlUi?.allowInsecureAuth === true) {
+    enabledFlags.push("gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true");
+  }
+  if (cfg.gateway?.controlUi?.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth === true) {
+    enabledFlags.push("gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth=true");
+  }
+  if (cfg.hooks?.gmail?.allowUnsafeExternalContent === true) {
+    enabledFlags.push("hooks.gmail.allowUnsafeExternalContent=true");
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(cfg.hooks?.mappings)) {
+    for (const [index, mapping] of cfg.hooks.mappings.entries()) {
+      if (mapping?.allowUnsafeExternalContent === true) {
+        enabledFlags.push(`hooks.mappings[${index}].allowUnsafeExternalContent=true`);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  if (cfg.tools?.exec?.applyPatch?.workspaceOnly === false) {
+    enabledFlags.push("tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly=false");
+  }
+  return enabledFlags;
+}
+
 async function collectFilesystemFindings(params: {
   stateDir: string;
   configPath: string;
@@ -348,7 +372,7 @@ function collectGatewayConfigFindings(
   if (cfg.gateway?.controlUi?.allowInsecureAuth === true) {
     findings.push({
       checkId: "gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth",
-      severity: "critical",
+      severity: "warn",
       title: "Control UI insecure auth toggle enabled",
       detail:
         "gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true does not bypass secure context or device identity checks; only dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth disables Control UI device identity checks.",
@@ -367,6 +391,18 @@ function collectGatewayConfigFindings(
     });
   }
 
+  const enabledDangerousFlags = collectEnabledInsecureOrDangerousFlags(cfg);
+  if (enabledDangerousFlags.length > 0) {
+    findings.push({
+      checkId: "config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags",
+      severity: "warn",
+      title: "Insecure or dangerous config flags enabled",
+      detail: `Detected ${enabledDangerousFlags.length} enabled flag(s): ${enabledDangerousFlags.join(", ")}.`,
+      remediation:
+        "Disable these flags when not actively debugging, or keep deployment scoped to trusted/local-only networks.",
+    });
+  }
+
   const token =
     typeof auth.token === "string" && auth.token.trim().length > 0 ? auth.token.trim() : null;
   if (auth.mode === "token" && token && token.length < 24) {