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feat(sandbox): block container namespace joins by default
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@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ For webhook ingress, it warns when `hooks.defaultSessionKey` is unset, when requ
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It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when `gateway.nodes.denyCommands` uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries, when `gateway.nodes.allowCommands` explicitly enables dangerous node commands, when global `tools.profile="minimal"` is overridden by agent tool profiles, when open groups expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.
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It also flags `gateway.allowRealIpFallback=true` (header-spoofing risk if proxies are misconfigured) and `discovery.mdns.mode="full"` (metadata leakage via mDNS TXT records).
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It also warns when sandbox browser uses Docker `bridge` network without `sandbox.browser.cdpSourceRange`.
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It also flags dangerous sandbox Docker network modes (including `host` and `container:*` namespace joins).
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It also warns when existing sandbox browser Docker containers have missing/stale hash labels (for example pre-migration containers missing `openclaw.browserConfigEpoch`) and recommends `openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all`.
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It also warns when npm-based plugin/hook install records are unpinned, missing integrity metadata, or drift from currently installed package versions.
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It warns when channel allowlists rely on mutable names/emails/tags instead of stable IDs (Discord, Slack, Google Chat, MS Teams, Mattermost, IRC scopes where applicable).
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