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docs(security): clarify shared-agent trust boundaries

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Peter Steinberger
2026-02-24 00:59:20 +00:00
parent 0cc327546b
commit 41b0568b35
2 changed files with 47 additions and 2 deletions
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SECURITY.md
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@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Report vulnerabilities directly to the repository where the issue lives:
- **ClawHub** — [openclaw/clawhub](https://github.com/openclaw/clawhub)
- **Trust and threat model** — [openclaw/trust](https://github.com/openclaw/trust)
For issues that don't fit a specific repo, or if you're unsure, email **security@openclaw.ai** and we'll route it.
For issues that don't fit a specific repo, or if you're unsure, email **[security@openclaw.ai](mailto:security@openclaw.ai)** and we'll route it.
For full reporting instructions see our [Trust page](https://trust.openclaw.ai).
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ OpenClaw does **not** model one gateway as a multi-tenant, adversarial user boun
- Public Internet Exposure
- Using OpenClaw in ways that the docs recommend not to
- Deployments where mutually untrusted/adversarial operators share one gateway host and config (for example, reports expecting per-operator isolation for `sessions.list`, `sessions.preview`, `chat.history`, or similar control-plane reads)
- Prompt injection attacks
- Prompt-injection-only attacks (without a policy/auth/sandbox boundary bypass)
- Reports that require write access to trusted local state (`~/.openclaw`, workspace files like `MEMORY.md` / `memory/*.md`)
- Reports that depend on trusted operator-supplied configuration values to trigger availability impact (for example custom regex patterns). These may still be fixed as defense-in-depth hardening, but are not security-boundary bypasses.
- Exposed secrets that are third-party/user-controlled credentials (not OpenClaw-owned and not granting access to OpenClaw-operated infrastructure/services) without demonstrated OpenClaw impact
@@ -108,6 +108,23 @@ OpenClaw security guidance assumes:
- Authenticated Gateway callers are treated as trusted operators. Session identifiers (for example `sessionKey`) are routing controls, not per-user authorization boundaries.
- Multiple gateway instances can run on one machine, but the recommended model is clean per-user isolation (prefer one host/VPS per user).
## One-User Trust Model (Personal Assistant)
OpenClaw's security model is "personal assistant" (one trusted operator, potentially many agents), not "shared multi-tenant bus."
- If multiple people can message the same tool-enabled agent (for example a shared Slack workspace), they can all steer that agent within its granted permissions.
- Session or memory scoping reduces context bleed, but does **not** create per-user host authorization boundaries.
- For mixed-trust or adversarial users, isolate by OS user/host/gateway and use separate credentials per boundary.
- A company-shared agent can be a valid setup when users are in the same trust boundary and the agent is strictly business-only.
- For company-shared setups, use a dedicated machine/VM/container and dedicated accounts; avoid mixing personal data on that runtime.
- If that host/browser profile is logged into personal accounts (for example Apple/Google/personal password manager), you have collapsed the boundary and increased personal-data exposure risk.
## Agent and Model Assumptions
- The model/agent is **not** a trusted principal. Assume prompt/content injection can manipulate behavior.
- Security boundaries come from host/config trust, auth, tool policy, sandboxing, and exec approvals.
- Prompt injection by itself is not a vulnerability report unless it crosses one of those boundaries.
## Workspace Memory Trust Boundary
`MEMORY.md` and `memory/*.md` are plain workspace files and are treated as trusted local operator state.