diff --git a/docs/tools/exec-approvals.md b/docs/tools/exec-approvals.md index 23d8b86a405..fdacdc5941a 100644 --- a/docs/tools/exec-approvals.md +++ b/docs/tools/exec-approvals.md @@ -4,35 +4,44 @@ read_when: - Configuring exec approvals or allowlists - Implementing exec approval UX in the macOS app - Reviewing sandbox escape prompts and implications -title: "Exec Approvals" +title: "Exec approvals" --- # Exec approvals -Exec approvals are the **companion app / node host guardrail** for letting a sandboxed agent run -commands on a real host (`gateway` or `node`). Think of it like a safety interlock: -commands are allowed only when policy + allowlist + (optional) user approval all agree. -Exec approvals are **in addition** to tool policy and elevated gating (unless elevated is set to `full`, which skips approvals). -Effective policy is the **stricter** of `tools.exec.*` and approvals defaults; if an approvals field is omitted, the `tools.exec` value is used. -Host exec also uses the local approvals state on that machine. A host-local -`ask: "always"` in `~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json` keeps prompting even if -session or config defaults request `ask: "on-miss"`. -Use `openclaw approvals get`, `openclaw approvals get --gateway`, or -`openclaw approvals get --node ` to inspect the requested policy, -host policy sources, and the effective result. -For the local machine, `openclaw exec-policy show` exposes the same merged view and -`openclaw exec-policy set|preset` can synchronize the local requested policy with the -local host approvals file in one step. When a local scope requests `host=node`, -`openclaw exec-policy show` reports that scope as node-managed at runtime instead of -pretending the local approvals file is the effective source of truth. +Exec approvals are the **companion app / node host guardrail** for letting a +sandboxed agent run commands on a real host (`gateway` or `node`). A safety +interlock: commands are allowed only when policy + allowlist + (optional) user +approval all agree. Exec approvals stack **on top of** tool policy and elevated +gating (unless elevated is set to `full`, which skips approvals). -If the companion app UI is **not available**, any request that requires a prompt is -resolved by the **ask fallback** (default: deny). + +Effective policy is the **stricter** of `tools.exec.*` and approvals defaults; +if an approvals field is omitted, the `tools.exec` value is used. Host exec +also uses local approvals state on that machine — a host-local `ask: "always"` +in `~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json` keeps prompting even if session or config +defaults request `ask: "on-miss"`. + -Native chat approval clients can also expose channel-specific affordances on the -pending approval message. For example, Matrix can seed reaction shortcuts on the -approval prompt (`✅` allow once, `❌` deny, and `♾️` allow always when available) -while still leaving the `/approve ...` commands in the message as a fallback. +## Inspecting the effective policy + +- `openclaw approvals get`, `... --gateway`, `... --node ` — show requested policy, host policy sources, and the effective result. +- `openclaw exec-policy show` — local-machine merged view. +- `openclaw exec-policy set|preset` — synchronize the local requested policy with the local host approvals file in one step. + +When a local scope requests `host=node`, `exec-policy show` reports that scope +as node-managed at runtime instead of pretending the local approvals file is +the source of truth. + +If the companion app UI is **not available**, any request that would normally +prompt is resolved by the **ask fallback** (default: deny). + + +Native chat approval clients can seed channel-specific affordances on the +pending approval message. For example, Matrix seeds reaction shortcuts (`✅` +allow once, `❌` deny, `♾️` allow always) while still leaving `/approve ...` +commands in the message as a fallback. + ## Where it applies @@ -268,60 +277,19 @@ Important trust notes: ## Safe bins (stdin-only) -`tools.exec.safeBins` defines a small list of **stdin-only** binaries (for example `cut`) -that can run in allowlist mode **without** explicit allowlist entries. Safe bins reject -positional file args and path-like tokens, so they can only operate on the incoming stream. -Treat this as a narrow fast-path for stream filters, not a general trust list. -Do **not** add interpreter or runtime binaries (for example `python3`, `node`, `ruby`, `bash`, `sh`, `zsh`) to `safeBins`. -If a command can evaluate code, execute subcommands, or read files by design, prefer explicit allowlist entries and keep approval prompts enabled. -Custom safe bins must define an explicit profile in `tools.exec.safeBinProfiles.`. -Validation is deterministic from argv shape only (no host filesystem existence checks), which -prevents file-existence oracle behavior from allow/deny differences. -File-oriented options are denied for default safe bins (for example `sort -o`, `sort --output`, -`sort --files0-from`, `sort --compress-program`, `sort --random-source`, -`sort --temporary-directory`/`-T`, `wc --files0-from`, `jq -f/--from-file`, -`grep -f/--file`). -Safe bins also enforce explicit per-binary flag policy for options that break stdin-only -behavior (for example `sort -o/--output/--compress-program` and grep recursive flags). -Long options are validated fail-closed in safe-bin mode: unknown flags and ambiguous -abbreviations are rejected. -Denied flags by safe-bin profile: +`tools.exec.safeBins` defines a small list of **stdin-only** binaries (for +example `cut`) that can run in allowlist mode **without** explicit allowlist +entries. Safe bins reject positional file args and path-like tokens, so they +can only operate on the incoming stream. Treat this as a narrow fast-path for +stream filters, not a general trust list. -[//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DENIED_FLAGS:START" - -- `grep`: `--dereference-recursive`, `--directories`, `--exclude-from`, `--file`, `--recursive`, `-R`, `-d`, `-f`, `-r` -- `jq`: `--argfile`, `--from-file`, `--library-path`, `--rawfile`, `--slurpfile`, `-L`, `-f` -- `sort`: `--compress-program`, `--files0-from`, `--output`, `--random-source`, `--temporary-directory`, `-T`, `-o` -- `wc`: `--files0-from` - -[//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DENIED_FLAGS:END" - -Safe bins also force argv tokens to be treated as **literal text** at execution time (no globbing -and no `$VARS` expansion) for stdin-only segments, so patterns like `*` or `$HOME/...` cannot be -used to smuggle file reads. -Safe bins must also resolve from trusted binary directories (system defaults plus optional -`tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`). `PATH` entries are never auto-trusted. -Default trusted safe-bin directories are intentionally minimal: `/bin`, `/usr/bin`. -If your safe-bin executable lives in package-manager/user paths (for example -`/opt/homebrew/bin`, `/usr/local/bin`, `/opt/local/bin`, `/snap/bin`), add them explicitly -to `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`. -Shell chaining and redirections are not auto-allowed in allowlist mode. - -Shell chaining (`&&`, `||`, `;`) is allowed when every top-level segment satisfies the allowlist -(including safe bins or skill auto-allow). Redirections remain unsupported in allowlist mode. -Command substitution (`$()` / backticks) is rejected during allowlist parsing, including inside -double quotes; use single quotes if you need literal `$()` text. -On macOS companion-app approvals, raw shell text containing shell control or expansion syntax -(`&&`, `||`, `;`, `|`, `` ` ``, `$`, `<`, `>`, `(`, `)`) is treated as an allowlist miss unless -the shell binary itself is allowlisted. -For shell wrappers (`bash|sh|zsh ... -c/-lc`), request-scoped env overrides are reduced to a -small explicit allowlist (`TERM`, `LANG`, `LC_*`, `COLORTERM`, `NO_COLOR`, `FORCE_COLOR`). -For allow-always decisions in allowlist mode, known dispatch wrappers -(`env`, `nice`, `nohup`, `stdbuf`, `timeout`) persist inner executable paths instead of wrapper -paths. Shell multiplexers (`busybox`, `toybox`) are also unwrapped for shell applets (`sh`, `ash`, -etc.) so inner executables are persisted instead of multiplexer binaries. If a wrapper or -multiplexer cannot be safely unwrapped, no allowlist entry is persisted automatically. -If you allowlist interpreters like `python3` or `node`, prefer `tools.exec.strictInlineEval=true` so inline eval still requires an explicit approval. In strict mode, `allow-always` can still persist benign interpreter/script invocations, but inline-eval carriers are not persisted automatically. + +Do **not** add interpreter or runtime binaries (for example `python3`, `node`, +`ruby`, `bash`, `sh`, `zsh`) to `safeBins`. If a command can evaluate code, +execute subcommands, or read files by design, prefer explicit allowlist entries +and keep approval prompts enabled. Custom safe bins must define an explicit +profile in `tools.exec.safeBinProfiles.`. + Default safe bins: @@ -331,10 +299,78 @@ Default safe bins: [//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DEFAULTS:END" -`grep` and `sort` are not in the default list. If you opt in, keep explicit allowlist entries for -their non-stdin workflows. -For `grep` in safe-bin mode, provide the pattern with `-e`/`--regexp`; positional pattern form is -rejected so file operands cannot be smuggled as ambiguous positionals. +`grep` and `sort` are not in the default list. If you opt in, keep explicit +allowlist entries for their non-stdin workflows. For `grep` in safe-bin mode, +provide the pattern with `-e`/`--regexp`; positional pattern form is rejected +so file operands cannot be smuggled as ambiguous positionals. + + + + Validation is deterministic from argv shape only (no host filesystem + existence checks), which prevents file-existence oracle behavior from + allow/deny differences. File-oriented options are denied for default safe + bins; long options are validated fail-closed (unknown flags and ambiguous + abbreviations are rejected). + + Denied flags by safe-bin profile: + + [//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DENIED_FLAGS:START" + + - `grep`: `--dereference-recursive`, `--directories`, `--exclude-from`, `--file`, `--recursive`, `-R`, `-d`, `-f`, `-r` + - `jq`: `--argfile`, `--from-file`, `--library-path`, `--rawfile`, `--slurpfile`, `-L`, `-f` + - `sort`: `--compress-program`, `--files0-from`, `--output`, `--random-source`, `--temporary-directory`, `-T`, `-o` + - `wc`: `--files0-from` + + [//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DENIED_FLAGS:END" + + Safe bins also force argv tokens to be treated as **literal text** at + execution time (no globbing and no `$VARS` expansion) for stdin-only + segments, so patterns like `*` or `$HOME/...` cannot be used to smuggle + file reads. + + + + + Safe bins must resolve from trusted binary directories (system defaults + plus optional `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`). `PATH` entries are never + auto-trusted. Default trusted directories are intentionally minimal: + `/bin`, `/usr/bin`. If your safe-bin executable lives in + package-manager/user paths (for example `/opt/homebrew/bin`, + `/usr/local/bin`, `/opt/local/bin`, `/snap/bin`), add them explicitly to + `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`. + + + + Shell chaining (`&&`, `||`, `;`) is allowed when every top-level segment + satisfies the allowlist (including safe bins or skill auto-allow). + Redirections remain unsupported in allowlist mode. Command substitution + (`$()` / backticks) is rejected during allowlist parsing, including inside + double quotes; use single quotes if you need literal `$()` text. + + On macOS companion-app approvals, raw shell text containing shell control + or expansion syntax (`&&`, `||`, `;`, `|`, `` ` ``, `$`, `<`, `>`, `(`, + `)`) is treated as an allowlist miss unless the shell binary itself is + allowlisted. + + For shell wrappers (`bash|sh|zsh ... -c/-lc`), request-scoped env + overrides are reduced to a small explicit allowlist (`TERM`, `LANG`, + `LC_*`, `COLORTERM`, `NO_COLOR`, `FORCE_COLOR`). + + For `allow-always` decisions in allowlist mode, known dispatch wrappers + (`env`, `nice`, `nohup`, `stdbuf`, `timeout`) persist the inner executable + path instead of the wrapper path. Shell multiplexers (`busybox`, `toybox`) + are unwrapped for shell applets (`sh`, `ash`, etc.) the same way. If a + wrapper or multiplexer cannot be safely unwrapped, no allowlist entry is + persisted automatically. + + If you allowlist interpreters like `python3` or `node`, prefer + `tools.exec.strictInlineEval=true` so inline eval still requires an + explicit approval. In strict mode, `allow-always` can still persist benign + interpreter/script invocations, but inline-eval carriers are not persisted + automatically. + + + ### Safe bins versus allowlist @@ -642,20 +678,29 @@ stale results from a prior successful run. - **full** is powerful; prefer allowlists when possible. - **ask** keeps you in the loop while still allowing fast approvals. -- Per-agent allowlists prevent one agent’s approvals from leaking into others. +- Per-agent allowlists prevent one agent's approvals from leaking into others. - Approvals only apply to host exec requests from **authorized senders**. Unauthorized senders cannot issue `/exec`. -- `/exec security=full` is a session-level convenience for authorized operators and skips approvals by design. - To hard-block host exec, set approvals security to `deny` or deny the `exec` tool via tool policy. - -Related: - -- [Exec tool](/tools/exec) -- [Elevated mode](/tools/elevated) -- [Skills](/tools/skills) +- `/exec security=full` is a session-level convenience for authorized operators and skips approvals by design. To hard-block host exec, set approvals security to `deny` or deny the `exec` tool via tool policy. ## Related -- [Exec](/tools/exec) — shell command execution tool -- [Sandboxing](/gateway/sandboxing) — sandbox modes and workspace access -- [Security](/gateway/security) — security model and hardening -- [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated](/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated) — when to use each + + + Shell command execution tool. + + + Break-glass path that also skips approvals. + + + Sandbox modes and workspace access. + + + Security model and hardening. + + + When to reach for each control. + + + Skill-backed auto-allow behavior. + +