diff --git a/.github/CODEOWNERS b/.github/CODEOWNERS
index cfdbf26958d..d928b1f433b 100644
--- a/.github/CODEOWNERS
+++ b/.github/CODEOWNERS
@@ -12,9 +12,14 @@
 /.github/workflows/codeql-android-critical-security.yml @openclaw/openclaw-secops
 /.github/workflows/codeql-critical-quality.yml @openclaw/openclaw-secops
 /.github/workflows/dependency-guard.yml @openclaw/openclaw-secops
+/.github/workflows/security-sensitive-guard.yml @openclaw/openclaw-secops
 /test/scripts/dependency-guard-workflow.test.ts @openclaw/openclaw-secops
 /test/scripts/dependency-guard-script.test.ts @openclaw/openclaw-secops
+/test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-workflow.test.ts @openclaw/openclaw-secops
+/test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-script.test.ts @openclaw/openclaw-secops
 /scripts/github/dependency-guard.mjs @openclaw/openclaw-secops
+/scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs @openclaw/openclaw-secops
+/.gitignore @openclaw/openclaw-secops
 /package-lock.json @openclaw/openclaw-secops
 /npm-shrinkwrap.json @openclaw/openclaw-secops
 /extensions/*/package-lock.json @openclaw/openclaw-secops
diff --git a/.github/workflows/security-sensitive-guard.yml b/.github/workflows/security-sensitive-guard.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0a46bdf0cd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/security-sensitive-guard.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+name: Security Sensitive Guard
+
+on:
+  pull_request_target: # zizmor: ignore[dangerous-triggers] checks trusted base script only; never checks out PR head
+    types: [opened, reopened, synchronize, ready_for_review]
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  pull-requests: write
+  issues: write
+
+concurrency:
+  group: security-sensitive-guard-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  security-sensitive-guard-detect:
+    if: ${{ !github.event.pull_request.draft }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    timeout-minutes: 5
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out trusted base workflow scripts
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Detect security-sensitive changes
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          OPENCLAW_SECURITY_APPROVERS: vincentkoc,steipete,joshavant
+          OPENCLAW_SECURITY_SENSITIVE_GUARD_MODE: detect
+          OPENCLAW_SECURITY_TEAM_SLUG: openclaw-secops
+        run: node scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs
+
+  security-sensitive-guard:
+    if: ${{ !github.event.pull_request.draft && always() }}
+    needs:
+      - security-sensitive-guard-detect
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    timeout-minutes: 5
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out trusted base workflow scripts
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Enforce security-sensitive guard
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          OPENCLAW_SECURITY_APPROVERS: vincentkoc,steipete,joshavant
+          OPENCLAW_SECURITY_SENSITIVE_GUARD_MODE: enforce
+          OPENCLAW_SECURITY_TEAM_SLUG: openclaw-secops
+        run: node scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs
diff --git a/scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs b/scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0f8bc90ad82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,717 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+
+// GitHub security-sensitive file guard: detects sensitive boundary files,
+// manages sticky comments/labels, and requires SHA-bound secops/admin approval.
+import { appendFile, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { readBoundedResponseText } from "../lib/bounded-response.mjs";
+
+/** Marker used to identify security-sensitive guard comments. */
+export const securitySensitiveGuardMarker = "<!-- openclaw:security-sensitive-guard -->";
+export const securitySensitiveChangedLabel = "security-sensitive-changed";
+export const allowSecuritySensitiveCommand = "/allow-security-sensitive-change";
+export const GITHUB_ERROR_BODY_MAX_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
+export const GITHUB_API_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
+
+const securityTeamSlug = process.env.OPENCLAW_SECURITY_TEAM_SLUG ?? "openclaw-secops";
+const maxListedFiles = 25;
+const securitySensitiveFiles = [
+  {
+    path: ".gitignore",
+    reason:
+      "Controls ignored secret and local files, including common `.env` files, before they can be accidentally committed.",
+  },
+];
+
+export function securitySensitiveFileDefinitions() {
+  return securitySensitiveFiles.map((entry) => ({ ...entry }));
+}
+
+export function securitySensitiveFileDefinition(filename) {
+  return securitySensitiveFiles.find((entry) => entry.path === filename) ?? null;
+}
+
+export function isSecuritySensitiveFile(filename) {
+  return securitySensitiveFileDefinition(filename) !== null;
+}
+
+export function sanitizeDisplayValue(value) {
+  return String(value)
+    .replace(/[\p{Cc}]/gu, "?")
+    .slice(0, 240);
+}
+
+export function markdownCode(value) {
+  return `\`${sanitizeDisplayValue(value).replaceAll("`", "\\`")}\``;
+}
+
+function* securitySensitiveOverrideCandidates({ comments, expectedSha, newerThan }) {
+  if (!expectedSha) {
+    return;
+  }
+  const commandPattern = /^\/allow-security-sensitive-change(?:\s+(.+))?$/gimu;
+  for (const comment of comments.toReversed()) {
+    const body = comment.body ?? "";
+    for (const match of body.matchAll(commandPattern)) {
+      const reason = match[1]?.trim();
+      const login = comment.user?.login;
+      if (!login || !isCommentNewerThan(comment, newerThan)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      yield {
+        login,
+        reason: reason ? sanitizeDisplayValue(reason) : null,
+        sha: expectedSha,
+        url: comment.html_url,
+      };
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+export function findSecuritySensitiveOverrideCommand({
+  comments,
+  expectedSha,
+  isSecurityMember,
+  newerThan,
+}) {
+  for (const candidate of securitySensitiveOverrideCandidates({
+    comments,
+    expectedSha,
+    newerThan,
+  })) {
+    if (isSecurityMember(candidate.login)) {
+      return candidate;
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+export async function findSecuritySensitiveOverrideCommandAsync(input) {
+  for (const candidate of securitySensitiveOverrideCandidates(input)) {
+    if (await input.isSecurityMember(candidate.login)) {
+      return candidate;
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+function isCommentNewerThan(comment, newerThan) {
+  if (!newerThan) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const commentTime = Date.parse(comment.created_at ?? "");
+  const barrierTime = Date.parse(newerThan);
+  return Number.isFinite(commentTime) && Number.isFinite(barrierTime) && commentTime > barrierTime;
+}
+
+export function securitySensitiveGuardCommentHeadSha(comment) {
+  const body = comment?.body ?? "";
+  const patterns = [
+    /Approved SHA:\s+`([a-f0-9]{40})`/iu,
+    /current head SHA\s+\(`([a-f0-9]{40})`\)/iu,
+    /Current SHA:\s+`([a-f0-9]{40})`/iu,
+  ];
+  for (const pattern of patterns) {
+    const match = body.match(pattern);
+    if (match?.[1]) {
+      return match[1];
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+export function securitySensitiveOverrideExpectedSha(existingGuardComment, currentHeadSha) {
+  if (
+    !currentHeadSha ||
+    existingGuardComment?.body?.includes("### Security-sensitive changes are blocked") !== true
+  ) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return securitySensitiveGuardCommentHeadSha(existingGuardComment) === currentHeadSha
+    ? currentHeadSha
+    : null;
+}
+
+export function isSecuritySensitiveGuardAuthorizedForHead(comment, currentHeadSha) {
+  return (
+    Boolean(currentHeadSha) &&
+    comment?.body?.includes("### Security-sensitive change authorized") === true &&
+    securitySensitiveGuardCommentHeadSha(comment) === currentHeadSha
+  );
+}
+
+export function isSecuritySensitiveGuardTrustedForHead(comment, currentHeadSha) {
+  return (
+    Boolean(currentHeadSha) &&
+    comment?.body?.includes("### Security-sensitive changes noted") === true &&
+    securitySensitiveGuardCommentHeadSha(comment) === currentHeadSha
+  );
+}
+
+export function securityApproverSet(value) {
+  return new Set(
+    String(value ?? "")
+      .split(/[\s,]+/u)
+      .map((login) => login.trim().toLowerCase())
+      .filter(Boolean),
+  );
+}
+
+export function securitySensitiveGuardCommentAuthors(value) {
+  return new Set(
+    String(value ?? "github-actions[bot]")
+      .split(/[\s,]+/u)
+      .map((login) => login.trim().toLowerCase())
+      .filter(Boolean),
+  );
+}
+
+export function isSecuritySensitiveGuardMarkerComment(comment, trustedAuthors) {
+  const login = comment.user?.login?.toLowerCase();
+  return Boolean(
+    login && trustedAuthors.has(login) && comment.body?.includes(securitySensitiveGuardMarker),
+  );
+}
+
+function sortedSecuritySensitiveChanges(filenames) {
+  const byPath = new Map();
+  for (const filename of filenames) {
+    if (typeof filename !== "string") {
+      continue;
+    }
+    const definition = securitySensitiveFileDefinition(filename);
+    if (definition) {
+      byPath.set(definition.path, definition);
+    }
+  }
+  return [...byPath.values()].toSorted((left, right) => left.path.localeCompare(right.path));
+}
+
+export function collectSecuritySensitiveChanges(files) {
+  const filenames = [];
+  for (const file of files) {
+    if (typeof file === "string") {
+      filenames.push(file);
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (file && typeof file === "object") {
+      filenames.push(file.filename, file.previous_filename);
+    }
+  }
+  return sortedSecuritySensitiveChanges(filenames);
+}
+
+function renderChangedFileLines(changes) {
+  const listedFiles = changes.slice(0, maxListedFiles);
+  const omittedCount = changes.length - listedFiles.length;
+  const lines = listedFiles.map(
+    (change) => `- ${markdownCode(change.path)}: ${sanitizeDisplayValue(change.reason)}`,
+  );
+  if (omittedCount > 0) {
+    lines.push(`- ${omittedCount} additional security-sensitive files not shown`);
+  }
+  return lines;
+}
+
+export function renderSecuritySensitiveAwarenessComment(changes) {
+  return [
+    securitySensitiveGuardMarker,
+    "",
+    "### Security-sensitive file changes detected",
+    "",
+    "This PR changes files that define security boundaries. Maintainers should confirm these changes are intentional.",
+    "",
+    "Changed files:",
+    ...renderChangedFileLines(changes),
+    "",
+    "Maintainer follow-up:",
+    "- Review whether each security-sensitive file change is intentional.",
+    "- Confirm the change does not weaken secret, credential, or local-state protection.",
+    "- If this PR intentionally needs the change, a repository admin or member of `@openclaw/openclaw-secops` must approve the exact head SHA.",
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+export function renderAuthorizedSecuritySensitiveComment(override) {
+  const lines = [
+    securitySensitiveGuardMarker,
+    "",
+    "### Security-sensitive change authorized",
+    "",
+    "This PR includes security-sensitive file changes. A repository admin or member of `@openclaw/openclaw-secops` authorized this exact head SHA with `/allow-security-sensitive-change`.",
+    "",
+    `- Approved SHA: ${markdownCode(override.sha)}`,
+    `- Approved by: @${sanitizeDisplayValue(override.login)}`,
+  ];
+  if (override.reason) {
+    lines.push(`- Reason: ${markdownCode(override.reason)}`);
+  }
+  lines.push("", "A later push changes the PR head SHA and requires a fresh security approval.");
+  return lines.join("\n");
+}
+
+export function renderTrustedSecuritySensitiveComment({ actor, headSha, changes }) {
+  return [
+    securitySensitiveGuardMarker,
+    "",
+    "### Security-sensitive changes noted",
+    "",
+    "This PR includes security-sensitive file changes. The guard is informational because the PR author is a repository admin or a member of `@openclaw/openclaw-secops`.",
+    "",
+    `- Current SHA: ${markdownCode(headSha ?? "<head-sha>")}`,
+    `- Trusted actor: @${sanitizeDisplayValue(actor.login)}`,
+    `- Trusted role: ${markdownCode(actor.reason)}`,
+    "",
+    "Changed files:",
+    ...renderChangedFileLines(changes),
+    "",
+    "Security review is still recommended before merge when the change is intentional.",
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+export function renderClearedSecuritySensitiveGuardComment({ headSha }) {
+  return [
+    securitySensitiveGuardMarker,
+    "",
+    "### Security-sensitive guard cleared",
+    "",
+    "This PR no longer has blocked security-sensitive file changes. A future security-sensitive change requires a fresh `/allow-security-sensitive-change` comment after the guard blocks that new head SHA.",
+    "",
+    `- Current SHA: ${markdownCode(headSha ?? "<head-sha>")}`,
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+export function renderBlockedSecuritySensitiveComment({ headSha, changes }) {
+  return [
+    securitySensitiveGuardMarker,
+    "",
+    "### Security-sensitive changes are blocked",
+    "",
+    "OpenClaw does not accept security-sensitive file changes through PRs unless a repository admin or security explicitly authorizes the current head SHA.",
+    "",
+    "Detected security-sensitive changes:",
+    ...renderChangedFileLines(changes),
+    "",
+    "If this PR intentionally needs these changes, ask a repository admin or member of `@openclaw/openclaw-secops` to comment:",
+    "",
+    "```text",
+    allowSecuritySensitiveCommand,
+    "```",
+    "",
+    `The action will approve the current head SHA (${markdownCode(headSha ?? "<head-sha>")}) when it reruns. A later push requires a fresh approval.`,
+  ].join("\n");
+}
+
+export function securitySensitiveGuardTrustedActorCandidates({
+  pullRequest,
+  event,
+  currentHeadSha,
+}) {
+  const eventHeadSha = event?.pull_request?.head?.sha;
+  const eventAfterSha = event?.after;
+  const eventMatchesCurrentHead =
+    Boolean(currentHeadSha) &&
+    (eventHeadSha === currentHeadSha || eventAfterSha === currentHeadSha);
+  if (!eventMatchesCurrentHead) {
+    return [];
+  }
+  const candidates = [];
+  const seen = new Set();
+  for (const [source, login] of [["pull request author", pullRequest?.user?.login]]) {
+    if (typeof login !== "string" || login.length === 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    const normalizedLogin = login.toLowerCase();
+    if (seen.has(normalizedLogin)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    seen.add(normalizedLogin);
+    candidates.push({ login, source });
+  }
+  return candidates;
+}
+
+export async function findTrustedSecuritySensitiveGuardActor({
+  candidates,
+  isSecuritySensitiveApprover,
+}) {
+  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+    const role = await isSecuritySensitiveApprover(candidate.login);
+    if (role) {
+      return {
+        login: candidate.login,
+        reason: `${candidate.source}; ${role}`,
+      };
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+function githubErrorBodyTooLarge(maxBytes) {
+  return new Error(`GitHub error response body exceeded ${maxBytes} bytes`);
+}
+
+export async function readBoundedGitHubErrorText(response, maxBytes = GITHUB_ERROR_BODY_MAX_BYTES) {
+  return await readBoundedResponseText(response, "GitHub error", maxBytes, {
+    createTooLargeError: () => githubErrorBodyTooLarge(maxBytes),
+  });
+}
+
+function timeoutError(path, method, timeoutMs) {
+  return new Error(`GitHub API ${method} ${path} exceeded timeout ${timeoutMs}ms`);
+}
+
+function combineAbortSignals(signals) {
+  const activeSignals = signals.filter(Boolean);
+  if (activeSignals.length === 0) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (activeSignals.length === 1) {
+    return activeSignals[0];
+  }
+  return AbortSignal.any(activeSignals);
+}
+
+export function githubApi(token, options = {}) {
+  const fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
+  const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? GITHUB_API_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS;
+  const baseHeaders = {
+    accept: "application/vnd.github+json",
+    authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
+    "user-agent": "openclaw-security-sensitive-guard",
+    "x-github-api-version": "2022-11-28",
+  };
+  const request = async (path, requestOptions = {}) => {
+    const method = requestOptions.method ?? "GET";
+    const timeoutController = new AbortController();
+    let timeout;
+    const timeoutPromise = new Promise((_, reject) => {
+      timeout = setTimeout(() => {
+        timeoutController.abort();
+        reject(timeoutError(path, method, timeoutMs));
+      }, timeoutMs);
+      timeout.unref?.();
+    });
+    const operationPromise = (async () => {
+      const response = await fetchImpl(`https://api.github.com${path}`, {
+        ...requestOptions,
+        signal: combineAbortSignals([requestOptions.signal, timeoutController.signal]),
+        headers: { ...baseHeaders, ...requestOptions.headers },
+      });
+      if (response.status === 204) {
+        return null;
+      }
+      if (!response.ok) {
+        let errorText;
+        try {
+          errorText = await readBoundedGitHubErrorText(response);
+        } catch (bodyError) {
+          errorText = bodyError instanceof Error ? bodyError.message : String(bodyError);
+        }
+        const error = new Error(`${response.status} ${response.statusText}: ${errorText}`);
+        error.status = response.status;
+        throw error;
+      }
+      return response.json();
+    })();
+    operationPromise.catch(() => {});
+    try {
+      return await Promise.race([operationPromise, timeoutPromise]);
+    } finally {
+      clearTimeout(timeout);
+    }
+  };
+  return {
+    request,
+    paginate: async (path) => {
+      const items = [];
+      for (let page = 1; ; page += 1) {
+        const separator = path.includes("?") ? "&" : "?";
+        const pageItems = await request(`${path}${separator}per_page=100&page=${page}`);
+        items.push(...pageItems);
+        if (pageItems.length < 100) {
+          return items;
+        }
+      }
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+async function writeSummary(markdown) {
+  const summaryPath = process.env.GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY;
+  if (!summaryPath) {
+    console.log(markdown);
+    return;
+  }
+  await appendFile(summaryPath, `${markdown}\n`);
+}
+
+async function main() {
+  const token = process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN;
+  const eventPath = process.env.GITHUB_EVENT_PATH;
+  const repository = process.env.GITHUB_REPOSITORY;
+  if (!token || !eventPath || !repository) {
+    throw new Error("GITHUB_TOKEN, GITHUB_EVENT_PATH, and GITHUB_REPOSITORY are required.");
+  }
+  const [owner, repo] = repository.split("/");
+  const event = JSON.parse(await readFile(eventPath, "utf8"));
+  const eventPullRequest = event.pull_request;
+  if (!eventPullRequest) {
+    console.log("No pull_request payload found; skipping.");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const api = githubApi(token);
+  const explicitSecurityApprovers = securityApproverSet(process.env.OPENCLAW_SECURITY_APPROVERS);
+  const trustedCommentAuthors = securitySensitiveGuardCommentAuthors(
+    process.env.OPENCLAW_SECURITY_SENSITIVE_GUARD_COMMENT_BOTS,
+  );
+  const issuePath = `/repos/${owner}/${repo}/issues/${eventPullRequest.number}`;
+  const pullPath = `/repos/${owner}/${repo}/pulls/${eventPullRequest.number}`;
+  const pullRequest = await api.request(pullPath);
+  const mode = process.env.OPENCLAW_SECURITY_SENSITIVE_GUARD_MODE ?? "enforce";
+  const files = await api.paginate(`${pullPath}/files`);
+  const securitySensitiveChanges = collectSecuritySensitiveChanges(files);
+
+  const [comments, labels] = await Promise.all([
+    api.paginate(`${issuePath}/comments`),
+    api.paginate(`${issuePath}/labels`),
+  ]);
+  const existingGuardComment = comments.find((comment) =>
+    isSecuritySensitiveGuardMarkerComment(comment, trustedCommentAuthors),
+  );
+  const labelNames = new Set(labels.map((label) => label.name));
+
+  const ignoreUnavailableWritePermission = (action) => (error) => {
+    if (error?.status === 403) {
+      console.warn(`Skipping ${action}; token does not have write permission.`);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (error?.status === 404 || error?.status === 422) {
+      console.warn(`${action} is unavailable.`);
+      return;
+    }
+    throw error;
+  };
+  const removeLabelIfPresent = async (label) => {
+    if (!labelNames.has(label)) {
+      return;
+    }
+    await api
+      .request(`${issuePath}/labels/${encodeURIComponent(label)}`, {
+        method: "DELETE",
+      })
+      .catch(ignoreUnavailableWritePermission(`label "${label}" removal`));
+    labelNames.delete(label);
+  };
+  const addLabelIfMissing = async (label) => {
+    if (labelNames.has(label)) {
+      return;
+    }
+    await api
+      .request(`${issuePath}/labels`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        body: JSON.stringify({ labels: [label] }),
+      })
+      .catch(ignoreUnavailableWritePermission(`label "${label}" update`));
+    labelNames.add(label);
+  };
+  const upsertComment = async (comment, body) => {
+    if (comment) {
+      return await api
+        .request(`/repos/${owner}/${repo}/issues/comments/${comment.id}`, {
+          method: "PATCH",
+          body: JSON.stringify({ body }),
+        })
+        .catch(ignoreUnavailableWritePermission("comment update"));
+    }
+    return await api
+      .request(`${issuePath}/comments`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        body: JSON.stringify({ body }),
+      })
+      .catch(ignoreUnavailableWritePermission("comment creation"));
+  };
+
+  if (securitySensitiveChanges.length === 0) {
+    await removeLabelIfPresent(securitySensitiveChangedLabel);
+    if (existingGuardComment) {
+      await upsertComment(
+        existingGuardComment,
+        renderClearedSecuritySensitiveGuardComment({ headSha: pullRequest.head?.sha }),
+      );
+    }
+    await writeSummary(
+      "## Security Sensitive Guard\n\nNo security-sensitive file changes detected.",
+    );
+    console.log("No security-sensitive file changes detected.");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  await addLabelIfMissing(securitySensitiveChangedLabel);
+  await writeSummary(
+    [
+      "## Security Sensitive Guard",
+      "",
+      `Detected ${securitySensitiveChanges.length} security-sensitive file change(s).`,
+      "",
+      ...securitySensitiveChanges.map((change) => `- ${markdownCode(change.path)}`),
+    ].join("\n"),
+  );
+  console.log(`Detected ${securitySensitiveChanges.length} security-sensitive file change(s).`);
+
+  const membershipCache = new Map();
+  const permissionCache = new Map();
+  const isSecurityMember = async (login) => {
+    const normalizedLogin = login.toLowerCase();
+    if (explicitSecurityApprovers.has(normalizedLogin)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (membershipCache.has(normalizedLogin)) {
+      return membershipCache.get(normalizedLogin);
+    }
+    try {
+      const membership = await api.request(
+        `/orgs/${owner}/teams/${securityTeamSlug}/memberships/${encodeURIComponent(login)}`,
+      );
+      const allowed = membership?.state === "active";
+      membershipCache.set(normalizedLogin, allowed);
+      return allowed;
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (error?.status !== 404) {
+        console.warn(`Could not verify ${login} against ${securityTeamSlug}: ${error.message}`);
+      }
+      membershipCache.set(normalizedLogin, false);
+      return false;
+    }
+  };
+  const isRepositoryAdmin = async (login) => {
+    const normalizedLogin = login.toLowerCase();
+    if (permissionCache.has(normalizedLogin)) {
+      return permissionCache.get(normalizedLogin);
+    }
+    try {
+      const result = await api.request(
+        `/repos/${owner}/${repo}/collaborators/${encodeURIComponent(login)}/permission`,
+      );
+      const allowed = result?.permission === "admin";
+      permissionCache.set(normalizedLogin, allowed);
+      return allowed;
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (error?.status !== 404) {
+        console.warn(`Could not verify repository permission for ${login}: ${error.message}`);
+      }
+      permissionCache.set(normalizedLogin, false);
+      return false;
+    }
+  };
+  const isSecuritySensitiveApprover = async (login) => {
+    if (await isSecurityMember(login)) {
+      return securityTeamSlug;
+    }
+    if (await isRepositoryAdmin(login)) {
+      return "repository admin";
+    }
+    return null;
+  };
+  const currentHeadSha = pullRequest.head?.sha;
+  if (isSecuritySensitiveGuardTrustedForHead(existingGuardComment, currentHeadSha)) {
+    await writeSummary(
+      [
+        "## Security Sensitive Guard",
+        "",
+        `Security-sensitive changes remain informational for a trusted actor at ${markdownCode(currentHeadSha)}.`,
+      ].join("\n"),
+    );
+    console.log("Security-sensitive changes remain informational for this head SHA.");
+    return;
+  }
+  const trustedActor = await findTrustedSecuritySensitiveGuardActor({
+    candidates: securitySensitiveGuardTrustedActorCandidates({
+      pullRequest,
+      event,
+      currentHeadSha,
+    }),
+    isSecuritySensitiveApprover,
+  });
+  if (trustedActor) {
+    await upsertComment(
+      existingGuardComment,
+      renderTrustedSecuritySensitiveComment({
+        actor: trustedActor,
+        changes: securitySensitiveChanges,
+        headSha: currentHeadSha,
+      }),
+    );
+    await writeSummary(
+      [
+        "## Security Sensitive Guard",
+        "",
+        `Security-sensitive changes noted for trusted actor @${sanitizeDisplayValue(trustedActor.login)} and allowed to continue.`,
+      ].join("\n"),
+    );
+    console.log("Security-sensitive changes noted for trusted actor; guard is informational.");
+    return;
+  }
+  if (isSecuritySensitiveGuardAuthorizedForHead(existingGuardComment, currentHeadSha)) {
+    await writeSummary(
+      [
+        "## Security Sensitive Guard",
+        "",
+        `Security-sensitive changes remain authorized for ${markdownCode(currentHeadSha)}.`,
+      ].join("\n"),
+    );
+    console.log("Security-sensitive changes remain authorized for this head SHA.");
+    return;
+  }
+  const override = await findSecuritySensitiveOverrideCommandAsync({
+    comments,
+    expectedSha: securitySensitiveOverrideExpectedSha(existingGuardComment, currentHeadSha),
+    isSecurityMember: async (login) => Boolean(await isSecuritySensitiveApprover(login)),
+    newerThan: existingGuardComment?.updated_at ?? existingGuardComment?.created_at,
+  });
+  if (override) {
+    await upsertComment(existingGuardComment, renderAuthorizedSecuritySensitiveComment(override));
+    await writeSummary(
+      [
+        "## Security Sensitive Guard",
+        "",
+        `Security-sensitive changes authorized by @${sanitizeDisplayValue(override.login)} for ${markdownCode(override.sha)}.`,
+      ].join("\n"),
+    );
+    console.log("Security-sensitive changes authorized by trusted override.");
+    return;
+  }
+  if (mode === "detect") {
+    await upsertComment(
+      existingGuardComment,
+      renderSecuritySensitiveAwarenessComment(securitySensitiveChanges),
+    );
+    await writeSummary(
+      "## Security Sensitive Guard\n\nSecurity-sensitive enforcement deferred to the final guard job.",
+    );
+    console.log("Security-sensitive enforcement deferred to the final guard job.");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  await upsertComment(
+    existingGuardComment,
+    renderBlockedSecuritySensitiveComment({
+      changes: securitySensitiveChanges,
+      headSha: pullRequest.head?.sha,
+    }),
+  );
+  await writeSummary(
+    "## Security Sensitive Guard\n\nSecurity-sensitive changes are blocked without a current admin or secops override.",
+  );
+  throw new Error(
+    "Security-sensitive changes require removal or a current admin or secops override.",
+  );
+}
+
+if (import.meta.url === `file://${process.argv[1]}`) {
+  main().catch(
+    /** @param {unknown} error */ (error) => {
+      console.error(error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
+      process.exitCode = 1;
+    },
+  );
+}
diff --git a/scripts/sync-openclaw-label-colors.mjs b/scripts/sync-openclaw-label-colors.mjs
index db5cd91e72b..1f3499f8c5e 100644
--- a/scripts/sync-openclaw-label-colors.mjs
+++ b/scripts/sync-openclaw-label-colors.mjs
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ const EXACT_COLORS = new Map(
     "dedupe:child": COLORS.paleBlue,
     dependencies: COLORS.neutralGray,
     "dependencies-changed": COLORS.paleYellow,
+    "security-sensitive-changed": COLORS.paleYellow,
     github_actions: COLORS.neutralGray,
     go: COLORS.neutralGray,
     java: COLORS.neutralGray,
diff --git a/scripts/test-projects.test-support.mjs b/scripts/test-projects.test-support.mjs
index 84a55098073..73f9ca3e753 100644
--- a/scripts/test-projects.test-support.mjs
+++ b/scripts/test-projects.test-support.mjs
@@ -401,6 +401,10 @@ const BROAD_ONLY_TEST_HELPERS = new Set(["test/helpers/poll.ts"]);
 const TOOLING_SOURCE_TEST_TARGETS = new Map([
   [".crabbox.yaml", ["test/scripts/package-acceptance-workflow.test.ts"]],
   [".github/workflows/ci.yml", ["test/scripts/ci-workflow-guards.test.ts"]],
+  [
+    ".github/workflows/security-sensitive-guard.yml",
+    ["test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-workflow.test.ts"],
+  ],
   [
     ".github/workflows/ci-check-testbox.yml",
     ["test/scripts/ci-workflow-guards.test.ts", "test/scripts/package-acceptance-workflow.test.ts"],
@@ -504,6 +508,10 @@ const TOOLING_SOURCE_TEST_TARGETS = new Map([
     ],
   ],
   ["scripts/dependency-changes-report.mjs", ["test/scripts/dependency-changes-report.test.ts"]],
+  [
+    "scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs",
+    ["test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-script.test.ts"],
+  ],
   [
     "scripts/dependency-ownership-surface-report.mjs",
     ["test/scripts/dependency-ownership-surface-report.test.ts"],
diff --git a/test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-script.test.ts b/test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-script.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5bb90a42355
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-script.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+// Security Sensitive Guard Script tests cover sensitive file guard behavior.
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  allowSecuritySensitiveCommand,
+  collectSecuritySensitiveChanges,
+  findSecuritySensitiveOverrideCommand,
+  findSecuritySensitiveOverrideCommandAsync,
+  findTrustedSecuritySensitiveGuardActor,
+  isSecuritySensitiveFile,
+  isSecuritySensitiveGuardAuthorizedForHead,
+  isSecuritySensitiveGuardMarkerComment,
+  isSecuritySensitiveGuardTrustedForHead,
+  markdownCode,
+  renderAuthorizedSecuritySensitiveComment,
+  renderBlockedSecuritySensitiveComment,
+  renderClearedSecuritySensitiveGuardComment,
+  renderSecuritySensitiveAwarenessComment,
+  renderTrustedSecuritySensitiveComment,
+  sanitizeDisplayValue,
+  securityApproverSet,
+  securitySensitiveFileDefinition,
+  securitySensitiveFileDefinitions,
+  securitySensitiveGuardCommentAuthors,
+  securitySensitiveGuardCommentHeadSha,
+  securitySensitiveGuardMarker,
+  securitySensitiveGuardTrustedActorCandidates,
+  securitySensitiveOverrideExpectedSha,
+} from "../../scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs";
+
+const headSha = "a".repeat(40);
+const staleSha = "b".repeat(40);
+
+describe("security-sensitive guard script", () => {
+  it("detects only registered security-sensitive file surfaces", () => {
+    expect(securitySensitiveFileDefinitions()).toEqual([
+      {
+        path: ".gitignore",
+        reason:
+          "Controls ignored secret and local files, including common `.env` files, before they can be accidentally committed.",
+      },
+    ]);
+    expect(isSecuritySensitiveFile(".gitignore")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSecuritySensitiveFile("docs/.gitignore")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isSecuritySensitiveFile("package.json")).toBe(false);
+    expect(securitySensitiveFileDefinition(".gitignore")?.reason).toContain(".env");
+  });
+
+  it("detects renames away from registered security-sensitive file surfaces", () => {
+    expect(
+      collectSecuritySensitiveChanges([
+        {
+          filename: ".gitignore.disabled",
+          previous_filename: ".gitignore",
+          status: "renamed",
+        },
+      ]),
+    ).toEqual([securitySensitiveFileDefinition(".gitignore")]);
+  });
+
+  it("accepts only security-member override commands for the current head sha", () => {
+    const comments = [
+      {
+        body: "/allow-security-sensitive-change not enough",
+        created_at: "2026-05-28T20:00:00Z",
+        user: { login: "not-security" },
+      },
+      {
+        body: "/allow-security-sensitive-change stale approval",
+        created_at: "2026-05-28T20:01:00Z",
+        user: { login: "security-user" },
+      },
+      {
+        body: "/allow-security-sensitive-change reviewed .gitignore",
+        created_at: "2026-05-28T20:03:00Z",
+        html_url: "https://example.test/comment",
+        user: { login: "security-user" },
+      },
+    ];
+
+    const override = findSecuritySensitiveOverrideCommand({
+      comments,
+      expectedSha: headSha,
+      isSecurityMember: (login) => login === "security-user",
+      newerThan: "2026-05-28T20:02:00Z",
+    });
+
+    expect(override).toEqual({
+      login: "security-user",
+      reason: "reviewed .gitignore",
+      sha: headSha,
+      url: "https://example.test/comment",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("rejects stale or non-security override commands", async () => {
+    const comments = [
+      {
+        body: "/allow-security-sensitive-change stale approval",
+        created_at: "2026-05-28T20:00:00Z",
+        user: { login: "security-user" },
+      },
+      {
+        body: "/allow-security-sensitive-change not enough",
+        created_at: "2026-05-28T20:02:00Z",
+        user: { login: "not-security" },
+      },
+    ];
+
+    await expect(
+      findSecuritySensitiveOverrideCommandAsync({
+        comments,
+        expectedSha: headSha,
+        isSecurityMember: async (login) => login === "security-user",
+        newerThan: "2026-05-28T20:01:00Z",
+      }),
+    ).resolves.toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("binds override commands to the head sha in the blocked guard comment", () => {
+    const blockedComment = {
+      body: renderBlockedSecuritySensitiveComment({
+        changes: [securitySensitiveFileDefinition(".gitignore")],
+        headSha,
+      }),
+    };
+    const staleBlockedComment = {
+      body: renderBlockedSecuritySensitiveComment({
+        changes: [securitySensitiveFileDefinition(".gitignore")],
+        headSha: staleSha,
+      }),
+    };
+
+    expect(securitySensitiveGuardCommentHeadSha(blockedComment)).toBe(headSha);
+    expect(securitySensitiveOverrideExpectedSha(blockedComment, headSha)).toBe(headSha);
+    expect(securitySensitiveOverrideExpectedSha(staleBlockedComment, headSha)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("preserves same-head authorization across reruns", () => {
+    const authorizedComment = {
+      body: renderAuthorizedSecuritySensitiveComment({
+        login: "security-user",
+        reason: null,
+        sha: headSha,
+      }),
+    };
+
+    expect(securitySensitiveGuardCommentHeadSha(authorizedComment)).toBe(headSha);
+    expect(isSecuritySensitiveGuardAuthorizedForHead(authorizedComment, headSha)).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSecuritySensitiveGuardAuthorizedForHead(authorizedComment, staleSha)).toBe(false);
+    expect(securitySensitiveOverrideExpectedSha(authorizedComment, headSha)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("recognizes trusted security-sensitive guard actors automatically", async () => {
+    const sameActorCandidates = securitySensitiveGuardTrustedActorCandidates({
+      pullRequest: { user: { login: "repo-admin" } },
+      event: { pull_request: { head: { sha: headSha } }, sender: { login: "repo-admin" } },
+      currentHeadSha: headSha,
+    });
+    const staleAuthorCandidate = securitySensitiveGuardTrustedActorCandidates({
+      pullRequest: { user: { login: "repo-admin" } },
+      event: { pull_request: { head: { sha: staleSha } }, sender: { login: "repo-admin" } },
+      currentHeadSha: headSha,
+    });
+
+    expect(sameActorCandidates).toEqual([{ login: "repo-admin", source: "pull request author" }]);
+    expect(staleAuthorCandidate).toEqual([]);
+
+    await expect(
+      findTrustedSecuritySensitiveGuardActor({
+        candidates: sameActorCandidates,
+        isSecuritySensitiveApprover: async (login) =>
+          login === "repo-admin" ? "repository admin" : null,
+      }),
+    ).resolves.toEqual({
+      login: "repo-admin",
+      reason: "pull request author; repository admin",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("trusts only configured security-sensitive guard marker comment authors", () => {
+    const trustedAuthors = securitySensitiveGuardCommentAuthors(
+      "github-actions[bot], openclaw-security-guard[bot]",
+    );
+
+    expect(
+      isSecuritySensitiveGuardMarkerComment(
+        {
+          body: securitySensitiveGuardMarker,
+          user: { login: "openclaw-security-guard[bot]" },
+        },
+        trustedAuthors,
+      ),
+    ).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      isSecuritySensitiveGuardMarkerComment(
+        {
+          body: securitySensitiveGuardMarker,
+          user: { login: "contributor" },
+        },
+        trustedAuthors,
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("renders deterministic awareness, blocked, trusted, authorized, and cleared comments", () => {
+    const changes = [securitySensitiveFileDefinition(".gitignore")];
+    const awarenessBody = renderSecuritySensitiveAwarenessComment(changes);
+    const blockedBody = renderBlockedSecuritySensitiveComment({ changes, headSha });
+    const trustedBody = renderTrustedSecuritySensitiveComment({
+      actor: { login: "repo-admin", reason: "pull request author; repository admin" },
+      changes,
+      headSha,
+    });
+    const authorizedBody = renderAuthorizedSecuritySensitiveComment({
+      login: "security-user",
+      reason: "reviewed .gitignore",
+      sha: headSha,
+    });
+    const clearedBody = renderClearedSecuritySensitiveGuardComment({ headSha });
+
+    expect(awarenessBody).toContain(securitySensitiveGuardMarker);
+    expect(awarenessBody).toContain("Security-sensitive file changes detected");
+    expect(awarenessBody).toContain("`.gitignore`");
+    expect(awarenessBody).toContain(".env");
+    expect(blockedBody).toContain("Security-sensitive changes are blocked");
+    expect(blockedBody).toContain(allowSecuritySensitiveCommand);
+    expect(blockedBody).toContain(`current head SHA (\`${headSha}\`)`);
+    expect(trustedBody).toContain("Security-sensitive changes noted");
+    expect(trustedBody).toContain("@repo-admin");
+    expect(isSecuritySensitiveGuardTrustedForHead({ body: trustedBody }, headSha)).toBe(true);
+    expect(authorizedBody).toContain("Security-sensitive change authorized");
+    expect(authorizedBody).toContain("`reviewed .gitignore`");
+    expect(clearedBody).toContain("Security-sensitive guard cleared");
+    expect(clearedBody).toContain("requires a fresh `/allow-security-sensitive-change` comment");
+  });
+
+  it("sanitizes display values and markdown code", () => {
+    expect(sanitizeDisplayValue("abc\u0000def")).toBe("abc?def");
+    expect(sanitizeDisplayValue("x".repeat(300))).toHaveLength(240);
+    expect(markdownCode("`quoted`")).toBe("`\\`quoted\\``");
+  });
+
+  it("parses explicit security approver allowlists", () => {
+    expect(securityApproverSet("vincentkoc, steipete\njoshavant")).toEqual(
+      new Set(["vincentkoc", "steipete", "joshavant"]),
+    );
+  });
+});
diff --git a/test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-workflow.test.ts b/test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-workflow.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9d6def087bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-workflow.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// Security Sensitive Guard Workflow tests cover sensitive file guard workflow behavior.
+import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { parse } from "yaml";
+
+const WORKFLOW = ".github/workflows/security-sensitive-guard.yml";
+const CODEOWNERS = ".github/CODEOWNERS";
+
+type WorkflowStep = {
+  env?: Record<string, string>;
+  name?: string;
+  run?: string;
+  uses?: string;
+  with?: Record<string, string>;
+};
+
+type WorkflowJob = {
+  if?: string;
+  needs?: string | string[];
+  permissions?: Record<string, string>;
+  steps?: WorkflowStep[];
+};
+
+type Workflow = {
+  jobs?: Record<string, WorkflowJob>;
+  name?: string;
+  permissions?: Record<string, string>;
+};
+
+function readWorkflow(): Workflow {
+  return parse(readFileSync(WORKFLOW, "utf8")) as Workflow;
+}
+
+describe("security-sensitive guard workflow", () => {
+  it("uses the security-sensitive guard check name", () => {
+    const parsed = readWorkflow();
+
+    expect(parsed.name).toBe("Security Sensitive Guard");
+    expect(parsed.jobs).toHaveProperty("security-sensitive-guard-detect");
+    expect(parsed.jobs).toHaveProperty("security-sensitive-guard");
+  });
+
+  it("uses a metadata-only pull_request_target workflow with bounded write permissions", () => {
+    const workflow = readFileSync(WORKFLOW, "utf8");
+    const parsed = readWorkflow();
+
+    expect(workflow).toContain("pull_request_target:");
+    expect(workflow).toContain("checks trusted base script only; never checks out PR head");
+    expect(parsed.permissions).toEqual({
+      contents: "read",
+      "pull-requests": "write",
+      issues: "write",
+    });
+    expect(parsed.jobs?.["security-sensitive-guard-detect"]?.permissions).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(parsed.jobs?.["security-sensitive-guard"]?.permissions).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("checks out only trusted base scripts and does not execute PR-controlled code", () => {
+    const workflow = readFileSync(WORKFLOW, "utf8");
+    const forbiddenSnippets = [
+      "github.event.pull_request.head",
+      "pullRequest.head",
+      "pnpm install",
+      "npm install",
+      "pnpm dlx",
+      "actions: write",
+      "id-token: write",
+    ];
+
+    for (const snippet of forbiddenSnippets) {
+      expect(workflow).not.toContain(snippet);
+    }
+
+    const jobs = readWorkflow().jobs ?? {};
+    for (const jobName of ["security-sensitive-guard-detect", "security-sensitive-guard"]) {
+      const steps = jobs[jobName]?.steps ?? [];
+      expect(steps[0].uses).toBe("actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd");
+      expect(steps[0].with?.ref).toBe("${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}");
+      expect(steps[0].with?.["persist-credentials"]).toBe(false);
+      expect(steps.at(-1)?.run).toBe("node scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs");
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("keeps detection separate from the final required check", () => {
+    const jobs = readWorkflow().jobs ?? {};
+    const detectJob = jobs["security-sensitive-guard-detect"];
+    const finalJob = jobs["security-sensitive-guard"];
+    const detectSteps = detectJob?.steps ?? [];
+    const finalSteps = finalJob?.steps ?? [];
+
+    expect(finalJob?.needs).toEqual(["security-sensitive-guard-detect"]);
+    expect(finalJob?.if).toContain("always()");
+    expect(detectSteps[1].env?.OPENCLAW_SECURITY_SENSITIVE_GUARD_MODE).toBe("detect");
+    expect(finalSteps[1].env?.OPENCLAW_SECURITY_SENSITIVE_GUARD_MODE).toBe("enforce");
+    expect(finalSteps[1].env?.OPENCLAW_SECURITY_TEAM_SLUG).toBe("openclaw-secops");
+    expect(finalSteps[1].env?.OPENCLAW_SECURITY_APPROVERS).toBe("vincentkoc,steipete,joshavant");
+  });
+
+  it("uses a dedicated checked-in script and detects the intended file surfaces", () => {
+    const workflow = readFileSync(WORKFLOW, "utf8");
+    const script = readFileSync("scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs", "utf8");
+
+    expect(workflow).toContain("scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs");
+    expect(script).toContain('"security-sensitive-changed"');
+    expect(script).toContain('path: ".gitignore"');
+    expect(script).toContain(".env");
+    expect(script).toContain("/allow-security-sensitive-change");
+    expect(script).toContain("openclaw-secops");
+    expect(script).toContain("/memberships/");
+    expect(script).toContain("A later push requires a fresh approval.");
+    expect(script).toContain("process.exitCode = 1");
+  });
+
+  it("requires secops review for future workflow or guard changes", () => {
+    const codeowners = readFileSync(CODEOWNERS, "utf8");
+    expect(codeowners).toContain(
+      "/.github/workflows/security-sensitive-guard.yml @openclaw/openclaw-secops",
+    );
+    expect(codeowners).toContain(
+      "/test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-workflow.test.ts @openclaw/openclaw-secops",
+    );
+    expect(codeowners).toContain(
+      "/test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-script.test.ts @openclaw/openclaw-secops",
+    );
+    expect(codeowners).toContain(
+      "/scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs @openclaw/openclaw-secops",
+    );
+    expect(codeowners).toContain("/.gitignore @openclaw/openclaw-secops");
+  });
+});
diff --git a/test/scripts/test-projects.test.ts b/test/scripts/test-projects.test.ts
index 9a3caf2dfe5..c9afb9be7c1 100644
--- a/test/scripts/test-projects.test.ts
+++ b/test/scripts/test-projects.test.ts
@@ -498,6 +498,15 @@ describe("scripts/test-projects changed-target routing", () => {
     });
   });
 
+  it("keeps security-sensitive guard workflow edits on guard workflow tests", () => {
+    expect(
+      resolveChangedTestTargetPlan([".github/workflows/security-sensitive-guard.yml"]),
+    ).toEqual({
+      mode: "targets",
+      targets: ["test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-workflow.test.ts"],
+    });
+  });
+
   it("keeps Crabbox and Testbox workflow edits on workflow regression tests", () => {
     for (const workflowPath of [
       ".github/workflows/ci-check-testbox.yml",
@@ -570,6 +579,11 @@ describe("scripts/test-projects changed-target routing", () => {
       targets: ["test/scripts/dependency-changes-report.test.ts"],
     });
 
+    expect(resolveChangedTestTargetPlan(["scripts/github/security-sensitive-guard.mjs"])).toEqual({
+      mode: "targets",
+      targets: ["test/scripts/security-sensitive-guard-script.test.ts"],
+    });
+
     expect(
       resolveChangedTestTargetPlan(["scripts/dependency-ownership-surface-report.mjs"]),
     ).toEqual({