From 808a60d3bdf8b7436e836525d74c4c6dafc38dd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Steinberger Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2026 14:25:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] docs: clarify intentional network-visible canvas model in security policy --- SECURITY.md | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index 63440837047..c64b1ef99cb 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -68,6 +68,10 @@ OpenClaw's web interface (Gateway Control UI + HTTP endpoints) is intended for * - Recommended: keep the Gateway **loopback-only** (`127.0.0.1` / `::1`). - Config: `gateway.bind="loopback"` (default). - CLI: `openclaw gateway run --bind loopback`. +- Canvas host note: network-visible canvas is **intentional** for trusted node scenarios (LAN/tailnet). + - Expected setup: non-loopback bind + Gateway auth (token/password/trusted-proxy) + firewall/tailnet controls. + - Expected routes: `/__openclaw__/canvas/`, `/__openclaw__/a2ui/`. + - This deployment model alone is not a security vulnerability. - Do **not** expose it to the public internet (no direct bind to `0.0.0.0`, no public reverse proxy). It is not hardened for public exposure. - If you need remote access, prefer an SSH tunnel or Tailscale serve/funnel (so the Gateway still binds to loopback), plus strong Gateway auth. - The Gateway HTTP surface includes the canvas host (`/__openclaw__/canvas/`, `/__openclaw__/a2ui/`). Treat canvas content as sensitive/untrusted and avoid exposing it beyond loopback unless you understand the risk.