docs(security): clarify trusted-host deployment assumptions

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Peter Steinberger
2026-02-21 12:53:07 +01:00
parent ede496fa1a
commit 810218756d
3 changed files with 21 additions and 0 deletions

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@@ -47,8 +47,17 @@ When patching a GHSA via `gh api`, include `X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28` (o
- Public Internet Exposure
- Using OpenClaw in ways that the docs recommend not to
- Deployments where mutually untrusted/adversarial operators share one gateway host and config
- Prompt injection attacks
## Deployment Assumptions
OpenClaw security guidance assumes:
- The host where OpenClaw runs is within a trusted OS/admin boundary.
- Anyone who can modify `~/.openclaw` state/config (including `openclaw.json`) is effectively a trusted operator.
- A single Gateway shared by mutually untrusted people is **not a recommended setup**. Use separate gateways (or at minimum separate OS users/hosts) per trust boundary.
## Plugin Trust Boundary
Plugins/extensions are loaded **in-process** with the Gateway and are treated as trusted code.