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docs(security): clarify trusted-host deployment assumptions
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@@ -47,8 +47,17 @@ When patching a GHSA via `gh api`, include `X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28` (o
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- Public Internet Exposure
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- Using OpenClaw in ways that the docs recommend not to
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- Deployments where mutually untrusted/adversarial operators share one gateway host and config
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- Prompt injection attacks
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## Deployment Assumptions
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OpenClaw security guidance assumes:
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- The host where OpenClaw runs is within a trusted OS/admin boundary.
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- Anyone who can modify `~/.openclaw` state/config (including `openclaw.json`) is effectively a trusted operator.
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- A single Gateway shared by mutually untrusted people is **not a recommended setup**. Use separate gateways (or at minimum separate OS users/hosts) per trust boundary.
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## Plugin Trust Boundary
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Plugins/extensions are loaded **in-process** with the Gateway and are treated as trusted code.
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