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fix(security): make allowFrom id-only by default with dangerous name opt-in (#24907)

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* fix(channels): default allowFrom to id-only; add dangerous name opt-in

* docs(security): align channel allowFrom docs with id-only default
This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-02-24 01:01:51 +00:00
committed by GitHub
parent 41b0568b35
commit cfa44ea6b4
53 changed files with 852 additions and 100 deletions
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SECURITY.md
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@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ OpenClaw does **not** model one gateway as a multi-tenant, adversarial user boun
- Deployments where mutually untrusted/adversarial operators share one gateway host and config (for example, reports expecting per-operator isolation for `sessions.list`, `sessions.preview`, `chat.history`, or similar control-plane reads)
- Prompt-injection-only attacks (without a policy/auth/sandbox boundary bypass)
- Reports that require write access to trusted local state (`~/.openclaw`, workspace files like `MEMORY.md` / `memory/*.md`)
- Any report whose only claim is that an operator-enabled `dangerous*`/`dangerously*` config option weakens defaults (these are explicit break-glass tradeoffs by design)
- Reports that depend on trusted operator-supplied configuration values to trigger availability impact (for example custom regex patterns). These may still be fixed as defense-in-depth hardening, but are not security-boundary bypasses.
- Exposed secrets that are third-party/user-controlled credentials (not OpenClaw-owned and not granting access to OpenClaw-operated infrastructure/services) without demonstrated OpenClaw impact