From d68380bb7ff95b870a60c47f5d2cdd75a8654b26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Steinberger Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 00:17:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] docs(security): clarify exposed-secret report scope --- SECURITY.md | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index c6801e52a52..9276aef7283 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ For fastest triage, include all of the following: - Tested version details (OpenClaw version and/or commit SHA). - Reproducible PoC against latest `main` or latest released version. - Demonstrated impact tied to OpenClaw's documented trust boundaries. +- For exposed-secret reports: proof the credential is OpenClaw-owned (or grants access to OpenClaw-operated infrastructure/services). - Scope check explaining why the report is **not** covered by the Out of Scope section below. Reports that miss these requirements may be closed as `invalid` or `no-action`. @@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ When patching a GHSA via `gh api`, include `X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28` (o - Prompt injection attacks - Reports that require write access to trusted local state (`~/.openclaw`, workspace files like `MEMORY.md` / `memory/*.md`) - Reports that depend on trusted operator-supplied configuration values to trigger availability impact (for example custom regex patterns). These may still be fixed as defense-in-depth hardening, but are not security-boundary bypasses. +- Exposed secrets that are third-party/user-controlled credentials (not OpenClaw-owned and not granting access to OpenClaw-operated infrastructure/services) without demonstrated OpenClaw impact ## Deployment Assumptions