fix(node-host): fail closed on unbound interpreter approvals

SECURITY.md

@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Plugins/extensions are part of OpenClaw's trusted computing base for a gateway.
 - Any report whose only claim is that an operator-enabled `dangerous*`/`dangerously*` config option weakens defaults (these are explicit break-glass tradeoffs by design)
 - Reports that depend on trusted operator-supplied configuration values to trigger availability impact (for example custom regex patterns). These may still be fixed as defense-in-depth hardening, but are not security-boundary bypasses.
 - Reports whose only claim is heuristic/parity drift in command-risk detection (for example obfuscation-pattern checks) across exec surfaces, without a demonstrated trust-boundary bypass. These are hardening-only findings and are not vulnerabilities; triage may close them as `invalid`/`no-action` or track them separately as low/informational hardening.
+- Reports whose only claim is that exec approvals do not semantically model every interpreter/runtime loader form, subcommand, flag combination, package script, or transitive module/config import. Exec approvals bind exact request context and best-effort direct local file operands; they are not a complete semantic model of everything a runtime may load.
 - Exposed secrets that are third-party/user-controlled credentials (not OpenClaw-owned and not granting access to OpenClaw-operated infrastructure/services) without demonstrated OpenClaw impact
 - Reports whose only claim is host-side exec when sandbox runtime is disabled/unavailable (documented default behavior in the trusted-operator model), without a boundary bypass.
 - Reports whose only claim is that a platform-provided upload destination URL is untrusted (for example Microsoft Teams `fileConsent/invoke` `uploadInfo.uploadUrl`) without proving attacker control in an authenticated production flow.
@@ -165,6 +166,7 @@ OpenClaw separates routing from execution, but both remain inside the same opera
 - **Gateway** is the control plane. If a caller passes Gateway auth, they are treated as a trusted operator for that Gateway.
 - **Node** is an execution extension of the Gateway. Pairing a node grants operator-level remote capability on that node.
 - **Exec approvals** (allowlist/ask UI) are operator guardrails to reduce accidental command execution, not a multi-tenant authorization boundary.
+- Exec approvals bind exact command/cwd/env context and, when OpenClaw can identify one concrete local script/file operand, that file snapshot too. This is best-effort integrity hardening, not a complete semantic model of every interpreter/runtime loader path.
 - Differences in command-risk warning heuristics between exec surfaces (`gateway`, `node`, `sandbox`) do not, by themselves, constitute a security-boundary bypass.
 - For untrusted-user isolation, split by trust boundary: separate gateways and separate OS users/hosts per boundary.
 

docs/gateway/security/index.md

@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ Treat Gateway and node as one operator trust domain, with different roles:
 - A caller authenticated to the Gateway is trusted at Gateway scope. After pairing, node actions are trusted operator actions on that node.
 - `sessionKey` is routing/context selection, not per-user auth.
 - Exec approvals (allowlist + ask) are guardrails for operator intent, not hostile multi-tenant isolation.
+- Exec approvals bind exact request context and best-effort direct local file operands; they do not semantically model every runtime/interpreter loader path. Use sandboxing and host isolation for strong boundaries.
 
 If you need hostile-user isolation, split trust boundaries by OS user/host and run separate gateways.
 
@@ -370,6 +371,7 @@ If a macOS node is paired, the Gateway can invoke `system.run` on that node. Thi
 
 - Requires node pairing (approval + token).
 - Controlled on the Mac via **Settings → Exec approvals** (security + ask + allowlist).
+- Approval mode binds exact request context and, when possible, one concrete local script/file operand. If OpenClaw cannot identify exactly one direct local file for an interpreter/runtime command, approval-backed execution is denied rather than promising full semantic coverage.
 - If you don’t want remote execution, set security to **deny** and remove node pairing for that Mac.
 
 ## Dynamic skills (watcher / remote nodes)

docs/nodes/index.md

@@ -54,6 +54,15 @@ forwards `exec` calls to the **node host** when `host=node` is selected.
 - **Node host**: executes `system.run`/`system.which` on the node machine.
 - **Approvals**: enforced on the node host via `~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json`.
 
+Approval note:
+
+- Approval-backed node runs bind exact request context.
+- For direct shell/runtime file executions, OpenClaw also best-effort binds one concrete local
+  file operand and denies the run if that file changes before execution.
+- If OpenClaw cannot identify exactly one concrete local file for an interpreter/runtime command,
+  approval-backed execution is denied instead of pretending full runtime coverage. Use sandboxing,
+  separate hosts, or an explicit trusted allowlist/full workflow for broader interpreter semantics.
+
 ### Start a node host (foreground)
 
 On the node machine:

docs/tools/exec-approvals.md

@@ -30,9 +30,14 @@ Trust model note:
 - Gateway-authenticated callers are trusted operators for that Gateway.
 - Paired nodes extend that trusted operator capability onto the node host.
 - Exec approvals reduce accidental execution risk, but are not a per-user auth boundary.
-- Approved node-host runs also bind canonical execution context: canonical cwd, pinned executable
+- Approved node-host runs bind canonical execution context: canonical cwd, exact argv, env
-  path when applicable, and interpreter-style script operands. If a bound script changes after
+  binding when present, and pinned executable path when applicable.
-  approval but before execution, the run is denied instead of executing drifted content.
+- For shell scripts and direct interpreter/runtime file invocations, OpenClaw also tries to bind
+  one concrete local file operand. If that bound file changes after approval but before execution,
+  the run is denied instead of executing drifted content.
+- This file binding is intentionally best-effort, not a complete semantic model of every
+  interpreter/runtime loader path. If approval mode cannot identify exactly one concrete local
+  file to bind, it refuses to mint an approval-backed run instead of pretending full coverage.
 
 macOS split:
 
@@ -259,6 +264,20 @@ For `host=node`, approval requests include a canonical `systemRunPlan` payload.
 that plan as the authoritative command/cwd/session context when forwarding approved `system.run`
 requests.
 
+## Interpreter/runtime commands
+
+Approval-backed interpreter/runtime runs are intentionally conservative:
+
+- Exact argv/cwd/env context is always bound.
+- Direct shell script and direct runtime file forms are best-effort bound to one concrete local
+  file snapshot.
+- If OpenClaw cannot identify exactly one concrete local file for an interpreter/runtime command
+  (for example package scripts, eval forms, runtime-specific loader chains, or ambiguous multi-file
+  forms), approval-backed execution is denied instead of claiming semantic coverage it does not
+  have.
+- For those workflows, prefer sandboxing, a separate host boundary, or an explicit trusted
+  allowlist/full workflow where the operator accepts the broader runtime semantics.
+
 When approvals are required, the exec tool returns immediately with an approval id. Use that id to
 correlate later system events (`Exec finished` / `Exec denied`). If no decision arrives before the
 timeout, the request is treated as an approval timeout and surfaced as a denial reason.

src/node-host/invoke-system-run-plan.test.ts

@@ -214,6 +214,38 @@ describe("hardenApprovedExecutionPaths", () => {
   }
 
   const mutableOperandCases: RuntimeFixture[] = [
+    {
+      name: "python flagged file",
+      binName: "python3",
+      argv: ["python3", "-B", "./run.py"],
+      scriptName: "run.py",
+      initialBody: 'print("SAFE")\n',
+      expectedArgvIndex: 2,
+    },
+    {
+      name: "lua direct file",
+      binName: "lua",
+      argv: ["lua", "./run.lua"],
+      scriptName: "run.lua",
+      initialBody: 'print("SAFE")\n',
+      expectedArgvIndex: 1,
+    },
+    {
+      name: "pypy direct file",
+      binName: "pypy",
+      argv: ["pypy", "./run.py"],
+      scriptName: "run.py",
+      initialBody: 'print("SAFE")\n',
+      expectedArgvIndex: 1,
+    },
+    {
+      name: "versioned node alias file",
+      binName: "node20",
+      argv: ["node20", "./run.js"],
+      scriptName: "run.js",
+      initialBody: 'console.log("SAFE");\n',
+      expectedArgvIndex: 1,
+    },
     {
       name: "bun direct file",
       binName: "bun",
@@ -238,6 +270,22 @@ describe("hardenApprovedExecutionPaths", () => {
       initialBody: 'console.log("SAFE");\n',
       expectedArgvIndex: 5,
     },
+    {
+      name: "bun test file",
+      binName: "bun",
+      argv: ["bun", "test", "./run.test.ts"],
+      scriptName: "run.test.ts",
+      initialBody: 'console.log("SAFE");\n',
+      expectedArgvIndex: 2,
+    },
+    {
+      name: "deno test file",
+      binName: "deno",
+      argv: ["deno", "test", "./run.test.ts"],
+      scriptName: "run.test.ts",
+      initialBody: 'console.log("SAFE");\n',
+      expectedArgvIndex: 2,
+    },
   ];
 
   for (const runtimeCase of mutableOperandCases) {
@@ -296,7 +344,7 @@ describe("hardenApprovedExecutionPaths", () => {
     }
   });
 
-  it("does not snapshot bun package script names", () => {
+  it("rejects bun package script names that do not bind a concrete file", () => {
     withFakeRuntimeBin({
       binName: "bun",
       run: () => {
@@ -306,11 +354,11 @@ describe("hardenApprovedExecutionPaths", () => {
             command: ["bun", "run", "dev"],
             cwd: tmp,
           });
-          expect(prepared.ok).toBe(true);
+          expect(prepared).toEqual({
-          if (!prepared.ok) {
+            ok: false,
-            throw new Error("unreachable");
+            message:
-          }
+              "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval cannot safely bind this interpreter/runtime command",
-          expect(prepared.plan.mutableFileOperand).toBeUndefined();
+          });
         } finally {
           fs.rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
         }
@@ -318,7 +366,7 @@ describe("hardenApprovedExecutionPaths", () => {
     });
   });
 
-  it("does not snapshot deno eval invocations", () => {
+  it("rejects deno eval invocations that do not bind a concrete file", () => {
     withFakeRuntimeBin({
       binName: "deno",
       run: () => {
@@ -328,11 +376,11 @@ describe("hardenApprovedExecutionPaths", () => {
             command: ["deno", "eval", "console.log('SAFE')"],
             cwd: tmp,
           });
-          expect(prepared.ok).toBe(true);
+          expect(prepared).toEqual({
-          if (!prepared.ok) {
+            ok: false,
-            throw new Error("unreachable");
+            message:
-          }
+              "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval cannot safely bind this interpreter/runtime command",
-          expect(prepared.plan.mutableFileOperand).toBeUndefined();
+          });
         } finally {
           fs.rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
         }

src/node-host/invoke-system-run-plan.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import type {
   SystemRunApprovalPlan,
 } from "../infra/exec-approvals.js";
 import { resolveCommandResolutionFromArgv } from "../infra/exec-command-resolution.js";
+import { isInterpreterLikeSafeBin } from "../infra/exec-safe-bin-runtime-policy.js";
 import {
   POSIX_SHELL_WRAPPERS,
   normalizeExecutableToken,
@@ -316,6 +317,53 @@ function resolveOptionFilteredPositionalIndex(params: {
   return null;
 }
 
+function collectExistingFileOperandIndexes(params: {
+  argv: string[];
+  startIndex: number;
+  cwd: string | undefined;
+}): number[] {
+  let afterDoubleDash = false;
+  const hits: number[] = [];
+  for (let i = params.startIndex; i < params.argv.length; i += 1) {
+    const token = params.argv[i]?.trim() ?? "";
+    if (!token) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (afterDoubleDash) {
+      if (resolvesToExistingFileSync(token, params.cwd)) {
+        hits.push(i);
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (token === "--") {
+      afterDoubleDash = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (token === "-") {
+      return [];
+    }
+    if (token.startsWith("-")) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (resolvesToExistingFileSync(token, params.cwd)) {
+      hits.push(i);
+    }
+  }
+  return hits;
+}
+
+function resolveGenericInterpreterScriptOperandIndex(params: {
+  argv: string[];
+  cwd: string | undefined;
+}): number | null {
+  const hits = collectExistingFileOperandIndexes({
+    argv: params.argv,
+    startIndex: 1,
+    cwd: params.cwd,
+  });
+  return hits.length === 1 ? hits[0] : null;
+}
+
 function resolveBunScriptOperandIndex(params: {
   argv: string[];
   cwd: string | undefined;
@@ -371,36 +419,76 @@ function resolveMutableFileOperandIndex(argv: string[], cwd: string | undefined)
     const shellIndex = resolvePosixShellScriptOperandIndex(unwrapped.argv);
     return shellIndex === null ? null : unwrapped.baseIndex + shellIndex;
   }
-  if (!MUTABLE_ARGV1_INTERPRETER_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(executable))) {
+  if (MUTABLE_ARGV1_INTERPRETER_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(executable))) {
+    const operand = unwrapped.argv[1]?.trim() ?? "";
+    if (operand && operand !== "-" && !operand.startsWith("-")) {
+      return unwrapped.baseIndex + 1;
+    }
+  }
   if (executable === "bun") {
     const bunIndex = resolveBunScriptOperandIndex({
       argv: unwrapped.argv,
       cwd,
     });
-      return bunIndex === null ? null : unwrapped.baseIndex + bunIndex;
+    if (bunIndex !== null) {
+      return unwrapped.baseIndex + bunIndex;
+    }
   }
   if (executable === "deno") {
     const denoIndex = resolveDenoRunScriptOperandIndex({
       argv: unwrapped.argv,
       cwd,
     });
-      return denoIndex === null ? null : unwrapped.baseIndex + denoIndex;
+    if (denoIndex !== null) {
+      return unwrapped.baseIndex + denoIndex;
     }
+  }
+  if (!isInterpreterLikeSafeBin(executable)) {
     return null;
   }
-  const operand = unwrapped.argv[1]?.trim() ?? "";
+  const genericIndex = resolveGenericInterpreterScriptOperandIndex({
-  if (!operand || operand === "-" || operand.startsWith("-")) {
+    argv: unwrapped.argv,
-    return null;
+    cwd,
+  });
+  return genericIndex === null ? null : unwrapped.baseIndex + genericIndex;
 }
-  return unwrapped.baseIndex + 1;
+
+function requiresStableInterpreterApprovalBindingWithShellCommand(params: {
+  argv: string[];
+  shellCommand: string | null;
+}): boolean {
+  if (params.shellCommand !== null) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const unwrapped = unwrapArgvForMutableOperand(params.argv);
+  const executable = normalizeExecutableToken(unwrapped.argv[0] ?? "");
+  if (!executable) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if ((POSIX_SHELL_WRAPPERS as ReadonlySet<string>).has(executable)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return isInterpreterLikeSafeBin(executable);
 }
 
 function resolveMutableFileOperandSnapshotSync(params: {
   argv: string[];
   cwd: string | undefined;
+  shellCommand: string | null;
 }): { ok: true; snapshot: SystemRunApprovalFileOperand | null } | { ok: false; message: string } {
   const argvIndex = resolveMutableFileOperandIndex(params.argv, params.cwd);
   if (argvIndex === null) {
+    if (
+      requiresStableInterpreterApprovalBindingWithShellCommand({
+        argv: params.argv,
+        shellCommand: params.shellCommand,
+      })
+    ) {
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        message: "SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval cannot safely bind this interpreter/runtime command",
+      };
+    }
     return { ok: true, snapshot: null };
   }
   const rawOperand = params.argv[argvIndex]?.trim();
@@ -658,6 +746,7 @@ export function buildSystemRunApprovalPlan(params: {
   const mutableFileOperand = resolveMutableFileOperandSnapshotSync({
     argv: hardening.argv,
     cwd: hardening.cwd,
+    shellCommand: command.shellCommand,
   });
   if (!mutableFileOperand.ok) {
     return { ok: false, message: mutableFileOperand.message };