From de2e5c7b740ab9baec19347bddba61150f5c1458 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Feb 2026 10:10:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] docs(security): clarify dangerous control-ui bypass policy

---
 CHANGELOG.md | 1 +
 SECURITY.md  | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index c41b53b725c..b3d4965e302 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 
 - Security/Audit: add `openclaw security audit` detection for open group policies that expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards (`security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs`).
 - Security/Exec env: block request-scoped `HOME` and `ZDOTDIR` overrides in host exec env sanitizers (Node + macOS), preventing shell startup-file execution before allowlist-evaluated command bodies. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
+- Security/Gateway: emit a startup security warning when insecure/dangerous config flags are enabled (including `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth=true`) and point operators to `openclaw security audit`.
 - Security/Hooks auth: normalize hook auth rate-limit client IP keys so IPv4 and IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses share one throttle bucket, preventing dual-form auth-attempt budget bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
 - Security/Exec approvals: treat `env` and shell-dispatch wrappers as transparent during allowlist analysis on node-host and macOS companion paths so policy checks match the effective executable/inline shell payload instead of the wrapper binary, blocking wrapper-smuggled allowlist bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Telegram/WSL2: disable `autoSelectFamily` by default on WSL2 and memoize WSL2 detection in Telegram network decision logic to avoid repeated sync `/proc/version` probes on fetch/send paths. (#21916) Thanks @MizukiMachine.
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 4c7162ecd0a..ae6885bc23e 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ OpenClaw's web interface (Gateway Control UI + HTTP endpoints) is intended for *
 - Recommended: keep the Gateway **loopback-only** (`127.0.0.1` / `::1`).
   - Config: `gateway.bind="loopback"` (default).
   - CLI: `openclaw gateway run --bind loopback`.
+- `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth` is intended for localhost-only break-glass use.
+  - OpenClaw keeps deployment flexibility by design and does not hard-forbid non-local setups.
+  - Non-local and other risky configurations are surfaced by `openclaw security audit` as dangerous findings.
+  - This operator-selected tradeoff is by design and not, by itself, a security vulnerability.
 - Canvas host note: network-visible canvas is **intentional** for trusted node scenarios (LAN/tailnet).
   - Expected setup: non-loopback bind + Gateway auth (token/password/trusted-proxy) + firewall/tailnet controls.
   - Expected routes: `/__openclaw__/canvas/`, `/__openclaw__/a2ui/`.