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fix(gateway): decouple backend RPC from CLI pairing

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Peter Steinberger
2026-04-25 23:22:08 +01:00
parent 91adb69c57
commit e640c0a95f
7 changed files with 175 additions and 12 deletions
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docs/gateway/security/index.md
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@@ -92,6 +92,11 @@ Treat Gateway and node as one operator trust domain, with different roles:
- **Gateway** is the control plane and policy surface (`gateway.auth`, tool policy, routing).
- **Node** is remote execution surface paired to that Gateway (commands, device actions, host-local capabilities).
- A caller authenticated to the Gateway is trusted at Gateway scope. After pairing, node actions are trusted operator actions on that node.
- Direct loopback backend clients authenticated with the shared gateway
token/password can make internal control-plane RPCs without presenting a user
device identity. This is not a remote or browser pairing bypass: network
clients, node clients, device-token clients, and explicit device identities
still go through pairing and scope-upgrade enforcement.
- `sessionKey` is routing/context selection, not per-user auth.
- Exec approvals (allowlist + ask) are guardrails for operator intent, not hostile multi-tenant isolation.
- OpenClaw's product default for trusted single-operator setups is that host exec on `gateway`/`node` is allowed without approval prompts (`security="full"`, `ask="off"` unless you tighten it). That default is intentional UX, not a vulnerability by itself.