vultr/openclaw
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw.git synced 2026-03-12 07:20:45 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

docs(security): clarify gateway-node trust boundary in docs

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-02-24 01:35:40 +00:00
parent 1f81677093
commit f0f886ecc4
4 changed files with 37 additions and 1 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

9
SECURITY.md
View File

@@ -126,6 +126,15 @@ OpenClaw's security model is "personal assistant" (one trusted operator, potenti
- Security boundaries come from host/config trust, auth, tool policy, sandboxing, and exec approvals.
- Prompt injection by itself is not a vulnerability report unless it crosses one of those boundaries.
## Gateway and Node trust concept
OpenClaw separates routing from execution, but both remain inside the same operator trust boundary:
- **Gateway** is the control plane. If a caller passes Gateway auth, they are treated as a trusted operator for that Gateway.
- **Node** is an execution extension of the Gateway. Pairing a node grants operator-level remote capability on that node.
- **Exec approvals** (allowlist/ask UI) are operator guardrails to reduce accidental command execution, not a multi-tenant authorization boundary.
- For untrusted-user isolation, split by trust boundary: separate gateways and separate OS users/hosts per boundary.
## Workspace Memory Trust Boundary
`MEMORY.md` and `memory/*.md` are plain workspace files and are treated as trusted local operator state.