docs(security): document sessions_spawn sandbox=require hardening

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-03-02 01:29:13 +00:00
parent f53ea0b74b
commit f8459ef46c
2 changed files with 17 additions and 0 deletions

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@@ -206,6 +206,14 @@ For threat model + hardening guidance (including `openclaw security audit --deep
- `tools.fs.workspaceOnly: true` (optional): restricts `read`/`write`/`edit`/`apply_patch` paths and native prompt image auto-load paths to the workspace directory.
- Avoid setting `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false` unless you fully trust who can trigger tool execution.
### Sub-agent delegation hardening
- Keep `sessions_spawn` denied unless you explicitly need delegated runs.
- Keep `agents.list[].subagents.allowAgents` narrow, and only include agents with sandbox settings you trust.
- When delegation must stay sandboxed, call `sessions_spawn` with `sandbox: "require"` (default is `inherit`).
- `sandbox: "require"` rejects the spawn unless the target child runtime is sandboxed.
- This prevents a less-restricted session from delegating work into an unsandboxed child by mistake.
### Web Interface Safety
OpenClaw's web interface (Gateway Control UI + HTTP endpoints) is intended for **local use only**.