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docs(security): document sessions_spawn sandbox=require hardening
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@@ -206,6 +206,14 @@ For threat model + hardening guidance (including `openclaw security audit --deep
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- `tools.fs.workspaceOnly: true` (optional): restricts `read`/`write`/`edit`/`apply_patch` paths and native prompt image auto-load paths to the workspace directory.
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- Avoid setting `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: false` unless you fully trust who can trigger tool execution.
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### Sub-agent delegation hardening
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- Keep `sessions_spawn` denied unless you explicitly need delegated runs.
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- Keep `agents.list[].subagents.allowAgents` narrow, and only include agents with sandbox settings you trust.
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- When delegation must stay sandboxed, call `sessions_spawn` with `sandbox: "require"` (default is `inherit`).
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- `sandbox: "require"` rejects the spawn unless the target child runtime is sandboxed.
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- This prevents a less-restricted session from delegating work into an unsandboxed child by mistake.
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### Web Interface Safety
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OpenClaw's web interface (Gateway Control UI + HTTP endpoints) is intended for **local use only**.
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