* fix(mattermost): prevent duplicate messages when block streaming + threading are active
Remove replyToId from createBlockReplyPayloadKey so identical content is
deduplicated regardless of threading target. Add explicit threading dock
to the Mattermost plugin with resolveReplyToMode reading from config
(default "all"), and add replyToMode to the Mattermost config schema.
Fixes#41219
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mattermost): address PR review — per-account replyToMode and test clarity
Read replyToMode from the merged per-account config via
resolveMattermostAccount so account-level overrides are honored in
multi-account setups. Add replyToMode to MattermostAccountConfig type.
Rename misleading test to clarify it exercises shouldDropFinalPayloads
short-circuit, not payload key dedup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Replies: keep block-pipeline reply targets distinct
* Tests: cover block reply target-aware dedupe
* Update CHANGELOG.md
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
* fix(cron): prevent duplicate proactive delivery on transient retry
* refactor: scope skipQueue to retryTransient path only
Non-retrying direct delivery (structured content / thread) keeps the
write-ahead queue so recoverPendingDeliveries can replay after a crash.
Addresses review feedback from codex-connector.
* fix: preserve write-ahead queue on initial delivery attempt
The first call through retryTransientDirectCronDelivery now keeps the
write-ahead queue entry so recoverPendingDeliveries can replay after a
crash. Only subsequent retry attempts set skipQueue to prevent
duplicate sends.
Addresses second codex-connector review on ea5ae5c.
* ci: retrigger checks
* Cron: bypass write-ahead queue for direct isolated delivery
* Tests: assert isolated cron skipQueue invariants
* Changelog: add cron duplicate-delivery fix entry
---------
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
* fix: prevent duplicate assistant messages in TUI (fixes#35278)
When startAssistant() is called multiple times with the same runId,
it was creating duplicate AssistantMessageComponent instances instead
of reusing the existing one. This caused messages to appear twice in
the terminal UI.
The fix checks if a component already exists for the runId before
creating a new one. If it exists, we update its text instead of
appending a duplicate component.
Test coverage includes verification that:
- Only one component is created when startAssistant is called twice
- The second text replaces the first
- Component count remains 1 (prevents regression)
Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)
via [Happy](https://happy.engineering)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Happy <yesreply@happy.engineering>
* Changelog: add TUI duplicate-render fix entry
---------
Co-authored-by: 沐沐 <mumu@example.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Happy <yesreply@happy.engineering>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
In trusted-proxy mode, enforceOriginCheckForAnyClient was set to false
whenever proxy headers were present. This allowed browser-originated
WebSocket connections from untrusted origins to bypass origin validation
entirely, as the check only ran for control-ui and webchat client types.
An attacker serving a page from an untrusted origin could connect through
a trusted reverse proxy, inherit proxy-injected identity, and obtain
operator.admin access via the sharedAuthOk / roleCanSkipDeviceIdentity
path without any origin restriction.
Remove the hasProxyHeaders exemption so origin validation runs for all
browser-originated connections regardless of how the request arrived.
Fixes GHSA-5wcw-8jjv-m286
On macOS, launchctl bootout permanently unloads the LaunchAgent plist.
Even with KeepAlive: true, launchd cannot respawn a service whose plist
has been removed from its registry. This left users with a dead gateway
requiring manual 'openclaw gateway install' to recover.
Affected trigger paths:
- openclaw gateway restart from an agent session (#43311)
- SIGTERM on config reload (#43406)
- Gateway self-restart via SIGTERM (#43035)
- Hot reload on channel config change (#43049)
Switch restartLaunchAgent() to launchctl kickstart -k, which force-kills
and restarts the service without unloading the plist. When the restart
originates from inside the launchd-managed process tree, delegate to a
new detached handoff helper (launchd-restart-handoff.ts) to avoid the
caller being killed mid-command. Self-restart paths in process-respawn.ts
now schedule the detached start-after-exit handoff before exiting instead
of relying on exit/KeepAlive timing.
Fixes#43311, #43406, #43035, #43049
The nodes tool was missing from OWNER_ONLY_TOOL_NAME_FALLBACKS in
tool-policy.ts. applyOwnerOnlyToolPolicy() correctly removed gateway
and cron for non-owners but kept nodes, which internally issues
privileged gateway calls: node.pair.approve (operator.pairing) and
node.invoke (operator.write).
A non-owner sender could approve pending node pairings and invoke
arbitrary node commands, extending to system.run on paired nodes.
Add nodes to the fallback owner-only set. Non-owners no longer receive
the nodes tool after policy application; owners retain it.
Fixes GHSA-r26r-9hxr-r792
Plugin subagent dispatch used a hardcoded synthetic client carrying
operator.admin, operator.approvals, and operator.pairing for all
runtime.subagent.* calls. Plugin HTTP routes with auth:"plugin" require
no gateway auth by design, so an unauthenticated external request could
drive admin-only gateway methods (sessions.delete, agent.run) through
the subagent runtime.
Propagate the real gateway client into the plugin runtime request scope
when one is available. Plugin HTTP routes now run inside a scoped
runtime client: auth:"plugin" routes receive a non-admin synthetic
operator.write client; gateway-authenticated routes retain admin-capable
scopes. The security boundary is enforced at the HTTP handler level.
Fixes GHSA-xw77-45gv-p728
device.token.rotate accepted attacker-controlled scopes and forwarded
them to rotateDeviceToken without verifying the caller held those
scopes. A pairing-scoped token could rotate up to operator.admin on
any already-paired device whose approvedScopes included admin.
Add a caller-scope subsetting check before rotateDeviceToken: the
requested scopes must be a subset of client.connect.scopes via the
existing roleScopesAllow helper. Reject with missing scope: <scope>
if not.
Also add server.device-token-rotate-authz.test.ts covering both the
priv-esc path and the admin-to-node-invoke chain.
Fixes GHSA-4jpw-hj22-2xmc
