Adds the provider runtime quality shard to the PR CodeQL guard, keeps PR quality analysis path-sharded by surface, and fixes selector overlap for Plugin SDK/package-contract paths.
Adds the gateway runtime quality shard to the PR CodeQL guard, keeps PR quality analysis path-sharded by surface, and documents the shard selector behavior.
* feat(file-transfer): add bundled plugin for binary file ops on nodes
New extensions/file-transfer/ plugin exposing four agent tools
(file_fetch, dir_list, dir_fetch, file_write) and four matching
node-host commands (file.fetch, dir.list, dir.fetch, file.write).
Lets agents read and write files on paired nodes by absolute path,
bypassing the bash output cap (200KB) and the live tool-result
text cap that would otherwise truncate base64 payloads.
Public surface
--------------
- file_fetch({ node, path, maxBytes? })
Image MIMEs return image content blocks; small text (<=8 KB) inlines
as text content; everything else returns a saved-media-path text
block. sha256-verified end-to-end.
- dir_list({ node, path, pageToken?, maxEntries? })
Structured directory listing — name, path, size, mimeType, isDir,
mtime. Paginated. No content transfer.
- dir_fetch({ node, path, maxBytes?, includeDotfiles? })
Server-side tar -czf streamed back, unpacked into the gateway media
store, returns a manifest of saved paths. Single round-trip.
60s wall-clock timeouts on tar create/unpack. tar -xzf without -P
rejects absolute paths in archive entries.
- file_write({ node, path, contentBase64, mimeType?, overwrite?,
createParents? })
Atomic write (temp + rename). Refuses to overwrite by default.
Refuses to write through symlinks (lstat check). Buffer-side
sha256 (no read-back race). Pair with file_fetch to round-trip
files between nodes — DO NOT use exec/cp for file copies.
All four commands gated by:
- dangerous-by-default node command policy
(gateway.nodes.allowCommands opt-in)
- per-node path policy (gateway.nodes.fileTransfer)
- optional operator approval prompt (ask: off | on-miss | always)
16 MB raw byte ceiling per single-frame round-trip (25 MB WS frame
with ~33% base64 overhead and JSON envelope). 8 MB defaults.
Path policy and approvals
-------------------------
Default behavior is DENY. The operator must explicitly opt in:
{
"gateway": {
"nodes": {
"fileTransfer": {
"<nodeId-or-displayName>": {
"ask": "off" | "on-miss" | "always",
"allowReadPaths": ["~/Screenshots/**", "/tmp/**"],
"allowWritePaths": ["~/Downloads/**"],
"denyPaths": ["**/.ssh/**", "**/.aws/**"],
"maxBytes": 16777216
},
"*": { "ask": "on-miss" }
}
}
}
}
ask modes:
off — silent: allow if matched, deny if not (default)
on-miss — silent allow if matched; prompt on miss
always — prompt every call (denyPaths still hard-deny)
denyPaths always wins. allow-always from the prompt persists the
exact path back into allowReadPaths/allowWritePaths via
mutateConfigFile so subsequent matching calls go silent.
Reuses existing primitives — no new gateway methods:
plugin.approval.request / plugin.approval.waitDecision
decision: allow-once | allow-always | deny
Pre-flight against requested path AND post-flight against the
canonicalPath returned by the node — closes symlink-escape attacks
where the requested path matched policy but realpath resolves
somewhere else.
Audit log
---------
JSONL at ~/.openclaw/audit/file-transfer.jsonl. Records every
decision (allow/allowed-once/allowed-always/denied/error) with
timestamp, op, nodeId, displayName, requestedPath, canonicalPath,
decision, error code, sizeBytes, sha256, durationMs. Best-effort
writes; never propagates failure.
Plugin layout
-------------
extensions/file-transfer/
index.ts definePluginEntry, nodeHostCommands
openclaw.plugin.json contracts.tools registration
package.json
src/node-host/{file-fetch,dir-list,dir-fetch,file-write}.ts
src/tools/{file-fetch,dir-list,dir-fetch,file-write}-tool.ts
src/shared/
mime.ts single-source extension->MIME map + image/text sets
errors.ts shared error code enum and helpers
params.ts shared param-validation helpers + GatewayCallOptions
policy.ts evaluateFilePolicy, persistAllowAlways
approval.ts plugin.approval.request wrapper
gatekeep.ts one-stop policy + approval + audit orchestrator
audit.ts JSONL audit sink
Core touch points
-----------------
- src/infra/node-commands.ts: NODE_FILE_FETCH_COMMAND,
NODE_DIR_LIST_COMMAND, NODE_DIR_FETCH_COMMAND,
NODE_FILE_WRITE_COMMAND, NODE_FILE_COMMANDS array
- src/gateway/node-command-policy.ts: all four added to
DEFAULT_DANGEROUS_NODE_COMMANDS
- src/security/audit-extra.sync.ts: audit detail mentions file ops
- src/agents/tools/nodes-tool-media.ts: MEDIA_INVOKE_ACTIONS entry
for file.fetch redirects raw nodes(action=invoke) callers to the
dedicated file_fetch tool to prevent base64 context bloat
- src/agents/tools/nodes-tool.ts: nodes tool description points to
the dedicated file_fetch tool
Known limitations / follow-ups
------------------------------
- No tests in this PR. For a security-sensitive surface this is a
gap; will follow up with a test pass.
- Direct CLI invocation (openclaw nodes invoke --command file.fetch)
bypasses the plugin policy entirely. Plugin-side gating is the
realistic threat model (agent on iMessage requesting paths it
shouldn't), but for true defense-in-depth, policy belongs in the
gateway-side node.invoke dispatch. Move-policy-to-core is a
separate PR.
- file_watch (long-lived filesystem event subscription) is not
included; it needs a new node-protocol primitive for streaming
event channels and was descoped from this PR.
- dir_fetch includeDotfiles: true is the only supported mode;
BSD tar exclude patterns reliably collapse dotfile filtering
to an empty archive. Reliable filtering needs a
`find ! -name ".*" | tar -T -` pipeline; deferred.
- dir_fetch du -sk preflight is a heuristic (du * 4 vs maxBytes);
the mid-stream byte cap is the actual safety net.
* test(file-transfer): add unit tests for handlers, policy, and shared utilities
Adds 77 tests covering:
- handleFileFetch: validation, fs errors, sha256, size cap, symlink canonicalization
- handleFileWrite: validation, atomic write, overwrite policy, parent dir handling, symlink refusal, integrity check, size cap
- handleDirList: validation, fs errors, sorted listing, dotfile inclusion, pagination
- handleDirFetch: validation, fs errors, gzipped tar with sha256, mid-stream byte cap
- evaluateFilePolicy: default-deny, denyPaths-wins, allow matching, ask modes (off/on-miss/always), node-id/displayName/'*' resolution
- persistAllowAlways: append, dedupe, create-on-missing
- shared/mime: extension lookup, image/text inline sets
- shared/errors: err helper, classifyFsError, throwFromNodePayload
Also fixes accumulated lint regressions in the prod source flagged once these
files moved into the changed-gate scope (parseInt -> Number.parseInt, redundant
type casts removed, single-statement if bodies wrapped in braces).
* fix(file-transfer): address PR review feedback (security + availability)
Reviewer findings addressed (greptile + aisle):
- policy: persistAllowAlways no longer escalates per-node approvals to the
'*' wildcard entry; allow-always now writes under the specific node's
own entry, never the wildcard (greptile P1 SECURITY).
- policy: add literal '..' segment short-circuit in evaluateFilePolicy,
raised before glob match. Stops "/allowed/../etc/passwd" from passing
preflight against "/allowed/**" globs (aisle MEDIUM CWE-22).
- file-write: replace no-op base64 try/catch with actual round-trip
validation. Buffer.from(s, "base64") never throws — invalid input
silently decoded to garbage bytes. Now re-encodes and compares
modulo padding/url-variant chars (greptile P1 SECURITY).
- file-write: document the parent-symlink residual risk and rely on the
existing gateway-side post-flight policy check; full rollback requires
a node-side file.unlink which is deferred to a follow-up. Initial
segment-walk attempt was reverted because it false-positives on system
symlinks like macOS /var → /private/var (aisle HIGH CWE-59).
- dir-fetch tool: add preValidateTarball pass that runs `tar -tzvf` and
rejects symlinks, hardlinks, absolute paths, '..' traversal,
uncompressed sizes >64MB, and entry counts >5000 — before any
extraction. Drops --no-overwrite-dir (GNU-only flag rejected by BSD
tar on macOS) (aisle HIGH x2 CWE-22 + CWE-409, greptile P2).
- dir-fetch tool: stream-hash files via fs.open + read loop instead of
fs.readFile to avoid full-buffer reads on large extracted entries.
- dir-fetch handler: replace spawnSync in countTarEntries with async
spawn + bounded buffer so tar -tzf can't park the node-host event
loop for up to 10s on a slow filesystem (greptile P1 AVAIL).
- audit: clear auditDirPromise on rejection so a transient mkdir
failure doesn't permanently silence the audit log (greptile P2).
New tests: wildcard escalation rejection, base64 malformed/url-variant,
'..' traversal short-circuit (3 cases). 84/84 passing.
* fix(file-transfer): CI failures + second-round PR review feedback
CI failures on previous push:
- Declare runtime deps (minimatch, typebox) in package.json — failed the
extension-runtime-dependencies contract test that scans imports.
- Switch policy.ts and policy.test.ts off the broad
openclaw/plugin-sdk/config-runtime barrel and onto the narrow
openclaw/plugin-sdk/config-mutation + runtime-config-snapshot subpaths.
This satisfies the deprecated-internal-config-api architecture guard.
Second-round Aisle findings:
- policy: traversal-segment check now treats backslash and forward slash
as equivalent, so a Windows node can't be hit with mixed-separator
"C:\\allowed\\..\\Windows\\system.ini" (Aisle HIGH CWE-22).
- dir-fetch tool: replace the single fragile `tar -tvzf` parser pass
(which broke for filenames containing whitespace) with two robust
passes: `tar -tzf` for paths only (one per line, no parsing of
fixed columns) and `tar -tzvf` for type chars only (FIRST CHAR of each
line, never the path column). Also reject backslash-containing entry
names. Drops the in-process uncompressed-size cap because reliably
parsing sizes from tar output is fragile and Aisle flagged it as a
bypass primitive — entry-count cap stays (Aisle HIGH CWE-22, MED).
Tests still 84/84 passing.
* fix(file-transfer): third-round PR review feedback
Aisle's re-analysis on b63daa6a05 surfaced 3 actionable findings:
- nodes.invoke bypass (HIGH CWE-285): generic nodes.action="invoke" let
agents call dir.list/dir.fetch/file.write directly, skipping the
file-transfer plugin's gatekeep + policy + approval flow. Only file.fetch
was redirected to its dedicated tool. Add the other three to
MEDIA_INVOKE_ACTIONS so the redirect-or-deny logic in
nodes-tool-commands fires for all four. The dedicated tools enforce
policy; the generic invoke surface no longer has a way to skip them
without an explicit allowMediaInvokeCommands opt-in.
- prototype pollution in persistAllowAlways (MED CWE-1321): a paired
node with displayName "__proto__" / "prototype" / "constructor" would
mutate the fileTransfer object's prototype when persisting allow-always.
Reject those keys explicitly. Switch the existing-key lookup to
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call so a key like "constructor"
doesn't accidentally match Object.prototype.constructor.
- decompression-bomb cap in dir_fetch (MED CWE-409): compressed tar is
bounded upstream, but a highly compressible bomb can still expand to
gigabytes. Enforce DIR_FETCH_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_BYTES (64MB) summed
across extracted files and DIR_FETCH_MAX_SINGLE_FILE_BYTES (16MB) per
entry, both checked during the post-extract walk. On bust, rm -rf the
rootDir and audit-log + throw UNCOMPRESSED_TOO_LARGE.
Tests: 85/85 passing (added prototype-pollution rejection test).
Aisle's HIGH parent-symlink finding remains documented as deferred — full
rollback requires a node-side file.unlink command which is out of scope
for this PR. The gateway-side post-flight policy check still detects and
loudly errors on canonical-path mismatches.
* fix(file-transfer): refuse symlink traversal by default with followSymlinks opt-in
Closes the deferred Aisle HIGH parent-symlink finding. Instead of
detecting the escape in a post-flight gateway check after the file is
already written, the node-side handler now refuses pre-flight if any
component of the requested path resolves through a symlink.
Behavior:
- Reads (file.fetch / dir.list / dir.fetch): node realpath()s the
requested path. If canonical != requested AND followSymlinks=false,
return SYMLINK_REDIRECT { canonicalPath } — no I/O happens.
- Writes (file.write): node realpath()s the parent dir. Same refusal
rule. The lstat-on-final check is kept to catch the case where the
target file itself is an existing symlink.
- Opt-in: set gateway.nodes.fileTransfer.<node>.followSymlinks=true to
bring back the previous "follow + post-flight check" behavior.
Operator UX: the SYMLINK_REDIRECT response includes the canonical path
so the operator can either update their allow list to the canonical form
or set followSymlinks=true on that node. On macOS, /var → /private/var
and /tmp → /private/tmp are system aliases that trip the new check, so
operators using those paths need followSymlinks=true OR canonical-path
allowlists.
Wiring:
- Add followSymlinks?: boolean to NodeFilePolicyConfig.
- evaluateFilePolicy returns followSymlinks (default false) on its
ok=true branches.
- gatekeep propagates it via GatekeepOutcome.
- Each tool passes it as a node.invoke param.
- Each handler honors it pre-flight before any read/write.
Tests updated: 89/89 passing.
- realpath(mkdtemp()) so existing happy-path tests don't trip the new
default on macOS where mkdtemp lands under symlinked /var/folders.
- New tests: SYMLINK_REDIRECT refusal for file.fetch and file.write
parent traversal; opt-in passthrough when followSymlinks=true.
- New policy test: followSymlinks propagation default false / true.
* fix(file-transfer): close two more aisle findings on 069bd66
Aisle re-analysis on 069bd66 surfaced two issues my earlier round-three
fix missed:
- HIGH (CWE-284): file.fetch / dir.fetch / dir.list / file.write were
still bypassable via the generic nodes.action="invoke" surface when
the operator had set allowMediaInvokeCommands=true. That flag was
meant to opt in to base64-bloat for camera/screen, not to disable
path policy on file-transfer. Split the redirect map: introduce
POLICY_REDIRECT_INVOKE_COMMANDS (file-transfer only) which ALWAYS
rerouts to its dedicated tool regardless of the bloat flag. Camera
and screen continue to use the bloat-only redirect (suppressed by
allowMediaInvokeCommands=true). Confirmed by clawsweeper P1.
- MED (CWE-276): tar -xzf in dir_fetch unpack preserved archive
ownership and permissions, so a malicious node could plant
setuid/setgid or world-writable files on a gateway running with
elevated privileges. Add --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions
(both flags are portable across BSD tar / GNU tar).
Tests: 89/89 passing.
* chore(file-transfer): drop file_watch from plugin description
Phase 5 (file_watch) was deferred earlier in this PR. Strip the watch
mention from the plugin description in package.json,
openclaw.plugin.json, and index.ts so the metadata reflects what's
actually shipped (file_fetch, dir_list, dir_fetch, file_write).
Closes clawsweeper P3.
* fix(file-transfer): hash before rename and allow zero-byte round-trip
Two of Peter's review findings on PR #74134:
- P2 (file-write integrity): hash the decoded buffer + compare against
expectedSha256 BEFORE temp+rename. Previously the rename happened
first, then the sha check unlinked the target on mismatch — with
overwrite=true a bad caller hash could replace + delete the original.
Now a hash mismatch returns INTEGRITY_FAILURE without touching disk.
Added a regression test that asserts the original file survives.
- P2/P3 (zero-byte round-trip): the tool layer's truthy checks on
contentBase64 and base64 rejected the empty string, blocking zero-byte
files from round-tripping through file_fetch -> file_write. Switched
to type-checks (typeof === "string") and added zero-byte tests at the
handler layer for both fetch and write (sha matches the known empty
digest).
Tests: 92/92 passing.
* fix(file-transfer): declare gateway.nodes.fileTransfer in core config schema
Peter's P1/P2 finding: the plugin reads/writes gateway.nodes.fileTransfer
via casts through unknown because the strict zod schema and OpenClawConfig
type didn't declare it. That meant `openclaw config validate` would
reject the very examples in the plugin's own documentation.
- Add fileTransfer block to gateway.nodes in src/config/zod-schema.ts
with the full per-node entry shape (ask, allowReadPaths,
allowWritePaths, denyPaths, maxBytes, followSymlinks).
- Add GatewayNodeFileTransferEntry + the fileTransfer field on
GatewayNodesConfig in src/config/types.gateway.ts.
- Drop the `as unknown` casts in the extension's policy.ts now that
gateway.nodes.fileTransfer is properly typed end-to-end.
- Regenerate docs/.generated/config-baseline.sha256.
Tests: 92/92 passing. pnpm config:docs:check OK.
* fix(file-transfer): enforce path policy at gateway dispatch
Closes Peter's P1 review finding on PR #74134.
The agent-tool-only redirect added in earlier commits left CLI
(`openclaw nodes invoke`), plugin-runtime, and raw `node.invoke` callers
able to skip the file-transfer path policy entirely. The fix moves the
security boundary down to the gateway: every code path that reaches
`node.invoke` for file.fetch / dir.list / dir.fetch / file.write now
runs the same allow/deny check.
- New: src/gateway/file-transfer-dispatch.ts with
`evaluateFileTransferDispatchPolicy` and `isFileTransferCommand`. Same
semantics as the extension-side `evaluateFilePolicy` minus the
operator-prompt flow (prompts stay at the agent-tool layer; the
gateway is silent enforcement).
- src/gateway/server-methods/nodes.ts: after the existing command
allowlist check, run the new gate before forwarding. Denies emit
INVALID_REQUEST with a structured `{ command, code, reason }`.
- Decision matrix mirrors the extension: NO_POLICY (no entry for
this node) deny, denyPaths-wins, '..' traversal short-circuit
(with backslash separator handling), allowPaths match → allow,
no allow match → deny.
- 19 new unit tests covering each branch including identity
resolution (nodeId/displayName/'*'), prototype-pollution-safe lookup,
and read-vs-write allow-list separation.
Note on allow-once approvals: the agent tool's interactive
`allow-once` decision now has to flow through the dedicated tool's
pre-flight (which forwards an approved request); raw `nodes.invoke`
callers cannot benefit from one-time approvals because the gateway is
silent. allow-always (which persists to allowReadPaths/allowWritePaths)
continues to work transparently because by the time the next request
hits the gateway the path is in the persisted allow list.
Tests: 92 extension + 19 gateway = 111 total, all passing.
* fix(file-transfer): enforce node policy in gateway
* fix(file-transfer): use plugin node policy only
* fix(file-transfer): harden node policy edge cases
* fix(file-transfer): close review hardening gaps
* fix(file-transfer): harden node invoke policy
* fix(file-transfer): align runtime dependency versions
* fix(file-transfer): keep minimatch extension-owned
* refactor(file-transfer): remove unused approval gate
* fix(file-transfer): require canonical node policy authorization
Co-authored-by: Omar Shahine <10343873+omarshahine@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(clawsweeper): address review for automerge-openclaw-openclaw-74134 (1)
Co-authored-by: Omar Shahine <10343873+omarshahine@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(file-transfer): recheck dir fetch archive policy after fetch
* fix(file-transfer): name file-transfer tool in invoke redirect
---------
Co-authored-by: Omar Shahine <10343873+omarshahine@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: clawsweeper-repair <clawsweeper-repair@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds the focused MCP/process/tool-execution CodeQL security shard and documents it in CI docs.
Proof:
- Branch CodeQL security run https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/actions/runs/25132942030 passed on 9d8ca2bae7.
- New mcp-process-tool-boundary analysis 1200250367 returned 0 results.
- Branch open CodeQL alerts: none.
- Workflow Sanity, Blacksmith Testbox, Blacksmith Build Artifacts Testbox, and OpenGrep PR Diff passed.
Remove the maintainer PAT fallback from the ClawSweeper dispatch workflow so missing app auth fails closed instead of attributing downstream automation to a human token.
* feat(security): add GHSA detector-review pipeline and OpenGrep CI workflows [AI-assisted]
Stand up an end-to-end pipeline that turns every published openclaw GitHub
Security Advisory into a reusable OpenGrep rule, and wire the compiled rules
into manual-dispatch GitHub Actions workflows that publish SARIF to GitHub
Code Scanning.
The pipeline is harness-agnostic: any coding-agent CLI (Rovo Dev, Claude
Code, Codex, OpenCode, or anything you can shell out to) can drive it via
the runner script's --harness flag. Built-in adapters cover the four common
harnesses; --harness-cmd '<template>' supports anything else with shell-style
{prompt}/{model}/{output_file} substitution.
Pipeline pieces:
- scripts/run-ghsa-detector-review-batch.mjs runs your chosen coding harness
in parallel against every advisory using the agent-agnostic detector-review
spec at security/detector-review/detector-review-spec.md. Each case
produces an opengrep general-rule.yml (precise) and broad-rule.yml
(review-aid), plus a coverage-validated report against the vulnerable
commit's changed files.
- scripts/compile-opengrep-rules.mjs walks a run directory, rewrites each
rule's id to ghsa-detector.<ghsa>.<orig-id>, injects ghsa/advisory-url/
detector-bucket/source-rule-id metadata, and uses opengrep itself to drop
rules with InvalidRuleSchemaError so the published super-configs load
cleanly.
Compiled outputs:
- security/opengrep/precise.yml (336 rules)
- security/opengrep/broad.yml (459 rules)
- security/opengrep/compile-manifest.json (per-rule provenance map)
CI workflows (manual workflow_dispatch only):
- .github/workflows/opengrep-precise.yml
- .github/workflows/opengrep-broad.yml
Both install a pinned opengrep, run opengrep scan against src/, upload SARIF
to Code Scanning under categories opengrep-precise / opengrep-broad, and use
continue-on-error: true so findings never block the workflow.
Detector-review spec and assets:
- security/detector-review/detector-review-spec.md the agent-agnostic spec
the runner injects into each per-case prompt
- security/detector-review/references/{detector-rubric,report-template}.md
- security/detector-review/scripts/init_case.py
- security/prompt-suffix-coverage-first.md mandatory prompt addendum that
enforces coverage-first validation (rule must catch the OG vuln, not just
pass synthetic fixtures)
Docs:
- security/README.md end-to-end flow, supported harnesses, regen recipe
- security/opengrep/README.md compiled-config details + recompile recipe
* security: tighten GHSA OpenGrep detector workflow
* chore: refine precise opengrep workflow
* chore: remove stale opengrep metadata
* fix: harden GHSA OpenGrep workflow
* ci: split OpenGrep diff and full scans
* chore: remove performance-only opengrep rule
* ci: use OpenGrep installer path
* chore: enforce opengrep rule metadata provenance
* chore: generalize opengrep rule compilation
* docs: align opengrep rulepack guidance
* chore: support generic opengrep rule sources
* fix: validate opengrep rulepack-only changes
---------
Co-authored-by: Jesse Merhi <security-engineering@atlassian.com>
