* feat(browser): direct extension→gateway relay path for remote Chrome (#53599)
Let the OpenClaw Chrome extension pair directly to a remote gateway over
wss:// with no OpenClaw node host on the browser machine — the managed-hosting
path from #53599 (extension is the only thing installed on the laptop).
- Gateway route /browser/extension registered by the browser plugin with
auth:"plugin" + no nodeCapability, so the gateway does not pre-enforce token
auth (browser WebSockets cannot send an Authorization header). The upgrade
handler self-validates the host-local relay secret from ?token=, origin-checks
chrome-extension://, resolves the extension profile, then attaches the socket
to the same ExtensionRelayBridge the loopback relay uses. All CDP synthesis,
tab-group scoping, and the in-process Playwright /cdp client are unchanged.
- `openclaw browser extension pair --gateway-url wss://host` prints a
wss://host/browser/extension#<secret> string; the path ends in /extension so
the extension's existing pairing parser accepts it with zero extension code
changes.
- relay-server: extract attachExtensionWebSocket + export requestToken /
isAllowedExtensionOrigin / EXTENSION_RELAY_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES so loopback and
gateway paths share one bind + one frame cap.
- runtime-lifecycle: dispose the shared gateway WebSocketServer on shutdown.
- docs: three remote topologies (same host / direct-to-gateway / via node host).
Coverage: 6 unit tests for the handler's path/503/403/404/401/attach branches.
The full extension→bridge→CDP→Chrome loop over /browser/extension was live-proven
with a real Chrome + the built extension. The real gateway upgrade→handleUpgrade
dispatch for an auth:"plugin" unprotected route is verified against core
(server-http.ts, plugins-http.ts, route-auth.ts).
* fix(browser): harden remote extension pairing
* feat(browser): restore driver "extension" via loopback Chrome extension relay
Reintroduces browser profile driver "extension" (removed in 2026.3.22) as a
loopback relay that drives the user's signed-in Chrome through an MV3 extension
instead of the remote-debugging port. This avoids Chrome's blocking "Allow
remote debugging?" prompt, which cannot be clicked when the operator drives
OpenClaw from a phone. Automated tabs live in an "OpenClaw" tab group (the
consent boundary), mirroring the Codex/Claude-in-Chrome model.
- relay bridge synthesizes the CDP browser target surface for Playwright
connectOverCDP and forwards session-scoped commands to chrome.debugger
- relay server binds loopback only; both sides authenticate with a token
derived (HMAC-SHA256) from gateway auth, so the raw credential never reaches
Chrome; extension origin + loopback Host checks guard the upgrade
- built-in "chrome" profile; distinct relay ports per extension profile;
relay reconciles on auth rotation / cdpPort change and prunes removed profiles
- doctor + status surface the extension transport; doctor keeps repairing the
retired relay endpoint URL on legacy "extension" profiles
Refs #53599
* feat(browser): bundle the OpenClaw MV3 Chrome extension
Thin MV3 extension (chrome-extension/): a WebSocket client to the loopback
relay plus chrome.debugger forwarding and OpenClaw tab-group management. All
CDP target synthesis lives server-side in the relay bridge, so the extension
stays a dumb transport (the removed 2026.3 extension put that logic in a
1000-line untestable service worker). Popup handles pairing and per-tab share
toggle; `openclaw browser extension path|pair` load and pair it. A build copy
hook stages it into dist so the load path is stable.
Refs #53599
* docs(browser): document the Chrome extension profile
Adds docs/tools/chrome-extension for the restored extension driver (install,
pair, tab-group consent model, security posture) and wires it into the browser
docs profile section and nav.
Refs #53599
* feat(browser): make the extension relay work on remote browser nodes
Derives the relay auth token from a host-local secret in the credentials dir
(created on first use) instead of gateway auth. Each machine that runs a
browser — the gateway host and every browser node host — owns its own token, so
the extension pairs with whichever machine hosts its Chrome and no gateway
credential travels to a node. The node host already runs the shared browser
control bootstrap, so this is all that was missing for cross-machine control.
Also removes the "relay needs gateway auth before it can start" failure mode:
startup and `openclaw browser extension pair` ensure the secret exists.
Refs #53599
* fix(browser): harden relay secret creation and satisfy CI lint/typecheck
- Make the host-local relay secret creation atomic (O_CREAT|O_EXCL + adopt the
winner on EEXIST) so the gateway service and `extension pair` CLI cannot mint
divergent tokens on a fresh host (would 401 until restart); credentials dir
created mode 0700. (adversarial review finding)
- Resolve type-aware oxlint findings across the relay + extension: unknown catch
vars, addEventListener over ws.on* in the MV3 worker, void async listeners,
drop useless returns/spreads, Object.assign over map-spread, safe ws frame
decode (Buffer[]/ArrayBuffer), toSorted.
- Add extensionRelayDefaultPort/extensionRelayPorts to remaining test config
literals; type the extension relay-core module (.d.ts, excluded from dist);
regenerate docs_map.
* fix(browser): satisfy OpenGrep security policy on the relay
- Hash both operands before timingSafeEqual so token comparison has no
length short-circuit (GHSA-JJ6Q-RRRF-H66H).
- Bound the relay WebSocketServer with maxPayload (64 MiB, headroom for CDP
screenshots/bodies) against oversized frames (GHSA-VW3H-Q6XQ-JJM5).
- Rewrite the config test env helper to avoid the skill-env-host-injection
shape (GHSA-82G8-464F-2MV7); it is a test-only env swap.
