# Problem
The security audit and onboarding screens suggested 'Set session.dmScope="..."'
for multi-user DM isolation. This led users to try setting the value in invalid
config paths (e.g., 'channels.imessage.dmScope').
# Changes
- Updated 'src/security/audit.ts' to use 'formatCliCommand' for dmScope remediation.
- Updated 'src/commands/doctor-security.ts' and 'src/commands/onboard-channels.ts'
to use the explicit 'openclaw config set' command format.
# Validation
- Verified text alignment with 'pnpm tsgo'.
- Confirmed CLI command formatting remains consistent across modified files.
* fix(security): handle additional Unicode angle bracket homoglyphs in content sanitization
The foldMarkerChar function sanitizes external content markers to
prevent prompt injection boundary escapes, but only handles fullwidth
ASCII (U+FF21-FF5A) and fullwidth angle brackets (U+FF1C/FF1E).
Add handling for additional visually similar Unicode characters that
could be used to craft fake end markers:
- Mathematical angle brackets (U+27E8, U+27E9)
- CJK angle brackets (U+3008, U+3009)
- Left/right-pointing angle brackets (U+2329, U+232A)
- Single angle quotation marks (U+2039, U+203A)
- Small less-than/greater-than signs (U+FE64, U+FE65)
* test(security): add homoglyph marker coverage
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
* feat(gateway): add auth rate-limiting & brute-force protection
Add a per-IP sliding-window rate limiter to Gateway authentication
endpoints (HTTP, WebSocket upgrade, and WS message-level auth).
When gateway.auth.rateLimit is configured, failed auth attempts are
tracked per client IP. Once the threshold is exceeded within the
sliding window, further attempts are blocked with HTTP 429 + Retry-After
until the lockout period expires. Loopback addresses are exempt by
default so local CLI sessions are never locked out.
The limiter is only created when explicitly configured (undefined
otherwise), keeping the feature fully opt-in and backward-compatible.
* fix(gateway): isolate auth rate-limit scopes and normalize 429 responses
---------
Co-authored-by: buerbaumer <buerbaumer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
* fix(security): distinguish webhooks from internal hooks in audit summary
The attack surface summary reported a single 'hooks: disabled/enabled' line
that only checked the external webhook endpoint (hooks.enabled), ignoring
internal hooks (hooks.internal.enabled). Users who enabled internal hooks
(session-memory, command-logger, etc.) saw 'hooks: disabled' and thought
something was broken.
Split into two separate lines:
- hooks.webhooks: disabled/enabled
- hooks.internal: disabled/enabled
Fixes#13466
* test(security): move attack surface tests to focused test file
Move the 3 new hook-distinction tests from the monolithic audit.test.ts
(1,511 lines) into a dedicated audit-extra.sync.test.ts that tests
collectAttackSurfaceSummaryFindings directly. Avoids growing the
already-large test file and keeps tests focused on the changed unit.
* fix: add changelog entry for security audit hook split (#13474) (thanks @mcaxtr)
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
* Tests: harden flake hotspots and consolidate provider-auth suites
* Tests: restore env vars by deleting missing snapshot values
* Tests: use real newline in memory summary filter case
* Tests(memory): use fake timers for qmd timeout coverage
* Changelog: add tests hardening entry for #11598
