* feat(browser): send pages to the main session from the Chrome extension
One-click page share in the OpenClaw Chrome extension: toolbar popup with an
optional note, page/selection context menu, and Alt+Shift+S. Capture is
selection-first with a readability heuristic, X/Twitter thread extraction, and
Google Docs plain-text export via the user's session cookies. Payloads ride the
existing paired relay WebSocket as a new pageShare message; the gateway-only
page-share sink wraps page text in the external-content safety boundary, then
enqueues a main-session system event and requests an immediate heartbeat
(hooks/wake semantics). Node-hosted relays report a clear unsupported error.
Capture heuristics adapted from Nat Eliason's MIT-licensed send-to-openclaw.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
* fix(browser): keep page-controlled metadata inside the share safety boundary
Review findings: move title/URL inside wrapExternalContent (a hostile <title>
must not become trusted header text), prefer the user's selection over the
full Google Docs export, and pass the context-menu selectionText through so
iframe selections and selections cleared during relay reconnect still win.
* fix(browser): bind context-menu shares to the click-time document
Selection shares from the context menu now send the click snapshot directly
(no recapture), so navigations during relay reconnect cannot mislabel the
source and iframe selections are preserved. The Google Docs selection probe
scans all accessible frames before falling back to the full-document export.
* test(browser): expect the page-share handler in relay server args
* fix(browser): probe only the main frame for Google Docs selections
All-frame injection rejects wholesale when one frame is inaccessible and
returns child frames in nondeterministic order, so the probe now reads the
main frame only. Child-frame selections still share correctly through the
context menu's click-time selectionText; toolbar/shortcut entry sends the
full page for that case (named tradeoff in the code comment).
* fix(browser): satisfy page-share CI gates
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
* feat(browser): direct extension→gateway relay path for remote Chrome (#53599)
Let the OpenClaw Chrome extension pair directly to a remote gateway over
wss:// with no OpenClaw node host on the browser machine — the managed-hosting
path from #53599 (extension is the only thing installed on the laptop).
- Gateway route /browser/extension registered by the browser plugin with
auth:"plugin" + no nodeCapability, so the gateway does not pre-enforce token
auth (browser WebSockets cannot send an Authorization header). The upgrade
handler self-validates the host-local relay secret from ?token=, origin-checks
chrome-extension://, resolves the extension profile, then attaches the socket
to the same ExtensionRelayBridge the loopback relay uses. All CDP synthesis,
tab-group scoping, and the in-process Playwright /cdp client are unchanged.
- `openclaw browser extension pair --gateway-url wss://host` prints a
wss://host/browser/extension#<secret> string; the path ends in /extension so
the extension's existing pairing parser accepts it with zero extension code
changes.
- relay-server: extract attachExtensionWebSocket + export requestToken /
isAllowedExtensionOrigin / EXTENSION_RELAY_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES so loopback and
gateway paths share one bind + one frame cap.
- runtime-lifecycle: dispose the shared gateway WebSocketServer on shutdown.
- docs: three remote topologies (same host / direct-to-gateway / via node host).
Coverage: 6 unit tests for the handler's path/503/403/404/401/attach branches.
The full extension→bridge→CDP→Chrome loop over /browser/extension was live-proven
with a real Chrome + the built extension. The real gateway upgrade→handleUpgrade
dispatch for an auth:"plugin" unprotected route is verified against core
(server-http.ts, plugins-http.ts, route-auth.ts).
* fix(browser): harden remote extension pairing
* feat(browser): restore driver "extension" via loopback Chrome extension relay
Reintroduces browser profile driver "extension" (removed in 2026.3.22) as a
loopback relay that drives the user's signed-in Chrome through an MV3 extension
instead of the remote-debugging port. This avoids Chrome's blocking "Allow
remote debugging?" prompt, which cannot be clicked when the operator drives
OpenClaw from a phone. Automated tabs live in an "OpenClaw" tab group (the
consent boundary), mirroring the Codex/Claude-in-Chrome model.
- relay bridge synthesizes the CDP browser target surface for Playwright
connectOverCDP and forwards session-scoped commands to chrome.debugger
- relay server binds loopback only; both sides authenticate with a token
derived (HMAC-SHA256) from gateway auth, so the raw credential never reaches
Chrome; extension origin + loopback Host checks guard the upgrade
- built-in "chrome" profile; distinct relay ports per extension profile;
relay reconciles on auth rotation / cdpPort change and prunes removed profiles
- doctor + status surface the extension transport; doctor keeps repairing the
retired relay endpoint URL on legacy "extension" profiles
Refs #53599
* feat(browser): bundle the OpenClaw MV3 Chrome extension
Thin MV3 extension (chrome-extension/): a WebSocket client to the loopback
relay plus chrome.debugger forwarding and OpenClaw tab-group management. All
CDP target synthesis lives server-side in the relay bridge, so the extension
stays a dumb transport (the removed 2026.3 extension put that logic in a
1000-line untestable service worker). Popup handles pairing and per-tab share
toggle; `openclaw browser extension path|pair` load and pair it. A build copy
hook stages it into dist so the load path is stable.
Refs #53599
* docs(browser): document the Chrome extension profile
Adds docs/tools/chrome-extension for the restored extension driver (install,
pair, tab-group consent model, security posture) and wires it into the browser
docs profile section and nav.
Refs #53599
* feat(browser): make the extension relay work on remote browser nodes
Derives the relay auth token from a host-local secret in the credentials dir
(created on first use) instead of gateway auth. Each machine that runs a
browser — the gateway host and every browser node host — owns its own token, so
the extension pairs with whichever machine hosts its Chrome and no gateway
credential travels to a node. The node host already runs the shared browser
control bootstrap, so this is all that was missing for cross-machine control.
Also removes the "relay needs gateway auth before it can start" failure mode:
startup and `openclaw browser extension pair` ensure the secret exists.
Refs #53599
* fix(browser): harden relay secret creation and satisfy CI lint/typecheck
- Make the host-local relay secret creation atomic (O_CREAT|O_EXCL + adopt the
winner on EEXIST) so the gateway service and `extension pair` CLI cannot mint
divergent tokens on a fresh host (would 401 until restart); credentials dir
created mode 0700. (adversarial review finding)
- Resolve type-aware oxlint findings across the relay + extension: unknown catch
vars, addEventListener over ws.on* in the MV3 worker, void async listeners,
drop useless returns/spreads, Object.assign over map-spread, safe ws frame
decode (Buffer[]/ArrayBuffer), toSorted.
- Add extensionRelayDefaultPort/extensionRelayPorts to remaining test config
literals; type the extension relay-core module (.d.ts, excluded from dist);
regenerate docs_map.
* fix(browser): satisfy OpenGrep security policy on the relay
- Hash both operands before timingSafeEqual so token comparison has no
length short-circuit (GHSA-JJ6Q-RRRF-H66H).
- Bound the relay WebSocketServer with maxPayload (64 MiB, headroom for CDP
screenshots/bodies) against oversized frames (GHSA-VW3H-Q6XQ-JJM5).
- Rewrite the config test env helper to avoid the skill-env-host-injection
shape (GHSA-82G8-464F-2MV7); it is a test-only env swap.
