An IRC sender mask is nick!user@host where only host is server verified;
nick and user (ident) are client supplied and spoofable. The allowlist
identity classifier treated any entry containing "!" or "@" as a verified
stable identity, so a host-less nick!user entry was classified stable and
matched by the host-less nick!user subject candidate. With
dangerouslyAllowNameMatching at its secure default (off), the mutable
identifier policy only strips entries owned by a dangerous field, so the
host-less entry was never stripped and a remote sender presenting the same
nick and ident was admitted regardless of host.
Require a verified @host component before an entry or subject is classified
stable. Host-less nick and host-less nick!user are now both routed to a
dangerous (mutable) field so they are gated by the same name-matching policy.
The doctor mutable-allowlist detector now also flags host-less nick!user
entries so operators who typed that undocumented shape get a warning. The
documented full nick!user@host mask stays stable and unaffected.
Two-step decode in decodeLiteralEscapes:
- Step 1: regex anchored to high-surrogate range (U+D800–U+DBFF) so a
preceding BMP escape (e.g. \u0041) cannot consume the high-surrogate
half of a valid pair like \uD83D\uDE00 (😀), leaving \uDE00 lone.
- Step 2: decode remaining BMP codepoints; preserve lone surrogates as
six-character literals instead of corrupting them to U+FFFD in the
outbound IRC UTF-8 stream.
* fix(irc): prevent ghost nick collisions on rejoin after network delay
* test(irc): add regression tests for fallback nick uniqueness
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: wendy-chsy <wan.wenyan@xydigit.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(irc): sanitize internal tool-trace lines from outbound text
* fix(irc): sanitize internal tool-trace lines from outbound text
---------
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
* chore(release): close out 2026.6.10 on main
* chore(release): align native app metadata for 2026.6.10
* chore(release): sync Android 2026.6.10 notes
* docs(changelog): preserve 2026.6.9 history
* docs(changelog): preserve 2026.6.9 history
Bumps OpenClaw release metadata to 2026.5.31 across package manifests, app version files, plugin metadata, changelog headings, and generated shrinkwraps.
Verification:
- pnpm plugins:sync:check
- pnpm ios:version:check
- pnpm deps:shrinkwrap:check
- git diff --check
- stale 2026.5.30/build-code scan across changed files
- autoreview clean: no accepted/actionable findings
- PR CI green for real gates: Checks, security scans, dependency guard, app lanes, real behavior proof
Known non-code workflow issue:
- label workflow failed because this PR hits GitHub's 100-label issue cap before the size-label step.
Followup nits from the #84711 review:
- Narrow the inspectTokenFile catch in
extensions/telegram/src/account-inspect.ts to FsSafeError so only
fs-safe validation throws map to configured_unavailable; any other
throw (programmer error, unexpected I/O) is rethrown.
- Add a regression test for the IRC NickServ password file symlink
rejection path (extensions/irc/src/accounts.ts:118), paralleling the
existing top-level passwordFile test.
- Add a regression test for the Telegram account-level tokenFile
symlink rejection path (extensions/telegram/src/token.ts:149),
paralleling the existing channel-level tokenFile test.
Behavior was already correct after #84711; this just locks coverage and
tightens the catch.
* fix(infra): restore symlink rejection in tryReadSecretFileSync
The local wrapper added in 9e4eca00ff swallowed all errors from
@openclaw/fs-safe@0.2.7's tryReadSecretFileSync via a bare try/catch,
silently downgrading every rejectSymlink: true caller (Telegram, LINE,
Zalo, IRC, Nextcloud Talk credential files) to accept symlinked
credential files. It also broke the infra-state CI shard's symlink
expectation that #84595 had just realigned with the new fail-closed
upstream contract.
Restore the direct re-export so the upstream contract surfaces:
undefined for blank/missing/not-found, FsSafeError for symlink,
oversize, non-regular file, and hardlink validation failures.
* test(plugins): align stale symlink tests with fail-closed contract
5 token/account resolver tests still asserted the pre-fs-safe-0.2.7
"silent skip" behavior (token: "", source: "none") on rejected symlinks;
they passed only because the swallow-all wrapper in secret-file.ts hid
the throw. Restoring the upstream fail-closed contract surfaces the
throw, so update the tests to expect FsSafeError.
inspectTelegramAccount reports credential status (its return type has an
explicit configured_unavailable state for "configured but unreadable"),
so its callsite is the right boundary to catch the FsSafeError and map
it to configured_unavailable rather than letting the throw bubble.
Affected:
- extensions/zalo/src/token.test.ts
- extensions/line/src/accounts.test.ts
- extensions/telegram/src/token.test.ts
- extensions/irc/src/accounts.test.ts
- extensions/nextcloud-talk/src/setup.test.ts
- extensions/telegram/src/account-inspect.ts (catch + report status)