openclaw/docs/gateway/sandboxing.md

summary, title, sidebarTitle, read_when, status

summary	title	sidebarTitle	read_when	status
How OpenClaw sandboxing works: modes, scopes, workspace access, and images	Sandboxing	Sandboxing	You want a dedicated explanation of sandboxing or need to tune agents.defaults.sandbox.	active

OpenClaw can run tool execution inside a sandbox backend to reduce blast radius. Sandboxing is off by default and controlled by agents.defaults.sandbox (global) or agents.entries.*.sandbox (per-agent). The Gateway process always stays on the host; only tool execution moves into the sandbox when enabled.

This is not a perfect security boundary, but it materially limits filesystem and process access when the model does something dumb.

What gets sandboxed

• Tool execution: exec, read, write, edit, apply_patch, process, etc.
• The optional sandboxed browser (agents.defaults.sandbox.browser).

Not sandboxed:

• The Gateway process itself.
• Any tool explicitly allowed to run outside the sandbox via tools.elevated. Elevated exec bypasses sandboxing and runs on the configured escape path (gateway by default, or node when the exec target is node). If sandboxing is off, tools.elevated changes nothing since exec already runs on the host. See Elevated Mode.

Modes, scope, and backend

Three independent settings control sandbox behavior:

Setting	Key	Values	Default
Mode	agents.defaults.sandbox.mode	off, non-main, all	off
Scope	agents.defaults.sandbox.scope	agent, session, shared	agent
Backend	agents.defaults.sandbox.backend	docker, podman, ssh, openshell	docker

Mode controls when sandboxing applies:

• off: no sandboxing.
• non-main: sandbox every session except the agent's main session. The main session key is always agent:<agentId>:main (or global when session.scope is "global"); it is not configurable. Group/channel sessions use their own keys, so they always count as non-main and get sandboxed.
• all: every session runs in a sandbox.

Scope controls how many containers/environments are created:

• agent: one container per agent.
• session: one container per session.
• shared: one container shared by all sandboxed sessions (per-agent docker/ssh/browser overrides are ignored under this scope).

Non-shared runtime identity also includes the resolved agent workspace path. This prevents co-hosted workspaces that reuse the same agent or session keys from sharing Docker, browser, SSH, OpenShell, or plugin-provided sandbox state. shared scope intentionally remains workspace-independent.

The first use after upgrading from an older release creates non-shared runtimes and sandbox workspaces under the workspace-qualified identity. Existing non-shared runtimes are not adopted; this is an intentional one-time reset. They can age out through configured prune settings or be removed with openclaw sandbox recreate; the next use provisions the current identity.

Backend controls which runtime executes sandboxed tools. Docker and Podman share agents.defaults.sandbox.docker; SSH-specific config lives under agents.defaults.sandbox.ssh; OpenShell-specific config lives under plugins.entries.openshell.config.

	Docker or Podman backend	SSH	OpenShell
Where it runs	Local Docker or Podman container	Any SSH-accessible host	OpenShell managed sandbox
Setup	Docker and/or Podman	SSH key + target host	OpenShell plugin enabled
Workspace model	Bind-mount or copy	Remote-canonical (seed once)	mirror or remote
Network control	docker.network (default: none)	Depends on remote host	Depends on OpenShell
Browser sandbox	Docker engine only	Not supported	Not supported yet
Bind mounts	docker.binds	N/A	N/A
Best for	Local development and container isolation	Offloading to a remote machine	Managed remote sandboxes with optional two-way sync

Supported capability matrix

Sandbox backends isolate tool execution. They do not move the Gateway, native plugins, or control-plane RPC into the sandbox.

Capability	Docker	SSH	OpenShell
Shell and child processes	Supported inside the container	Supported on the remote host	Supported inside the managed sandbox
File tools	Supported through the container filesystem bridge	Supported through the SSH filesystem bridge	Supported through the SSH bridge in mirror or remote mode
Workspace access	none, ro, and rw	none, ro, and rw	none, ro, and rw
Network restriction	docker.network; defaults to "none"	Controlled by the remote host	Controlled by the selected OpenShell policy
Sandboxed browser	Supported in a separate browser container	Not supported	Not supported
Additional host folders	docker.binds with explicit :ro or :rw	Not supported as mounts; seed or copy files instead	Not supported as mounts; use workspace sync or remote files
Packages and runtimes	Bake a custom image, or use setupCommand with the required privileges	Provision them on the remote host	Include them in the source image or install when policy permits
Private certificate roots	Bake or mount them into the image and configure the consuming runtime	Configure the remote host trust store	Include them in the source image or configure them inside sandbox
Plugin and MCP tool access	Gateway-side execution, additionally gated by sandbox tool policy	Gateway-side execution, additionally gated by policy	Gateway-side execution, additionally gated by sandbox tool policy

Native plugins remain in-process with the Gateway and share its trust boundary. Sandboxed sessions can use plugin-owned and MCP tools only when normal tool policy and tools.sandbox.tools both allow them. See MCP and plugin tools inside sandbox tool policy and Plugin execution model.

Docker backend

The Docker backend runs tools locally through the docker CLI. Its selection and error behavior are unchanged; it does not probe or fall back to Podman.

Defaults: network: "none" (no egress), readOnlyRoot: true, capDrop: ["ALL"], image openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim.

This explicit configuration keeps the agent workspace read-only and preserves the default restricted runtime posture:

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      sandbox: {
        mode: "all",
        backend: "docker",
        scope: "session",
        workspaceAccess: "ro",
        docker: {
          image: "openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim",
          readOnlyRoot: true,
          tmpfs: ["/tmp", "/var/tmp", "/run"],
          network: "none",
          capDrop: ["ALL"],
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

OpenClaw also creates Docker sandbox containers with an init process and no-new-privileges. With workspaceAccess: "ro", the agent workspace is mounted read-only at /agent; write operations to the agent workspace are rejected, while the configured tmpfs paths remain writable.

To expose host GPUs, set agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.gpus (or the per-agent override) to a value like "all" or "device=GPU-uuid". This is passed to the selected container engine's Docker-compatible --gpus flag and requires compatible host GPU setup. Podman requires version 5.0 or newer for this option.

**Docker-out-of-Docker (DooD) constraints**

If you deploy the OpenClaw Gateway itself as a Docker container, it orchestrates sibling sandbox containers using the host's Docker socket (DooD). This introduces a path mapping constraint:

• Config requires host paths: openclaw.json workspace must contain the host's absolute path (e.g. /home/user/.openclaw/workspaces), not the internal Gateway container path. The Docker daemon evaluates paths relative to the host OS namespace, not the Gateway's own namespace.
• Matching volume map required: The Gateway process also writes heartbeat and bridge files to that workspace path. Give the Gateway container an identical volume map (-v /home/user/.openclaw:/home/user/.openclaw) so the same host path resolves correctly from inside the Gateway container too. Mismatched mappings surface as EACCES when the Gateway tries to write its heartbeat.
• Codex code mode: when an OpenClaw sandbox is active, OpenClaw disables Codex app-server native Code Mode, user MCP servers, and app-backed plugin execution for that turn (those run from the Gateway-host app-server process, not the OpenClaw sandbox backend), unless the sandbox tool policy exposes the required tools and you opt into the experimental sandbox exec-server path. Shell access then routes through OpenClaw sandbox-backed tools such as sandbox_exec and sandbox_process. Do not mount the host Docker socket into agent sandbox containers or custom Codex sandboxes. See Codex Harness for the full behavior.

On Ubuntu/AppArmor hosts with Docker sandbox mode enabled, Codex app-server workspace-write shell execution needs unprivileged user namespaces inside the sandbox container, and this can fail before shell startup when the service user cannot create them. This needs an unprivileged network namespace too when Docker sandbox egress is disabled (network: "none", the default). Common symptoms: bwrap: setting up uid map: Permission denied and bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted. Run openclaw doctor; if it reports a Codex bwrap namespace probe failure, prefer an AppArmor profile that grants the required namespaces to the OpenClaw service process. kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0 is a host-wide fallback with security tradeoffs; use it only when that host posture is acceptable.

Sandboxed browser

• The sandbox browser auto-starts (ensures CDP is reachable) when the browser tool needs it. Configure via agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.autoStart (default true) and autoStartTimeoutMs (default 12s).
• Sandbox browser containers use a dedicated Docker network (openclaw-sandbox-browser) instead of the global bridge network. Configure with agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.network.
• Sandbox browser network mode "none" is unsupported because browser control requires host-published CDP ports. Use the dedicated default, bridge, or another custom bridge network. openclaw doctor --fix disables affected persisted sidecars and restores the dedicated network without silently enabling egress.
• agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.cdpSourceRange restricts container-edge CDP ingress with a CIDR allowlist (for example 172.21.0.1/32).
• noVNC observer access is password-protected by default; OpenClaw emits a short-lived token URL that serves a local bootstrap page and opens noVNC with the password in the URL fragment (not query string or header logs).
• agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.allowHostControl (default false) lets sandboxed sessions target the host browser explicitly.
• Optional allowlists gate target: "custom": allowedControlUrls, allowedControlHosts, allowedControlPorts.

Podman backend

Use sandbox.backend: "podman" to select the native podman CLI directly. This is a built-in backend, not a plugin. It does not probe or select Docker, even when the docker executable is installed.

Podman reuses the existing sandbox.docker.* settings and the active native podman CLI context; it adds no separate connection configuration surface.

Rootless Podman defaults to --userns=keep-id for writable workspace mounts. A long-lived sandbox can reserve subordinate IDs and block unrelated --userns=auto workloads; remove it before starting those workloads. Set sandbox.docker.user to a nonzero numeric UID or UID:GID to control the container user. Rootless Podman rejects UID or GID 0 because Podman 4.x cannot remap namespace root while preserving workspace bind ownership; bake root-required setup into the image or use rootful Podman. Rootful Podman otherwise uses the workspace owner when available.

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      sandbox: {
        mode: "all",
        backend: "podman",
        scope: "session",
        workspaceAccess: "rw",
        docker: {
          image: "openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim",
          network: "none",
          readOnlyRoot: true,
          capDrop: ["ALL"],
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

Build or pull the sandbox image into the selected Podman store before enabling the backend. From a source checkout, build the same sandbox Dockerfile with Podman:

podman build -t openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim -f scripts/docker/sandbox/Dockerfile .

Podman notes:

• Browser sandboxing is not supported by Podman; keep sandbox.browser.enabled off, or install Docker and select backend: "docker".
• Local Podman engines and Podman Machine are supported. Podman Machine bind sources must be under the host home directory, which is its default shared volume. Arbitrary remote Podman connections are rejected; use the SSH backend for remote execution.
• Custom tmpfs or bind mounts must not cover /run/podman-init; OpenClaw rejects them so sandbox cleanup continues to work.

**Podman-outside-of-Podman constraints**

A containerized Gateway creates sibling sandboxes through the host's local Podman engine or Podman Machine.

• Use host paths consistently: configure workspace with its host absolute path, then mount the complete state root and workspace into the Gateway at those same paths. Otherwise the sandbox may mount the workspace while the Gateway cannot write heartbeat or skill-workspace files.
• Podman Machine setup: bind sources must be under the host home directory. Set the Gateway HOME to that path and point OPENCLAW_HOME, OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR, and OPENCLAW_CONFIG_DIR at the canonical mounted state root. The image needs a compatible Podman client, its named connection and SSH identity, plus a dedicated writable SSH directory for known-host metadata.
• Keep Podman access Gateway-only: never mount the engine socket, connection material, or SSH identity into agent sandboxes. Arbitrary remote connections are unsupported; use the SSH backend instead.

SSH backend

Use backend: "ssh" to sandbox exec, file tools, and media reads on an arbitrary SSH-accessible machine.

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      sandbox: {
        mode: "all",
        backend: "ssh",
        scope: "session",
        workspaceAccess: "rw",
        ssh: {
          target: "user@gateway-host:22",
          workspaceRoot: "/tmp/openclaw-sandboxes",
          strictHostKeyChecking: true,
          updateHostKeys: true,
          identityFile: "~/.ssh/id_ed25519",
          certificateFile: "~/.ssh/id_ed25519-cert.pub",
          knownHostsFile: "~/.ssh/known_hosts",
          // Or use SecretRefs / inline contents instead of local files:
          // identityData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_IDENTITY" },
          // certificateData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_CERTIFICATE" },
          // knownHostsData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS" },
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

Defaults: command: "ssh", workspaceRoot: "/tmp/openclaw-sandboxes", strictHostKeyChecking: true, updateHostKeys: true.

• Lifecycle: OpenClaw creates a per-scope remote root under sandbox.ssh.workspaceRoot. On first use after create or recreate, it seeds that remote workspace from the local workspace once. After that, exec, read, write, edit, apply_patch, prompt media reads, and inbound media staging run directly against the remote workspace over SSH. OpenClaw does not sync remote changes back to the local workspace automatically.
• Authentication material: identityFile/certificateFile/knownHostsFile reference existing local files. identityData/certificateData/knownHostsData accept inline strings or SecretRefs, resolved through the normal secrets runtime snapshot, written to temp files with mode 0600, and deleted when the SSH session ends. If both a *File and *Data variant are set for the same item, *Data wins for that session.
• Remote-canonical consequences: the remote SSH workspace becomes the real sandbox state after the initial seed. Host-local edits made outside OpenClaw after the seed step are not visible remotely until you recreate the sandbox. openclaw sandbox recreate deletes the per-scope remote root and seeds again from local on next use. Browser sandboxing is not supported on this backend, and sandbox.docker.* settings do not apply to it.

OpenShell backend

Use backend: "openshell" to sandbox tools in an OpenShell-managed remote environment. OpenShell reuses the same SSH transport and remote filesystem bridge as the generic SSH backend, and adds OpenShell lifecycle (sandbox create/get/delete/ssh-config) plus an optional mirror workspace sync mode.

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      sandbox: {
        mode: "all",
        backend: "openshell",
        scope: "session",
        workspaceAccess: "rw",
      },
    },
  },
  plugins: {
    entries: {
      openshell: {
        enabled: true,
        config: {
          from: "openclaw",
          mode: "remote", // mirror | remote
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

mode: "mirror" (default) keeps the local workspace canonical: OpenClaw syncs local into the sandbox before exec and syncs back after. mode: "remote" seeds the remote workspace once from local, then runs exec/read/write/edit/apply_patch directly against the remote workspace without syncing back; local edits after the seed are invisible until you openclaw sandbox recreate. Under scope: "agent" or scope: "shared", that remote workspace is shared at the same scope. Current limitations: sandbox browser isn't supported yet, and sandbox.docker.binds doesn't apply to this backend.

openclaw sandbox list/recreate/prune all treat OpenShell runtimes the same as Docker runtimes; prune logic is backend-aware.

For the full prerequisites, configuration reference, workspace-mode comparison, and lifecycle details, see OpenShell.

Workspace access

agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess controls what the sandbox can see:

Value	Behavior
none (default)	Tools see an isolated sandbox workspace under ~/.openclaw/sandboxes.
ro	Mounts the agent workspace read-only at /agent (disables write/edit/apply_patch).
rw	Mounts the agent workspace read/write at /workspace.

With the OpenShell backend, mirror mode still uses the local workspace as the canonical source between exec turns, remote mode uses the remote OpenShell workspace as canonical after the initial seed, and workspaceAccess: "ro"/"none" still restrict write behavior the same way.

Inbound media is copied into the active sandbox workspace (media/inbound/*).

**Skills**: the `read` tool is sandbox-rooted. With `workspaceAccess: "none"`, OpenClaw mirrors eligible skills into the sandbox workspace (`.../skills`) so they can be read. With `"rw"`, workspace skills are readable from `/workspace/skills`, and eligible managed, bundled, or plugin skills are materialized into the generated read-only path `/workspace/.openclaw/sandbox-skills/skills`.

Multiple folders for one agent

Use Docker bind mounts when one sandboxed agent needs more than its primary workspace. Each entry maps a host folder to a container path with an explicit access mode:

host-directory:container-directory:ro
host-directory:container-directory:rw

• ro makes the mounted folder read-only inside the sandbox.
• rw lets sandboxed tools and processes change the host folder.
• The container path is the path the agent uses. Host paths are not exposed automatically.

This example gives the research agent a writable primary workspace, read-only reference material at /reference, and a separate writable output folder at /drafts:

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      sandbox: {
        mode: "all",
        scope: "agent",
      },
    },
    list: [
      {
        id: "research",
        workspace: "/srv/openclaw/research-workspace",
        sandbox: {
          workspaceAccess: "rw",
          docker: {
            binds: ["/srv/shared/reference:/reference:ro", "/srv/shared/drafts:/drafts:rw"],
            // Required because these sources are outside the agent workspace.
            dangerouslyAllowExternalBindSources: true,
          },
        },
      },
    ],
  },
}

workspaceAccess and bind modes are independent:

Setting	Controls
workspaceAccess: "none"	Uses an isolated sandbox workspace; does not expose the agent workspace.
workspaceAccess: "ro"	Mounts the agent workspace read-only at /agent.
workspaceAccess: "rw"	Mounts the agent workspace read/write at /workspace.
docker.binds entry :ro/:rw	Controls only that additional host folder at its configured container path.

Changing workspaceAccess does not change an additional bind from ro to rw, or vice versa. Global and per-agent docker.binds are merged. Keep scope: "agent" or "session" for per-agent binds; scope: "shared" ignores all per-agent Docker overrides and uses only global binds.

Bind mounts are the supported multi-folder boundary because Docker constructs the container's filesystem view with mount isolation, and the ro/rw mode applies to every process in the sandbox. That boundary covers exec, filesystem tools, child processes, and libraries without duplicating path-authorization checks across each OpenClaw code path. A host-side path allowlist cannot provide the same complete boundary when an allowed shell or dependency can access files directly.

The opt-in dangerouslyAllowExternalBindSources only permits sources outside the workspace roots. It does not disable OpenClaw's blocked system, credential, Docker socket, symlink-parent, or reserved-target checks. Prefer the smallest folder, use ro unless writes are required, and recreate the sandbox after changing mounts:

openclaw sandbox recreate --agent research

Other bind behavior

agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.binds configures global mounts. The format is the same host:container:mode form (for example, "/home/user/source:/source:rw").

agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.binds mounts additional host directories into the sandbox browser container only. When set (including []), it replaces docker.binds for the browser container; when omitted, the browser container falls back to docker.binds.

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      sandbox: {
        docker: {
          binds: ["/home/user/source:/source:ro", "/var/data/myapp:/data:ro"],
        },
      },
    },
    list: [
      {
        id: "build",
        sandbox: {
          docker: {
            binds: ["/mnt/cache:/cache:rw"],
          },
        },
      },
    ],
  },
}

**Bind security**

• Binds bypass the sandbox filesystem: they expose host paths with whatever mode you set (:ro or :rw).
• OpenClaw blocks dangerous bind sources by default: system paths (/etc, /proc, /sys, /dev, /root, /boot), Docker socket directories (/run, /var/run, and their docker.sock variants), and common home-directory credential roots (~/.aws, ~/.cargo, ~/.config, ~/.docker, ~/.gnupg, ~/.netrc, ~/.npm, ~/.ssh).
• Validation normalizes the source path, then resolves it again through the deepest existing ancestor before re-checking blocked paths and allowed roots, so symlink-parent escapes fail closed even when the final leaf doesn't exist yet (e.g. /workspace/run-link/new-file still resolves as /var/run/... if run-link points there).
• Bind targets that shadow the reserved container mount points (/workspace, /agent) are also blocked by default; override with agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.dangerouslyAllowReservedContainerTargets: true.
• Bind sources outside the workspace/agent-workspace allowlisted roots are blocked by default; override with agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.dangerouslyAllowExternalBindSources: true. Allowed roots are canonicalized the same way, so a path that only looks inside the allowlist before symlink resolution is still rejected as outside allowed roots.
• Sensitive mounts (secrets, SSH keys, service credentials) should be :ro unless absolutely required.
• Combine with workspaceAccess: "ro" if you only need read access to the workspace; bind modes stay independent.
• See Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated for how binds interact with tool policy and elevated exec.

Images and setup

Default Docker image: openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim

**Source checkout vs npm install**

The scripts/sandbox-setup.sh, scripts/sandbox-common-setup.sh, and scripts/sandbox-browser-setup.sh helper scripts are only available when running from a source checkout. They are not included in the npm package.

If you installed OpenClaw via npm install -g openclaw, use the inline docker build commands shown below instead.

From a source checkout:

```bash
scripts/sandbox-setup.sh
```

From an npm install (no source checkout needed):

```bash
docker build -t openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim - <<'DOCKERFILE'
FROM debian:bookworm-slim
ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
  bash ca-certificates curl git jq python3 ripgrep \
  && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash sandbox
USER sandbox
WORKDIR /home/sandbox
CMD ["sleep", "infinity"]
DOCKERFILE
```

The default image does **not** include Node. If a skill needs Node (or other runtimes), either bake a custom image or install via `sandbox.docker.setupCommand` (requires network egress + writable root + root user).

OpenClaw does not silently substitute plain `debian:bookworm-slim` when `openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim` is missing. Sandbox runs that target the default image fail fast with a build instruction until you build it, because the bundled image carries `python3` for the sandbox write/edit helpers.

For a more functional sandbox image with common tooling (for example `curl`, `jq`, Node 24, pnpm, `python3`, and `git`):

From a source checkout:

```bash
scripts/sandbox-common-setup.sh
```

From an npm install, build the default image first (see above), then build the common image on top using [`scripts/docker/sandbox/Dockerfile.common`](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/scripts/docker/sandbox/Dockerfile.common) from the repository.

Then set `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.image` to `openclaw-sandbox-common:bookworm-slim`.

From a source checkout:

```bash
scripts/sandbox-browser-setup.sh
```

The npm package does not include the browser Dockerfile or entrypoint. Use a source checkout to build this image.

By default, local container sandboxes run with no network. Override with agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network.

Package installation and certificate-store changes are image provisioning, not normal sandbox-turn behavior. The defaults deliberately combine no network, a read-only root filesystem, and a non-root image user, so an in-turn package install should fail. Prefer a custom image that already contains packages and private certificate roots. If a Node process needs a private CA, also configure the CA path for Node, for example with `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, through the custom image or `sandbox.docker.env`. The bundled sandbox browser image applies conservative Chromium startup flags for containerized workloads:

- `--remote-debugging-address=127.0.0.1`
- `--remote-debugging-port=<derived from OPENCLAW_BROWSER_CDP_PORT>`
- `--user-data-dir=${HOME}/.chrome`
- `--no-first-run`
- `--no-default-browser-check`
- `--disable-dev-shm-usage`
- `--disable-background-networking`
- `--disable-breakpad`
- `--disable-crash-reporter`
- `--no-zygote`
- `--metrics-recording-only`
- `--password-store=basic`
- `--use-mock-keychain`
- `--headless=new` when `browser.headless` is enabled.
- `--no-sandbox --disable-setuid-sandbox` (always enabled in the sandbox browser container).
- `--disable-3d-apis`, `--disable-gpu`, `--disable-software-rasterizer` by default; these graphics-hardening flags help containers without GPU support. Set `OPENCLAW_BROWSER_DISABLE_GRAPHICS_FLAGS=0` if your workload needs WebGL or other 3D features.
- `--disable-extensions` by default; set `OPENCLAW_BROWSER_DISABLE_EXTENSIONS=0` for extension-reliant flows.
- `--renderer-process-limit=2` by default; controlled by `OPENCLAW_BROWSER_RENDERER_PROCESS_LIMIT=<N>`, where `0` keeps Chromium's default.

If you need a different runtime profile, use a custom browser image and provide your own entrypoint. For local (non-container) Chromium profiles, use `browser.extraArgs` to append additional startup flags.

- `network: "host"` is blocked. - `network: "container:"` is blocked by default (namespace join bypass risk). - Break-glass override: `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.dangerouslyAllowContainerNamespaceJoin: true`.

Docker installs and the containerized gateway live here: Docker

For Docker gateway deployments, scripts/docker/setup.sh can bootstrap sandbox config. Set OPENCLAW_SANDBOX=1 (or true/yes/on) to enable that path. Override the socket location with OPENCLAW_DOCKER_SOCKET. Full setup and env reference: Docker.

setupCommand (one-time container setup)

setupCommand runs once after the sandbox container is created (not on every run). It executes inside the container via sh -lc.

Paths:

• Global: agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.setupCommand
• Per-agent: agents.entries.*.sandbox.docker.setupCommand

- Default `docker.network` is `"none"` (no egress), so package installs will fail. - `docker.network: "container:"` requires `dangerouslyAllowContainerNamespaceJoin: true` and is break-glass only. - `readOnlyRoot: true` prevents writes; set `readOnlyRoot: false` or bake a custom image. - `user` must be root for package installs. Docker can omit `user` or set `user: "0:0"`; rootful Podman must set `user: "0:0"` because its default preserves workspace ownership. Rootless Podman rejects zero-valued users; bake packages into the image or use rootful Podman. - Sandbox exec does **not** inherit host `process.env`. Use `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.env` (or a custom image) for skill API keys. - Values in `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.env` are passed as explicit container environment variables. Anyone with access to the selected container engine can inspect them with metadata commands such as `docker inspect` or `podman inspect`. Use a custom image, mounted secret file, or another secret delivery path if that metadata exposure is not acceptable.

Tool policy and escape hatches

Tool allow/deny policies still apply before sandbox rules. If a tool is denied globally or per-agent, sandboxing doesn't bring it back.

tools.elevated is an explicit escape hatch that runs exec outside the sandbox (gateway by default, or node when the exec target is node). /exec directives only apply for authorized senders and persist per session; to hard-disable exec, use tool policy deny (see Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated).

Debugging:

• openclaw sandbox list shows sandbox containers, status, image match, age, idle time, and associated session/agent.
• openclaw sandbox explain [--session <key>] [--agent <id>] inspects effective sandbox mode, host workspace, runtime workdir, Docker mounts, tool policy, and fix-it config keys. Its workspaceRoot field remains the configured sandbox root; effectiveHostWorkspaceRoot shows where the active workspace actually lives.
• openclaw sandbox recreate [--all | --session <key> | --agent <id>] [--browser] [--force] removes containers/environments so they get recreated with current config on next use.
• See Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated for the "why is this blocked?" mental model.

Multi-agent overrides

Each agent can override sandbox + tools: agents.entries.*.sandbox and agents.entries.*.tools (plus agents.entries.*.tools.sandbox.tools for sandbox tool policy). See Multi-Agent Sandbox & Tools for precedence.

Minimal enable example

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      sandbox: {
        mode: "non-main",
        scope: "session",
        workspaceAccess: "none",
      },
    },
  },
}

Related

• Multi-Agent Sandbox & Tools -- per-agent overrides and precedence
• OpenShell -- managed sandbox backend setup, workspace modes, and config reference
• Sandbox configuration
• Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated -- debugging "why is this blocked?"
• Security