Files
openclaw/extensions/memory-lancedb/memory-capture-sanitization.ts
Jesse Merhi d7627d6f4c refactor(prompt): use plain inbound context labels and drop system-tag sanitizer (#112000)
* refactor(prompt): plain inbound context labels with a provenance marker

Replaces trust-worded inbound context labels ("(untrusted metadata)",
"(untrusted, for context)") with plain labels plus a fixed provenance
marker suffix appended to every OpenClaw-injected context header.

Detection keys on the marker, not label text, so strippers stay correct
across UI, TUI, replay, /trace segmentation, memory recall, and the Swift
chat preprocessor. Drops sanitizeInboundSystemTags in favor of the marker
boundary plus trusted system-prompt narration.

Renames the untrusted-named plugin SDK context identifiers to
channel-provenance names, keeping deprecated aliases registered for
removal after 2026-09-08.

Adds `openclaw doctor --fix` migrations that rewrite legacy inbound
labels in stored SQLite transcripts and purge legacy envelope-
contaminated LanceDB recall rows.

* fix(ci): resolve gate failures for plain inbound context labels

- doctor sqlite readers: open read-only connections via openNodeSqliteDatabase
  so the Kysely connection-boundary guardrail holds; unexport the now-internal
  transcript snapshot type (Knip unused-export gate).
- compat registry: split the record table into registry-records.ts and
  plugin-sdk-subpath-records.ts. The new compat record pushed registry.ts past
  the 700-line oxlint cap; suppressions are disallowed, so follow the existing
  sibling record-module pattern. Public exports and PluginCompatCode literals
  unchanged.
- acp-runtime test: assert current finalization behavior (newline normalization
  only). The bracket de-fang and System: rewrite it expected were removed with
  sanitizeInboundSystemTags; forged system lines are neutralized at the
  system-event queue, the single chokepoint feeding the System:-per-line render.
- regenerate docs_map and the plugin SDK API baseline manifest.

* fix(prompt): harden inbound context label migration and drop in-band sanitizer

Review follow-ups on the plain-label + provenance-marker change:

- Remove src/security/system-tags.ts. Rewriting inbound text to neutralize
  look-alike `System:`/`[System]` markers corrupted legitimate user text and is
  not a real injection boundary; role separation plus external-content wrapping
  is. Explicit product decision, recorded at the system-event queue.
- Narrow the LanceDB legacy-row purge so it cannot delete benign memories. It
  now requires a complete known legacy sentinel line, a legacy label followed by
  a fenced JSON body, or the complete legacy external-content header. The prior
  predicates matched ordinary prose such as `Notes (untrusted metadata):`, and
  deletion is irreversible.
- Make explicit-empty canonical ChannelStructuredContext win over the deprecated
  alias via a present/absent result instead of collapsing `[]` to undefined.
- Keep `\r?` in the active-memory doctor rule. It is the only rule spanning the
  header's line break, migrated assistant rows skip newline normalization, and
  without it the marked-header replace wins and the body strips to empty. Added
  a CRLF regression test.
- Fix stale comments that described removed behavior, and cover the Swift
  prose-block strip path.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WNzsPddQmxy9Y7jKD4wAxH
2026-07-27 11:27:53 +10:00

568 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript

import { BUNDLED_CHAT_CHANNEL_ENVELOPE_PREFIXES } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/chat-channel-ids";
import { expectDefined } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/expect-runtime";
import { MESSAGE_TOOL_DELIVERY_HINTS } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/message-tool-delivery-hints";
import { truncateUtf16Safe } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/text-utility-runtime";
const MEDIA_NOTE_HEADER = /^\[media attached(?: \d+\/\d+)?: /;
function stripMediaNoteLine(line: string): string | null {
// Prompt assembly puts captions on following lines; inline legacy text stays ordinary content.
return MEDIA_NOTE_HEADER.test(line) && line.endsWith("]") ? null : line;
}
export function dropMediaNoteLines(text: string): string {
return text
.split("\n")
.map(stripMediaNoteLine)
.filter((line): line is string => line !== null)
.join("\n");
}
/**
* Provenance marker appended to every OpenClaw-injected inbound context header
* by `buildInboundUserContextPrefix`. `sanitizeForMemoryCapture` and
* `looksLikeEnvelopeSludge` key on this marker rather than on label text, so
* detection is label-agnostic (arbitrary plugin `ChannelStructuredContext`
* labels are covered) and never collides with a user's own `<heading>:` + JSON.
* The marker glyph is duplicated inline in the regexes below because extensions
* must not import core internals; keep byte-identical with
* `src/auto-reply/reply/inbound-context-marker.ts`.
*/
// A context header line: any line whose trimmed text ends with the marker.
const MARKER_HEADER_LINE_RE = /^[^\n]*⟦openclaw:ctx⟧[ \t]*$/m;
// A marker header immediately followed by its ```json fenced payload.
const MARKER_JSON_BLOCK_RE =
/^[^\n]*⟦openclaw:ctx⟧[ \t]*\n[ \t]*```json[ \t]*\n[\s\S]*?\n[ \t]*```[ \t]*\n?/gm;
// A leading chronological-window marker header (`... (chronological, ...): ⟦marker⟧`).
// Scoped to the chronological window blocks only: those carry the "keep the real
// inbound envelope inside the window" handling in stripLeadingChronologicalContextBlocks.
// Other prose headers (chat history, thread starter) defer to the current-message
// marker via the sanitize pass-loop, so they must NOT match here.
const LEADING_CHRONOLOGICAL_MARKER_HEADER_RE =
/^\s*[^\n]*chronological[^\n]*⟦openclaw:ctx⟧[ \t]*(?:\n|$)/;
const MESSAGE_TOOL_DELIVERY_HINT_RE = new RegExp(
`^\\s*(?:${MESSAGE_TOOL_DELIVERY_HINTS.map((hint) =>
hint.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&"),
).join("|")})\\s*$`,
"m",
);
const HISTORY_CONTEXT_MARKER = "[Chat messages since your last reply - for context]";
const CURRENT_MESSAGE_MARKER = "[Current message - respond to this]";
const HISTORY_CONTEXT_MARKERS = [
HISTORY_CONTEXT_MARKER,
"[Chat messages since your last reply \u2014 CONTEXT ONLY]",
"[Merged earlier messages \u2014 CONTEXT ONLY]",
] as const;
const CURRENT_MESSAGE_MARKERS = [
CURRENT_MESSAGE_MARKER,
"[CURRENT MESSAGE \u2014 reply to this]",
"[CURRENT MESSAGE \u2014 reply using the context above]",
] as const;
const ACTIVE_TURN_RECOVERY_RE = /active-turn-recovery/i;
const BRACKETED_PREFIX_RE = /\[[^\]\n]{1,500}\]\s/g;
const LEADING_CURRENT_MESSAGE_CONTEXT_RE = /^\s*Current message:[ \t]*(?:\n|$)/;
const LEADING_CURRENT_MESSAGE_REPLY_LINE_RE = /^\s*\[Replying to:[^\n]{0,1000}\]\s*\n/;
const LEADING_CURRENT_MESSAGE_ID_SENDER_RE = /^#\d+\s+[^\n:]{1,100}:\s*/;
const CONTEXT_HEADER_RE = /^Context:[ \t]*⟦openclaw:ctx⟧[ \t]*$/m;
/**
* Matches JSON blobs that look like OpenClaw transport envelope metadata.
* Orthogonal to the header marker: it catches a bare envelope payload by its
* compound keys even when no marker header precedes it (e.g. a fragment that
* leaked outside its ```json fence). Core's `formatContextJsonBlock` emits
* compact single-line JSON; the optional-newline branch also catches legacy
* pretty-printed blocks. Key list mirrors envelope identifiers used by
* `buildInboundUserContextPrefix` and stays narrow to avoid false-positives on
* legitimate user JSON with bare keys like "conversation" or "sender".
*/
const ENVELOPE_JSON_LINE_RE =
/^\s*\{\s*(?:\n\s*)?"(?:chat_id|message_id|reply_to_id|sender_id|conversation_label|conversation_info|sender_name|channel_id|channel_type|group_subject|group_channel|group_space|topic_id|thread_label)"\s*:/m;
/**
* Leading bracketed envelope header injected by `formatAgentEnvelope` /
* `formatInboundEnvelope` (src/auto-reply/envelope.ts). Real shape, with parts
* joined by spaces inside a single `[...]`:
*
* `[<channel> <from> +<elapsed>? <host>? <ip>? <Wkd YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM TZ>?] <body>`
*
* Examples:
* `[Telegram Alice +5m] I prefer dark mode`
* `[Telegram Group id:123 Alice +5m Mon 2026-05-17 14:30 EDT] Alice: text`
* `[Discord #general user +0s Mon 2026-05-17T14:30Z] text`
*
* Detection keys on the load-bearing parts that mark this header as an
* envelope (rather than arbitrary user-typed `[brackets]`): an elapsed marker
* `+<n><unit>` produced by `formatTimeAgo({suffix:false})` (units: s/m/h/d, or
* the literal `just now` fallback), or a weekday + ISO date pair produced by
* `formatEnvelopeTimestamp`. Either marker is unique enough that quoting
* `[5m]` or `[Mon 2026-05-17]` mid-sentence will not look like an envelope
* prefix because the regex is anchored to start-of-string and requires the
* marker to live inside the leading bracket followed by `]<space>`.
*
* Capture group 1 is the inside-bracket text, used by the sender-prefix
* gating logic in `sanitizeForMemoryCapture` to scope which body labels we
* are willing to strip. Header part length is capped at 300 chars to avoid
* catastrophic backtracking on pathological inputs; real envelopes are well
* under that.
*/
const INBOUND_ENVELOPE_PREFIX_RE =
/^\[([^\]\n]{0,300}?(?:\s\+(?:\d+[smhdwy]|just now)\b|\s[A-Za-z]{3}\s\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2})[^\]\n]{0,200})\]\s/;
/**
* Marker-free leading envelope header. The elapsed/date marker regex above
* misses envelopes where `formatAgentEnvelope` drops every optional marker.
* Because channel labels can also be ordinary words, callers only accept this
* match after `matchKnownChannelMarkerFreeEnvelopePrefix` finds a stronger
* group/thread or body-sender signal.
*
* Anchoring on a known bundled/official channel prefix from
* `BUNDLED_CHAT_CHANNEL_ENVELOPE_PREFIXES` keeps the detector and formatter in
* sync across callers that pass either ids or display labels like `Google Chat`.
* Case insensitive because the formatter does not lowercase `params.channel`
* itself; production paths feed mixed ids and labels.
*
* From-label must be at least one non-whitespace token so user prose like
* `[note]` or `[telegram] ...` (no following label) is not mistaken for an
* envelope. Capture group 1 is the inside-bracket text (channel + from-label
* and any remaining header parts), used by the sender-prefix gating logic in
* `sanitizeForMemoryCapture`. Header part length is capped at 300 chars to
* match the marker-aware regex above and avoid catastrophic backtracking.
*
* Guarded against an empty `BUNDLED_CHAT_CHANNEL_ENVELOPE_PREFIXES` so the
* alternation never degenerates into `(?:)` (which would match the empty string
* and flag every `[...]` prefix as an envelope). When the bundled list is empty the
* known-channel detector is disabled and only the marker-aware regex above
* applies.
*/
const ENVELOPE_KNOWN_CHANNEL_PATTERN = BUNDLED_CHAT_CHANNEL_ENVELOPE_PREFIXES.map((prefix) =>
prefix.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&"),
).join("|");
const INBOUND_ENVELOPE_KNOWN_CHANNEL_PREFIX_RE: RegExp | null = ENVELOPE_KNOWN_CHANNEL_PATTERN
? new RegExp(
`^\\[((?:${ENVELOPE_KNOWN_CHANNEL_PATTERN})\\s+[^\\]\\n\\s][^\\]\\n]{0,299})\\]\\s`,
"i",
)
: null;
/**
* Group-chat envelope bodies prepend `<Sender>: ` to the raw user text (see
* `formatInboundEnvelope`). After stripping the leading envelope bracket,
* this pattern matches that body sender prefix; capture group 1 is the label
* itself so the gated strip in `sanitizeForMemoryCapture` can compare it
* against the envelope header before removing it. Sender label is capped at
* the same length as `sanitizeEnvelopeHeaderPart` would produce in practice
* (the envelope formatter does not truncate, but a 120-char ceiling keeps the
* regex bounded and matches realistic display names).
*/
const ENVELOPE_BODY_SENDER_PREFIX_RE = /^([^\n:]{1,120}):\s/;
const ENVELOPE_BODY_DIRECT_PREFIX = "(sender)";
const ENVELOPE_BODY_SELF_PREFIX = "(self)";
const SENDER_PREFIXED_ENVELOPE_CHANNEL_RE =
/^(?:discord|imessage|line|mattermost|qqbot|signal|slack|telegram|whatsapp)(?:\s|$)/i;
const NON_DIRECT_ENVELOPE_HEADER_RE =
/(?:^|\s)(?:#[^\s]+|group:[^\s]+|group\s+id:[^\s]+|room:[^\s]+|channel\s+id:[^\s]+|id:-[^\s]+|unknown-group|[^\s]+@g\.us)(?:\s|$)/i;
const USER_AUTHORED_BODY_LABEL_RE = /^(?:action|decision|fixme|note|question|reminder|todo)$/i;
function matchKnownChannelMarkerFreeEnvelopePrefix(
text: string,
options?: { allowAmbiguousDirect?: boolean },
): RegExpMatchArray | null {
const match = INBOUND_ENVELOPE_KNOWN_CHANNEL_PREFIX_RE?.exec(text);
if (!match) {
return null;
}
const headerInside = match[1] ?? "";
if (NON_DIRECT_ENVELOPE_HEADER_RE.test(headerInside)) {
return match;
}
const body = text.slice(match[0].length);
if (stripEnvelopeBodySenderPrefix(body, headerInside) !== body) {
return match;
}
return options?.allowAmbiguousDirect ? match : null;
}
/**
* Returns true if `text` looks like it contains OpenClaw-injected envelope or
* transport metadata that should never be persisted as a long-term memory.
*/
export function looksLikeEnvelopeSludge(text: string): boolean {
if (!text) {
return false;
}
// Generic line-anchored sentinel match; precompiled at module scope so the
// hot-path callers (capture gating, recall filtering) do not pay a regex
// compile per invocation.
if (MARKER_HEADER_LINE_RE.test(text)) {
return true;
}
if (MESSAGE_TOOL_DELIVERY_HINT_RE.test(text)) {
return true;
}
if (
HISTORY_CONTEXT_MARKERS.some((marker) => text.includes(marker)) ||
CURRENT_MESSAGE_MARKERS.some((marker) => text.includes(marker))
) {
return true;
}
if (ACTIVE_TURN_RECOVERY_RE.test(text)) {
return true;
}
// Check for JSON blobs that look like envelope metadata (payload-based, header-independent).
if (ENVELOPE_JSON_LINE_RE.test(text)) {
return true;
}
// Check for the leading `[Channel sender +elapsed ...]` bracket emitted by
// formatInboundEnvelope. Marker-free channel brackets need a stronger
// group/thread or body-sender signal so user prose like `[Signal Hill] ...`
// is not treated as transport metadata.
return (
INBOUND_ENVELOPE_PREFIX_RE.test(text) ||
matchKnownChannelMarkerFreeEnvelopePrefix(text) !== null
);
}
/**
* Timestamp prefix pattern injected by `injectTimestamp`.
* Canonical source: src/auto-reply/reply/strip-inbound-meta.ts
*/
const LEADING_TIMESTAMP_PREFIX_RE = /^\[[A-Za-z]{3} \d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2} \d{2}:\d{2}[^\]]*\] */;
/**
* Decide whether a `<X>: ` body prefix that follows a stripped envelope
* bracket was emitted by the formatter (vs being user-typed prose). The
* formatter contract in `src/auto-reply/envelope.ts` only ever prepends:
* - `(self): ` for direct chats with `fromMe`, OR
* - `<resolvedSender>: ` for non-direct chats with a sender label.
*
* Some channel paths call `formatInboundEnvelope` and therefore put the room in
* the header while keeping the sender as the body label, for example
* `[Slack #general] Alice: text`. Generic `formatAgentEnvelope` callers and
* direct `formatInboundEnvelope` bodies do not add that body label, so require
* structural non-direct markers and preserve common user-authored labels like
* `TODO:`.
*/
function stripEnvelopeBodySenderPrefix(body: string, headerInside: string): string {
const match = body.match(ENVELOPE_BODY_SENDER_PREFIX_RE);
if (!match) {
return body;
}
const label = expectDefined(match[1], "envelope body sender capture");
if (label === ENVELOPE_BODY_SELF_PREFIX || label === ENVELOPE_BODY_DIRECT_PREFIX) {
return body.slice(match[0].length);
}
if (
SENDER_PREFIXED_ENVELOPE_CHANNEL_RE.test(headerInside) &&
NON_DIRECT_ENVELOPE_HEADER_RE.test(headerInside) &&
!USER_AUTHORED_BODY_LABEL_RE.test(label)
) {
return body.slice(match[0].length);
}
const headerTokens = headerInside.split(/\s+/);
if (headerTokens.includes(label) || headerInside.includes(label)) {
return body.slice(match[0].length);
}
return body;
}
function stripLeadingMessageToolDeliveryHints(text: string): string {
const lines = text.split("\n");
let index = 0;
let stripped = false;
while (index < lines.length) {
const trimmed = lines[index]?.trim();
if (!trimmed) {
index += 1;
continue;
}
if (!MESSAGE_TOOL_DELIVERY_HINTS.some((hint) => hint === trimmed)) {
break;
}
stripped = true;
index += 1;
}
return stripped ? lines.slice(index).join("\n") : text;
}
function findFirstInboundEnvelopeIndex(
text: string,
options?: { allowAmbiguousMarkerFree?: boolean; skipReplyQuoteLine?: boolean },
) {
for (const match of text.matchAll(BRACKETED_PREFIX_RE)) {
const index = match.index;
if (options?.skipReplyQuoteLine) {
const lineStart = text.lastIndexOf("\n", index - 1) + 1;
if (text.slice(lineStart, index).includes("[Replying to:")) {
continue;
}
}
const candidate = text.slice(index);
if (
INBOUND_ENVELOPE_PREFIX_RE.test(candidate) ||
matchKnownChannelMarkerFreeEnvelopePrefix(candidate, {
allowAmbiguousDirect: options?.allowAmbiguousMarkerFree,
})
) {
return index;
}
}
return -1;
}
function stripPendingHistoryContextBeforeCurrentMessage(text: string): string {
const candidateText = text.trimStart();
if (!HISTORY_CONTEXT_MARKERS.some((marker) => candidateText.startsWith(marker))) {
return text;
}
const currentMarker = findLastContextMarker(candidateText, CURRENT_MESSAGE_MARKERS);
if (!currentMarker) {
return text;
}
return candidateText.slice(currentMarker.index + currentMarker.marker.length);
}
function stripToCurrentMessageMarker(text: string): string | null {
const currentMarker = findLastContextMarker(text, CURRENT_MESSAGE_MARKERS);
if (!currentMarker) {
return null;
}
return text.slice(currentMarker.index + currentMarker.marker.length);
}
function findLastContextMarker(
text: string,
markers: readonly string[],
): { index: number; marker: string } | null {
let result: { index: number; marker: string } | null = null;
for (const marker of markers) {
const index = text.lastIndexOf(marker);
if (index !== -1 && (!result || index > result.index)) {
result = { index, marker };
}
}
return result;
}
function stripLeadingCurrentMessageContextBeforeEnvelope(text: string): string {
const candidateText = text.trimStart();
if (!LEADING_CURRENT_MESSAGE_CONTEXT_RE.test(candidateText)) {
return text;
}
const envelopeIndex = findFirstInboundEnvelopeIndex(candidateText, {
allowAmbiguousMarkerFree: true,
skipReplyQuoteLine: true,
});
if (envelopeIndex === -1) {
let plainBody = candidateText.replace(LEADING_CURRENT_MESSAGE_CONTEXT_RE, "").trimStart();
for (let pass = 0; pass < 4; pass += 1) {
const replyLineMatch = plainBody.match(LEADING_CURRENT_MESSAGE_REPLY_LINE_RE);
if (!replyLineMatch) {
break;
}
plainBody = plainBody.slice(replyLineMatch[0].length).trimStart();
}
const currentMessagePrefixMatch = plainBody.match(LEADING_CURRENT_MESSAGE_ID_SENDER_RE);
return currentMessagePrefixMatch ? plainBody.slice(currentMessagePrefixMatch[0].length) : text;
}
// `Current message:` is current-turn transport context. Strip it only when a
// real current-message body follows; otherwise preserve the text for normal capture.
return candidateText.slice(envelopeIndex);
}
function stripLeadingPlainTextMetadataBody(text: string): string {
const candidateText = text.trimStart();
const markerBody = stripToCurrentMessageMarker(candidateText);
if (markerBody !== null) {
return markerBody;
}
const currentMessageBody = stripLeadingCurrentMessageContextBeforeEnvelope(candidateText);
return currentMessageBody === candidateText ? "" : currentMessageBody;
}
function stripLeadingInboundEnvelope(
text: string,
options?: { allowAmbiguousMarkerFree?: boolean },
): string {
const strippedCandidate = stripLeadingCurrentMessageContextBeforeEnvelope(
stripPendingHistoryContextBeforeCurrentMessage(stripLeadingMessageToolDeliveryHints(text)),
);
const candidateText = strippedCandidate.trimStart();
const allowAmbiguousMarkerFree = options?.allowAmbiguousMarkerFree || strippedCandidate !== text;
const envelopePrefixMatch =
candidateText.match(INBOUND_ENVELOPE_PREFIX_RE) ??
matchKnownChannelMarkerFreeEnvelopePrefix(candidateText, {
allowAmbiguousDirect: allowAmbiguousMarkerFree,
});
if (!envelopePrefixMatch) {
return strippedCandidate === text ? text : candidateText;
}
const headerInside = envelopePrefixMatch[1] ?? "";
const afterBracket = candidateText.slice(envelopePrefixMatch[0].length);
return stripEnvelopeBodySenderPrefix(afterBracket, headerInside);
}
function stripLeadingChronologicalContextBlocks(text: string): string {
let cleaned = text;
let remainingPasses = 16;
while (remainingPasses > 0) {
remainingPasses -= 1;
const match = cleaned.match(LEADING_CHRONOLOGICAL_MARKER_HEADER_RE);
if (!match) {
return cleaned;
}
const afterLabel = cleaned.slice(match[0].length);
const bodyStart = afterLabel.search(/\S/);
if (bodyStart === -1) {
return "";
}
const bodyLineEnd = afterLabel.indexOf("\n", bodyStart);
const firstBodyLine =
bodyLineEnd === -1 ? afterLabel.slice(bodyStart) : afterLabel.slice(bodyStart, bodyLineEnd);
let lineEnvelopeIndex = firstBodyLine.trimStart().startsWith("[")
? findFirstInboundEnvelopeIndex(firstBodyLine, {
allowAmbiguousMarkerFree: true,
skipReplyQuoteLine: true,
})
: -1;
if (lineEnvelopeIndex === -1 && match[0].includes("selected for current message")) {
const inlineEnvelopeIndex = findFirstInboundEnvelopeIndex(firstBodyLine, {
allowAmbiguousMarkerFree: true,
skipReplyQuoteLine: true,
});
const prefix = inlineEnvelopeIndex === -1 ? "" : firstBodyLine.slice(0, inlineEnvelopeIndex);
lineEnvelopeIndex = /^#\d+\s/.test(prefix.trimStart()) ? inlineEnvelopeIndex : -1;
}
const envelopeIndex = lineEnvelopeIndex === -1 ? -1 : bodyStart + lineEnvelopeIndex;
if (envelopeIndex === -1) {
const separatorMatch = /\n[ \t]*\n/.exec(afterLabel);
cleaned = separatorMatch
? afterLabel.slice(separatorMatch.index + separatorMatch[0].length)
: "";
} else {
cleaned = afterLabel.slice(envelopeIndex);
}
if (!cleaned) {
return "";
}
}
return cleaned;
}
/**
* Strips OpenClaw-injected envelope metadata from a user message so that only
* the user's actual intent text remains. Returns empty string if nothing
* meaningful survives.
*/
export function sanitizeForMemoryCapture(text: string): string {
if (!text) {
return "";
}
// Pre-truncate to cap regex work on very large inputs (ReDoS mitigation)
const MAX_SANITIZE_CHARS = 10_000;
let cleaned =
text.length > MAX_SANITIZE_CHARS ? truncateUtf16Safe(text, MAX_SANITIZE_CHARS) : text;
let strippedInjectedContext = false;
cleaned = cleaned.replace(LEADING_TIMESTAMP_PREFIX_RE, "");
// Media notes are presentation-only prompt lines. Drop the whole rendered line;
// never parse attachment identity back out of its text projection.
cleaned = dropMediaNoteLines(cleaned);
const afterDeliveryHints = stripLeadingMessageToolDeliveryHints(cleaned);
strippedInjectedContext ||= afterDeliveryHints !== cleaned;
cleaned = afterDeliveryHints;
// Strip inbound metadata blocks: generic label line + optional ```json +
// content + ```. This deliberately mirrors `looksLikeEnvelopeSludge`'s
// generic label coverage so current reply-chain, location, and plugin-owned
// structured-context labels do not make `shouldCapture` reject the useful
// user body that follows.
const afterJsonMetaBlocks = cleaned.replace(MARKER_JSON_BLOCK_RE, "");
strippedInjectedContext ||= afterJsonMetaBlocks !== cleaned;
cleaned = afterJsonMetaBlocks;
// First strip legacy/inline sentinel+code-fence blocks; each replace removes
// the entire block including its sentinel header so iteration order does not
// matter.
// Plain chat-window context blocks are untrusted history lines rather than
// JSON metadata. When they lead the prompt, keep only the following real
// inbound envelope; if no envelope follows, drop the context block entirely.
const afterChronologicalContext = stripLeadingChronologicalContextBlocks(cleaned);
strippedInjectedContext ||= afterChronologicalContext !== cleaned;
cleaned = afterChronologicalContext;
// For context headers that survived the code-fence strip (plain-text body,
// no JSON fence — chat history/window), act on the earliest marker header
// each pass. A bounded retry cap rules out pathological input from spinning
// forever.
for (let pass = 0; pass < 16; pass += 1) {
const headerMatch = cleaned.match(MARKER_HEADER_LINE_RE);
if (headerMatch?.index === undefined) {
break;
}
const before = cleaned.slice(0, headerMatch.index);
if (before.trim().length > 0) {
// User content precedes the earliest context header -- truncate here so
// every trailing context block (chat history, thread starter, etc.) is
// dropped. No further passes are needed once the trailing text is gone.
cleaned = before;
break;
}
// Header sits at the very beginning. Fenced blocks were already removed
// above, so this is a prose-body context header; drop the header line and
// its plain-text body. A stray fenced block the block regex missed keeps
// only its header removed so the next pass can retry.
const lineEnd = cleaned.indexOf("\n");
const afterHeader = lineEnd === -1 ? "" : cleaned.slice(lineEnd + 1);
const afterPlainTextMetadata = afterHeader.trimStart().startsWith("```json")
? afterHeader
: stripLeadingPlainTextMetadataBody(afterHeader);
strippedInjectedContext ||= afterPlainTextMetadata !== cleaned;
cleaned = afterPlainTextMetadata;
}
// Active-memory context can be prepended before the real user prompt; strip
// that known block before the generic context-header truncation below.
const afterActiveMemoryContext = cleaned.replace(
/^Context:[ \t]*\n<active_memory_plugin>[\s\S]*?<\/active_memory_plugin>\s*/gm,
"",
);
strippedInjectedContext ||= afterActiveMemoryContext !== cleaned;
cleaned = afterActiveMemoryContext;
// Strip the marked channel-context header and everything after it.
const untrustedLineMatch = CONTEXT_HEADER_RE.exec(cleaned);
if (untrustedLineMatch) {
strippedInjectedContext = true;
cleaned = cleaned.slice(0, untrustedLineMatch.index);
}
// Strip the leading inbound-envelope bracket emitted by formatInboundEnvelope
// (src/auto-reply/envelope.ts) after context metadata is removed. Real prompt
// bodies often arrive as currentInboundContext followed by `[Channel ...]`.
// The bracket precedes the user's body text; for non-direct envelopes the
// body is prefixed with `<Sender>: ` and for direct fromMe with `(self): `,
// so strip that too when the surviving label matches the formatter contract.
cleaned = stripLeadingInboundEnvelope(cleaned, {
allowAmbiguousMarkerFree: strippedInjectedContext,
});
cleaned = cleaned.replace(/<active_memory_plugin>[\s\S]*?<\/active_memory_plugin>/g, "");
cleaned = cleaned
.replace(/\n{3,}/g, "\n\n")
.replace(/[ \t]{2,}/g, " ")
.trim();
return cleaned;
}