Files
openclaw/src/shared
Kaspre 44840007d4 fix(agents): scope custom provider baseUrl SSRF trust by origin (#80751)
* fix(agents): scope provider SSRF trust by origin

* fix(provider): preserve explicit private-network deny

* docs(provider): document exact-origin SSRF trust

* test(provider): cover exact-origin SSRF edges

* docs(provider): align local model private-origin guidance

* refactor(ssrf): keep policy merging in infra

* test(ssrf): cover exact-origin trust through guard

* test(ssrf): block sibling private-origin redirects

* fix(provider): keep loopback trust origin-scoped

* fix(provider): block metadata origin trust

* fix(ssrf): keep metadata rebinding blocked

* fix(ssrf): block cloud metadata origins

* fix(ssrf): block ipv6 metadata origins

* fix(ssrf): block embedded metadata origins

* test(ssrf): cover embedded link-local metadata

* test(provider): cover custom anthropic proxy classification

* test(provider): widen transport policy mock

* test(plugin-sdk): assert metadata-IP allowedOrigins entries are rejected

Plugin authors can construct an SsrFPolicy that lists any well-formed
http(s) origin in allowedOrigins. The abuse-resistance lives one layer
deeper, in resolvePinnedHostnameWithPolicy's metadata/link-local block.
Add an SDK-level smoke test asserting that contract directly:

- AWS/Alibaba IMDS IPv4 literals, GCP metadata canonical hostname,
  IPv6 ULA metadata literal, and non-metadata link-local IPv4 entries
  build a policy via ssrfPolicyFromHttpBaseUrlAllowedOrigin and are
  then rejected at resolvePinnedHostnameWithPolicy.
- DNS rebinding from a trusted private DNS origin to a metadata IP is
  rejected even when the request hostname is origin-trusted.

This would fail if the SDK helper or resolveSsrFPolicyForUrl ever
short-circuited past the metadata block.

* chore(docs): regenerate baselines after upstream rebase

upstream/main moved between rebases; the merged source state for the
PR's `src/config/schema.help.ts` change and the upstream plugin-sdk
surface changes both produce different hashes than the committed
baselines, so `config:docs:check` and `plugin-sdk:api:check` would fail.

Regenerated via `pnpm config:docs:gen` + `pnpm plugin-sdk:api:gen` on
Crabbox; both baselines verified with their respective `--check`
generators.

* test(plugin-sdk): assert SSRF blocked error class

* fix(lint): satisfy exact-origin PR lint rules

* docs: clarify custom provider origin trust

* chore(docs): refresh plugin sdk api baseline

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
2026-05-15 11:00:29 +01:00
..