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2b77862b92
Two-step decode in decodeLiteralEscapes:
- Step 1: regex anchored to high-surrogate range (U+D800–U+DBFF) so a
preceding BMP escape (e.g. \u0041) cannot consume the high-surrogate
half of a valid pair like \uD83D\uDE00 (😀), leaving \uDE00 lone.
- Step 2: decode remaining BMP codepoints; preserve lone surrogates as
six-character literals instead of corrupting them to U+FFFD in the
outbound IRC UTF-8 stream.
88 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
88 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
// Irc tests cover protocol plugin behavior.
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import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import {
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parseIrcLine,
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parseIrcPrefix,
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sanitizeIrcOutboundText,
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sanitizeIrcTarget,
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} from "./protocol.js";
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describe("irc protocol", () => {
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it("parses PRIVMSG lines with prefix and trailing", () => {
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const parsed = parseIrcLine(":alice!u@host PRIVMSG #room :hello world");
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expect(parsed).toEqual({
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raw: ":alice!u@host PRIVMSG #room :hello world",
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prefix: "alice!u@host",
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command: "PRIVMSG",
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params: ["#room"],
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trailing: "hello world",
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});
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expect(parseIrcPrefix(parsed?.prefix)).toEqual({
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nick: "alice",
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user: "u",
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host: "host",
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});
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});
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it("sanitizes outbound text to prevent command injection", () => {
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expect(sanitizeIrcOutboundText("hello\\r\\nJOIN #oops")).toBe("hello JOIN #oops");
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expect(sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\u0001test\\u0000")).toBe("test");
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});
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it("validates targets and rejects control characters", () => {
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expect(sanitizeIrcTarget("#openclaw")).toBe("#openclaw");
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expect(() => sanitizeIrcTarget("#bad\\nPING")).toThrow(/Invalid IRC target/);
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expect(() => sanitizeIrcTarget(" user")).toThrow(/Invalid IRC target/);
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});
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describe("\\u escape surrogate-range guard", () => {
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const LONE_SURROGATE = /[\uD800-\uDFFF]/;
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it("preserves literal \\uXXXX when codepoint is a high surrogate", () => {
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const out = sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\uD800");
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expect(LONE_SURROGATE.test(out)).toBe(false);
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});
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it("preserves literal \\uXXXX when codepoint is a low surrogate", () => {
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const out = sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\uDFFF");
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expect(LONE_SURROGATE.test(out)).toBe(false);
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});
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it("still decodes valid BMP codepoints outside the surrogate range", () => {
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expect(sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\u0041")).toBe("A");
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expect(sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\u00e9")).toBe("é"); // é
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});
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it("decodes adjacent surrogate-pair escapes to the astral character", () => {
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expect(sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\uD83D\\uDE00")).toBe("😀");
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expect(sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\uD83D\\uDE00\\uD83D\\uDE01")).toBe("😀😁");
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});
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it("preserves lone high surrogate even when followed by a non-surrogate \\u", () => {
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const out = sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\uD800\\u0041");
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expect(LONE_SURROGATE.test(out)).toBe(false);
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expect(out).toContain("A");
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});
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it("decodes BMP-escaped prefix before a surrogate pair correctly", () => {
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// Regression: \\u0041\\uD83D\\uDE00 must yield A😀, not A\\uD83D\\uDE00.
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// The old step-1 regex \\u(xxxx)\\u(xxxx) would consume \\u0041\\uD83D as a
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// non-pair, leaving \\uDE00 as a lone surrogate.
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expect(sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\u0041\\uD83D\\uDE00")).toBe("A😀");
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});
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it("handles lone high surrogate followed by a different surrogate pair", () => {
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// \\uD800\\uD83D\\uDE00: D800 is lone (no matching low), D83D+DE00 form 😀.
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// Use toBe rather than LONE_SURROGATE regex: emoji contains surrogate
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// code units internally that would trigger a naive /[\uD800-\uDFFF]/ check.
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expect(sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\uD800\\uD83D\\uDE00")).toBe("\\uD800😀");
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});
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it("preserves two consecutive lone high surrogates", () => {
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const out = sanitizeIrcOutboundText("\\uD800\\uD801");
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expect(LONE_SURROGATE.test(out)).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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});
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