Files
openclaw/src/security/audit-extra.async.ts
2026-02-14 15:39:45 +00:00

851 lines
30 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Asynchronous security audit collector functions.
*
* These functions perform I/O (filesystem, config reads) to detect security issues.
*/
import fs from "node:fs/promises";
import path from "node:path";
import type { SandboxToolPolicy } from "../agents/sandbox/types.js";
import type { OpenClawConfig, ConfigFileSnapshot } from "../config/config.js";
import type { AgentToolsConfig } from "../config/types.tools.js";
import type { SkillScanFinding } from "./skill-scanner.js";
import type { ExecFn } from "./windows-acl.js";
import { resolveAgentWorkspaceDir, resolveDefaultAgentId } from "../agents/agent-scope.js";
import { isToolAllowedByPolicies } from "../agents/pi-tools.policy.js";
import {
resolveSandboxConfigForAgent,
resolveSandboxToolPolicyForAgent,
} from "../agents/sandbox.js";
import { loadWorkspaceSkillEntries } from "../agents/skills.js";
import { resolveToolProfilePolicy } from "../agents/tool-policy.js";
import { MANIFEST_KEY } from "../compat/legacy-names.js";
import { resolveNativeSkillsEnabled } from "../config/commands.js";
import { createConfigIO } from "../config/config.js";
import { collectIncludePathsRecursive } from "../config/includes-scan.js";
import { resolveOAuthDir } from "../config/paths.js";
import { normalizePluginsConfig } from "../plugins/config-state.js";
import { normalizeAgentId } from "../routing/session-key.js";
import {
formatPermissionDetail,
formatPermissionRemediation,
inspectPathPermissions,
safeStat,
} from "./audit-fs.js";
import * as skillScanner from "./skill-scanner.js";
export type SecurityAuditFinding = {
checkId: string;
severity: "info" | "warn" | "critical";
title: string;
detail: string;
remediation?: string;
};
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
function expandTilde(p: string, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | null {
if (!p.startsWith("~")) {
return p;
}
const home = typeof env.HOME === "string" && env.HOME.trim() ? env.HOME.trim() : null;
if (!home) {
return null;
}
if (p === "~") {
return home;
}
if (p.startsWith("~/") || p.startsWith("~\\")) {
return path.join(home, p.slice(2));
}
return null;
}
function isPathInside(basePath: string, candidatePath: string): boolean {
const base = path.resolve(basePath);
const candidate = path.resolve(candidatePath);
const rel = path.relative(base, candidate);
return rel === "" || (!rel.startsWith(`..${path.sep}`) && rel !== ".." && !path.isAbsolute(rel));
}
function extensionUsesSkippedScannerPath(entry: string): boolean {
const segments = entry.split(/[\\/]+/).filter(Boolean);
return segments.some(
(segment) =>
segment === "node_modules" ||
(segment.startsWith(".") && segment !== "." && segment !== ".."),
);
}
async function readPluginManifestExtensions(pluginPath: string): Promise<string[]> {
const manifestPath = path.join(pluginPath, "package.json");
const raw = await fs.readFile(manifestPath, "utf-8").catch(() => "");
if (!raw.trim()) {
return [];
}
const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as Partial<
Record<typeof MANIFEST_KEY, { extensions?: unknown }>
> | null;
const extensions = parsed?.[MANIFEST_KEY]?.extensions;
if (!Array.isArray(extensions)) {
return [];
}
return extensions.map((entry) => (typeof entry === "string" ? entry.trim() : "")).filter(Boolean);
}
function listWorkspaceDirs(cfg: OpenClawConfig): string[] {
const dirs = new Set<string>();
const list = cfg.agents?.list;
if (Array.isArray(list)) {
for (const entry of list) {
if (entry && typeof entry === "object" && typeof entry.id === "string") {
dirs.add(resolveAgentWorkspaceDir(cfg, entry.id));
}
}
}
dirs.add(resolveAgentWorkspaceDir(cfg, resolveDefaultAgentId(cfg)));
return [...dirs];
}
function formatCodeSafetyDetails(findings: SkillScanFinding[], rootDir: string): string {
return findings
.map((finding) => {
const relPath = path.relative(rootDir, finding.file);
const filePath =
relPath && relPath !== "." && !relPath.startsWith("..")
? relPath
: path.basename(finding.file);
const normalizedPath = filePath.replaceAll("\\", "/");
return ` - [${finding.ruleId}] ${finding.message} (${normalizedPath}:${finding.line})`;
})
.join("\n");
}
function unionAllow(base?: string[], extra?: string[]): string[] | undefined {
if (!Array.isArray(extra) || extra.length === 0) {
return base;
}
if (!Array.isArray(base) || base.length === 0) {
return Array.from(new Set(["*", ...extra]));
}
return Array.from(new Set([...base, ...extra]));
}
function pickToolPolicy(config?: {
allow?: string[];
alsoAllow?: string[];
deny?: string[];
}): SandboxToolPolicy | undefined {
if (!config) {
return undefined;
}
const allow = Array.isArray(config.allow)
? unionAllow(config.allow, config.alsoAllow)
: Array.isArray(config.alsoAllow) && config.alsoAllow.length > 0
? unionAllow(undefined, config.alsoAllow)
: undefined;
const deny = Array.isArray(config.deny) ? config.deny : undefined;
if (!allow && !deny) {
return undefined;
}
return { allow, deny };
}
function resolveToolPolicies(params: {
cfg: OpenClawConfig;
agentTools?: AgentToolsConfig;
sandboxMode?: "off" | "non-main" | "all";
agentId?: string | null;
}): Array<SandboxToolPolicy | undefined> {
const profile = params.agentTools?.profile ?? params.cfg.tools?.profile;
const profilePolicy = resolveToolProfilePolicy(profile);
const policies: Array<SandboxToolPolicy | undefined> = [
profilePolicy,
pickToolPolicy(params.cfg.tools ?? undefined),
pickToolPolicy(params.agentTools),
];
if (params.sandboxMode === "all") {
policies.push(resolveSandboxToolPolicyForAgent(params.cfg, params.agentId ?? undefined));
}
return policies;
}
function normalizePluginIdSet(entries: string[]): Set<string> {
return new Set(entries.map((entry) => entry.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean));
}
function resolveEnabledExtensionPluginIds(params: {
cfg: OpenClawConfig;
pluginDirs: string[];
}): string[] {
const normalized = normalizePluginsConfig(params.cfg.plugins);
if (!normalized.enabled) {
return [];
}
const allowSet = normalizePluginIdSet(normalized.allow);
const denySet = normalizePluginIdSet(normalized.deny);
const entryById = new Map<string, { enabled?: boolean }>();
for (const [id, entry] of Object.entries(normalized.entries)) {
entryById.set(id.trim().toLowerCase(), entry);
}
const enabled: string[] = [];
for (const id of params.pluginDirs) {
const normalizedId = id.trim().toLowerCase();
if (!normalizedId) {
continue;
}
if (denySet.has(normalizedId)) {
continue;
}
if (allowSet.size > 0 && !allowSet.has(normalizedId)) {
continue;
}
if (entryById.get(normalizedId)?.enabled === false) {
continue;
}
enabled.push(normalizedId);
}
return enabled;
}
function collectAllowEntries(config?: { allow?: string[]; alsoAllow?: string[] }): string[] {
const out: string[] = [];
if (Array.isArray(config?.allow)) {
out.push(...config.allow);
}
if (Array.isArray(config?.alsoAllow)) {
out.push(...config.alsoAllow);
}
return out.map((entry) => entry.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean);
}
function hasExplicitPluginAllow(params: {
allowEntries: string[];
enabledPluginIds: Set<string>;
}): boolean {
return params.allowEntries.some(
(entry) => entry === "group:plugins" || params.enabledPluginIds.has(entry),
);
}
function hasProviderPluginAllow(params: {
byProvider?: Record<string, { allow?: string[]; alsoAllow?: string[]; deny?: string[] }>;
enabledPluginIds: Set<string>;
}): boolean {
if (!params.byProvider) {
return false;
}
for (const policy of Object.values(params.byProvider)) {
if (
hasExplicitPluginAllow({
allowEntries: collectAllowEntries(policy),
enabledPluginIds: params.enabledPluginIds,
})
) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Exported collectors
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
export async function collectPluginsTrustFindings(params: {
cfg: OpenClawConfig;
stateDir: string;
}): Promise<SecurityAuditFinding[]> {
const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
const extensionsDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "extensions");
const st = await safeStat(extensionsDir);
if (!st.ok || !st.isDir) {
return findings;
}
const entries = await fs.readdir(extensionsDir, { withFileTypes: true }).catch(() => []);
const pluginDirs = entries
.filter((e) => e.isDirectory())
.map((e) => e.name)
.filter(Boolean);
if (pluginDirs.length === 0) {
return findings;
}
const allow = params.cfg.plugins?.allow;
const allowConfigured = Array.isArray(allow) && allow.length > 0;
if (!allowConfigured) {
const hasString = (value: unknown) => typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0;
const hasAccountStringKey = (account: unknown, key: string) =>
Boolean(
account &&
typeof account === "object" &&
hasString((account as Record<string, unknown>)[key]),
);
const discordConfigured =
hasString(params.cfg.channels?.discord?.token) ||
Boolean(
params.cfg.channels?.discord?.accounts &&
Object.values(params.cfg.channels.discord.accounts).some((a) =>
hasAccountStringKey(a, "token"),
),
) ||
hasString(process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN);
const telegramConfigured =
hasString(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.botToken) ||
hasString(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.tokenFile) ||
Boolean(
params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.accounts &&
Object.values(params.cfg.channels.telegram.accounts).some(
(a) => hasAccountStringKey(a, "botToken") || hasAccountStringKey(a, "tokenFile"),
),
) ||
hasString(process.env.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN);
const slackConfigured =
hasString(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.botToken) ||
hasString(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.appToken) ||
Boolean(
params.cfg.channels?.slack?.accounts &&
Object.values(params.cfg.channels.slack.accounts).some(
(a) => hasAccountStringKey(a, "botToken") || hasAccountStringKey(a, "appToken"),
),
) ||
hasString(process.env.SLACK_BOT_TOKEN) ||
hasString(process.env.SLACK_APP_TOKEN);
const skillCommandsLikelyExposed =
(discordConfigured &&
resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
providerId: "discord",
providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.discord?.commands?.nativeSkills,
globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills,
})) ||
(telegramConfigured &&
resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
providerId: "telegram",
providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.commands?.nativeSkills,
globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills,
})) ||
(slackConfigured &&
resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
providerId: "slack",
providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.slack?.commands?.nativeSkills,
globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills,
}));
findings.push({
checkId: "plugins.extensions_no_allowlist",
severity: skillCommandsLikelyExposed ? "critical" : "warn",
title: "Extensions exist but plugins.allow is not set",
detail:
`Found ${pluginDirs.length} extension(s) under ${extensionsDir}. Without plugins.allow, any discovered plugin id may load (depending on config and plugin behavior).` +
(skillCommandsLikelyExposed
? "\nNative skill commands are enabled on at least one configured chat surface; treat unpinned/unallowlisted extensions as high risk."
: ""),
remediation: "Set plugins.allow to an explicit list of plugin ids you trust.",
});
}
const enabledExtensionPluginIds = resolveEnabledExtensionPluginIds({
cfg: params.cfg,
pluginDirs,
});
if (enabledExtensionPluginIds.length > 0) {
const enabledPluginSet = new Set(enabledExtensionPluginIds);
const contexts: Array<{
label: string;
agentId?: string;
tools?: AgentToolsConfig;
}> = [{ label: "default" }];
for (const entry of params.cfg.agents?.list ?? []) {
if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object" || typeof entry.id !== "string") {
continue;
}
contexts.push({
label: `agents.list.${entry.id}`,
agentId: entry.id,
tools: entry.tools,
});
}
const permissiveContexts: string[] = [];
for (const context of contexts) {
const profile = context.tools?.profile ?? params.cfg.tools?.profile;
const restrictiveProfile = Boolean(resolveToolProfilePolicy(profile));
const sandboxMode = resolveSandboxConfigForAgent(params.cfg, context.agentId).mode;
const policies = resolveToolPolicies({
cfg: params.cfg,
agentTools: context.tools,
sandboxMode,
agentId: context.agentId,
});
const broadPolicy = isToolAllowedByPolicies("__openclaw_plugin_probe__", policies);
const explicitPluginAllow =
!restrictiveProfile &&
(hasExplicitPluginAllow({
allowEntries: collectAllowEntries(params.cfg.tools),
enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet,
}) ||
hasProviderPluginAllow({
byProvider: params.cfg.tools?.byProvider,
enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet,
}) ||
hasExplicitPluginAllow({
allowEntries: collectAllowEntries(context.tools),
enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet,
}) ||
hasProviderPluginAllow({
byProvider: context.tools?.byProvider,
enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet,
}));
if (broadPolicy || explicitPluginAllow) {
permissiveContexts.push(context.label);
}
}
if (permissiveContexts.length > 0) {
findings.push({
checkId: "plugins.tools_reachable_permissive_policy",
severity: "warn",
title: "Extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy",
detail:
`Enabled extension plugins: ${enabledExtensionPluginIds.join(", ")}.\n` +
`Permissive tool policy contexts:\n${permissiveContexts.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
remediation:
"Use restrictive profiles (`minimal`/`coding`) or explicit tool allowlists that exclude plugin tools for agents handling untrusted input.",
});
}
}
return findings;
}
export async function collectIncludeFilePermFindings(params: {
configSnapshot: ConfigFileSnapshot;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
platform?: NodeJS.Platform;
execIcacls?: ExecFn;
}): Promise<SecurityAuditFinding[]> {
const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
if (!params.configSnapshot.exists) {
return findings;
}
const configPath = params.configSnapshot.path;
const includePaths = await collectIncludePathsRecursive({
configPath,
parsed: params.configSnapshot.parsed,
});
if (includePaths.length === 0) {
return findings;
}
for (const p of includePaths) {
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
const perms = await inspectPathPermissions(p, {
env: params.env,
platform: params.platform,
exec: params.execIcacls,
});
if (!perms.ok) {
continue;
}
if (perms.worldWritable || perms.groupWritable) {
findings.push({
checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_writable",
severity: "critical",
title: "Config include file is writable by others",
detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; another user could influence your effective config.`,
remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
targetPath: p,
perms,
isDir: false,
posixMode: 0o600,
env: params.env,
}),
});
} else if (perms.worldReadable) {
findings.push({
checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_world_readable",
severity: "critical",
title: "Config include file is world-readable",
detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; include files can contain tokens and private settings.`,
remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
targetPath: p,
perms,
isDir: false,
posixMode: 0o600,
env: params.env,
}),
});
} else if (perms.groupReadable) {
findings.push({
checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_group_readable",
severity: "warn",
title: "Config include file is group-readable",
detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; include files can contain tokens and private settings.`,
remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
targetPath: p,
perms,
isDir: false,
posixMode: 0o600,
env: params.env,
}),
});
}
}
return findings;
}
export async function collectStateDeepFilesystemFindings(params: {
cfg: OpenClawConfig;
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
stateDir: string;
platform?: NodeJS.Platform;
execIcacls?: ExecFn;
}): Promise<SecurityAuditFinding[]> {
const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
const oauthDir = resolveOAuthDir(params.env, params.stateDir);
const oauthPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(oauthDir, {
env: params.env,
platform: params.platform,
exec: params.execIcacls,
});
if (oauthPerms.ok && oauthPerms.isDir) {
if (oauthPerms.worldWritable || oauthPerms.groupWritable) {
findings.push({
checkId: "fs.credentials_dir.perms_writable",
severity: "critical",
title: "Credentials dir is writable by others",
detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(oauthDir, oauthPerms)}; another user could drop/modify credential files.`,
remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
targetPath: oauthDir,
perms: oauthPerms,
isDir: true,
posixMode: 0o700,
env: params.env,
}),
});
} else if (oauthPerms.groupReadable || oauthPerms.worldReadable) {
findings.push({
checkId: "fs.credentials_dir.perms_readable",
severity: "warn",
title: "Credentials dir is readable by others",
detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(oauthDir, oauthPerms)}; credentials and allowlists can be sensitive.`,
remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
targetPath: oauthDir,
perms: oauthPerms,
isDir: true,
posixMode: 0o700,
env: params.env,
}),
});
}
}
const agentIds = Array.isArray(params.cfg.agents?.list)
? params.cfg.agents?.list
.map((a) => (a && typeof a === "object" && typeof a.id === "string" ? a.id.trim() : ""))
.filter(Boolean)
: [];
const defaultAgentId = resolveDefaultAgentId(params.cfg);
const ids = Array.from(new Set([defaultAgentId, ...agentIds])).map((id) => normalizeAgentId(id));
for (const agentId of ids) {
const agentDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "agents", agentId, "agent");
const authPath = path.join(agentDir, "auth-profiles.json");
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
const authPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(authPath, {
env: params.env,
platform: params.platform,
exec: params.execIcacls,
});
if (authPerms.ok) {
if (authPerms.worldWritable || authPerms.groupWritable) {
findings.push({
checkId: "fs.auth_profiles.perms_writable",
severity: "critical",
title: "auth-profiles.json is writable by others",
detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(authPath, authPerms)}; another user could inject credentials.`,
remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
targetPath: authPath,
perms: authPerms,
isDir: false,
posixMode: 0o600,
env: params.env,
}),
});
} else if (authPerms.worldReadable || authPerms.groupReadable) {
findings.push({
checkId: "fs.auth_profiles.perms_readable",
severity: "warn",
title: "auth-profiles.json is readable by others",
detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(authPath, authPerms)}; auth-profiles.json contains API keys and OAuth tokens.`,
remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
targetPath: authPath,
perms: authPerms,
isDir: false,
posixMode: 0o600,
env: params.env,
}),
});
}
}
const storePath = path.join(params.stateDir, "agents", agentId, "sessions", "sessions.json");
// eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
const storePerms = await inspectPathPermissions(storePath, {
env: params.env,
platform: params.platform,
exec: params.execIcacls,
});
if (storePerms.ok) {
if (storePerms.worldReadable || storePerms.groupReadable) {
findings.push({
checkId: "fs.sessions_store.perms_readable",
severity: "warn",
title: "sessions.json is readable by others",
detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(storePath, storePerms)}; routing and transcript metadata can be sensitive.`,
remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
targetPath: storePath,
perms: storePerms,
isDir: false,
posixMode: 0o600,
env: params.env,
}),
});
}
}
}
const logFile =
typeof params.cfg.logging?.file === "string" ? params.cfg.logging.file.trim() : "";
if (logFile) {
const expanded = logFile.startsWith("~") ? expandTilde(logFile, params.env) : logFile;
if (expanded) {
const logPath = path.resolve(expanded);
const logPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(logPath, {
env: params.env,
platform: params.platform,
exec: params.execIcacls,
});
if (logPerms.ok) {
if (logPerms.worldReadable || logPerms.groupReadable) {
findings.push({
checkId: "fs.log_file.perms_readable",
severity: "warn",
title: "Log file is readable by others",
detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(logPath, logPerms)}; logs can contain private messages and tool output.`,
remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
targetPath: logPath,
perms: logPerms,
isDir: false,
posixMode: 0o600,
env: params.env,
}),
});
}
}
}
}
return findings;
}
export async function readConfigSnapshotForAudit(params: {
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
configPath: string;
}): Promise<ConfigFileSnapshot> {
return await createConfigIO({
env: params.env,
configPath: params.configPath,
}).readConfigFileSnapshot();
}
export async function collectPluginsCodeSafetyFindings(params: {
stateDir: string;
}): Promise<SecurityAuditFinding[]> {
const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
const extensionsDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "extensions");
const st = await safeStat(extensionsDir);
if (!st.ok || !st.isDir) {
return findings;
}
const entries = await fs.readdir(extensionsDir, { withFileTypes: true }).catch((err) => {
findings.push({
checkId: "plugins.code_safety.scan_failed",
severity: "warn",
title: "Plugin extensions directory scan failed",
detail: `Static code scan could not list extensions directory: ${String(err)}`,
remediation:
"Check file permissions and plugin layout, then rerun `openclaw security audit --deep`.",
});
return [];
});
const pluginDirs = entries.filter((e) => e.isDirectory()).map((e) => e.name);
for (const pluginName of pluginDirs) {
const pluginPath = path.join(extensionsDir, pluginName);
const extensionEntries = await readPluginManifestExtensions(pluginPath).catch(() => []);
const forcedScanEntries: string[] = [];
const escapedEntries: string[] = [];
for (const entry of extensionEntries) {
const resolvedEntry = path.resolve(pluginPath, entry);
if (!isPathInside(pluginPath, resolvedEntry)) {
escapedEntries.push(entry);
continue;
}
if (extensionUsesSkippedScannerPath(entry)) {
findings.push({
checkId: "plugins.code_safety.entry_path",
severity: "warn",
title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" entry path is hidden or node_modules`,
detail: `Extension entry "${entry}" points to a hidden or node_modules path. Deep code scan will cover this entry explicitly, but review this path choice carefully.`,
remediation: "Prefer extension entrypoints under normal source paths like dist/ or src/.",
});
}
forcedScanEntries.push(resolvedEntry);
}
if (escapedEntries.length > 0) {
findings.push({
checkId: "plugins.code_safety.entry_escape",
severity: "critical",
title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" has extension entry path traversal`,
detail: `Found extension entries that escape the plugin directory:\n${escapedEntries.map((entry) => ` - ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
remediation:
"Update the plugin manifest so all openclaw.extensions entries stay inside the plugin directory.",
});
}
const summary = await skillScanner
.scanDirectoryWithSummary(pluginPath, {
includeFiles: forcedScanEntries,
})
.catch((err) => {
findings.push({
checkId: "plugins.code_safety.scan_failed",
severity: "warn",
title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" code scan failed`,
detail: `Static code scan could not complete: ${String(err)}`,
remediation:
"Check file permissions and plugin layout, then rerun `openclaw security audit --deep`.",
});
return null;
});
if (!summary) {
continue;
}
if (summary.critical > 0) {
const criticalFindings = summary.findings.filter((f) => f.severity === "critical");
const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(criticalFindings, pluginPath);
findings.push({
checkId: "plugins.code_safety",
severity: "critical",
title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" contains dangerous code patterns`,
detail: `Found ${summary.critical} critical issue(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s):\n${details}`,
remediation:
"Review the plugin source code carefully before use. If untrusted, remove the plugin from your OpenClaw extensions state directory.",
});
} else if (summary.warn > 0) {
const warnFindings = summary.findings.filter((f) => f.severity === "warn");
const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(warnFindings, pluginPath);
findings.push({
checkId: "plugins.code_safety",
severity: "warn",
title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" contains suspicious code patterns`,
detail: `Found ${summary.warn} warning(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s):\n${details}`,
remediation: `Review the flagged code to ensure it is intentional and safe.`,
});
}
}
return findings;
}
export async function collectInstalledSkillsCodeSafetyFindings(params: {
cfg: OpenClawConfig;
stateDir: string;
}): Promise<SecurityAuditFinding[]> {
const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
const pluginExtensionsDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "extensions");
const scannedSkillDirs = new Set<string>();
const workspaceDirs = listWorkspaceDirs(params.cfg);
for (const workspaceDir of workspaceDirs) {
const entries = loadWorkspaceSkillEntries(workspaceDir, { config: params.cfg });
for (const entry of entries) {
if (entry.skill.source === "openclaw-bundled") {
continue;
}
const skillDir = path.resolve(entry.skill.baseDir);
if (isPathInside(pluginExtensionsDir, skillDir)) {
// Plugin code is already covered by plugins.code_safety checks.
continue;
}
if (scannedSkillDirs.has(skillDir)) {
continue;
}
scannedSkillDirs.add(skillDir);
const skillName = entry.skill.name;
const summary = await skillScanner.scanDirectoryWithSummary(skillDir).catch((err) => {
findings.push({
checkId: "skills.code_safety.scan_failed",
severity: "warn",
title: `Skill "${skillName}" code scan failed`,
detail: `Static code scan could not complete for ${skillDir}: ${String(err)}`,
remediation:
"Check file permissions and skill layout, then rerun `openclaw security audit --deep`.",
});
return null;
});
if (!summary) {
continue;
}
if (summary.critical > 0) {
const criticalFindings = summary.findings.filter(
(finding) => finding.severity === "critical",
);
const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(criticalFindings, skillDir);
findings.push({
checkId: "skills.code_safety",
severity: "critical",
title: `Skill "${skillName}" contains dangerous code patterns`,
detail: `Found ${summary.critical} critical issue(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s) under ${skillDir}:\n${details}`,
remediation: `Review the skill source code before use. If untrusted, remove "${skillDir}".`,
});
} else if (summary.warn > 0) {
const warnFindings = summary.findings.filter((finding) => finding.severity === "warn");
const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(warnFindings, skillDir);
findings.push({
checkId: "skills.code_safety",
severity: "warn",
title: `Skill "${skillName}" contains suspicious code patterns`,
detail: `Found ${summary.warn} warning(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s) under ${skillDir}:\n${details}`,
remediation: "Review flagged lines to ensure the behavior is intentional and safe.",
});
}
}
}
return findings;
}