openclaw/docs/tools/multi-agent-sandbox-tools.md

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summary	title	sidebarTitle	read_when	status
Per-agent sandbox + tool restrictions, precedence, and examples	Multi-agent sandbox and tools	Multi-agent sandbox and tools	You want per-agent sandboxing or per-agent tool allow/deny policies in a multi-agent gateway.	active

Each agent in a multi-agent setup can override the global sandbox and tool policy. This page covers per-agent configuration, precedence rules, and examples.

Backends and modes — full sandbox reference. Debug "why is this blocked?" Elevated exec for trusted senders. Auth is scoped by agent: each agent has its own `agentDir` auth store in `~/.openclaw/agents//agent/openclaw-agent.sqlite`. Never reuse `agentDir` across agents. Agents can read through to the default/main agent's auth profiles when they do not have a local profile, but OAuth refresh tokens are not cloned into secondary agent stores. If you copy credentials manually, copy only portable static `api_key` or `token` profiles.

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Configuration examples

```json { "agents": { "list": [ { "id": "main", "default": true, "name": "Personal Assistant", "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace", "sandbox": { "mode": "off" } }, { "id": "family", "name": "Family Bot", "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-family", "sandbox": { "mode": "all", "scope": "agent" }, "tools": { "allow": ["read", "message"], "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process", "browser"], "message": { "crossContext": { "allowWithinProvider": false, "allowAcrossProviders": false } } } } ] }, "bindings": [ { "agentId": "family", "match": { "provider": "whatsapp", "accountId": "*", "peer": { "kind": "group", "id": "120363424282127706@g.us" } } } ] } ```

**Result:**

- `main` agent: runs on host, full tool access.
- `family` agent: runs in Docker (one container per agent), only `read` and current-conversation message sends.

```json { "agents": { "list": [ { "id": "personal", "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-personal", "sandbox": { "mode": "off" } }, { "id": "work", "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-work", "sandbox": { "mode": "all", "scope": "shared", "workspaceRoot": "/tmp/work-sandboxes" }, "tools": { "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"], "deny": ["browser", "gateway", "discord"] } } ] } } ``` ```json { "tools": { "profile": "coding" }, "agents": { "list": [ { "id": "support", "tools": { "profile": "messaging", "allow": ["slack"] } } ] } } ```

**Result:**

- default agents get coding tools.
- `support` agent is messaging-only (+ Slack tool).

```json { "agents": { "defaults": { "sandbox": { "mode": "non-main", "scope": "session" } }, "list": [ { "id": "main", "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace", "sandbox": { "mode": "off" } }, { "id": "public", "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace-public", "sandbox": { "mode": "all", "scope": "agent" }, "tools": { "allow": ["read"], "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"] } } ] } } ```

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Configuration precedence

When both global (agents.defaults.*) and agent-specific (agents.entries.*.*) configs exist:

Sandbox config

Agent-specific settings override global:

agents.entries.*.sandbox.mode > agents.defaults.sandbox.mode
agents.entries.*.sandbox.scope > agents.defaults.sandbox.scope
agents.entries.*.sandbox.workspaceRoot > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceRoot
agents.entries.*.sandbox.workspaceAccess > agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess
agents.entries.*.sandbox.docker.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.*
agents.entries.*.sandbox.browser.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.*
agents.entries.*.sandbox.prune.* > agents.defaults.sandbox.prune.*

`agents.entries.*.sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.*` overrides `agents.defaults.sandbox.{docker,browser,prune}.*` for that agent (ignored when sandbox scope resolves to `"shared"`).

Tool restrictions

The filtering order is:

`tools.profile` or `agents.entries.*.tools.profile`. `tools.byProvider[provider].profile` or `agents.entries.*.tools.byProvider[provider].profile`. `tools.allow` / `tools.deny`. `tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny`. `agents.entries.*.tools.allow/deny`. `agents.entries.*.tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny`. `tools.sandbox.tools` or `agents.entries.*.tools.sandbox.tools`. `tools.subagents.tools`, if applicable. - Each level can further restrict tools, but cannot grant back denied tools from earlier levels. - If `agents.entries.*.tools.sandbox.tools` is set, it replaces `tools.sandbox.tools` for that agent. - If `agents.entries.*.tools.profile` is set, it overrides `tools.profile` for that agent. - Provider tool keys accept either `provider` (e.g. `google-antigravity`) or `provider/model` (e.g. `openai/gpt-5.4`). If any explicit allowlist in that chain leaves the run with no callable tools, OpenClaw stops before submitting the prompt to the model. This is intentional: an agent configured with a missing tool such as `agents.entries.*.tools.allow: ["query_db"]` should fail loudly until the plugin that registers `query_db` is enabled, not continue as a text-only agent.

Tool policies support group:* shorthands that expand to multiple tools. See Tool groups for the full list.

Per-agent elevated overrides (agents.entries.*.tools.elevated) can further restrict elevated exec for specific agents. See Elevated mode for details.

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Migration from single agent

```json { "agents": { "defaults": { "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace", "sandbox": { "mode": "non-main" } } }, "tools": { "sandbox": { "tools": { "allow": ["read", "write", "apply_patch", "exec"], "deny": [] } } } } ``` ```json { "agents": { "list": [ { "id": "main", "default": true, "workspace": "~/.openclaw/workspace", "sandbox": { "mode": "off" } } ] } } ``` Legacy `agents.defaults.*`/`agents.entries.*.*` config keys (such as `sandbox.perSession`, `agentRuntime`, `embeddedPi`) are migrated by `openclaw doctor`; prefer `agents.defaults` + `agents.entries` going forward.

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Tool restriction examples

```json { "tools": { "allow": ["read"], "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "process"] } } ``` ```json { "tools": { "allow": ["read", "exec", "process"], "deny": ["write", "edit", "apply_patch", "browser", "gateway"] } } ```

<Warning>
This policy disables OpenClaw filesystem tools, but `exec` is still a shell and can write files wherever the selected host or sandbox filesystem allows. For a read-only agent, deny `exec` and `process`, or combine shell access with sandbox filesystem controls such as `agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess: "ro"` or `"none"`.
</Warning>

```json { "tools": { "sessions": { "visibility": "tree" }, "allow": ["sessions_list", "sessions_send", "sessions_history", "session_status"], "deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "apply_patch", "read", "browser"] } } ```

`sessions_history` in this profile still returns a bounded, sanitized recall view rather than a raw transcript dump. Assistant recall strips thinking tags, `<relevant-memories>` scaffolding, plain-text tool-call XML payloads (including `<tool_call>...</tool_call>`, `<function_call>...</function_call>`, `<tool_calls>...</tool_calls>`, `<function_calls>...</function_calls>`, and truncated tool-call blocks), downgraded tool-call scaffolding, leaked ASCII/full-width model control tokens, and malformed MiniMax tool-call XML before redaction/truncation.

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Common pitfall: "non-main"

`agents.defaults.sandbox.mode: "non-main"` checks the session key against the main session key (always `"main"`; `session.mainKey` is not user-configurable, and OpenClaw warns and ignores any other value), not the agent id. Group/channel sessions always get their own keys, so they are treated as non-main and will be sandboxed. If you want an agent to never sandbox, set `agents.entries.*.sandbox.mode: "off"`.

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Testing

After configuring multi-agent sandbox and tools:

```bash openclaw agents list --bindings ``` ```bash docker ps --filter "name=openclaw-sbx-" ``` - Send a message requiring restricted tools. - Verify the agent cannot use denied tools. ```bash openclaw logs --follow | grep -E "routing|sandbox|tools" ```

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Troubleshooting

- Check if there's a global `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode` that overrides it. - Agent-specific config takes precedence, so set `agents.entries.*.sandbox.mode: "all"`. - Check the [full filtering order](#tool-restrictions): profile → provider profile → global policy → provider policy → agent policy → agent provider policy → sandbox → subagent. - Each level can only further restrict, not grant back. - See [Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated](/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated) for step-by-step debugging. - Default `scope` is `"agent"` (one container per agent id). - Set `scope: "session"` for one container per session, or `scope: "shared"` to reuse one container across agents.

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Related

• Elevated mode
• Multi-agent routing
• Sandbox configuration
• Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated — debugging "why is this blocked?"
• Sandboxing — full sandbox reference (modes, scopes, backends, images)
• Session management