Files
openclaw/docs/plugins/sdk-runtime.md
clawsweeper[bot] 0603c2327d fix(file-transfer): require canonical node policy authorization (#74742)
* feat(file-transfer): add bundled plugin for binary file ops on nodes

New extensions/file-transfer/ plugin exposing four agent tools
(file_fetch, dir_list, dir_fetch, file_write) and four matching
node-host commands (file.fetch, dir.list, dir.fetch, file.write).
Lets agents read and write files on paired nodes by absolute path,
bypassing the bash output cap (200KB) and the live tool-result
text cap that would otherwise truncate base64 payloads.

Public surface
--------------
- file_fetch({ node, path, maxBytes? })
  Image MIMEs return image content blocks; small text (<=8 KB) inlines
  as text content; everything else returns a saved-media-path text
  block. sha256-verified end-to-end.
- dir_list({ node, path, pageToken?, maxEntries? })
  Structured directory listing — name, path, size, mimeType, isDir,
  mtime. Paginated. No content transfer.
- dir_fetch({ node, path, maxBytes?, includeDotfiles? })
  Server-side tar -czf streamed back, unpacked into the gateway media
  store, returns a manifest of saved paths. Single round-trip.
  60s wall-clock timeouts on tar create/unpack. tar -xzf without -P
  rejects absolute paths in archive entries.
- file_write({ node, path, contentBase64, mimeType?, overwrite?,
              createParents? })
  Atomic write (temp + rename). Refuses to overwrite by default.
  Refuses to write through symlinks (lstat check). Buffer-side
  sha256 (no read-back race). Pair with file_fetch to round-trip
  files between nodes — DO NOT use exec/cp for file copies.

All four commands gated by:
  - dangerous-by-default node command policy
    (gateway.nodes.allowCommands opt-in)
  - per-node path policy (gateway.nodes.fileTransfer)
  - optional operator approval prompt (ask: off | on-miss | always)

16 MB raw byte ceiling per single-frame round-trip (25 MB WS frame
with ~33% base64 overhead and JSON envelope). 8 MB defaults.

Path policy and approvals
-------------------------
Default behavior is DENY. The operator must explicitly opt in:

  {
    "gateway": {
      "nodes": {
        "fileTransfer": {
          "<nodeId-or-displayName>": {
            "ask":              "off" | "on-miss" | "always",
            "allowReadPaths":   ["~/Screenshots/**", "/tmp/**"],
            "allowWritePaths":  ["~/Downloads/**"],
            "denyPaths":        ["**/.ssh/**", "**/.aws/**"],
            "maxBytes":         16777216
          },
          "*": { "ask": "on-miss" }
        }
      }
    }
  }

ask modes:
  off       — silent: allow if matched, deny if not (default)
  on-miss   — silent allow if matched; prompt on miss
  always    — prompt every call (denyPaths still hard-deny)

denyPaths always wins. allow-always from the prompt persists the
exact path back into allowReadPaths/allowWritePaths via
mutateConfigFile so subsequent matching calls go silent.

Reuses existing primitives — no new gateway methods:
  plugin.approval.request / plugin.approval.waitDecision
  decision: allow-once | allow-always | deny

Pre-flight against requested path AND post-flight against the
canonicalPath returned by the node — closes symlink-escape attacks
where the requested path matched policy but realpath resolves
somewhere else.

Audit log
---------
JSONL at ~/.openclaw/audit/file-transfer.jsonl. Records every
decision (allow/allowed-once/allowed-always/denied/error) with
timestamp, op, nodeId, displayName, requestedPath, canonicalPath,
decision, error code, sizeBytes, sha256, durationMs. Best-effort
writes; never propagates failure.

Plugin layout
-------------
extensions/file-transfer/
  index.ts                       definePluginEntry, nodeHostCommands
  openclaw.plugin.json           contracts.tools registration
  package.json
  src/node-host/{file-fetch,dir-list,dir-fetch,file-write}.ts
  src/tools/{file-fetch,dir-list,dir-fetch,file-write}-tool.ts
  src/shared/
    mime.ts        single-source extension->MIME map + image/text sets
    errors.ts      shared error code enum and helpers
    params.ts      shared param-validation helpers + GatewayCallOptions
    policy.ts      evaluateFilePolicy, persistAllowAlways
    approval.ts    plugin.approval.request wrapper
    gatekeep.ts    one-stop policy + approval + audit orchestrator
    audit.ts       JSONL audit sink

Core touch points
-----------------
- src/infra/node-commands.ts: NODE_FILE_FETCH_COMMAND,
  NODE_DIR_LIST_COMMAND, NODE_DIR_FETCH_COMMAND,
  NODE_FILE_WRITE_COMMAND, NODE_FILE_COMMANDS array
- src/gateway/node-command-policy.ts: all four added to
  DEFAULT_DANGEROUS_NODE_COMMANDS
- src/security/audit-extra.sync.ts: audit detail mentions file ops
- src/agents/tools/nodes-tool-media.ts: MEDIA_INVOKE_ACTIONS entry
  for file.fetch redirects raw nodes(action=invoke) callers to the
  dedicated file_fetch tool to prevent base64 context bloat
- src/agents/tools/nodes-tool.ts: nodes tool description points to
  the dedicated file_fetch tool

Known limitations / follow-ups
------------------------------
- No tests in this PR. For a security-sensitive surface this is a
  gap; will follow up with a test pass.
- Direct CLI invocation (openclaw nodes invoke --command file.fetch)
  bypasses the plugin policy entirely. Plugin-side gating is the
  realistic threat model (agent on iMessage requesting paths it
  shouldn't), but for true defense-in-depth, policy belongs in the
  gateway-side node.invoke dispatch. Move-policy-to-core is a
  separate PR.
- file_watch (long-lived filesystem event subscription) is not
  included; it needs a new node-protocol primitive for streaming
  event channels and was descoped from this PR.
- dir_fetch includeDotfiles: true is the only supported mode;
  BSD tar exclude patterns reliably collapse dotfile filtering
  to an empty archive. Reliable filtering needs a
  `find ! -name ".*" | tar -T -` pipeline; deferred.
- dir_fetch du -sk preflight is a heuristic (du * 4 vs maxBytes);
  the mid-stream byte cap is the actual safety net.

* test(file-transfer): add unit tests for handlers, policy, and shared utilities

Adds 77 tests covering:
- handleFileFetch: validation, fs errors, sha256, size cap, symlink canonicalization
- handleFileWrite: validation, atomic write, overwrite policy, parent dir handling, symlink refusal, integrity check, size cap
- handleDirList: validation, fs errors, sorted listing, dotfile inclusion, pagination
- handleDirFetch: validation, fs errors, gzipped tar with sha256, mid-stream byte cap
- evaluateFilePolicy: default-deny, denyPaths-wins, allow matching, ask modes (off/on-miss/always), node-id/displayName/'*' resolution
- persistAllowAlways: append, dedupe, create-on-missing
- shared/mime: extension lookup, image/text inline sets
- shared/errors: err helper, classifyFsError, throwFromNodePayload

Also fixes accumulated lint regressions in the prod source flagged once these
files moved into the changed-gate scope (parseInt -> Number.parseInt, redundant
type casts removed, single-statement if bodies wrapped in braces).

* fix(file-transfer): address PR review feedback (security + availability)

Reviewer findings addressed (greptile + aisle):

- policy: persistAllowAlways no longer escalates per-node approvals to the
  '*' wildcard entry; allow-always now writes under the specific node's
  own entry, never the wildcard (greptile P1 SECURITY).
- policy: add literal '..' segment short-circuit in evaluateFilePolicy,
  raised before glob match. Stops "/allowed/../etc/passwd" from passing
  preflight against "/allowed/**" globs (aisle MEDIUM CWE-22).
- file-write: replace no-op base64 try/catch with actual round-trip
  validation. Buffer.from(s, "base64") never throws — invalid input
  silently decoded to garbage bytes. Now re-encodes and compares
  modulo padding/url-variant chars (greptile P1 SECURITY).
- file-write: document the parent-symlink residual risk and rely on the
  existing gateway-side post-flight policy check; full rollback requires
  a node-side file.unlink which is deferred to a follow-up. Initial
  segment-walk attempt was reverted because it false-positives on system
  symlinks like macOS /var → /private/var (aisle HIGH CWE-59).
- dir-fetch tool: add preValidateTarball pass that runs `tar -tzvf` and
  rejects symlinks, hardlinks, absolute paths, '..' traversal,
  uncompressed sizes >64MB, and entry counts >5000 — before any
  extraction. Drops --no-overwrite-dir (GNU-only flag rejected by BSD
  tar on macOS) (aisle HIGH x2 CWE-22 + CWE-409, greptile P2).
- dir-fetch tool: stream-hash files via fs.open + read loop instead of
  fs.readFile to avoid full-buffer reads on large extracted entries.
- dir-fetch handler: replace spawnSync in countTarEntries with async
  spawn + bounded buffer so tar -tzf can't park the node-host event
  loop for up to 10s on a slow filesystem (greptile P1 AVAIL).
- audit: clear auditDirPromise on rejection so a transient mkdir
  failure doesn't permanently silence the audit log (greptile P2).

New tests: wildcard escalation rejection, base64 malformed/url-variant,
'..' traversal short-circuit (3 cases). 84/84 passing.

* fix(file-transfer): CI failures + second-round PR review feedback

CI failures on previous push:

- Declare runtime deps (minimatch, typebox) in package.json — failed the
  extension-runtime-dependencies contract test that scans imports.
- Switch policy.ts and policy.test.ts off the broad
  openclaw/plugin-sdk/config-runtime barrel and onto the narrow
  openclaw/plugin-sdk/config-mutation + runtime-config-snapshot subpaths.
  This satisfies the deprecated-internal-config-api architecture guard.

Second-round Aisle findings:

- policy: traversal-segment check now treats backslash and forward slash
  as equivalent, so a Windows node can't be hit with mixed-separator
  "C:\\allowed\\..\\Windows\\system.ini" (Aisle HIGH CWE-22).
- dir-fetch tool: replace the single fragile `tar -tvzf` parser pass
  (which broke for filenames containing whitespace) with two robust
  passes: `tar -tzf` for paths only (one per line, no parsing of
  fixed columns) and `tar -tzvf` for type chars only (FIRST CHAR of each
  line, never the path column). Also reject backslash-containing entry
  names. Drops the in-process uncompressed-size cap because reliably
  parsing sizes from tar output is fragile and Aisle flagged it as a
  bypass primitive — entry-count cap stays (Aisle HIGH CWE-22, MED).

Tests still 84/84 passing.

* fix(file-transfer): third-round PR review feedback

Aisle's re-analysis on b63daa6a05 surfaced 3 actionable findings:

- nodes.invoke bypass (HIGH CWE-285): generic nodes.action="invoke" let
  agents call dir.list/dir.fetch/file.write directly, skipping the
  file-transfer plugin's gatekeep + policy + approval flow. Only file.fetch
  was redirected to its dedicated tool. Add the other three to
  MEDIA_INVOKE_ACTIONS so the redirect-or-deny logic in
  nodes-tool-commands fires for all four. The dedicated tools enforce
  policy; the generic invoke surface no longer has a way to skip them
  without an explicit allowMediaInvokeCommands opt-in.
- prototype pollution in persistAllowAlways (MED CWE-1321): a paired
  node with displayName "__proto__" / "prototype" / "constructor" would
  mutate the fileTransfer object's prototype when persisting allow-always.
  Reject those keys explicitly. Switch the existing-key lookup to
  Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call so a key like "constructor"
  doesn't accidentally match Object.prototype.constructor.
- decompression-bomb cap in dir_fetch (MED CWE-409): compressed tar is
  bounded upstream, but a highly compressible bomb can still expand to
  gigabytes. Enforce DIR_FETCH_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_BYTES (64MB) summed
  across extracted files and DIR_FETCH_MAX_SINGLE_FILE_BYTES (16MB) per
  entry, both checked during the post-extract walk. On bust, rm -rf the
  rootDir and audit-log + throw UNCOMPRESSED_TOO_LARGE.

Tests: 85/85 passing (added prototype-pollution rejection test).

Aisle's HIGH parent-symlink finding remains documented as deferred — full
rollback requires a node-side file.unlink command which is out of scope
for this PR. The gateway-side post-flight policy check still detects and
loudly errors on canonical-path mismatches.

* fix(file-transfer): refuse symlink traversal by default with followSymlinks opt-in

Closes the deferred Aisle HIGH parent-symlink finding. Instead of
detecting the escape in a post-flight gateway check after the file is
already written, the node-side handler now refuses pre-flight if any
component of the requested path resolves through a symlink.

Behavior:
- Reads (file.fetch / dir.list / dir.fetch): node realpath()s the
  requested path. If canonical != requested AND followSymlinks=false,
  return SYMLINK_REDIRECT { canonicalPath } — no I/O happens.
- Writes (file.write): node realpath()s the parent dir. Same refusal
  rule. The lstat-on-final check is kept to catch the case where the
  target file itself is an existing symlink.
- Opt-in: set gateway.nodes.fileTransfer.<node>.followSymlinks=true to
  bring back the previous "follow + post-flight check" behavior.

Operator UX: the SYMLINK_REDIRECT response includes the canonical path
so the operator can either update their allow list to the canonical form
or set followSymlinks=true on that node. On macOS, /var → /private/var
and /tmp → /private/tmp are system aliases that trip the new check, so
operators using those paths need followSymlinks=true OR canonical-path
allowlists.

Wiring:
- Add followSymlinks?: boolean to NodeFilePolicyConfig.
- evaluateFilePolicy returns followSymlinks (default false) on its
  ok=true branches.
- gatekeep propagates it via GatekeepOutcome.
- Each tool passes it as a node.invoke param.
- Each handler honors it pre-flight before any read/write.

Tests updated: 89/89 passing.
- realpath(mkdtemp()) so existing happy-path tests don't trip the new
  default on macOS where mkdtemp lands under symlinked /var/folders.
- New tests: SYMLINK_REDIRECT refusal for file.fetch and file.write
  parent traversal; opt-in passthrough when followSymlinks=true.
- New policy test: followSymlinks propagation default false / true.

* fix(file-transfer): close two more aisle findings on 069bd66

Aisle re-analysis on 069bd66 surfaced two issues my earlier round-three
fix missed:

- HIGH (CWE-284): file.fetch / dir.fetch / dir.list / file.write were
  still bypassable via the generic nodes.action="invoke" surface when
  the operator had set allowMediaInvokeCommands=true. That flag was
  meant to opt in to base64-bloat for camera/screen, not to disable
  path policy on file-transfer. Split the redirect map: introduce
  POLICY_REDIRECT_INVOKE_COMMANDS (file-transfer only) which ALWAYS
  rerouts to its dedicated tool regardless of the bloat flag. Camera
  and screen continue to use the bloat-only redirect (suppressed by
  allowMediaInvokeCommands=true). Confirmed by clawsweeper P1.
- MED (CWE-276): tar -xzf in dir_fetch unpack preserved archive
  ownership and permissions, so a malicious node could plant
  setuid/setgid or world-writable files on a gateway running with
  elevated privileges. Add --no-same-owner --no-same-permissions
  (both flags are portable across BSD tar / GNU tar).

Tests: 89/89 passing.

* chore(file-transfer): drop file_watch from plugin description

Phase 5 (file_watch) was deferred earlier in this PR. Strip the watch
mention from the plugin description in package.json,
openclaw.plugin.json, and index.ts so the metadata reflects what's
actually shipped (file_fetch, dir_list, dir_fetch, file_write).
Closes clawsweeper P3.

* fix(file-transfer): hash before rename and allow zero-byte round-trip

Two of Peter's review findings on PR #74134:

- P2 (file-write integrity): hash the decoded buffer + compare against
  expectedSha256 BEFORE temp+rename. Previously the rename happened
  first, then the sha check unlinked the target on mismatch — with
  overwrite=true a bad caller hash could replace + delete the original.
  Now a hash mismatch returns INTEGRITY_FAILURE without touching disk.
  Added a regression test that asserts the original file survives.

- P2/P3 (zero-byte round-trip): the tool layer's truthy checks on
  contentBase64 and base64 rejected the empty string, blocking zero-byte
  files from round-tripping through file_fetch -> file_write. Switched
  to type-checks (typeof === "string") and added zero-byte tests at the
  handler layer for both fetch and write (sha matches the known empty
  digest).

Tests: 92/92 passing.

* fix(file-transfer): declare gateway.nodes.fileTransfer in core config schema

Peter's P1/P2 finding: the plugin reads/writes gateway.nodes.fileTransfer
via casts through unknown because the strict zod schema and OpenClawConfig
type didn't declare it. That meant `openclaw config validate` would
reject the very examples in the plugin's own documentation.

- Add fileTransfer block to gateway.nodes in src/config/zod-schema.ts
  with the full per-node entry shape (ask, allowReadPaths,
  allowWritePaths, denyPaths, maxBytes, followSymlinks).
- Add GatewayNodeFileTransferEntry + the fileTransfer field on
  GatewayNodesConfig in src/config/types.gateway.ts.
- Drop the `as unknown` casts in the extension's policy.ts now that
  gateway.nodes.fileTransfer is properly typed end-to-end.
- Regenerate docs/.generated/config-baseline.sha256.

Tests: 92/92 passing. pnpm config:docs:check OK.

* fix(file-transfer): enforce path policy at gateway dispatch

Closes Peter's P1 review finding on PR #74134.

The agent-tool-only redirect added in earlier commits left CLI
(`openclaw nodes invoke`), plugin-runtime, and raw `node.invoke` callers
able to skip the file-transfer path policy entirely. The fix moves the
security boundary down to the gateway: every code path that reaches
`node.invoke` for file.fetch / dir.list / dir.fetch / file.write now
runs the same allow/deny check.

- New: src/gateway/file-transfer-dispatch.ts with
  `evaluateFileTransferDispatchPolicy` and `isFileTransferCommand`. Same
  semantics as the extension-side `evaluateFilePolicy` minus the
  operator-prompt flow (prompts stay at the agent-tool layer; the
  gateway is silent enforcement).
- src/gateway/server-methods/nodes.ts: after the existing command
  allowlist check, run the new gate before forwarding. Denies emit
  INVALID_REQUEST with a structured `{ command, code, reason }`.
- Decision matrix mirrors the extension: NO_POLICY (no entry for
  this node) deny, denyPaths-wins, '..' traversal short-circuit
  (with backslash separator handling), allowPaths match → allow,
  no allow match → deny.
- 19 new unit tests covering each branch including identity
  resolution (nodeId/displayName/'*'), prototype-pollution-safe lookup,
  and read-vs-write allow-list separation.

Note on allow-once approvals: the agent tool's interactive
`allow-once` decision now has to flow through the dedicated tool's
pre-flight (which forwards an approved request); raw `nodes.invoke`
callers cannot benefit from one-time approvals because the gateway is
silent. allow-always (which persists to allowReadPaths/allowWritePaths)
continues to work transparently because by the time the next request
hits the gateway the path is in the persisted allow list.

Tests: 92 extension + 19 gateway = 111 total, all passing.

* fix(file-transfer): enforce node policy in gateway

* fix(file-transfer): use plugin node policy only

* fix(file-transfer): harden node policy edge cases

* fix(file-transfer): close review hardening gaps

* fix(file-transfer): harden node invoke policy

* fix(file-transfer): align runtime dependency versions

* fix(file-transfer): keep minimatch extension-owned

* refactor(file-transfer): remove unused approval gate

* fix(file-transfer): require canonical node policy authorization

Co-authored-by: Omar Shahine <10343873+omarshahine@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(clawsweeper): address review for automerge-openclaw-openclaw-74134 (1)

Co-authored-by: Omar Shahine <10343873+omarshahine@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(file-transfer): recheck dir fetch archive policy after fetch

* fix(file-transfer): name file-transfer tool in invoke redirect

---------

Co-authored-by: Omar Shahine <10343873+omarshahine@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: clawsweeper-repair <clawsweeper-repair@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-30 04:03:40 +00:00

21 KiB

summary, title, sidebarTitle, read_when
summary title sidebarTitle read_when
api.runtime -- the injected runtime helpers available to plugins Plugin runtime helpers Runtime helpers
You need to call core helpers from a plugin (TTS, STT, image gen, web search, subagent, nodes)
You want to understand what api.runtime exposes
You are accessing config, agent, or media helpers from plugin code

Reference for the api.runtime object injected into every plugin during registration. Use these helpers instead of importing host internals directly.

Step-by-step guide that uses these helpers in context for channel plugins. Step-by-step guide that uses these helpers in context for provider plugins.
register(api) {
  const runtime = api.runtime;
}

Config Loading And Writes

Prefer config that was already passed into the active call path, for example api.config during registration or a cfg argument on channel/provider callbacks. This keeps one process snapshot flowing through the work instead of reparsing config on hot paths.

Use api.runtime.config.current() only when a long-lived handler needs the current process snapshot and no config was passed to that function. The returned value is readonly; clone or use a mutation helper before editing.

Tool factories receive ctx.runtimeConfig plus ctx.getRuntimeConfig(). Use the getter inside a long-lived tool's execute callback when config can change after the tool definition was created.

Persist changes with api.runtime.config.mutateConfigFile(...) or api.runtime.config.replaceConfigFile(...). Each write must choose an explicit afterWrite policy:

  • afterWrite: { mode: "auto" } lets the gateway reload planner decide.
  • afterWrite: { mode: "restart", reason: "..." } forces a clean restart when the writer knows hot reload is unsafe.
  • afterWrite: { mode: "none", reason: "..." } suppresses automatic reload/restart only when the caller owns the follow-up.

The mutation helpers return afterWrite plus a typed followUp summary so callers can log or test whether they requested a restart. The gateway still owns when that restart actually happens.

api.runtime.config.loadConfig() and api.runtime.config.writeConfigFile(...) are deprecated compatibility helpers under runtime-config-load-write. They warn once at runtime, and remain available for old external plugins during the migration window. Bundled plugins must not use them; the config boundary guards fail if plugin code calls them or imports those helpers from plugin SDK subpaths.

For direct SDK imports, use the focused config subpaths instead of the broad openclaw/plugin-sdk/config-runtime compatibility barrel: config-types for types, plugin-config-runtime for already-loaded config assertions and plugin entry lookup, runtime-config-snapshot for current process snapshots, and config-mutation for writes. Bundled plugin tests should mock these focused subpaths directly instead of mocking the broad compatibility barrel.

Internal OpenClaw runtime code has the same direction: load config once at the CLI, gateway, or process boundary, then pass that value through. Successful mutation writes refresh the process runtime snapshot and advance its internal revision; long-lived caches should key off the runtime-owned cache key instead of serializing config locally. Long-lived runtime modules have a zero-tolerance scanner for ambient loadConfig() calls; use a passed cfg, a request context.getRuntimeConfig(), or getRuntimeConfig() at an explicit process boundary.

Provider and channel execution paths must use the active runtime config snapshot, not a file snapshot returned for config readback or editing. File snapshots preserve source values such as SecretRef markers for UI and writes; provider callbacks need the resolved runtime view. When a helper may be called with either the active source snapshot or the active runtime snapshot, route through selectApplicableRuntimeConfig() before reading credentials.

Runtime namespaces

Agent identity, directories, and session management.
```typescript
// Resolve the agent's working directory
const agentDir = api.runtime.agent.resolveAgentDir(cfg);

// Resolve agent workspace
const workspaceDir = api.runtime.agent.resolveAgentWorkspaceDir(cfg);

// Get agent identity
const identity = api.runtime.agent.resolveAgentIdentity(cfg);

// Get default thinking level
const thinking = api.runtime.agent.resolveThinkingDefault({
  cfg,
  provider,
  model,
});

// Validate a user-provided thinking level against the active provider profile
const policy = api.runtime.agent.resolveThinkingPolicy({ provider, model });
const level = api.runtime.agent.normalizeThinkingLevel("extra high");
if (level && policy.levels.some((entry) => entry.id === level)) {
  // pass level to an embedded run
}

// Get agent timeout
const timeoutMs = api.runtime.agent.resolveAgentTimeoutMs(cfg);

// Ensure workspace exists
await api.runtime.agent.ensureAgentWorkspace(cfg);

// Run an embedded agent turn
const agentDir = api.runtime.agent.resolveAgentDir(cfg);
const result = await api.runtime.agent.runEmbeddedAgent({
  sessionId: "my-plugin:task-1",
  runId: crypto.randomUUID(),
  sessionFile: path.join(agentDir, "sessions", "my-plugin-task-1.jsonl"),
  workspaceDir: api.runtime.agent.resolveAgentWorkspaceDir(cfg),
  prompt: "Summarize the latest changes",
  timeoutMs: api.runtime.agent.resolveAgentTimeoutMs(cfg),
});
```

`runEmbeddedAgent(...)` is the neutral helper for starting a normal OpenClaw agent turn from plugin code. It uses the same provider/model resolution and agent-harness selection as channel-triggered replies.

`runEmbeddedPiAgent(...)` remains as a compatibility alias.

`resolveThinkingPolicy(...)` returns the provider/model's supported thinking levels and optional default. Provider plugins own the model-specific profile through their thinking hooks, so tool plugins should call this runtime helper instead of importing or duplicating provider lists.

`normalizeThinkingLevel(...)` converts user text such as `on`, `x-high`, or `extra high` to the canonical stored level before checking it against the resolved policy.

**Session store helpers** are under `api.runtime.agent.session`:

```typescript
const storePath = api.runtime.agent.session.resolveStorePath(cfg);
const store = api.runtime.agent.session.loadSessionStore(cfg);
await api.runtime.agent.session.saveSessionStore(cfg, store);
const filePath = api.runtime.agent.session.resolveSessionFilePath(cfg, sessionId);
```
Default model and provider constants:
```typescript
const model = api.runtime.agent.defaults.model; // e.g. "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6"
const provider = api.runtime.agent.defaults.provider; // e.g. "anthropic"
```
Launch and manage background subagent runs.
```typescript
// Start a subagent run
const { runId } = await api.runtime.subagent.run({
  sessionKey: "agent:main:subagent:search-helper",
  message: "Expand this query into focused follow-up searches.",
  provider: "openai", // optional override
  model: "gpt-4.1-mini", // optional override
  deliver: false,
});

// Wait for completion
const result = await api.runtime.subagent.waitForRun({ runId, timeoutMs: 30000 });

// Read session messages
const { messages } = await api.runtime.subagent.getSessionMessages({
  sessionKey: "agent:main:subagent:search-helper",
  limit: 10,
});

// Delete a session
await api.runtime.subagent.deleteSession({
  sessionKey: "agent:main:subagent:search-helper",
});
```

<Warning>
Model overrides (`provider`/`model`) require operator opt-in via `plugins.entries.<id>.subagent.allowModelOverride: true` in config. Untrusted plugins can still run subagents, but override requests are rejected.
</Warning>

`deleteSession(...)` can delete sessions created by the same plugin through `api.runtime.subagent.run(...)`. Deleting arbitrary user or operator sessions still requires an admin-scoped Gateway request.
List connected nodes and invoke a node-host command from Gateway-loaded plugin code or from plugin CLI commands. Use this when a plugin owns local work on a paired device, for example a browser or audio bridge on another Mac.
```typescript
const { nodes } = await api.runtime.nodes.list({ connected: true });

const result = await api.runtime.nodes.invoke({
  nodeId: "mac-studio",
  command: "my-plugin.command",
  params: { action: "start" },
  timeoutMs: 30000,
});
```

Inside the Gateway this runtime is in-process. In plugin CLI commands it calls the configured Gateway over RPC, so commands such as `openclaw googlemeet recover-tab` can inspect paired nodes from the terminal. Node commands still go through normal Gateway node pairing, command allowlists, plugin node-invoke policies, and node-local command handling.

Plugins that expose dangerous node-host commands should register a node-invoke policy with `api.registerNodeInvokePolicy(...)`. The policy runs in the Gateway after command allowlist checks and before the command is forwarded to the node, so direct `node.invoke` calls and higher-level plugin tools share the same enforcement path.
Bind a Task Flow runtime to an existing OpenClaw session key or trusted tool context, then create and manage Task Flows without passing an owner on every call.
```typescript
const taskFlow = api.runtime.tasks.managedFlows.fromToolContext(ctx);

const created = taskFlow.createManaged({
  controllerId: "my-plugin/review-batch",
  goal: "Review new pull requests",
});

const child = taskFlow.runTask({
  flowId: created.flowId,
  runtime: "acp",
  childSessionKey: "agent:main:subagent:reviewer",
  task: "Review PR #123",
  status: "running",
  startedAt: Date.now(),
});

const waiting = taskFlow.setWaiting({
  flowId: created.flowId,
  expectedRevision: created.revision,
  currentStep: "await-human-reply",
  waitJson: { kind: "reply", channel: "telegram" },
});
```

Use `bindSession({ sessionKey, requesterOrigin })` when you already have a trusted OpenClaw session key from your own binding layer. Do not bind from raw user input.
Text-to-speech synthesis.
```typescript
// Standard TTS
const clip = await api.runtime.tts.textToSpeech({
  text: "Hello from OpenClaw",
  cfg: api.config,
});

// Telephony-optimized TTS
const telephonyClip = await api.runtime.tts.textToSpeechTelephony({
  text: "Hello from OpenClaw",
  cfg: api.config,
});

// List available voices
const voices = await api.runtime.tts.listVoices({
  provider: "elevenlabs",
  cfg: api.config,
});
```

Uses core `messages.tts` configuration and provider selection. Returns PCM audio buffer + sample rate.
Image, audio, and video analysis.
```typescript
// Describe an image
const image = await api.runtime.mediaUnderstanding.describeImageFile({
  filePath: "/tmp/inbound-photo.jpg",
  cfg: api.config,
  agentDir: "/tmp/agent",
});

// Transcribe audio
const { text } = await api.runtime.mediaUnderstanding.transcribeAudioFile({
  filePath: "/tmp/inbound-audio.ogg",
  cfg: api.config,
  mime: "audio/ogg", // optional, for when MIME cannot be inferred
});

// Describe a video
const video = await api.runtime.mediaUnderstanding.describeVideoFile({
  filePath: "/tmp/inbound-video.mp4",
  cfg: api.config,
});

// Generic file analysis
const result = await api.runtime.mediaUnderstanding.runFile({
  filePath: "/tmp/inbound-file.pdf",
  cfg: api.config,
});
```

Returns `{ text: undefined }` when no output is produced (e.g. skipped input).

<Info>
`api.runtime.stt.transcribeAudioFile(...)` remains as a compatibility alias for `api.runtime.mediaUnderstanding.transcribeAudioFile(...)`.
</Info>
Image generation.
```typescript
const result = await api.runtime.imageGeneration.generate({
  prompt: "A robot painting a sunset",
  cfg: api.config,
});

const providers = api.runtime.imageGeneration.listProviders({ cfg: api.config });
```
Web search.
```typescript
const providers = api.runtime.webSearch.listProviders({ config: api.config });

const result = await api.runtime.webSearch.search({
  config: api.config,
  args: { query: "OpenClaw plugin SDK", count: 5 },
});
```
Low-level media utilities.
```typescript
const webMedia = await api.runtime.media.loadWebMedia(url);
const mime = await api.runtime.media.detectMime(buffer);
const kind = api.runtime.media.mediaKindFromMime("image/jpeg"); // "image"
const isVoice = api.runtime.media.isVoiceCompatibleAudio(filePath);
const metadata = await api.runtime.media.getImageMetadata(filePath);
const resized = await api.runtime.media.resizeToJpeg(buffer, { maxWidth: 800 });
const terminalQr = await api.runtime.media.renderQrTerminal("https://openclaw.ai");
const pngQr = await api.runtime.media.renderQrPngBase64("https://openclaw.ai", {
  scale: 6, // 1-12
  marginModules: 4, // 0-16
});
const pngQrDataUrl = await api.runtime.media.renderQrPngDataUrl("https://openclaw.ai");
const tmpRoot = resolvePreferredOpenClawTmpDir();
const pngQrFile = await api.runtime.media.writeQrPngTempFile("https://openclaw.ai", {
  tmpRoot,
  dirPrefix: "my-plugin-qr-",
  fileName: "qr.png",
});
```
Current runtime config snapshot and transactional config writes. Prefer config that was already passed into the active call path; use `current()` only when the handler needs the process snapshot directly.
```typescript
const cfg = api.runtime.config.current();
await api.runtime.config.mutateConfigFile({
  afterWrite: { mode: "auto" },
  mutate(draft) {
    draft.plugins ??= {};
  },
});
```

`mutateConfigFile(...)` and `replaceConfigFile(...)` return a `followUp`
value, for example `{ mode: "restart", requiresRestart: true, reason }`,
which records the writer intent without taking restart control away from the
gateway.
System-level utilities.
```typescript
await api.runtime.system.enqueueSystemEvent(event);
api.runtime.system.requestHeartbeatNow();
const output = await api.runtime.system.runCommandWithTimeout(cmd, args, opts);
const hint = api.runtime.system.formatNativeDependencyHint(pkg);
```
Event subscriptions.
```typescript
api.runtime.events.onAgentEvent((event) => {
  /* ... */
});
api.runtime.events.onSessionTranscriptUpdate((update) => {
  /* ... */
});
```
Logging.
```typescript
const verbose = api.runtime.logging.shouldLogVerbose();
const childLogger = api.runtime.logging.getChildLogger({ plugin: "my-plugin" }, { level: "debug" });
```
Model and provider auth resolution.
```typescript
const auth = await api.runtime.modelAuth.getApiKeyForModel({ model, cfg });
const providerAuth = await api.runtime.modelAuth.resolveApiKeyForProvider({
  provider: "openai",
  cfg,
});
```
State directory resolution and SQLite-backed keyed storage.
```typescript
const stateDir = api.runtime.state.resolveStateDir(process.env);
const store = api.runtime.state.openKeyedStore<MyRecord>({
  namespace: "my-feature",
  maxEntries: 200,
  defaultTtlMs: 15 * 60_000,
});

await store.register("key-1", { value: "hello" });
const value = await store.lookup("key-1");
await store.consume("key-1");
await store.clear();
```

Keyed stores survive restarts and are isolated by the runtime-bound plugin id. Limits: `maxEntries` per namespace, 1,000 live rows per plugin, JSON values under 64KB, and optional TTL expiry.

<Warning>
Bundled plugins only in this release.
</Warning>
Memory tool factories and CLI.
```typescript
const getTool = api.runtime.tools.createMemoryGetTool(/* ... */);
const searchTool = api.runtime.tools.createMemorySearchTool(/* ... */);
api.runtime.tools.registerMemoryCli(/* ... */);
```
Channel-specific runtime helpers (available when a channel plugin is loaded).
`api.runtime.channel.mentions` is the shared inbound mention-policy surface for bundled channel plugins that use runtime injection:

```typescript
const mentionMatch = api.runtime.channel.mentions.matchesMentionWithExplicit(text, {
  mentionRegexes,
  mentionPatterns,
});

const decision = api.runtime.channel.mentions.resolveInboundMentionDecision({
  facts: {
    canDetectMention: true,
    wasMentioned: mentionMatch.matched,
    implicitMentionKinds: api.runtime.channel.mentions.implicitMentionKindWhen(
      "reply_to_bot",
      isReplyToBot,
    ),
  },
  policy: {
    isGroup,
    requireMention,
    allowTextCommands,
    hasControlCommand,
    commandAuthorized,
  },
});
```

Available mention helpers:

- `buildMentionRegexes`
- `matchesMentionPatterns`
- `matchesMentionWithExplicit`
- `implicitMentionKindWhen`
- `resolveInboundMentionDecision`

`api.runtime.channel.mentions` intentionally does not expose the older `resolveMentionGating*` compatibility helpers. Prefer the normalized `{ facts, policy }` path.

Storing runtime references

Use createPluginRuntimeStore to store the runtime reference for use outside the register callback:

```typescript import { createPluginRuntimeStore } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/runtime-store"; import type { PluginRuntime } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/runtime-store";
const store = createPluginRuntimeStore<PluginRuntime>({
  pluginId: "my-plugin",
  errorMessage: "my-plugin runtime not initialized",
});
```
```typescript export default defineChannelPluginEntry({ id: "my-plugin", name: "My Plugin", description: "Example", plugin: myPlugin, setRuntime: store.setRuntime, }); ``` ```typescript export function getRuntime() { return store.getRuntime(); // throws if not initialized }
export function tryGetRuntime() {
  return store.tryGetRuntime(); // returns null if not initialized
}
```
Prefer `pluginId` for the runtime-store identity. The lower-level `key` form is for uncommon cases where one plugin intentionally needs more than one runtime slot.

Other top-level api fields

Beyond api.runtime, the API object also provides:

Plugin id. Plugin display name. Current config snapshot (active in-memory runtime snapshot when available). Plugin-specific config from `plugins.entries..config`. Scoped logger (`debug`, `info`, `warn`, `error`). Current load mode; `"setup-runtime"` is the lightweight pre-full-entry startup/setup window. Resolve a path relative to the plugin root.