Files
openclaw/src/secrets/plan.ts
Josh Avant 806803b7ef feat(secrets): expand SecretRef coverage across user-supplied credentials (#29580)
* feat(secrets): expand secret target coverage and gateway tooling

* docs(secrets): align gateway and CLI secret docs

* chore(protocol): regenerate swift gateway models for secrets methods

* fix(config): restore talk apiKey fallback and stabilize runner test

* ci(windows): reduce test worker count for shard stability

* ci(windows): raise node heap for test shard stability

* test(feishu): make proxy env precedence assertion windows-safe

* fix(gateway): resolve auth password SecretInput refs for clients

* fix(gateway): resolve remote SecretInput credentials for clients

* fix(secrets): skip inactive refs in command snapshot assignments

* fix(secrets): scope gateway.remote refs to effective auth surfaces

* fix(secrets): ignore memory defaults when enabled agents disable search

* fix(secrets): honor Google Chat serviceAccountRef inheritance

* fix(secrets): address tsgo errors in command and gateway collectors

* fix(secrets): avoid auth-store load in providers-only configure

* fix(gateway): defer local password ref resolution by precedence

* fix(secrets): gate telegram webhook secret refs by webhook mode

* fix(secrets): gate slack signing secret refs to http mode

* fix(secrets): skip telegram botToken refs when tokenFile is set

* fix(secrets): gate discord pluralkit refs by enabled flag

* fix(secrets): gate discord voice tts refs by voice enabled

* test(secrets): make runtime fixture modes explicit

* fix(cli): resolve local qr password secret refs

* fix(cli): fail when gateway leaves command refs unresolved

* fix(gateway): fail when local password SecretRef is unresolved

* fix(gateway): fail when required remote SecretRefs are unresolved

* fix(gateway): resolve local password refs only when password can win

* fix(cli): skip local password SecretRef resolution on qr token override

* test(gateway): cast SecretRef fixtures to OpenClawConfig

* test(secrets): activate mode-gated targets in runtime coverage fixture

* fix(cron): support SecretInput webhook tokens safely

* fix(bluebubbles): support SecretInput passwords across config paths

* fix(msteams): make appPassword SecretInput-safe in onboarding/token paths

* fix(bluebubbles): align SecretInput schema helper typing

* fix(cli): clarify secrets.resolve version-skew errors

* refactor(secrets): return structured inactive paths from secrets.resolve

* refactor(gateway): type onboarding secret writes as SecretInput

* chore(protocol): regenerate swift models for secrets.resolve

* feat(secrets): expand extension credential secretref support

* fix(secrets): gate web-search refs by active provider

* fix(onboarding): detect SecretRef credentials in extension status

* fix(onboarding): allow keeping existing ref in secret prompt

* fix(onboarding): resolve gateway password SecretRefs for probe and tui

* fix(onboarding): honor secret-input-mode for local gateway auth

* fix(acp): resolve gateway SecretInput credentials

* fix(secrets): gate gateway.remote refs to remote surfaces

* test(secrets): cover pattern matching and inactive array refs

* docs(secrets): clarify secrets.resolve and remote active surfaces

* fix(bluebubbles): keep existing SecretRef during onboarding

* fix(tests): resolve CI type errors in new SecretRef coverage

* fix(extensions): replace raw fetch with SSRF-guarded fetch

* test(secrets): mark gateway remote targets active in runtime coverage

* test(infra): normalize home-prefix expectation across platforms

* fix(cli): only resolve local qr password refs in password mode

* test(cli): cover local qr token mode with unresolved password ref

* docs(cli): clarify local qr password ref resolution behavior

* refactor(extensions): reuse sdk SecretInput helpers

* fix(wizard): resolve onboarding env-template secrets before plaintext

* fix(cli): surface secrets.resolve diagnostics in memory and qr

* test(secrets): repair post-rebase runtime and fixtures

* fix(gateway): skip remote password ref resolution when token wins

* fix(secrets): treat tailscale remote gateway refs as active

* fix(gateway): allow remote password fallback when token ref is unresolved

* fix(gateway): ignore stale local password refs for none and trusted-proxy

* fix(gateway): skip remote secret ref resolution on local call paths

* test(cli): cover qr remote tailscale secret ref resolution

* fix(secrets): align gateway password active-surface with auth inference

* fix(cli): resolve inferred local gateway password refs in qr

* fix(gateway): prefer resolvable remote password over token ref pre-resolution

* test(gateway): cover none and trusted-proxy stale password refs

* docs(secrets): sync qr and gateway active-surface behavior

* fix: restore stability blockers from pre-release audit

* Secrets: fix collector/runtime precedence contradictions

* docs: align secrets and web credential docs

* fix(rebase): resolve integration regressions after main rebase

* fix(node-host): resolve gateway secret refs for auth

* fix(secrets): harden secretinput runtime readers

* gateway: skip inactive auth secretref resolution

* cli: avoid gateway preflight for inactive secret refs

* extensions: allow unresolved refs in onboarding status

* tests: fix qr-cli module mock hoist ordering

* Security: align audit checks with SecretInput resolution

* Gateway: resolve local-mode remote fallback secret refs

* Node host: avoid resolving inactive password secret refs

* Secrets runtime: mark Slack appToken inactive for HTTP mode

* secrets: keep inactive gateway remote refs non-blocking

* cli: include agent memory secret targets in runtime resolution

* docs(secrets): sync docs with active-surface and web search behavior

* fix(secrets): keep telegram top-level token refs active for blank account tokens

* fix(daemon): resolve gateway password secret refs for probe auth

* fix(secrets): skip IRC NickServ ref resolution when NickServ is disabled

* fix(secrets): align token inheritance and exec timeout defaults

* docs(secrets): clarify active-surface notes in cli docs

* cli: require secrets.resolve gateway capability

* gateway: log auth secret surface diagnostics

* secrets: remove dead provider resolver module

* fix(secrets): restore gateway auth precedence and fallback resolution

* fix(tests): align plugin runtime mock typings

---------

Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
2026-03-03 02:58:20 +00:00

196 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript

import type { SecretProviderConfig, SecretRef } from "../config/types.secrets.js";
import { SecretProviderSchema } from "../config/zod-schema.core.js";
import { isValidSecretProviderAlias } from "./ref-contract.js";
import { parseDotPath, toDotPath } from "./shared.js";
import {
isKnownSecretTargetType,
resolvePlanTargetAgainstRegistry,
type ResolvedPlanTarget,
} from "./target-registry.js";
export type SecretsPlanTargetType = string;
export type SecretsPlanTarget = {
type: SecretsPlanTargetType;
/**
* Dot path in the target config surface for operator readability.
* Examples:
* - "models.providers.openai.apiKey"
* - "profiles.openai.key"
*/
path: string;
/**
* Canonical path segments used for safe mutation.
* Examples:
* - ["models", "providers", "openai", "apiKey"]
* - ["profiles", "openai", "key"]
*/
pathSegments?: string[];
ref: SecretRef;
/**
* Required for auth-profiles targets so apply can resolve the correct agent store.
*/
agentId?: string;
/**
* For provider targets, used to scrub auth-profile/static residues.
*/
providerId?: string;
/**
* For googlechat account-scoped targets.
*/
accountId?: string;
/**
* Optional auth-profile provider value used when creating new auth profile mappings.
*/
authProfileProvider?: string;
};
export type SecretsApplyPlan = {
version: 1;
protocolVersion: 1;
generatedAt: string;
generatedBy: "openclaw secrets configure" | "manual";
providerUpserts?: Record<string, SecretProviderConfig>;
providerDeletes?: string[];
targets: SecretsPlanTarget[];
options?: {
scrubEnv?: boolean;
scrubAuthProfilesForProviderTargets?: boolean;
scrubLegacyAuthJson?: boolean;
};
};
const FORBIDDEN_PATH_SEGMENTS = new Set(["__proto__", "prototype", "constructor"]);
function isObjectRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
return Boolean(value) && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value);
}
function isSecretProviderConfigShape(value: unknown): value is SecretProviderConfig {
return SecretProviderSchema.safeParse(value).success;
}
function hasForbiddenPathSegment(segments: string[]): boolean {
return segments.some((segment) => FORBIDDEN_PATH_SEGMENTS.has(segment));
}
export function resolveValidatedPlanTarget(candidate: {
type?: SecretsPlanTargetType;
path?: string;
pathSegments?: string[];
agentId?: string;
providerId?: string;
accountId?: string;
authProfileProvider?: string;
}): ResolvedPlanTarget | null {
if (!isKnownSecretTargetType(candidate.type)) {
return null;
}
const path = typeof candidate.path === "string" ? candidate.path.trim() : "";
if (!path) {
return null;
}
const segments =
Array.isArray(candidate.pathSegments) && candidate.pathSegments.length > 0
? candidate.pathSegments.map((segment) => String(segment).trim()).filter(Boolean)
: parseDotPath(path);
if (segments.length === 0 || hasForbiddenPathSegment(segments) || path !== toDotPath(segments)) {
return null;
}
return resolvePlanTargetAgainstRegistry({
type: candidate.type,
pathSegments: segments,
providerId: candidate.providerId,
accountId: candidate.accountId,
});
}
export function isSecretsApplyPlan(value: unknown): value is SecretsApplyPlan {
if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) {
return false;
}
const typed = value as Partial<SecretsApplyPlan>;
if (typed.version !== 1 || typed.protocolVersion !== 1 || !Array.isArray(typed.targets)) {
return false;
}
for (const target of typed.targets) {
if (!target || typeof target !== "object") {
return false;
}
const candidate = target as Partial<SecretsPlanTarget>;
const ref = candidate.ref as Partial<SecretRef> | undefined;
const resolved = resolveValidatedPlanTarget({
type: candidate.type,
path: candidate.path,
pathSegments: candidate.pathSegments,
agentId: candidate.agentId,
providerId: candidate.providerId,
accountId: candidate.accountId,
authProfileProvider: candidate.authProfileProvider,
});
if (
!isKnownSecretTargetType(candidate.type) ||
typeof candidate.path !== "string" ||
!candidate.path.trim() ||
(candidate.pathSegments !== undefined && !Array.isArray(candidate.pathSegments)) ||
!resolved ||
!ref ||
typeof ref !== "object" ||
(ref.source !== "env" && ref.source !== "file" && ref.source !== "exec") ||
typeof ref.provider !== "string" ||
ref.provider.trim().length === 0 ||
typeof ref.id !== "string" ||
ref.id.trim().length === 0
) {
return false;
}
if (resolved.entry.configFile === "auth-profiles.json") {
if (typeof candidate.agentId !== "string" || candidate.agentId.trim().length === 0) {
return false;
}
if (
candidate.authProfileProvider !== undefined &&
(typeof candidate.authProfileProvider !== "string" ||
candidate.authProfileProvider.trim().length === 0)
) {
return false;
}
}
}
if (typed.providerUpserts !== undefined) {
if (!isObjectRecord(typed.providerUpserts)) {
return false;
}
for (const [providerAlias, providerValue] of Object.entries(typed.providerUpserts)) {
if (!isValidSecretProviderAlias(providerAlias)) {
return false;
}
if (!isSecretProviderConfigShape(providerValue)) {
return false;
}
}
}
if (typed.providerDeletes !== undefined) {
if (
!Array.isArray(typed.providerDeletes) ||
typed.providerDeletes.some(
(providerAlias) =>
typeof providerAlias !== "string" || !isValidSecretProviderAlias(providerAlias),
)
) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
export function normalizeSecretsPlanOptions(
options: SecretsApplyPlan["options"] | undefined,
): Required<NonNullable<SecretsApplyPlan["options"]>> {
return {
scrubEnv: options?.scrubEnv ?? true,
scrubAuthProfilesForProviderTargets: options?.scrubAuthProfilesForProviderTargets ?? true,
scrubLegacyAuthJson: options?.scrubLegacyAuthJson ?? true,
};
}