Files
openclaw/src/agents/session-transcript-repair.attachments.test.ts
Nikolay Petrov a9f1188785 sessions_spawn: inline attachments with redaction, lifecycle cleanup, and docs (#16761)
Add inline file attachment support for sessions_spawn (subagent runtime only):

- Schema: attachments[] (name, content, encoding, mimeType) and attachAs.mountPath hint
- Materialization: files written to .openclaw/attachments/<uuid>/ with manifest.json
- Validation: strict base64 decode, filename checks, size limits, duplicate detection
- Transcript redaction: sanitizeToolCallInputs redacts attachment content from persisted transcripts
- Lifecycle cleanup: safeRemoveAttachmentsDir with symlink-safe path containment check
- Config: tools.sessions_spawn.attachments (enabled, maxFiles, maxFileBytes, maxTotalBytes, retainOnSessionKeep)
- Registry: attachmentsDir/attachmentsRootDir/retainAttachmentsOnKeep on SubagentRunRecord
- ACP rejection: attachments rejected for runtime=acp with clear error message
- Docs: updated tools/index.md, concepts/session-tool.md, configuration-reference.md
- Tests: 85 new/updated tests across 5 test files

Fixes:
- Guard fs.rm in materialization catch block with try/catch (review concern #1)
- Remove unreachable fallback in safeRemoveAttachmentsDir (review concern #7)
- Move attachment cleanup out of retry path to avoid timing issues with announce loop

Co-authored-by: Tyler Yust <TYTYYUST@YAHOO.COM>
Co-authored-by: napetrov <napetrov@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-01 21:33:51 -08:00

77 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript

import type { AgentMessage } from "@mariozechner/pi-agent-core";
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { sanitizeToolCallInputs } from "./session-transcript-repair.js";
function mkSessionsSpawnToolCall(content: string): AgentMessage {
return {
role: "assistant",
content: [
{
type: "toolCall",
id: "call_1",
name: "sessions_spawn",
arguments: {
task: "do thing",
attachments: [
{
name: "README.md",
encoding: "utf8",
content,
},
],
},
},
],
timestamp: Date.now(),
} as unknown as AgentMessage;
}
describe("sanitizeToolCallInputs redacts sessions_spawn attachments", () => {
it("replaces attachments[].content with __OPENCLAW_REDACTED__", () => {
const secret = "SUPER_SECRET_SHOULD_NOT_PERSIST";
const input = [mkSessionsSpawnToolCall(secret)];
const out = sanitizeToolCallInputs(input);
expect(out).toHaveLength(1);
const msg = out[0] as { content?: unknown[] };
const tool = (msg.content?.[0] ?? null) as {
name?: string;
arguments?: { attachments?: Array<{ content?: string }> };
} | null;
expect(tool?.name).toBe("sessions_spawn");
expect(tool?.arguments?.attachments?.[0]?.content).toBe("__OPENCLAW_REDACTED__");
expect(JSON.stringify(out)).not.toContain(secret);
});
it("redacts attachments content from tool input payloads too", () => {
const secret = "INPUT_SECRET_SHOULD_NOT_PERSIST";
const input = [
{
role: "assistant",
content: [
{
type: "toolUse",
id: "call_2",
name: "sessions_spawn",
input: {
task: "do thing",
attachments: [{ name: "x.txt", content: secret }],
},
},
],
},
] as unknown as AgentMessage[];
const out = sanitizeToolCallInputs(input);
const msg = out[0] as { content?: unknown[] };
const tool = (msg.content?.[0] ?? null) as {
// Some providers emit tool calls as `input`/`toolUse`. We normalize to `toolCall` with `arguments`.
input?: { attachments?: Array<{ content?: string }> };
arguments?: { attachments?: Array<{ content?: string }> };
} | null;
expect(
tool?.input?.attachments?.[0]?.content || tool?.arguments?.attachments?.[0]?.content,
).toBe("__OPENCLAW_REDACTED__");
expect(JSON.stringify(out)).not.toContain(secret);
});
});