openclaw/docs/cli/security.md

summary, read_when, title

summary	read_when	title
CLI reference for `openclaw security` (audit and fix common security footguns)	You want to run a quick security audit on config/state You want to apply safe "fix" suggestions (permissions, tighten defaults)	Security

openclaw security

Security tools (audit + optional fixes).

Related:

• Security guide: Security

Audit

openclaw security audit
openclaw security audit --deep
openclaw security audit --deep --password <password>
openclaw security audit --deep --token <token>
openclaw security audit --fix
openclaw security audit --json

Plain security audit stays on the cold config/filesystem/read-only path. It does not discover plugin runtime security collectors by default, so routine audits do not load every installed plugin runtime. Use --deep to include best-effort live Gateway probes and plugin-owned security audit collectors; explicit internal callers may also opt into those plugin-owned collectors when they already have an appropriate runtime scope.

The audit warns when multiple DM senders share the main session and recommends secure DM mode: session.dmScope="per-channel-peer" (or per-account-channel-peer for multi-account channels) for shared inboxes. This is for cooperative/shared inbox hardening. A single Gateway shared by mutually untrusted/adversarial operators is not a recommended setup; split trust boundaries with separate gateways (or separate OS users/hosts). It also emits security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic when config suggests likely shared-user ingress (for example open DM/group policy, configured group targets, or wildcard sender rules), and reminds you that OpenClaw is a personal-assistant trust model by default. For intentional shared-user setups, the audit guidance is to sandbox all sessions, keep filesystem access workspace-scoped, and keep personal/private identities or credentials off that runtime. It also warns when small models (<=300B) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled. For webhook ingress, it warns when hooks.token reuses the Gateway token, when hooks.token is short, when hooks.path="/", when hooks.defaultSessionKey is unset, when hooks.allowedAgentIds is unrestricted, when request sessionKey overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes. It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when gateway.nodes.denyCommands uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries (exact node command-name matching only, not shell-text filtering), when gateway.nodes.allowCommands explicitly enables dangerous node commands, when global tools.profile="minimal" is overridden by agent tool profiles, when write/edit tools are disabled but exec is still available without a constraining sandbox filesystem boundary, when open groups expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards, and when installed plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy. It also flags gateway.allowRealIpFallback=true (header-spoofing risk if proxies are misconfigured) and discovery.mdns.mode="full" (metadata leakage via mDNS TXT records). It also warns when sandbox browser uses Docker bridge network without sandbox.browser.cdpSourceRange. It also flags dangerous sandbox Docker network modes (including host and container:* namespace joins). It also warns when existing sandbox browser Docker containers have missing/stale hash labels (for example pre-migration containers missing openclaw.browserConfigEpoch) and recommends openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all. It also warns when npm-based plugin/hook install records are unpinned, missing integrity metadata, or drift from currently installed package versions. It warns when channel allowlists rely on mutable names/emails/tags instead of stable IDs (Discord, Slack, Google Chat, Microsoft Teams, Mattermost, IRC scopes where applicable). It warns when gateway.auth.mode="none" leaves Gateway HTTP APIs reachable without a shared secret (/tools/invoke plus any enabled /v1/* endpoint). Settings prefixed with dangerous/dangerously are explicit break-glass operator overrides; enabling one is not, by itself, a security vulnerability report. For the complete dangerous-parameter inventory, see the "Insecure or dangerous flags summary" section in Security.

SecretRef behavior:

• security audit resolves supported SecretRefs in read-only mode for its targeted paths.
• If a SecretRef is unavailable in the current command path, audit continues and reports secretDiagnostics (instead of crashing).
• --token and --password only override deep-probe auth for that command invocation; they do not rewrite config or SecretRef mappings.

JSON output

Use --json for CI/policy checks:

openclaw security audit --json | jq '.summary'
openclaw security audit --deep --json | jq '.findings[] | select(.severity=="critical") | .checkId'

If --fix and --json are combined, output includes both fix actions and final report:

openclaw security audit --fix --json | jq '{fix: .fix.ok, summary: .report.summary}'

What --fix changes

--fix applies safe, deterministic remediations:

• flips common groupPolicy="open" to groupPolicy="allowlist" (including account variants in supported channels)
• when WhatsApp group policy flips to allowlist, seeds groupAllowFrom from the stored pairing allowlist when that list exists and config does not already define allowFrom
• sets logging.redactSensitive from "off" to "tools"
• tightens permissions for state/config and common sensitive files (state/openclaw.sqlite, credentials/*.json legacy doctor inputs, legacy runtime/session JSON files, session *.jsonl)
• also tightens config include files referenced from openclaw.json
• uses chmod on POSIX hosts and icacls resets on Windows

--fix does not:

• rotate tokens/passwords/API keys
• disable tools (gateway, cron, exec, etc.)
• change gateway bind/auth/network exposure choices
• remove or rewrite plugins/skills

Related

• CLI reference
• Security audit