vultr/openclaw
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw.git synced 2026-07-22 11:51:23 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
Files
faf3dbdda833b36d4cccf465a40aabe2d1675d3d
openclaw/docs/reference/secretref-credential-surface.md
Peter Steinberger 5bab0c2ea8 feat(slack): support running as a real Slack user (user identity) (#109837) 
* feat(slack): add user-identity config surface (session token/cookie)

Introduce an account-level identity discriminator ("bot" default | "user") for
the Slack channel, plus sessionToken/sessionCookie secret fields for the
browser-session (user) path. Schema enforces structural coupling only
(identity="user" rejects appToken/signingSecret/relay/non-default mode);
credential presence is deferred to runtime like bot/app tokens. Account entries
inherit the top-level identity. Adds env fallback (SLACK_SESSION_TOKEN/COOKIE,
default account only), secret-contract registration, provenance *Source fields,
and UI hints. Config surface only; resolver/transport are later phases.

* refactor(slack): identity-aware operation-token resolver + dedup

Route Slack read/write token selection through a single identity-aware
resolveSlackOperationToken: identity="user" selects the browser-session token
for both operations (companion cookie attached later at client construction),
identity="bot" keeps the exact userToken/botToken + userTokenReadOnly behavior.
Delete the duplicated token-selection gate in action-runtime and route direct
sends/DM opens through the shared resolver with identity-neutral error wording.
Behavior-neutral for bot identity; net non-test LOC -2.

* refactor(slack): retarget user identity to xoxp + companion app

Replace the abandoned browser-session (xoxc/xoxd) approach for identity="user"
with the official path: authenticate as the human via the existing userToken
(xoxp) while a companion app (appToken/socket or signingSecret/http) carries
events. Remove sessionToken/sessionCookie config, env vars, secret-contract
entries, resolver fields, and their tests. Invert the schema coupling so
identity="user" permits the companion-app transport credentials, and drop the
now-vestigial user-identity structural guard entirely (identity is a permissive
discriminator; credential presence is a runtime concern). Resolver returns the
user token for user-identity reads and writes. Behavior-neutral for bot
identity.

* feat(slack): user-identity provider transport (xoxp + companion app)

Wire the identity="user" event transport. The companion Slack app runs Socket
Mode (appToken) or HTTP (signingSecret) while Bolt authenticates as the human
via the user token (no bot token). Startup auth.test runs on the user token and
its user_id becomes the self/mention target and self-send dedupe id (Bolt's
lazy per-event authorize populates context.botUserId=user_id, so the existing
self-event middleware drops the human's own messages). Identity-aware token
requirements and diagnostics; the bot-token identity warning is suppressed for
user identity. Behavior-neutral for identity="bot".

* feat(slack): user-identity setup, doctor, and docs

Add the setup wizard, doctor/status, and documentation for identity="user".
The wizard collects a user token plus the companion-app transport credential
(app token for socket, signing secret for http) and only persists identity when
"user" so bot setups keep byte-identical generated config; doctor validates the
user token via auth.test and warns on a missing transport credential; account
inspection reports user-token status. Message actions are gated on the active
identity's credential so user accounts expose actions. Docs add the exact
companion-app recipe (user scopes, on-behalf-of-user message events, socket/http
examples, the DM/group-DM-only-via-user-scope note, and self-send dedupe).
Behavior-neutral for identity="bot".

* test(slack): isolate user-identity provider tests to fix parallel flake

The new user-identity provider tests shared the globalThis-stored Slack test
client/handlers across files under parallel isolate:false, so their reaction
closures could reference a prior file's state and intermittently fail sibling
monitor tests (monitor.tool-result reactions). Track started monitors and
abort/await them all in afterEach (even on failed assertions), reset the shared
auth.test/mock state, and dispose the global Slack test runtime per file via a
new disposeSlackTestRuntime helper. Full Slack suite green across repeated
parallel runs.

* fix(slack): regenerate channel config metadata after rebase

* fix(slack): resolve setup consistent-return and doctor dead-export lint

* style: format install script test

* docs(slack): regenerate docs map for user-identity section

* test(slack): use renamed createSlackBoltApp token param in interop test

The rebase folded main's new wrapReceiver test into the renamed
createSlackBoltApp signature (botToken -> token); update the call site.
2026-07-17 23:23:21 +01:00

8.5 KiB
Raw Blame History

summary, read_when, title
summary read_when title
Canonical supported vs unsupported SecretRef credential surface
Verifying SecretRef credential coverage
Auditing whether a credential is eligible for `secrets configure` or `secrets apply`
Verifying why a credential is outside the supported surface
SecretRef credential surface

This page defines the canonical SecretRef credential surface: which credential fields accept a SecretRef (env/file/exec-backed reference) instead of a raw secret value.

Scope:

  • In scope: strictly user-supplied credentials that OpenClaw does not mint or rotate.
  • Out of scope: runtime-minted or rotating credentials, OAuth refresh material, and session-like artifacts.

The lists below are generated from the source target registry and checked against docs/reference/secretref-user-supplied-credentials-matrix.json in CI; do not hand-edit entries.

Supported credentials

openclaw.json targets (secrets configure + secrets apply + secrets audit)

  • models.providers.*.apiKey
  • models.providers.*.headers.*
  • models.providers.*.request.auth.token
  • models.providers.*.request.auth.value
  • models.providers.*.request.headers.*
  • models.providers.*.request.proxy.tls.ca
  • models.providers.*.request.proxy.tls.cert
  • models.providers.*.request.proxy.tls.key
  • models.providers.*.request.proxy.tls.passphrase
  • models.providers.*.request.tls.ca
  • models.providers.*.request.tls.cert
  • models.providers.*.request.tls.key
  • models.providers.*.request.tls.passphrase
  • skills.entries.*.apiKey
  • agents.defaults.memorySearch.remote.apiKey
  • agents.list[].tts.providers.*.apiKey
  • agents.list[].memorySearch.remote.apiKey
  • talk.providers.*.apiKey
  • talk.realtime.providers.*.apiKey
  • messages.tts.providers.*.apiKey
  • tools.web.fetch.firecrawl.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.acpx.config.mcpServers.*.env.*
  • plugins.entries.brave.config.webSearch.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.codex.config.appServer.authToken
  • plugins.entries.codex.config.appServer.headers.*
  • plugins.entries.exa.config.webSearch.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.google-meet.config.realtime.providers.*.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.google.config.webSearch.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.xai.config.webSearch.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.moonshot.config.webSearch.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.perplexity.config.webSearch.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.firecrawl.config.webSearch.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.minimax.config.webSearch.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.tavily.config.webSearch.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.parallel.config.webSearch.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.voice-call.config.realtime.providers.*.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.voice-call.config.streaming.providers.*.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.voice-call.config.tts.providers.*.apiKey
  • plugins.entries.voice-call.config.twilio.authToken
  • plugins.entries.webhooks.config.routes.*.secret
  • tools.web.search.*.apiKey
  • tools.web.search.apiKey
  • gateway.auth.password
  • gateway.auth.token
  • gateway.remote.token
  • gateway.remote.password
  • cron.webhookToken
  • channels.telegram.botToken
  • channels.telegram.webhookSecret
  • channels.telegram.accounts.*.botToken
  • channels.telegram.accounts.*.webhookSecret
  • channels.slack.botToken
  • channels.slack.appToken
  • channels.slack.relay.authToken
  • channels.slack.userToken
  • channels.slack.signingSecret
  • channels.slack.accounts.*.botToken
  • channels.slack.accounts.*.appToken
  • channels.slack.accounts.*.relay.authToken
  • channels.slack.accounts.*.userToken
  • channels.slack.accounts.*.signingSecret
  • channels.sms.authToken
  • channels.sms.accounts.*.authToken
  • channels.clickclack.token
  • channels.clickclack.accounts.*.token
  • channels.discord.token
  • channels.discord.pluralkit.token
  • channels.discord.voice.tts.providers.*.apiKey
  • channels.discord.accounts.*.token
  • channels.discord.accounts.*.pluralkit.token
  • channels.discord.accounts.*.voice.tts.providers.*.apiKey
  • channels.irc.password
  • channels.irc.nickserv.password
  • channels.irc.accounts.*.password
  • channels.irc.accounts.*.nickserv.password
  • channels.feishu.appSecret
  • channels.feishu.encryptKey
  • channels.feishu.verificationToken
  • channels.feishu.accounts.*.appSecret
  • channels.feishu.accounts.*.encryptKey
  • channels.feishu.accounts.*.verificationToken
  • channels.qqbot.clientSecret
  • channels.qqbot.accounts.*.clientSecret
  • channels.msteams.appPassword
  • channels.mattermost.botToken
  • channels.mattermost.accounts.*.botToken
  • channels.matrix.accessToken
  • channels.matrix.password
  • channels.matrix.accounts.*.accessToken
  • channels.matrix.accounts.*.password
  • channels.nextcloud-talk.botSecret
  • channels.nextcloud-talk.apiPassword
  • channels.nextcloud-talk.accounts.*.botSecret
  • channels.nextcloud-talk.accounts.*.apiPassword
  • channels.zalo.botToken
  • channels.zalo.webhookSecret
  • channels.zalo.accounts.*.botToken
  • channels.zalo.accounts.*.webhookSecret
  • channels.googlechat.serviceAccount via sibling serviceAccountRef (compatibility exception)
  • channels.googlechat.accounts.*.serviceAccount via sibling serviceAccountRef (compatibility exception)

auth-profiles.json targets (secrets configure + secrets apply + secrets audit)

  • profiles.*.keyRef (type: "api_key"; unsupported when auth.profiles.<id>.mode = "oauth")
  • profiles.*.tokenRef (type: "token"; unsupported when auth.profiles.<id>.mode = "oauth")

Notes:

  • Auth-profile plan targets require agentId; plan entries target profiles.*.key / profiles.*.token and write sibling refs (keyRef / tokenRef). Auth-profile refs are included in runtime resolution and audit coverage.
  • In openclaw.json, SecretRefs must use structured objects such as {"source":"env","provider":"default","id":"DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN"}. Legacy secretref-env:<ENV_VAR> marker strings are rejected on SecretRef credential paths; run openclaw doctor --fix to migrate valid markers.
  • OAuth policy guard: auth.profiles.<id>.mode = "oauth" cannot be combined with SecretRef inputs for that profile. Startup/reload and auth-profile resolution fail fast when this policy is violated.
  • For SecretRef-managed model providers, generated agents/*/agent/models.json entries persist non-secret markers (not resolved secret values) for apiKey/header surfaces. Marker persistence is source-authoritative: OpenClaw writes markers from the active source config snapshot (pre-resolution), not from resolved runtime secret values.
  • Cold Gateway startup can isolate resolution failures for mapped owners. The initial mapped owners are models.providers.* and the built-in TTS capability (messages.tts.providers.*, agents.list[].tts.providers.*, and channel voice TTS provider keys). Startup keeps each failed owner's explicit refs in the runtime snapshot, reports the owner through status and doctor, and rejects requests for that owner without trying environment or profile credentials. Gateway ingress auth remains required. Structurally invalid refs or values and currently unmapped owners fail startup. Reload and config-write preflight remain strict and retain the last-known-good snapshot.
  • For web search: in explicit provider mode (tools.web.search.provider set), only the selected provider key is active. In auto mode (tools.web.search.provider unset), only the first provider key that resolves by precedence is active, and non-selected provider refs are treated as inactive until selected. Legacy tools.web.search.* provider paths still resolve during the compatibility window, but the canonical SecretRef surface is plugins.entries.<plugin>.config.webSearch.*.
  • Slack identity: "user" uses channels.slack.userToken with channels.slack.appToken for Socket Mode or channels.slack.signingSecret for HTTP mode. The same pairing applies under channels.slack.accounts.*; no bot token is required for this identity.

Unsupported credentials

These credentials are minted, rotated, session-bearing, or OAuth-durable classes that do not fit read-only external SecretRef resolution:

  • commands.ownerDisplaySecret
  • hooks.token
  • hooks.gmail.pushToken
  • hooks.mappings[].sessionKey
  • auth-profiles.oauth.*
  • channels.discord.threadBindings.webhookToken
  • channels.discord.accounts.*.threadBindings.webhookToken
  • channels.whatsapp.creds.json
  • channels.whatsapp.accounts.*.creds.json

Related

Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink