test: normalize safe-bin docs parity indentation

docs/tools/exec-approvals.md

@@ -316,60 +316,60 @@ so file operands cannot be smuggled as ambiguous positionals.
 
     [//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DENIED_FLAGS:START"
 
-- `grep`: `--dereference-recursive`, `--directories`, `--exclude-from`, `--file`, `--recursive`, `-R`, `-d`, `-f`, `-r`
-- `jq`: `--argfile`, `--from-file`, `--library-path`, `--rawfile`, `--slurpfile`, `-L`, `-f`
-- `sort`: `--compress-program`, `--files0-from`, `--output`, `--random-source`, `--temporary-directory`, `-T`, `-o`
-- `wc`: `--files0-from`
+    - `grep`: `--dereference-recursive`, `--directories`, `--exclude-from`, `--file`, `--recursive`, `-R`, `-d`, `-f`, `-r`
+    - `jq`: `--argfile`, `--from-file`, `--library-path`, `--rawfile`, `--slurpfile`, `-L`, `-f`
+    - `sort`: `--compress-program`, `--files0-from`, `--output`, `--random-source`, `--temporary-directory`, `-T`, `-o`
+    - `wc`: `--files0-from`
 
-      [//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DENIED_FLAGS:END"
+    [//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DENIED_FLAGS:END"
 
-      Safe bins also force argv tokens to be treated as **literal text** at
-      execution time (no globbing and no `$VARS` expansion) for stdin-only
-      segments, so patterns like `*` or `$HOME/...` cannot be used to smuggle
-      file reads.
+    Safe bins also force argv tokens to be treated as **literal text** at
+    execution time (no globbing and no `$VARS` expansion) for stdin-only
+    segments, so patterns like `*` or `$HOME/...` cannot be used to smuggle
+    file reads.
 
-    </Accordion>
+  </Accordion>
 
-    <Accordion title="Trusted binary directories">
-      Safe bins must resolve from trusted binary directories (system defaults
-      plus optional `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`). `PATH` entries are never
-      auto-trusted. Default trusted directories are intentionally minimal:
-      `/bin`, `/usr/bin`. If your safe-bin executable lives in
-      package-manager/user paths (for example `/opt/homebrew/bin`,
-      `/usr/local/bin`, `/opt/local/bin`, `/snap/bin`), add them explicitly to
-      `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`.
-    </Accordion>
+  <Accordion title="Trusted binary directories">
+    Safe bins must resolve from trusted binary directories (system defaults
+    plus optional `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`). `PATH` entries are never
+    auto-trusted. Default trusted directories are intentionally minimal:
+    `/bin`, `/usr/bin`. If your safe-bin executable lives in
+    package-manager/user paths (for example `/opt/homebrew/bin`,
+    `/usr/local/bin`, `/opt/local/bin`, `/snap/bin`), add them explicitly to
+    `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`.
+  </Accordion>
 
-    <Accordion title="Shell chaining, wrappers, and multiplexers">
-      Shell chaining (`&&`, `||`, `;`) is allowed when every top-level segment
-      satisfies the allowlist (including safe bins or skill auto-allow).
-      Redirections remain unsupported in allowlist mode. Command substitution
-      (`$()` / backticks) is rejected during allowlist parsing, including inside
-      double quotes; use single quotes if you need literal `$()` text.
+  <Accordion title="Shell chaining, wrappers, and multiplexers">
+    Shell chaining (`&&`, `||`, `;`) is allowed when every top-level segment
+    satisfies the allowlist (including safe bins or skill auto-allow).
+    Redirections remain unsupported in allowlist mode. Command substitution
+    (`$()` / backticks) is rejected during allowlist parsing, including inside
+    double quotes; use single quotes if you need literal `$()` text.
 
-      On macOS companion-app approvals, raw shell text containing shell control
-      or expansion syntax (`&&`, `||`, `;`, `|`, `` ` ``, `$`, `<`, `>`, `(`,
-      `)`) is treated as an allowlist miss unless the shell binary itself is
-      allowlisted.
+    On macOS companion-app approvals, raw shell text containing shell control
+    or expansion syntax (`&&`, `||`, `;`, `|`, `` ` ``, `$`, `<`, `>`, `(`,
+    `)`) is treated as an allowlist miss unless the shell binary itself is
+    allowlisted.
 
-      For shell wrappers (`bash|sh|zsh ... -c/-lc`), request-scoped env
-      overrides are reduced to a small explicit allowlist (`TERM`, `LANG`,
-      `LC_*`, `COLORTERM`, `NO_COLOR`, `FORCE_COLOR`).
+    For shell wrappers (`bash|sh|zsh ... -c/-lc`), request-scoped env
+    overrides are reduced to a small explicit allowlist (`TERM`, `LANG`,
+    `LC_*`, `COLORTERM`, `NO_COLOR`, `FORCE_COLOR`).
 
-      For `allow-always` decisions in allowlist mode, known dispatch wrappers
-      (`env`, `nice`, `nohup`, `stdbuf`, `timeout`) persist the inner executable
-      path instead of the wrapper path. Shell multiplexers (`busybox`, `toybox`)
-      are unwrapped for shell applets (`sh`, `ash`, etc.) the same way. If a
-      wrapper or multiplexer cannot be safely unwrapped, no allowlist entry is
-      persisted automatically.
+    For `allow-always` decisions in allowlist mode, known dispatch wrappers
+    (`env`, `nice`, `nohup`, `stdbuf`, `timeout`) persist the inner executable
+    path instead of the wrapper path. Shell multiplexers (`busybox`, `toybox`)
+    are unwrapped for shell applets (`sh`, `ash`, etc.) the same way. If a
+    wrapper or multiplexer cannot be safely unwrapped, no allowlist entry is
+    persisted automatically.
 
-      If you allowlist interpreters like `python3` or `node`, prefer
-      `tools.exec.strictInlineEval=true` so inline eval still requires an
-      explicit approval. In strict mode, `allow-always` can still persist benign
-      interpreter/script invocations, but inline-eval carriers are not persisted
-      automatically.
+    If you allowlist interpreters like `python3` or `node`, prefer
+    `tools.exec.strictInlineEval=true` so inline eval still requires an
+    explicit approval. In strict mode, `allow-always` can still persist benign
+    interpreter/script invocations, but inline-eval carriers are not persisted
+    automatically.
 
-    </Accordion>
+  </Accordion>
   </AccordionGroup>
 
 ### Safe bins versus allowlist

src/infra/exec-safe-bin-policy.test.ts

@@ -17,6 +17,24 @@ const SAFE_BIN_DOC_DEFAULTS_END = '[//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DEFAULTS:END"';
 const SAFE_BIN_DOC_DENIED_FLAGS_START = '[//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DENIED_FLAGS:START"';
 const SAFE_BIN_DOC_DENIED_FLAGS_END = '[//]: # "SAFE_BIN_DENIED_FLAGS:END"';
 
+function normalizeGeneratedDocBlock(block: string): string {
+  const lines = block.split("\n");
+  while (lines[0]?.trim() === "") {
+    lines.shift();
+  }
+  while (lines.at(-1)?.trim() === "") {
+    lines.pop();
+  }
+  const indents = lines
+    .filter((line) => line.trim().length > 0)
+    .map((line) => line.match(/^ */)?.[0].length ?? 0);
+  const commonIndent = Math.min(...indents);
+  if (commonIndent <= 0) {
+    return lines.join("\n");
+  }
+  return lines.map((line) => line.slice(Math.min(line.length, commonIndent))).join("\n");
+}
+
 function buildDeniedFlagArgvVariants(flag: string): string[][] {
   const value = "blocked";
   if (flag.startsWith("--")) {
@@ -187,7 +205,9 @@ describe("exec safe bin policy docs parity", () => {
     const end = docs.indexOf(SAFE_BIN_DOC_DENIED_FLAGS_END);
     expect(start).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
     expect(end).toBeGreaterThan(start);
-    const actual = docs.slice(start + SAFE_BIN_DOC_DENIED_FLAGS_START.length, end).trim();
+    const actual = normalizeGeneratedDocBlock(
+      docs.slice(start + SAFE_BIN_DOC_DENIED_FLAGS_START.length, end),
+    );
     const expected = renderSafeBinDeniedFlagsDocBullets();
     expect(actual).toBe(expected);
   });