fix: harden archive extraction destinations

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-03-10 23:49:35 +00:00
parent 201420a7ee
commit 658cf4bd94
5 changed files with 309 additions and 63 deletions

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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- macOS/LaunchAgent install: tighten LaunchAgent directory and plist permissions during install so launchd bootstrap does not fail when the target home path or generated plist inherited group/world-writable modes.
- Gateway/Control UI: keep dashboard auth tokens in session-scoped browser storage so same-tab refreshes preserve remote token auth without restoring long-lived localStorage token persistence, while scoping tokens to the selected gateway URL and fragment-only bootstrap flow. (#40892) thanks @velvet-shark.
- Secret files: harden CLI and channel credential file reads against path-swap races by requiring direct regular files for `*File` secret inputs and rejecting symlink-backed secret files.
- Archive extraction: harden TAR and external `tar.bz2` installs against destination symlink and pre-existing child-symlink escapes by extracting into staging first and merging into the canonical destination with safe file opens.
- Models/Kimi Coding: send `anthropic-messages` tools in native Anthropic format again so `kimi-coding` stops degrading tool calls into XML/plain-text pseudo invocations instead of real `tool_use` blocks. (#38669, #39907, #40552) Thanks @opriz.
- Context engine/tests: add bundled-registry regression coverage for cross-chunk resolution, plugin-sdk re-exports, and concurrent chunk registration. (#40460) thanks @dsantoreis.
- Agents/embedded runner: bound compaction retry waiting and drain embedded runs during SIGUSR1 restart so session lanes recover instead of staying blocked behind compaction. (#40324) thanks @cgdusek.

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@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ import fs from "node:fs";
import {
createTarEntrySafetyChecker,
extractArchive as extractArchiveSafe,
mergeExtractedTreeIntoDestination,
prepareArchiveDestinationDir,
withStagedArchiveDestination,
} from "../infra/archive.js";
import { runCommandWithTimeout } from "../process/exec.js";
import { parseTarVerboseMetadata } from "./skills-install-tar-verbose.js";
@@ -66,6 +69,7 @@ export async function extractArchive(params: {
return { stdout: "", stderr: "tar not found on PATH", code: null };
}
const destinationRealDir = await prepareArchiveDestinationDir(targetDir);
const preflightHash = await hashFileSha256(archivePath);
// Preflight list to prevent zip-slip style traversal before extraction.
@@ -99,7 +103,7 @@ export async function extractArchive(params: {
};
}
const checkTarEntrySafety = createTarEntrySafetyChecker({
rootDir: targetDir,
rootDir: destinationRealDir,
stripComponents: strip,
escapeLabel: "targetDir",
});
@@ -129,11 +133,25 @@ export async function extractArchive(params: {
};
}
const argv = ["tar", "xf", archivePath, "-C", targetDir];
if (strip > 0) {
argv.push("--strip-components", String(strip));
}
return await runCommandWithTimeout(argv, { timeoutMs });
return await withStagedArchiveDestination({
destinationRealDir,
run: async (stagingDir) => {
const argv = ["tar", "xf", archivePath, "-C", stagingDir];
if (strip > 0) {
argv.push("--strip-components", String(strip));
}
const extractResult = await runCommandWithTimeout(argv, { timeoutMs });
if (extractResult.code !== 0) {
return extractResult;
}
await mergeExtractedTreeIntoDestination({
sourceDir: stagingDir,
destinationDir: destinationRealDir,
destinationRealDir,
});
return extractResult;
},
});
}
return { stdout: "", stderr: `unsupported archive type: ${archiveType}`, code: null };

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@@ -425,4 +425,47 @@ describe("installDownloadSpec extraction safety (tar.bz2)", () => {
.some((call) => (call[0] as string[])[1] === "xf");
expect(extractionAttempted).toBe(false);
});
it("rejects tar.bz2 entries that traverse pre-existing targetDir symlinks", async () => {
const entry = buildEntry("tbz2-targetdir-symlink");
const targetDir = path.join(resolveSkillToolsRootDir(entry), "target");
const outsideDir = path.join(workspaceDir, "tbz2-targetdir-outside");
await fs.mkdir(targetDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(outsideDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.symlink(
outsideDir,
path.join(targetDir, "escape"),
process.platform === "win32" ? "junction" : undefined,
);
mockArchiveResponse(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
runCommandWithTimeoutMock.mockImplementation(async (...argv: unknown[]) => {
const cmd = (argv[0] ?? []) as string[];
if (cmd[0] === "tar" && cmd[1] === "tf") {
return runCommandResult({ stdout: "escape/pwn.txt\n" });
}
if (cmd[0] === "tar" && cmd[1] === "tvf") {
return runCommandResult({ stdout: "-rw-r--r-- 0 0 0 0 Jan 1 00:00 escape/pwn.txt\n" });
}
if (cmd[0] === "tar" && cmd[1] === "xf") {
const stagingDir = String(cmd[cmd.indexOf("-C") + 1] ?? "");
await fs.mkdir(path.join(stagingDir, "escape"), { recursive: true });
await fs.writeFile(path.join(stagingDir, "escape", "pwn.txt"), "owned");
return runCommandResult({ stdout: "ok" });
}
return runCommandResult();
});
const result = await installDownloadSkill({
name: "tbz2-targetdir-symlink",
url: "https://example.invalid/evil.tbz2",
archive: "tar.bz2",
targetDir,
});
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
expect(result.stderr.toLowerCase()).toContain("archive entry traverses symlink in destination");
expect(await fileExists(path.join(outsideDir, "pwn.txt"))).toBe(false);
});
});

View File

@@ -105,6 +105,39 @@ describe("archive utils", () => {
},
);
it.each([{ ext: "zip" as const }, { ext: "tar" as const }])(
"rejects $ext extraction when destination dir is a symlink",
async ({ ext }) => {
await withArchiveCase(ext, async ({ workDir, archivePath, extractDir }) => {
const realExtractDir = path.join(workDir, "real-extract");
await fs.mkdir(realExtractDir, { recursive: true });
await writePackageArchive({
ext,
workDir,
archivePath,
fileName: "hello.txt",
content: "hi",
});
await fs.rm(extractDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
await fs.symlink(
realExtractDir,
extractDir,
process.platform === "win32" ? "junction" : undefined,
);
await expect(
extractArchive({ archivePath, destDir: extractDir, timeoutMs: 5_000 }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: "destination-symlink",
} satisfies Partial<ArchiveSecurityError>);
await expect(
fs.stat(path.join(realExtractDir, "package", "hello.txt")),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT" });
});
},
);
it("rejects zip path traversal (zip slip)", async () => {
await withArchiveCase("zip", async ({ archivePath, extractDir }) => {
const zip = new JSZip();
@@ -233,6 +266,32 @@ describe("archive utils", () => {
});
});
it("rejects tar entries that traverse pre-existing destination symlinks", async () => {
await withArchiveCase("tar", async ({ workDir, archivePath, extractDir }) => {
const outsideDir = path.join(workDir, "outside");
const archiveRoot = path.join(workDir, "archive-root");
await fs.mkdir(outsideDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(path.join(archiveRoot, "escape"), { recursive: true });
await fs.writeFile(path.join(archiveRoot, "escape", "pwn.txt"), "owned");
await fs.symlink(
outsideDir,
path.join(extractDir, "escape"),
process.platform === "win32" ? "junction" : undefined,
);
await tar.c({ cwd: archiveRoot, file: archivePath }, ["escape"]);
await expect(
extractArchive({ archivePath, destDir: extractDir, timeoutMs: 5_000 }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: "destination-symlink-traversal",
} satisfies Partial<ArchiveSecurityError>);
await expect(fs.stat(path.join(outsideDir, "pwn.txt"))).rejects.toMatchObject({
code: "ENOENT",
});
});
});
it.each([{ ext: "zip" as const }, { ext: "tar" as const }])(
"rejects $ext archives that exceed extracted size budget",
async ({ ext }) => {

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,12 @@ import {
validateArchiveEntryPath,
} from "./archive-path.js";
import { sameFileIdentity } from "./file-identity.js";
import { openFileWithinRoot, openWritableFileWithinRoot, SafeOpenError } from "./fs-safe.js";
import {
copyFileWithinRoot,
openFileWithinRoot,
openWritableFileWithinRoot,
SafeOpenError,
} from "./fs-safe.js";
import { isNotFoundPathError, isPathInside } from "./path-guards.js";
export type ArchiveKind = "tar" | "zip";
@@ -224,7 +229,7 @@ function symlinkTraversalError(originalPath: string): ArchiveSecurityError {
);
}
async function assertDestinationDirReady(destDir: string): Promise<string> {
export async function prepareArchiveDestinationDir(destDir: string): Promise<string> {
const stat = await fs.lstat(destDir);
if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
throw new ArchiveSecurityError("destination-symlink", "archive destination is a symlink");
@@ -243,7 +248,7 @@ async function assertNoSymlinkTraversal(params: {
relPath: string;
originalPath: string;
}): Promise<void> {
const parts = params.relPath.split("/").filter(Boolean);
const parts = params.relPath.split(/[\\/]+/).filter(Boolean);
let current = path.resolve(params.rootDir);
for (const part of parts) {
current = path.join(current, part);
@@ -281,6 +286,135 @@ async function assertResolvedInsideDestination(params: {
}
}
async function prepareArchiveOutputPath(params: {
destinationDir: string;
destinationRealDir: string;
relPath: string;
outPath: string;
originalPath: string;
isDirectory: boolean;
}): Promise<void> {
await assertNoSymlinkTraversal({
rootDir: params.destinationDir,
relPath: params.relPath,
originalPath: params.originalPath,
});
if (params.isDirectory) {
await fs.mkdir(params.outPath, { recursive: true });
await assertResolvedInsideDestination({
destinationRealDir: params.destinationRealDir,
targetPath: params.outPath,
originalPath: params.originalPath,
});
return;
}
const parentDir = path.dirname(params.outPath);
await fs.mkdir(parentDir, { recursive: true });
await assertResolvedInsideDestination({
destinationRealDir: params.destinationRealDir,
targetPath: parentDir,
originalPath: params.originalPath,
});
}
async function applyStagedEntryMode(params: {
destinationRealDir: string;
relPath: string;
mode: number;
originalPath: string;
}): Promise<void> {
const destinationPath = path.join(params.destinationRealDir, params.relPath);
await assertResolvedInsideDestination({
destinationRealDir: params.destinationRealDir,
targetPath: destinationPath,
originalPath: params.originalPath,
});
if (params.mode !== 0) {
await fs.chmod(destinationPath, params.mode).catch(() => undefined);
}
}
export async function withStagedArchiveDestination<T>(params: {
destinationRealDir: string;
run: (stagingDir: string) => Promise<T>;
}): Promise<T> {
const stagingDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(params.destinationRealDir, ".openclaw-archive-"));
try {
return await params.run(stagingDir);
} finally {
await fs.rm(stagingDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => undefined);
}
}
export async function mergeExtractedTreeIntoDestination(params: {
sourceDir: string;
destinationDir: string;
destinationRealDir: string;
}): Promise<void> {
const walk = async (currentSourceDir: string): Promise<void> => {
const entries = await fs.readdir(currentSourceDir, { withFileTypes: true });
for (const entry of entries) {
const sourcePath = path.join(currentSourceDir, entry.name);
const relPath = path.relative(params.sourceDir, sourcePath);
const originalPath = relPath.split(path.sep).join("/");
const destinationPath = path.join(params.destinationDir, relPath);
const sourceStat = await fs.lstat(sourcePath);
if (sourceStat.isSymbolicLink()) {
throw symlinkTraversalError(originalPath);
}
if (sourceStat.isDirectory()) {
await prepareArchiveOutputPath({
destinationDir: params.destinationDir,
destinationRealDir: params.destinationRealDir,
relPath,
outPath: destinationPath,
originalPath,
isDirectory: true,
});
await walk(sourcePath);
await applyStagedEntryMode({
destinationRealDir: params.destinationRealDir,
relPath,
mode: sourceStat.mode & 0o777,
originalPath,
});
continue;
}
if (!sourceStat.isFile()) {
throw new Error(`archive staging contains unsupported entry: ${originalPath}`);
}
await prepareArchiveOutputPath({
destinationDir: params.destinationDir,
destinationRealDir: params.destinationRealDir,
relPath,
outPath: destinationPath,
originalPath,
isDirectory: false,
});
await copyFileWithinRoot({
sourcePath,
rootDir: params.destinationRealDir,
relativePath: relPath,
mkdir: true,
});
await applyStagedEntryMode({
destinationRealDir: params.destinationRealDir,
relPath,
mode: sourceStat.mode & 0o777,
originalPath,
});
}
};
await walk(params.sourceDir);
}
type OpenZipOutputFileResult = {
handle: FileHandle;
createdForWrite: boolean;
@@ -403,29 +537,7 @@ async function prepareZipOutputPath(params: {
originalPath: string;
isDirectory: boolean;
}): Promise<void> {
await assertNoSymlinkTraversal({
rootDir: params.destinationDir,
relPath: params.relPath,
originalPath: params.originalPath,
});
if (params.isDirectory) {
await fs.mkdir(params.outPath, { recursive: true });
await assertResolvedInsideDestination({
destinationRealDir: params.destinationRealDir,
targetPath: params.outPath,
originalPath: params.originalPath,
});
return;
}
const parentDir = path.dirname(params.outPath);
await fs.mkdir(parentDir, { recursive: true });
await assertResolvedInsideDestination({
destinationRealDir: params.destinationRealDir,
targetPath: parentDir,
originalPath: params.originalPath,
});
await prepareArchiveOutputPath(params);
}
async function writeZipFileEntry(params: {
@@ -511,7 +623,7 @@ async function extractZip(params: {
limits?: ArchiveExtractLimits;
}): Promise<void> {
const limits = resolveExtractLimits(params.limits);
const destinationRealDir = await assertDestinationDirReady(params.destDir);
const destinationRealDir = await prepareArchiveDestinationDir(params.destDir);
const stat = await fs.stat(params.archivePath);
if (stat.size > limits.maxArchiveBytes) {
throw new Error(ERROR_ARCHIVE_SIZE_EXCEEDS_LIMIT);
@@ -641,37 +753,50 @@ export async function extractArchive(params: {
const label = kind === "zip" ? "extract zip" : "extract tar";
if (kind === "tar") {
const limits = resolveExtractLimits(params.limits);
const stat = await fs.stat(params.archivePath);
if (stat.size > limits.maxArchiveBytes) {
throw new Error(ERROR_ARCHIVE_SIZE_EXCEEDS_LIMIT);
}
const checkTarEntrySafety = createTarEntrySafetyChecker({
rootDir: params.destDir,
stripComponents: params.stripComponents,
limits,
});
await withTimeout(
tar.x({
file: params.archivePath,
cwd: params.destDir,
strip: Math.max(0, Math.floor(params.stripComponents ?? 0)),
gzip: params.tarGzip,
preservePaths: false,
strict: true,
onReadEntry(entry) {
try {
checkTarEntrySafety(readTarEntryInfo(entry));
} catch (err) {
const error = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));
// Node's EventEmitter calls listeners with `this` bound to the
// emitter (tar.Unpack), which exposes Parser.abort().
const emitter = this as unknown as { abort?: (error: Error) => void };
emitter.abort?.(error);
}
},
}),
(async () => {
const limits = resolveExtractLimits(params.limits);
const stat = await fs.stat(params.archivePath);
if (stat.size > limits.maxArchiveBytes) {
throw new Error(ERROR_ARCHIVE_SIZE_EXCEEDS_LIMIT);
}
const destinationRealDir = await prepareArchiveDestinationDir(params.destDir);
await withStagedArchiveDestination({
destinationRealDir,
run: async (stagingDir) => {
const checkTarEntrySafety = createTarEntrySafetyChecker({
rootDir: destinationRealDir,
stripComponents: params.stripComponents,
limits,
});
await tar.x({
file: params.archivePath,
cwd: stagingDir,
strip: Math.max(0, Math.floor(params.stripComponents ?? 0)),
gzip: params.tarGzip,
preservePaths: false,
strict: true,
onReadEntry(entry) {
try {
checkTarEntrySafety(readTarEntryInfo(entry));
} catch (err) {
const error = err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));
// Node's EventEmitter calls listeners with `this` bound to the
// emitter (tar.Unpack), which exposes Parser.abort().
const emitter = this as unknown as { abort?: (error: Error) => void };
emitter.abort?.(error);
}
},
});
await mergeExtractedTreeIntoDestination({
sourceDir: stagingDir,
destinationDir: destinationRealDir,
destinationRealDir,
});
},
});
})(),
params.timeoutMs,
label,
);