docs: fix THREAT-MODEL-ATLAS pairing TTLs and invalid file paths

This commit is contained in:
Vincent Koc
2026-03-31 14:21:48 +09:00
parent d352bd050a
commit 6c6792446b

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@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Nothing is explicitly out of scope for this threat model.
│ TRUST BOUNDARY 1: Channel Access │
│ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ GATEWAY │ │
│ │ • Device Pairing (30s grace period) │ │
│ │ • Device Pairing (1h DM / 5m node grace period) │ │
│ │ • AllowFrom / AllowList validation │ │
│ │ • Token/Password/Tailscale auth │ │
│ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
@@ -180,10 +180,10 @@ Nothing is explicitly out of scope for this threat model.
| Attribute | Value |
| ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- |
| **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0040 - AI Model Inference API Access |
| **Description** | Attacker intercepts pairing code during 30s grace period |
| **Attack Vector** | Shoulder surfing, network sniffing, social engineering |
| **Affected Components** | Device pairing system |
| **Current Mitigations** | 30s expiry, codes sent via existing channel |
| **Description** | Attacker intercepts pairing code during pairing grace period (1h for DM channel pairing, 5m for node pairing) |
| **Attack Vector** | Shoulder surfing, network sniffing, social engineering |
| **Affected Components** | Device pairing system |
| **Current Mitigations** | 1h expiry (DM pairing) / 5m expiry (node pairing), codes sent via existing channel |
| **Residual Risk** | Medium - Grace period exploitable |
| **Recommendations** | Reduce grace period, add confirmation step |
@@ -586,12 +586,9 @@ T-EXEC-002 → T-EXFIL-001 → External exfiltration
| ----------------------------------- | --------------------------- | ------------ |
| `src/infra/exec-approvals.ts` | Command approval logic | **Critical** |
| `src/gateway/auth.ts` | Gateway authentication | **Critical** |
| `src/web/inbound/access-control.ts` | Channel access control | **Critical** |
| `src/infra/net/ssrf.ts` | SSRF protection | **Critical** |
| `src/security/external-content.ts` | Prompt injection mitigation | **Critical** |
| `src/agents/sandbox/tool-policy.ts` | Tool policy enforcement | **Critical** |
| `convex/lib/moderation.ts` | ClawHub moderation | **High** |
| `convex/lib/skillPublish.ts` | Skill publishing flow | **High** |
| `src/routing/resolve-route.ts` | Session isolation | **Medium** |
### 7.3 Glossary