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docs: typography hygiene across 4 large pages
Replaced 152 typography characters (curly quotes, apostrophes, em/en dashes, non-breaking hyphens) with ASCII equivalents so grep, copy-paste, and Mintlify search hit clean tokens. Per docs/CLAUDE.md heading and content hygiene rules. - docs/gateway/security/index.md: 59 chars - docs/plugins/hooks.md: 34 chars - docs/reference/session-management-compaction.md: 30 chars - docs/tools/clawhub.md: 29 chars
This commit is contained in:
Vincent Koc
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ POSIX `chmod` when running on Windows.
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It flags common footguns (Gateway auth exposure, browser control exposure, elevated allowlists, filesystem permissions, permissive exec approvals, and open-channel tool exposure).
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OpenClaw is both a product and an experiment: you’re wiring frontier-model behavior into real messaging surfaces and real tools. **There is no “perfectly secure” setup.** The goal is to be deliberate about:
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OpenClaw is both a product and an experiment: you're wiring frontier-model behavior into real messaging surfaces and real tools. **There is no "perfectly secure" setup.** The goal is to be deliberate about:
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- who can talk to your bot
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- where the bot is allowed to act
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@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ Advisory triage guidance:
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- `security="full"` is a broad posture warning, not proof of a bug. It is the chosen default for trusted personal-assistant setups; tighten it only when your threat model needs approval or allowlist guardrails.
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- **Network exposure** (Gateway bind/auth, Tailscale Serve/Funnel, weak/short auth tokens).
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- **Browser control exposure** (remote nodes, relay ports, remote CDP endpoints).
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- **Local disk hygiene** (permissions, symlinks, config includes, “synced folder” paths).
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- **Local disk hygiene** (permissions, symlinks, config includes, "synced folder" paths).
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- **Plugins** (plugins load without an explicit allowlist).
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- **Policy drift/misconfig** (sandbox docker settings configured but sandbox mode off; ineffective `gateway.nodes.denyCommands` patterns because matching is exact command-name only (for example `system.run`) and does not inspect shell text; dangerous `gateway.nodes.allowCommands` entries; global `tools.profile="minimal"` overridden by per-agent profiles; plugin-owned tools reachable under permissive tool policy).
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- **Runtime expectation drift** (for example assuming implicit exec still means `sandbox` when `tools.exec.host` now defaults to `auto`, or explicitly setting `tools.exec.host="sandbox"` while sandbox mode is off).
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@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ Use this when auditing access or deciding what to back up:
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When the audit prints findings, treat this as a priority order:
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1. **Anything “open” + tools enabled**: lock down DMs/groups first (pairing/allowlists), then tighten tool policy/sandboxing.
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1. **Anything "open" + tools enabled**: lock down DMs/groups first (pairing/allowlists), then tighten tool policy/sandboxing.
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2. **Public network exposure** (LAN bind, Funnel, missing auth): fix immediately.
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3. **Browser control remote exposure**: treat it like operator access (tailnet-only, pair nodes deliberately, avoid public exposure).
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4. **Permissions**: make sure state/config/credentials/auth are not group/world-readable.
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@@ -265,11 +265,11 @@ Each audit finding is keyed by a structured `checkId` (for example
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`gateway.bind_no_auth` or `tools.exec.security_full_configured`). Common
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critical severity classes:
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- `fs.*` — filesystem permissions on state, config, credentials, auth profiles.
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- `gateway.*` — bind mode, auth, Tailscale, Control UI, trusted-proxy setup.
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- `hooks.*`, `browser.*`, `sandbox.*`, `tools.exec.*` — per-surface hardening.
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- `plugins.*`, `skills.*` — plugin/skill supply chain and scan findings.
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- `security.exposure.*` — cross-cutting checks where access policy meets tool blast radius.
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- `fs.*` - filesystem permissions on state, config, credentials, auth profiles.
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- `gateway.*` - bind mode, auth, Tailscale, Control UI, trusted-proxy setup.
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- `hooks.*`, `browser.*`, `sandbox.*`, `tools.exec.*` - per-surface hardening.
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- `plugins.*`, `skills.*` - plugin/skill supply chain and scan findings.
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- `security.exposure.*` - cross-cutting checks where access policy meets tool blast radius.
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See the full catalog with severity levels, fix keys, and auto-fix support at
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[Security audit checks](/gateway/security/audit-checks).
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@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ If a macOS node is paired, the Gateway can invoke `system.run` on that node. Thi
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`systemRunPlan`; later approved forwards reuse that stored plan, and gateway
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validation rejects caller edits to command/cwd/session context after the
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approval request was created.
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- If you don’t want remote execution, set security to **deny** and remove node pairing for that Mac.
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- If you don't want remote execution, set security to **deny** and remove node pairing for that Mac.
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This distinction matters for triage:
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@@ -463,11 +463,11 @@ People who message you can:
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## Core concept: access control before intelligence
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Most failures here are not fancy exploits — they’re “someone messaged the bot and the bot did what they asked.”
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Most failures here are not fancy exploits - they're "someone messaged the bot and the bot did what they asked."
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OpenClaw’s stance:
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OpenClaw's stance:
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- **Identity first:** decide who can talk to the bot (DM pairing / allowlists / explicit “open”).
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- **Identity first:** decide who can talk to the bot (DM pairing / allowlists / explicit "open").
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- **Scope next:** decide where the bot is allowed to act (group allowlists + mention gating, tools, sandboxing, device permissions).
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- **Model last:** assume the model can be manipulated; design so manipulation has limited blast radius.
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@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ Details: [Plugins](/tools/plugin)
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All current DM-capable channels support a DM policy (`dmPolicy` or `*.dm.policy`) that gates inbound DMs **before** the message is processed:
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- `pairing` (default): unknown senders receive a short pairing code and the bot ignores their message until approved. Codes expire after 1 hour; repeated DMs won’t resend a code until a new request is created. Pending requests are capped at **3 per channel** by default.
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- `pairing` (default): unknown senders receive a short pairing code and the bot ignores their message until approved. Codes expire after 1 hour; repeated DMs won't resend a code until a new request is created. Pending requests are capped at **3 per channel** by default.
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- `allowlist`: unknown senders are blocked (no pairing handshake).
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- `open`: allow anyone to DM (public). **Requires** the channel allowlist to include `"*"` (explicit opt-in).
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- `disabled`: ignore inbound DMs entirely.
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@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ If you run multiple accounts on the same channel, use `per-account-channel-peer`
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## Allowlists for DMs and groups
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OpenClaw has two separate “who can trigger me?” layers:
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OpenClaw has two separate "who can trigger me?" layers:
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- **DM allowlist** (`allowFrom` / `channels.discord.allowFrom` / `channels.slack.allowFrom`; legacy: `channels.discord.dm.allowFrom`, `channels.slack.dm.allowFrom`): who is allowed to talk to the bot in direct messages.
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- When `dmPolicy="pairing"`, approvals are written to the account-scoped pairing allowlist store under `~/.openclaw/credentials/` (`<channel>-allowFrom.json` for default account, `<channel>-<accountId>-allowFrom.json` for non-default accounts), merged with config allowlists.
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@@ -588,14 +588,14 @@ Details: [Configuration](/gateway/configuration) and [Groups](/channels/groups)
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## Prompt injection (what it is, why it matters)
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Prompt injection is when an attacker crafts a message that manipulates the model into doing something unsafe (“ignore your instructions”, “dump your filesystem”, “follow this link and run commands”, etc.).
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Prompt injection is when an attacker crafts a message that manipulates the model into doing something unsafe ("ignore your instructions", "dump your filesystem", "follow this link and run commands", etc.).
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Even with strong system prompts, **prompt injection is not solved**. System prompt guardrails are soft guidance only; hard enforcement comes from tool policy, exec approvals, sandboxing, and channel allowlists (and operators can disable these by design). What helps in practice:
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- Keep inbound DMs locked down (pairing/allowlists).
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- Prefer mention gating in groups; avoid “always-on” bots in public rooms.
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- Prefer mention gating in groups; avoid "always-on" bots in public rooms.
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- Treat links, attachments, and pasted instructions as hostile by default.
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- Run sensitive tool execution in a sandbox; keep secrets out of the agent’s reachable filesystem.
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- Run sensitive tool execution in a sandbox; keep secrets out of the agent's reachable filesystem.
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- Note: sandboxing is opt-in. If sandbox mode is off, implicit `host=auto` resolves to the gateway host. Explicit `host=sandbox` still fails closed because no sandbox runtime is available. Set `host=gateway` if you want that behavior to be explicit in config.
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- Limit high-risk tools (`exec`, `browser`, `web_fetch`, `web_search`) to trusted agents or explicit allowlists.
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- If you allowlist interpreters (`python`, `node`, `ruby`, `perl`, `php`, `lua`, `osascript`), enable `tools.exec.strictInlineEval` so inline eval forms still need explicit approval.
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@@ -604,10 +604,10 @@ Even with strong system prompts, **prompt injection is not solved**. System prom
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Red flags to treat as untrusted:
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- “Read this file/URL and do exactly what it says.”
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- “Ignore your system prompt or safety rules.”
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- “Reveal your hidden instructions or tool outputs.”
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- “Paste the full contents of ~/.openclaw or your logs.”
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- "Read this file/URL and do exactly what it says."
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- "Ignore your system prompt or safety rules."
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- "Reveal your hidden instructions or tool outputs."
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- "Paste the full contents of ~/.openclaw or your logs."
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## External content special-token sanitization
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@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ Why:
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- Sanitization happens at the external-content wrapping layer, so it applies uniformly across fetch/read tools and inbound channel content rather than being per-provider.
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- Outbound model responses already have a separate sanitizer that strips leaked `<tool_call>`, `<function_calls>`, `<system-reminder>`, `<previous_response>`, and similar internal runtime scaffolding from user-visible replies at the final channel delivery boundary. The external-content sanitizer is the inbound counterpart.
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This does not replace the other hardening on this page — `dmPolicy`, allowlists, exec approvals, sandboxing, and `contextVisibility` still do the primary work. It closes one specific tokenizer-layer bypass against self-hosted stacks that forward user text with special tokens intact.
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This does not replace the other hardening on this page - `dmPolicy`, allowlists, exec approvals, sandboxing, and `contextVisibility` still do the primary work. It closes one specific tokenizer-layer bypass against self-hosted stacks that forward user text with special tokens intact.
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## Unsafe external content bypass flags
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@@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ When Bonjour is enabled in minimal mode, the Gateway broadcasts enough for devic
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### Lock down the Gateway WebSocket (local auth)
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Gateway auth is **required by default**. If no valid gateway auth path is configured,
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the Gateway refuses WebSocket connections (fail‑closed).
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the Gateway refuses WebSocket connections (fail-closed).
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Onboarding generates a token by default (even for loopback) so
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local clients must authenticate.
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@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ Treat node pairing like admin access.
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Recommended pattern:
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- Keep the Gateway and node host on the same tailnet (Tailscale).
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- Pair the node intentionally; disable browser proxy routing if you don’t need it.
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- Pair the node intentionally; disable browser proxy routing if you don't need it.
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Avoid:
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@@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ OpenClaw loads workspace-local `.env` files for agents and tools, but never lets
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- Any key that starts with `OPENCLAW_*` is blocked from untrusted workspace `.env` files.
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- Channel endpoint settings for Matrix, Mattermost, IRC, and Synology Chat are also blocked from workspace `.env` overrides, so cloned workspaces cannot redirect bundled connector traffic through local endpoint config. Endpoint env keys (such as `MATRIX_HOMESERVER`, `MATTERMOST_URL`, `IRC_HOST`, `SYNOLOGY_CHAT_INCOMING_URL`) must come from the gateway process environment or `env.shellEnv`, not from a workspace-loaded `.env`.
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- The block is fail-closed: a new runtime-control variable added in a future release cannot be inherited from a checked-in or attacker-supplied `.env`; the key is ignored and the gateway keeps its own value.
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- Trusted process/OS environment variables (the gateway's own shell, launchd/systemd unit, app bundle) still apply — this only constrains `.env` file loading.
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- Trusted process/OS environment variables (the gateway's own shell, launchd/systemd unit, app bundle) still apply - this only constrains `.env` file loading.
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Why: workspace `.env` files frequently live next to agent code, get committed by accident, or get written by tools. Blocking the whole `OPENCLAW_*` prefix means adding a new `OPENCLAW_*` flag later can never regress into silent inheritance from workspace state.
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@@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ Recommendations:
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- Keep log and transcript redaction on (`logging.redactSensitive: "tools"`; default).
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- Add custom patterns for your environment via `logging.redactPatterns` (tokens, hostnames, internal URLs).
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- When sharing diagnostics, prefer `openclaw status --all` (pasteable, secrets redacted) over raw logs.
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- Prune old session transcripts and log files if you don’t need long retention.
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- Prune old session transcripts and log files if you don't need long retention.
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Details: [Logging](/gateway/logging)
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@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ Additional hardening options:
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### Secure baseline (copy/paste)
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One “safe default” config that keeps the Gateway private, requires DM pairing, and avoids always-on group bots:
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One "safe default" config that keeps the Gateway private, requires DM pairing, and avoids always-on group bots:
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```json5
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{
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@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ One “safe default” config that keeps the Gateway private, requires DM pairin
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}
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```
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If you want “safer by default” tool execution too, add a sandbox + deny dangerous tools for any non-owner agent (example below under “Per-agent access profiles”).
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If you want "safer by default" tool execution too, add a sandbox + deny dangerous tools for any non-owner agent (example below under "Per-agent access profiles").
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Built-in baseline for chat-driven agent turns: non-owner senders cannot use the `cron` or `gateway` tools.
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@@ -1140,14 +1140,14 @@ access those accounts and data. Treat browser profiles as **sensitive state**:
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trusted-proxy or Tailscale Serve identity headers.
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- Treat browser downloads as untrusted input; prefer an isolated downloads directory.
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- Disable browser sync/password managers in the agent profile if possible (reduces blast radius).
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- For remote gateways, assume “browser control” is equivalent to “operator access” to whatever that profile can reach.
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- For remote gateways, assume "browser control" is equivalent to "operator access" to whatever that profile can reach.
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- Keep the Gateway and node hosts tailnet-only; avoid exposing browser control ports to LAN or public Internet.
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- Disable browser proxy routing when you don’t need it (`gateway.nodes.browser.mode="off"`).
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- Chrome MCP existing-session mode is **not** “safer”; it can act as you in whatever that host Chrome profile can reach.
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- Disable browser proxy routing when you don't need it (`gateway.nodes.browser.mode="off"`).
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- Chrome MCP existing-session mode is **not** "safer"; it can act as you in whatever that host Chrome profile can reach.
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### Browser SSRF policy (strict by default)
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OpenClaw’s browser navigation policy is strict by default: private/internal destinations stay blocked unless you explicitly opt in.
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OpenClaw's browser navigation policy is strict by default: private/internal destinations stay blocked unless you explicitly opt in.
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- Default: `browser.ssrfPolicy.dangerouslyAllowPrivateNetwork` is unset, so browser navigation keeps private/internal/special-use destinations blocked.
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- Legacy alias: `browser.ssrfPolicy.allowPrivateNetwork` is still accepted for compatibility.
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@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ keep registration order.
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`api.on(name, handler, opts?)` accepts:
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- `priority` — handler ordering (higher runs first).
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- `timeoutMs` — optional per-hook budget. When set, the hook runner aborts that
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- `priority` - handler ordering (higher runs first).
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- `timeoutMs` - optional per-hook budget. When set, the hook runner aborts that
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handler after the budget elapses and continues with the next one, instead of
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letting slow setup or recall work consume the caller's configured model
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timeout. Omit it to use the default observation/decision timeout that the
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@@ -100,52 +100,52 @@ observation-only.
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**Agent turn**
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- `before_model_resolve` — override provider or model before session messages load
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- `agent_turn_prepare` — consume queued plugin turn injections and add same-turn context before prompt hooks
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- `before_prompt_build` — add dynamic context or system-prompt text before the model call
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- `before_agent_start` — compatibility-only combined phase; prefer the two hooks above
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- **`before_agent_reply`** — short-circuit the model turn with a synthetic reply or silence
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- **`before_agent_finalize`** — inspect the natural final answer and request one more model pass
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- `agent_end` — observe final messages, success state, and run duration
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- `heartbeat_prompt_contribution` — add heartbeat-only context for background monitor and lifecycle plugins
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- `before_model_resolve` - override provider or model before session messages load
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- `agent_turn_prepare` - consume queued plugin turn injections and add same-turn context before prompt hooks
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- `before_prompt_build` - add dynamic context or system-prompt text before the model call
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- `before_agent_start` - compatibility-only combined phase; prefer the two hooks above
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- **`before_agent_reply`** - short-circuit the model turn with a synthetic reply or silence
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- **`before_agent_finalize`** - inspect the natural final answer and request one more model pass
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- `agent_end` - observe final messages, success state, and run duration
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- `heartbeat_prompt_contribution` - add heartbeat-only context for background monitor and lifecycle plugins
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**Conversation observation**
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- `model_call_started` / `model_call_ended` — observe sanitized provider/model call metadata, timing, outcome, and bounded request-id hashes without prompt or response content
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- `llm_input` — observe provider input (system prompt, prompt, history)
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- `llm_output` — observe provider output
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- `model_call_started` / `model_call_ended` - observe sanitized provider/model call metadata, timing, outcome, and bounded request-id hashes without prompt or response content
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- `llm_input` - observe provider input (system prompt, prompt, history)
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- `llm_output` - observe provider output
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**Tools**
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- **`before_tool_call`** — rewrite tool params, block execution, or require approval
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- `after_tool_call` — observe tool results, errors, and duration
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- **`tool_result_persist`** — rewrite the assistant message produced from a tool result
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- **`before_message_write`** — inspect or block an in-progress message write (rare)
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- **`before_tool_call`** - rewrite tool params, block execution, or require approval
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- `after_tool_call` - observe tool results, errors, and duration
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- **`tool_result_persist`** - rewrite the assistant message produced from a tool result
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- **`before_message_write`** - inspect or block an in-progress message write (rare)
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**Messages and delivery**
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- **`inbound_claim`** — claim an inbound message before agent routing (synthetic replies)
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- `message_received` — observe inbound content, sender, thread, and metadata
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- **`message_sending`** — rewrite outbound content or cancel delivery
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- `message_sent` — observe outbound delivery success or failure
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- **`before_dispatch`** — inspect or rewrite an outbound dispatch before channel handoff
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- **`reply_dispatch`** — participate in the final reply-dispatch pipeline
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- **`inbound_claim`** - claim an inbound message before agent routing (synthetic replies)
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- `message_received` - observe inbound content, sender, thread, and metadata
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- **`message_sending`** - rewrite outbound content or cancel delivery
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- `message_sent` - observe outbound delivery success or failure
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- **`before_dispatch`** - inspect or rewrite an outbound dispatch before channel handoff
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- **`reply_dispatch`** - participate in the final reply-dispatch pipeline
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**Sessions and compaction**
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- `session_start` / `session_end` — track session lifecycle boundaries
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- `before_compaction` / `after_compaction` — observe or annotate compaction cycles
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- `before_reset` — observe session-reset events (`/reset`, programmatic resets)
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- `session_start` / `session_end` - track session lifecycle boundaries
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- `before_compaction` / `after_compaction` - observe or annotate compaction cycles
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- `before_reset` - observe session-reset events (`/reset`, programmatic resets)
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**Subagents**
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- `subagent_spawning` / `subagent_delivery_target` / `subagent_spawned` / `subagent_ended` — coordinate subagent routing and completion delivery
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- `subagent_spawning` / `subagent_delivery_target` / `subagent_spawned` / `subagent_ended` - coordinate subagent routing and completion delivery
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**Lifecycle**
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- `gateway_start` / `gateway_stop` — start or stop plugin-owned services with the Gateway
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- `cron_changed` — observe gateway-owned cron lifecycle changes (added, updated, removed, started, finished, scheduled)
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- **`before_install`** — inspect skill or plugin install scans and optionally block
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- `gateway_start` / `gateway_stop` - start or stop plugin-owned services with the Gateway
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- `cron_changed` - observe gateway-owned cron lifecycle changes (added, updated, removed, started, finished, scheduled)
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- **`before_install`** - inspect skill or plugin install scans and optionally block
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## Tool call policy
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@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ Rules:
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approvals. The `/approve` command can approve both exec and plugin approvals.
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- A lower-priority `block: true` can still block after a higher-priority hook
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requested approval.
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- `onResolution` receives the resolved approval decision — `allow-once`,
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- `onResolution` receives the resolved approval decision - `allow-once`,
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`allow-always`, `deny`, `timeout`, or `cancelled`.
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Bundled plugins that need host-level policy can register trusted tool policies
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@@ -397,14 +397,14 @@ before the next major release:
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`PluginApprovalResolution` union (`allow-once` / `allow-always` / `deny` /
|
||||
`timeout` / `cancelled`) instead of a free-form `string`.
|
||||
|
||||
For the full list — memory capability registration, provider thinking
|
||||
For the full list - memory capability registration, provider thinking
|
||||
profile, external auth providers, provider discovery types, task runtime
|
||||
accessors, and the `command-auth` → `command-status` rename — see
|
||||
accessors, and the `command-auth` → `command-status` rename - see
|
||||
[Plugin SDK migration → Active deprecations](/plugins/sdk-migration#active-deprecations).
|
||||
|
||||
## Related
|
||||
|
||||
- [Plugin SDK migration](/plugins/sdk-migration) — active deprecations and removal timeline
|
||||
- [Plugin SDK migration](/plugins/sdk-migration) - active deprecations and removal timeline
|
||||
- [Building plugins](/plugins/building-plugins)
|
||||
- [Plugin SDK overview](/plugins/sdk-overview)
|
||||
- [Plugin entry points](/plugins/sdk-entrypoints)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
summary: "Deep dive: session store + transcripts, lifecycle, and (auto)compaction internals"
|
||||
read_when:
|
||||
- You need to debug session ids, transcript JSONL, or sessions.json fields
|
||||
- You are changing auto-compaction behavior or adding “pre-compaction” housekeeping
|
||||
- You are changing auto-compaction behavior or adding "pre-compaction" housekeeping
|
||||
- You want to implement memory flushes or silent system turns
|
||||
title: "Session management deep dive"
|
||||
---
|
||||
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ If you want a higher-level overview first, start with:
|
||||
OpenClaw is designed around a single **Gateway process** that owns session state.
|
||||
|
||||
- UIs (macOS app, web Control UI, TUI) should query the Gateway for session lists and token counts.
|
||||
- In remote mode, session files are on the remote host; “checking your local Mac files” won’t reflect what the Gateway is using.
|
||||
- In remote mode, session files are on the remote host; "checking your local Mac files" won't reflect what the Gateway is using.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ runtime authority from an older run.
|
||||
|
||||
## Session keys (`sessionKey`)
|
||||
|
||||
A `sessionKey` identifies _which conversation bucket_ you’re in (routing + isolation).
|
||||
A `sessionKey` identifies _which conversation bucket_ you're in (routing + isolation).
|
||||
|
||||
Common patterns:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ Implementation detail: the decision happens in `initSessionState()` in `src/auto
|
||||
|
||||
## Session store schema (`sessions.json`)
|
||||
|
||||
The store’s value type is `SessionEntry` in `src/config/sessions.ts`.
|
||||
The store's value type is `SessionEntry` in `src/config/sessions.ts`.
|
||||
|
||||
Key fields (not exhaustive):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ The store is safe to edit, but the Gateway is the authority: it may rewrite or r
|
||||
|
||||
## Transcript structure (`*.jsonl`)
|
||||
|
||||
Transcripts are managed by `@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent`’s `SessionManager`.
|
||||
Transcripts are managed by `@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent`'s `SessionManager`.
|
||||
|
||||
The file is JSONL:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ Notable entry types:
|
||||
- `compaction`: persisted compaction summary with `firstKeptEntryId` and `tokensBefore`
|
||||
- `branch_summary`: persisted summary when navigating a tree branch
|
||||
|
||||
OpenClaw intentionally does **not** “fix up” transcripts; the Gateway uses `SessionManager` to read/write them.
|
||||
OpenClaw intentionally does **not** "fix up" transcripts; the Gateway uses `SessionManager` to read/write them.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -226,10 +226,10 @@ Two different concepts matter:
|
||||
1. **Model context window**: hard cap per model (tokens visible to the model)
|
||||
2. **Session store counters**: rolling stats written into `sessions.json` (used for /status and dashboards)
|
||||
|
||||
If you’re tuning limits:
|
||||
If you're tuning limits:
|
||||
|
||||
- The context window comes from the model catalog (and can be overridden via config).
|
||||
- `contextTokens` in the store is a runtime estimate/reporting value; don’t treat it as a strict guarantee.
|
||||
- `contextTokens` in the store is a runtime estimate/reporting value; don't treat it as a strict guarantee.
|
||||
|
||||
For more, see [/token-use](/reference/token-use).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ exceeded`, and similar provider-shaped variants) → compact → retry.
|
||||
|
||||
Where:
|
||||
|
||||
- `contextWindow` is the model’s context window
|
||||
- `contextWindow` is the model's context window
|
||||
- `reserveTokens` is headroom reserved for prompts + the next model output
|
||||
|
||||
These are Pi runtime semantics (OpenClaw consumes the events, but Pi decides when to compact).
|
||||
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ loop after new tool results have been appended.
|
||||
|
||||
## Compaction settings (`reserveTokens`, `keepRecentTokens`)
|
||||
|
||||
Pi’s compaction settings live in Pi settings:
|
||||
Pi's compaction settings live in Pi settings:
|
||||
|
||||
```json5
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ OpenClaw also enforces a safety floor for embedded runs:
|
||||
- If `compaction.reserveTokens < reserveTokensFloor`, OpenClaw bumps it.
|
||||
- Default floor is `20000` tokens.
|
||||
- Set `agents.defaults.compaction.reserveTokensFloor: 0` to disable the floor.
|
||||
- If it’s already higher, OpenClaw leaves it alone.
|
||||
- If it's already higher, OpenClaw leaves it alone.
|
||||
- Manual `/compact` honors an explicit `agents.defaults.compaction.keepRecentTokens`
|
||||
and keeps Pi's recent-tail cut point. Without an explicit keep budget,
|
||||
manual compaction remains a hard checkpoint and rebuilt context starts from
|
||||
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ OpenClaw also enforces a safety floor for embedded runs:
|
||||
compaction. The old full transcript remains archived and linked from the
|
||||
compaction checkpoint instead of being rewritten in place.
|
||||
|
||||
Why: leave enough headroom for multi-turn “housekeeping” (like memory writes) before compaction becomes unavoidable.
|
||||
Why: leave enough headroom for multi-turn "housekeeping" (like memory writes) before compaction becomes unavoidable.
|
||||
|
||||
Implementation: `ensurePiCompactionReserveTokens()` in `src/agents/pi-settings.ts`
|
||||
(called from `src/agents/pi-embedded-runner.ts`).
|
||||
@@ -382,12 +382,12 @@ You can observe compaction and session state via:
|
||||
|
||||
## Silent housekeeping (`NO_REPLY`)
|
||||
|
||||
OpenClaw supports “silent” turns for background tasks where the user should not see intermediate output.
|
||||
OpenClaw supports "silent" turns for background tasks where the user should not see intermediate output.
|
||||
|
||||
Convention:
|
||||
|
||||
- The assistant starts its output with the exact silent token `NO_REPLY` /
|
||||
`no_reply` to indicate “do not deliver a reply to the user”.
|
||||
`no_reply` to indicate "do not deliver a reply to the user".
|
||||
- OpenClaw strips/suppresses this in the delivery layer.
|
||||
- Exact silent-token suppression is case-insensitive, so `NO_REPLY` and
|
||||
`no_reply` both count when the whole payload is just the silent token.
|
||||
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ Convention:
|
||||
ordinary actionable user requests.
|
||||
|
||||
As of `2026.1.10`, OpenClaw also suppresses **draft/typing streaming** when a
|
||||
partial chunk begins with `NO_REPLY`, so silent operations don’t leak partial
|
||||
partial chunk begins with `NO_REPLY`, so silent operations don't leak partial
|
||||
output mid-turn.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
@@ -403,14 +403,14 @@ output mid-turn.
|
||||
## Pre-compaction "memory flush" (implemented)
|
||||
|
||||
Goal: before auto-compaction happens, run a silent agentic turn that writes durable
|
||||
state to disk (e.g. `memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md` in the agent workspace) so compaction can’t
|
||||
state to disk (e.g. `memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md` in the agent workspace) so compaction can't
|
||||
erase critical context.
|
||||
|
||||
OpenClaw uses the **pre-threshold flush** approach:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Monitor session context usage.
|
||||
2. When it crosses a “soft threshold” (below Pi’s compaction threshold), run a silent
|
||||
“write memory now” directive to the agent.
|
||||
2. When it crosses a "soft threshold" (below Pi's compaction threshold), run a silent
|
||||
"write memory now" directive to the agent.
|
||||
3. Use the exact silent token `NO_REPLY` / `no_reply` so the user sees
|
||||
nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ Notes:
|
||||
- The flush is skipped when the session workspace is read-only (`workspaceAccess: "ro"` or `"none"`).
|
||||
- See [Memory](/concepts/memory) for the workspace file layout and write patterns.
|
||||
|
||||
Pi also exposes a `session_before_compact` hook in the extension API, but OpenClaw’s
|
||||
Pi also exposes a `session_before_compact` hook in the extension API, but OpenClaw's
|
||||
flush logic lives on the Gateway side today.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ flush logic lives on the Gateway side today.
|
||||
- model context window (too small)
|
||||
- compaction settings (`reserveTokens` too high for the model window can cause earlier compaction)
|
||||
- tool-result bloat: enable/tune session pruning
|
||||
- Silent turns leaking? Confirm the reply starts with `NO_REPLY` (case-insensitive exact token) and you’re on a build that includes the streaming suppression fix.
|
||||
- Silent turns leaking? Confirm the reply starts with `NO_REPLY` (case-insensitive exact token) and you're on a build that includes the streaming suppression fix.
|
||||
|
||||
## Related
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Site: [clawhub.ai](https://clawhub.ai)
|
||||
```
|
||||
</Step>
|
||||
<Step title="Use">
|
||||
Start a new OpenClaw session — it picks up the new skill.
|
||||
Start a new OpenClaw session - it picks up the new skill.
|
||||
</Step>
|
||||
<Step title="Publish (optional)">
|
||||
For registry-authenticated workflows (publish, sync, manage), install
|
||||
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ shared, and gated, see [Skills](/tools/skills).
|
||||
|
||||
## Security and moderation
|
||||
|
||||
ClawHub is open by default — anyone can upload skills, but a GitHub
|
||||
ClawHub is open by default - anyone can upload skills, but a GitHub
|
||||
account must be **at least one week old** to publish. This slows down
|
||||
abuse without blocking legitimate contributors.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -221,9 +221,9 @@ publish/sync.
|
||||
|
||||
Login options:
|
||||
|
||||
- `--token <token>` — paste an API token.
|
||||
- `--label <label>` — label stored for browser login tokens (default: `CLI token`).
|
||||
- `--no-browser` — do not open a browser (requires `--token`).
|
||||
- `--token <token>` - paste an API token.
|
||||
- `--label <label>` - label stored for browser login tokens (default: `CLI token`).
|
||||
- `--no-browser` - do not open a browser (requires `--token`).
|
||||
|
||||
</Accordion>
|
||||
<Accordion title="Search">
|
||||
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ publish/sync.
|
||||
|
||||
Searches skills. For plugin/package discovery, use `clawhub package explore`.
|
||||
|
||||
- `--limit <n>` — max results.
|
||||
- `--limit <n>` - max results.
|
||||
|
||||
</Accordion>
|
||||
<Accordion title="Browse / inspect plugins">
|
||||
@@ -247,12 +247,12 @@ publish/sync.
|
||||
|
||||
Options:
|
||||
|
||||
- `--family skill|code-plugin|bundle-plugin` — filter package family.
|
||||
- `--official` — show only official packages.
|
||||
- `--executes-code` — show only packages that execute code.
|
||||
- `--version <version>` / `--tag <tag>` — inspect a specific package version.
|
||||
- `--versions`, `--files`, `--file <path>` — inspect package history and files.
|
||||
- `--json` — machine-readable output.
|
||||
- `--family skill|code-plugin|bundle-plugin` - filter package family.
|
||||
- `--official` - show only official packages.
|
||||
- `--executes-code` - show only packages that execute code.
|
||||
- `--version <version>` / `--tag <tag>` - inspect a specific package version.
|
||||
- `--versions`, `--files`, `--file <path>` - inspect package history and files.
|
||||
- `--json` - machine-readable output.
|
||||
|
||||
</Accordion>
|
||||
<Accordion title="Install / update / list">
|
||||
@@ -265,8 +265,8 @@ publish/sync.
|
||||
|
||||
Options:
|
||||
|
||||
- `--version <version>` — install or update to a specific version (single slug only on `update`).
|
||||
- `--force` — overwrite if the folder already exists, or when local files do not match any published version.
|
||||
- `--version <version>` - install or update to a specific version (single slug only on `update`).
|
||||
- `--force` - overwrite if the folder already exists, or when local files do not match any published version.
|
||||
- `clawhub list` reads `.clawhub/lock.json`.
|
||||
|
||||
</Accordion>
|
||||
@@ -277,11 +277,11 @@ publish/sync.
|
||||
|
||||
Options:
|
||||
|
||||
- `--slug <slug>` — skill slug.
|
||||
- `--name <name>` — display name.
|
||||
- `--version <version>` — semver version.
|
||||
- `--changelog <text>` — changelog text (can be empty).
|
||||
- `--tags <tags>` — comma-separated tags (default: `latest`).
|
||||
- `--slug <slug>` - skill slug.
|
||||
- `--name <name>` - display name.
|
||||
- `--version <version>` - semver version.
|
||||
- `--changelog <text>` - changelog text (can be empty).
|
||||
- `--tags <tags>` - comma-separated tags (default: `latest`).
|
||||
|
||||
</Accordion>
|
||||
<Accordion title="Publish plugins">
|
||||
@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ publish/sync.
|
||||
|
||||
Options:
|
||||
|
||||
- `--dry-run` — build the exact publish plan without uploading anything.
|
||||
- `--json` — emit machine-readable output for CI.
|
||||
- `--source-repo`, `--source-commit`, `--source-ref` — optional overrides when auto-detection is not enough.
|
||||
- `--dry-run` - build the exact publish plan without uploading anything.
|
||||
- `--json` - emit machine-readable output for CI.
|
||||
- `--source-repo`, `--source-commit`, `--source-ref` - optional overrides when auto-detection is not enough.
|
||||
|
||||
</Accordion>
|
||||
<Accordion title="Request rescans">
|
||||
@@ -329,13 +329,13 @@ publish/sync.
|
||||
|
||||
Options:
|
||||
|
||||
- `--root <dir...>` — extra scan roots.
|
||||
- `--all` — upload everything without prompts.
|
||||
- `--dry-run` — show what would be uploaded.
|
||||
- `--bump <type>` — `patch|minor|major` for updates (default: `patch`).
|
||||
- `--changelog <text>` — changelog for non-interactive updates.
|
||||
- `--tags <tags>` — comma-separated tags (default: `latest`).
|
||||
- `--concurrency <n>` — registry checks (default: `4`).
|
||||
- `--root <dir...>` - extra scan roots.
|
||||
- `--all` - upload everything without prompts.
|
||||
- `--dry-run` - show what would be uploaded.
|
||||
- `--bump <type>` - `patch|minor|major` for updates (default: `patch`).
|
||||
- `--changelog <text>` - changelog for non-interactive updates.
|
||||
- `--tags <tags>` - comma-separated tags (default: `latest`).
|
||||
- `--concurrency <n>` - registry checks (default: `4`).
|
||||
|
||||
</Accordion>
|
||||
</AccordionGroup>
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user