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fix(security): use icacls /sid for locale-independent Windows ACL audit (#38900)
* fix(security): use icacls /sid for locale-independent Windows ACL audit On non-English Windows editions (Russian, Chinese, etc.) icacls prints account names in the system locale. When Node.js reads the output in a different code page the strings are garbled (e.g. "NT AUTHORITY\???????" for "NT AUTHORITY\СИСТЕМА"), causing summarizeWindowsAcl to classify SYSTEM and Administrators as untrusted and flag the config files as "others writable" — a false-positive security alert. Fix: 1. Pass /sid to icacls so it outputs security identifiers (*S-1-5-X-...) instead of locale-dependent account names. 2. Extend SID_RE to accept the leading * that icacls prepends to SIDs in /sid mode: /^\*?s-\d+-\d+(-\d+)+$/i 3. Strip the * before looking up the bare SID in TRUSTED_SIDS / the per-user USERSID set so *S-1-5-18 is correctly classified as SYSTEM (trusted) and *S-1-5-32-544 as Administrators (trusted). Tests: - Update the inspectWindowsAcl "returns parsed ACL entries" assertion to expect the /sid flag in the icacls call. - Add "classifies *S-1-5-18 (icacls /sid prefix form of SYSTEM) as trusted" SID classification test. - Add "classifies *S-1-5-32-544 (icacls /sid Administrators) as trusted". - Add inspectWindowsAcl end-to-end test with /sid-format mock output (*S-1-5-18, *S-1-5-32-544, user SID) — all three classified as trusted. Fixes #35834 * fix(security): classify world-equivalent SIDs as 'world' when using icacls /sid When icacls is invoked with /sid, world-equivalent principals like Everyone, Authenticated Users, and BUILTIN\Users are emitted as raw SIDs (*S-1-1-0, *S-1-5-11, *S-1-5-32-545). classifyPrincipal() had no SID-based mapping for these, so they fell through to the generic 'group' category instead of 'world', silently downgrading security findings that should trigger world-write/world-readable alerts. Fix: add a WORLD_SIDS constant and check it before falling back to 'group'. Add three regression tests to lock in the behaviour. * Security: resolve owner SID fallback for Windows ACL audit --------- Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -244,6 +244,20 @@ Successfully processed 1 files`;
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expectTrustedOnly([aclEntry({ principal: "S-1-5-18" })]);
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});
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it("classifies *S-1-5-18 (icacls /sid prefix form of SYSTEM) as trusted (refs #35834)", () => {
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// icacls /sid output prefixes SIDs with *, e.g. *S-1-5-18 instead of
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// S-1-5-18. Without this fix the asterisk caused SID_RE to not match
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// and the SYSTEM entry was misclassified as "group" (untrusted).
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expectTrustedOnly([aclEntry({ principal: "*S-1-5-18" })]);
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});
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it("classifies *S-1-5-32-544 (icacls /sid Administrators) as trusted", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [aclEntry({ principal: "*S-1-5-32-544" })];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies BUILTIN\\Administrators SID (S-1-5-32-544) as trusted", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [aclEntry({ principal: "S-1-5-32-544" })];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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@@ -265,6 +279,21 @@ Successfully processed 1 files`;
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);
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});
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it("does not trust *-prefixed Everyone via USERSID", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "*S-1-1-0",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: false,
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},
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, { USERSID: "*S-1-1-0" });
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies unknown SID as group (not world)", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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@@ -281,6 +310,53 @@ Successfully processed 1 files`;
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies Everyone SID (S-1-1-0) as world, not group", () => {
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// When icacls is run with /sid, "Everyone" becomes *S-1-1-0.
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// It must be classified as "world" to preserve security-audit severity.
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "*S-1-1-0",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: false,
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},
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies Authenticated Users SID (S-1-5-11) as world, not group", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "*S-1-5-11",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: false,
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},
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies BUILTIN\\Users SID (S-1-5-32-545) as world, not group", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "*S-1-5-32-545",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: false,
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},
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("full scenario: SYSTEM SID + owner SID only → no findings", () => {
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const ownerSid = "S-1-5-21-1824257776-4070701511-781240313-1001";
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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@@ -319,7 +395,55 @@ Successfully processed 1 files`;
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exec: mockExec,
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});
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expectInspectSuccess(result, 2);
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expect(mockExec).toHaveBeenCalledWith("icacls", ["C:\\test\\file.txt"]);
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// /sid is passed so that account names are printed as SIDs, making the
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// audit locale-independent (fixes #35834).
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expect(mockExec).toHaveBeenCalledWith("icacls", ["C:\\test\\file.txt", "/sid"]);
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});
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it("classifies *S-1-5-18 (SID form of SYSTEM from /sid) as trusted", async () => {
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// When icacls is called with /sid it outputs *S-X-X-X instead of
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// locale-dependent names like "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM" or the Russian
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// garbled equivalent.
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const mockExec = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
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stdout:
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"C:\\test\\file.txt *S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001:(F)\n *S-1-5-18:(F)\n *S-1-5-32-544:(F)",
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stderr: "",
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});
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const result = await inspectWindowsAcl("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
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exec: mockExec,
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env: { USERSID: "S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001" },
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});
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expectInspectSuccess(result, 3);
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// All three entries (current user, SYSTEM, Administrators) must be trusted.
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expect(result.trusted).toHaveLength(3);
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expect(result.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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expect(result.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("resolves current user SID via whoami when USERSID is missing", async () => {
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const mockExec = vi
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.fn()
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.mockResolvedValueOnce({
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stdout:
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"C:\\test\\file.txt *S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001:(F)\n *S-1-5-18:(F)",
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stderr: "",
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})
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.mockResolvedValueOnce({
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stdout: '"mock-host\\\\MockUser","S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001"\r\n',
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stderr: "",
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});
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const result = await inspectWindowsAcl("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
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exec: mockExec,
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env: { USERNAME: "MockUser", USERDOMAIN: "mock-host" },
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});
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expectInspectSuccess(result, 2);
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expect(result.trusted).toHaveLength(2);
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expect(result.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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expect(mockExec).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(1, "icacls", ["C:\\test\\file.txt", "/sid"]);
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expect(mockExec).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(2, "whoami", ["/user", "/fo", "csv", "/nh"]);
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});
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it("returns error state on exec failure", async () => {
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@@ -42,12 +42,20 @@ const TRUSTED_BASE = new Set([
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const WORLD_SUFFIXES = ["\\users", "\\authenticated users"];
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const TRUSTED_SUFFIXES = ["\\administrators", "\\system", "\\système"];
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const SID_RE = /^s-\d+-\d+(-\d+)+$/i;
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// Accept an optional leading * which icacls prefixes to SIDs when invoked with /sid
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// (e.g. *S-1-5-18 instead of S-1-5-18).
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const SID_RE = /^\*?s-\d+-\d+(-\d+)+$/i;
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const TRUSTED_SIDS = new Set([
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"s-1-5-18",
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"s-1-5-32-544",
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"s-1-5-80-956008885-3418522649-1831038044-1853292631-2271478464",
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]);
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// SIDs for world-equivalent principals that icacls /sid emits as raw SIDs.
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// Without this list these would be classified as "group" instead of "world".
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// S-1-1-0 Everyone
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// S-1-5-11 Authenticated Users
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// S-1-5-32-545 BUILTIN\Users
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const WORLD_SIDS = new Set(["s-1-1-0", "s-1-5-11", "s-1-5-32-545"]);
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const STATUS_PREFIXES = [
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"successfully processed",
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"processed",
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@@ -57,6 +65,11 @@ const STATUS_PREFIXES = [
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const normalize = (value: string) => value.trim().toLowerCase();
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function normalizeSid(value: string): string {
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const normalized = normalize(value);
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return normalized.startsWith("*") ? normalized.slice(1) : normalized;
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}
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export function resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | null {
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const username = env?.USERNAME?.trim() || os.userInfo().username?.trim();
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if (!username) {
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@@ -77,7 +90,7 @@ function buildTrustedPrincipals(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): Set<string> {
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trusted.add(normalize(userOnly));
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}
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}
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const userSid = normalize(env?.USERSID ?? "");
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const userSid = normalizeSid(env?.USERSID ?? "");
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if (userSid && SID_RE.test(userSid)) {
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trusted.add(userSid);
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}
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@@ -91,7 +104,18 @@ function classifyPrincipal(
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const normalized = normalize(principal);
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if (SID_RE.test(normalized)) {
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return TRUSTED_SIDS.has(normalized) || trustedPrincipals.has(normalized) ? "trusted" : "group";
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// Strip the leading * that icacls /sid prefixes to SIDs before lookup.
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const sid = normalizeSid(normalized);
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// World-equivalent SIDs must be classified as "world", not "group", so
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// that callers applying world-write policies catch everyone/authenticated-
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// users entries the same way they would catch the human-readable names.
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if (WORLD_SIDS.has(sid)) {
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return "world";
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}
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if (TRUSTED_SIDS.has(sid) || trustedPrincipals.has(sid)) {
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return "trusted";
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}
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return "group";
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}
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if (
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@@ -243,16 +267,44 @@ export function summarizeWindowsAcl(
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return { trusted, untrustedWorld, untrustedGroup };
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}
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async function resolveCurrentUserSid(exec: ExecFn): Promise<string | null> {
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try {
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const { stdout, stderr } = await exec("whoami", ["/user", "/fo", "csv", "/nh"]);
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const match = `${stdout}\n${stderr}`.match(/\*?S-\d+-\d+(?:-\d+)+/i);
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return match ? normalizeSid(match[0]) : null;
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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export async function inspectWindowsAcl(
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targetPath: string,
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opts?: { env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; exec?: ExecFn },
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): Promise<WindowsAclSummary> {
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const exec = opts?.exec ?? runExec;
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try {
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const { stdout, stderr } = await exec("icacls", [targetPath]);
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// /sid outputs security identifiers (e.g. *S-1-5-18) instead of locale-
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// dependent account names so the audit works correctly on non-English
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// Windows (Russian, Chinese, etc.) where icacls prints Cyrillic / CJK
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// characters that may be garbled when Node reads them in the wrong code
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// page. Fixes #35834.
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const { stdout, stderr } = await exec("icacls", [targetPath, "/sid"]);
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const output = `${stdout}\n${stderr}`.trim();
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const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(output, targetPath);
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const { trusted, untrustedWorld, untrustedGroup } = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, opts?.env);
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let effectiveEnv = opts?.env;
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let { trusted, untrustedWorld, untrustedGroup } = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, effectiveEnv);
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const needsUserSidResolution =
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!effectiveEnv?.USERSID &&
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untrustedGroup.some((entry) => SID_RE.test(normalize(entry.principal)));
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if (needsUserSidResolution) {
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const currentUserSid = await resolveCurrentUserSid(exec);
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if (currentUserSid) {
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effectiveEnv = { ...effectiveEnv, USERSID: currentUserSid };
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({ trusted, untrustedWorld, untrustedGroup } = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, effectiveEnv));
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}
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}
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return { ok: true, entries, trusted, untrustedWorld, untrustedGroup };
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} catch (err) {
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return {
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