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docs(changelog): note shell-wrapper line-continuation exec hardening
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@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
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- Security/Audit: make `gateway.real_ip_fallback_enabled` severity conditional for loopback trusted-proxy setups (warn for loopback-only `trustedProxies`, critical when non-loopback proxies are trusted). (#23428) Thanks @bmendonca3.
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- Security/Exec env: block request-scoped `HOME` and `ZDOTDIR` overrides in host exec env sanitizers (Node + macOS), preventing shell startup-file execution before allowlist-evaluated command bodies. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
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- Security/Exec env: block `SHELLOPTS`/`PS4` in host exec env sanitizers and restrict shell-wrapper (`bash|sh|zsh ... -c/-lc`) request env overrides to a small explicit allowlist (`TERM`, `LANG`, `LC_*`, `COLORTERM`, `NO_COLOR`, `FORCE_COLOR`) on both node host and macOS companion paths, preventing xtrace prompt command-substitution allowlist bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
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- Security/Exec approvals: fail closed on shell line continuations (`\\\n`/`\\\r\n`) and treat shell-wrapper execution as approval-required in allowlist mode, preventing `$\\` newline command-substitution bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
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- Security/Gateway: emit a startup security warning when insecure/dangerous config flags are enabled (including `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth=true`) and point operators to `openclaw security audit`.
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- Security/Hooks auth: normalize hook auth rate-limit client IP keys so IPv4 and IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses share one throttle bucket, preventing dual-form auth-attempt budget bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
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- Security/Exec approvals: treat `env` and shell-dispatch wrappers as transparent during allowlist analysis on node-host and macOS companion paths so policy checks match the effective executable/inline shell payload instead of the wrapper binary, blocking wrapper-smuggled allowlist bypasses. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
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