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docs(changelog): split 2026.2.21 release entries

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Peter Steinberger
2026-02-21 20:06:57 +01:00
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CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -6,6 +6,35 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
### Changes
- Channels/Config: unify channel preview streaming config handling with a shared resolver and canonical migration path.
- Discord/Allowlist: canonicalize resolved Discord allowlist names to IDs and split resolution flow for clearer fail-closed behavior.
- iOS/Talk: prefetch TTS segments and suppress expected speech-cancellation errors for smoother talk playback. (#22833) Thanks @ngutman.
### Breaking
- **BREAKING:** unify channel preview-streaming config to `channels.<channel>.streaming` with enum values `off | partial | block | progress`, and move Slack native stream toggle to `channels.slack.nativeStreaming`. Legacy keys (`streamMode`, Slack boolean `streaming`) are still read and migrated by `openclaw doctor --fix`, but canonical saved config/docs now use the unified names.
### Fixes
- Security/Shell env: validate login-shell executable paths for shell-env fallback (`/etc/shells` + trusted prefixes) and block `SHELL` in dangerous env override policy paths so untrusted shell-path injection falls back safely to `/bin/sh`. Thanks @athuljayaram for reporting.
- Security/Config: make parsed chat allowlist checks fail closed when `allowFrom` is empty, restoring expected DM/pairing gating.
- Security/Exec: in non-default setups that manually add `sort` to `tools.exec.safeBins`, block `sort --compress-program` so allowlist-mode safe-bin checks cannot bypass approval. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Security/macOS app beta: harden `system.run` allowlist handling by evaluating shell chains per segment, treating control/expansion syntax as approval-required misses, and failing closed on unsafe parse cases. Default installs are unaffected unless `tools.exec.host` is explicitly enabled. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Security/Archive: block zip symlink escapes during archive extraction.
- Security/Discord: add `openclaw security audit` warnings for name/tag-based Discord allowlist entries (DM allowlists, guild/channel `users`, and pairing-store entries), highlighting slug-collision risk while keeping name-based matching supported, and canonicalize resolved Discord allowlist names to IDs at runtime without rewriting config files. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Security/Gateway: block node-role connections when device identity metadata is missing.
- Security/OpenClawKit/UI: strip synthetic inbound metadata wrappers from displayed conversation history so internal untrusted context does not leak into user-visible chat logs.
- Security/Browser relay: harden extension relay auth token handling for `/extension` and `/cdp` pathways.
- Cron: persist `delivered` state in cron job records so delivery failures remain visible in status and logs. (#19174) Thanks @simonemacario.
- Config/Doctor: only repair the OAuth credentials directory when affected channels are configured, avoiding fresh-install noise.
- Usage/Pricing: correct MiniMax M2.5 pricing defaults to fix inflated cost reporting. (#22755) Thanks @miloudbelarebia.
- Gateway/Daemon: verify gateway health after daemon restart.
- Agents/UI text: stop rewriting normal assistant billing/payment language outside explicit error contexts. (#17834) Thanks @niceysam.
## 2026.2.21
### Changes
- Models/Google: add Gemini 3.1 support (`google/gemini-3.1-pro-preview`).
- Providers/Onboarding: add Volcano Engine (Doubao) and BytePlus providers/models (including coding variants), wire onboarding auth choices for interactive + non-interactive flows, and align docs to `volcengine-api-key`. (#7967) Thanks @funmore123.
- Channels/CLI: add per-account/channel `defaultTo` outbound routing fallback so `openclaw agent --deliver` can send without explicit `--reply-to` when a default target is configured. (#16985) Thanks @KirillShchetinin.
@@ -30,22 +59,10 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Dependencies/Unused Dependencies: remove or scope unused root and extension deps (`@larksuiteoapi/node-sdk`, `signal-utils`, `ollama`, `lit`, `@lit/context`, `@lit-labs/signals`, `@microsoft/agents-hosting-express`, `@microsoft/agents-hosting-extensions-teams`, and plugin-local `openclaw` devDeps in `extensions/open-prose`, `extensions/lobster`, and `extensions/llm-task`). (#22471, #22495) Thanks @vincentkoc.
- Dependencies/A2UI: harden dependency resolution after root cleanup (resolve `lit`, `@lit/context`, `@lit-labs/signals`, and `signal-utils` from workspace/root) and simplify bundling fallback behavior, including `pnpm dlx rolldown` compatibility. (#22481, #22507) Thanks @vincentkoc.
### Breaking
- **BREAKING:** unify channel preview-streaming config to `channels.<channel>.streaming` with enum values `off | partial | block | progress`, and move Slack native stream toggle to `channels.slack.nativeStreaming`. Legacy keys (`streamMode`, Slack boolean `streaming`) are still read and migrated by `openclaw doctor --fix`, but canonical saved config/docs now use the unified names.
### Fixes
- Security/Shell env: validate login-shell executable paths for shell-env fallback (`/etc/shells` + trusted prefixes) and block `SHELL` in dangerous env override policy paths so untrusted shell-path injection falls back safely to `/bin/sh`. Thanks @athuljayaram for reporting.
- Chat/Usage/TUI: strip synthetic inbound metadata blocks (including `Conversation info` and trailing `Untrusted context` channel metadata wrappers) from displayed conversation history so internal prompt context no longer leaks into user-visible logs.
- Security/Exec: in non-default setups that manually add `sort` to `tools.exec.safeBins`, block `sort --compress-program` so allowlist-mode safe-bin checks cannot bypass approval. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Security/Discord: add `openclaw security audit` warnings for name/tag-based Discord allowlist entries (DM allowlists, guild/channel `users`, and pairing-store entries), highlighting slug-collision risk while keeping name-based matching supported, and canonicalize resolved Discord allowlist names to IDs at runtime without rewriting config files. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Security/BlueBubbles: make parsed chat allowlist checks fail closed when `allowFrom` is empty, restoring expected `pairing`/`allowlist` DM gating for BlueBubbles and blocking unauthorized DM/reaction processing when no allowlist entries are configured. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Doctor/State integrity: only require/create the OAuth credentials directory when WhatsApp or pairing-backed channels are configured, and downgrade fresh-install missing-dir noise to an informational warning.
- Agents/Sanitization: stop rewriting billing-shaped assistant text outside explicit error context so normal replies about billing/credits/payment are preserved across messaging channels. (#17834, fixes #11359)
- Security/Agents: cap embedded Pi runner outer retry loop with a higher profile-aware dynamic limit (32-160 attempts) and return an explicit `retry_limit` error payload when retries never converge, preventing unbounded internal retry cycles (`GHSA-76m6-pj3w-v7mf`).
- Telegram: detect duplicate bot-token ownership across Telegram accounts at startup/status time, mark secondary accounts as not configured with an explicit fix message, and block duplicate account startup before polling to avoid endless `getUpdates` conflict loops.
- Security/macOS app beta: harden `system.run` allowlist handling by evaluating shell chains per segment, treating control/expansion syntax as approval-required misses, and failing closed on unsafe parse cases. Default installs are unaffected unless `tools.exec.host` is explicitly enabled. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Agents/Tool images: include source filenames in `agents/tool-images` resize logs so compression events can be traced back to specific files.
- Providers/OAuth: harden Qwen and Chutes refresh handling by validating refresh response expiry values and preserving prior refresh tokens when providers return empty refresh token fields, with regression coverage for empty-token responses.
- Models/Kimi-Coding: add missing implicit provider template for `kimi-coding` with correct `anthropic-messages` API type and base URL, fixing 403 errors when using Kimi for Coding. (#22409)
@@ -57,7 +74,6 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Providers/Copilot: add `claude-sonnet-4.6` and `claude-sonnet-4.5` to the default GitHub Copilot model catalog and add coverage for model-list/definition helpers. (#20270, fixes #20091) Thanks @Clawborn.
- Auto-reply/WebChat: avoid defaulting inbound runtime channel labels to unrelated providers (for example `whatsapp`) for webchat sessions so channel-specific formatting guidance stays accurate. (#21534) Thanks @lbo728.
- Status: include persisted `cacheRead`/`cacheWrite` in session summaries so compact `/status` output consistently shows cache hit percentages from real session data.
- Models/MiniMax: correct default M2.5 API pricing for input/output/cache token costs in onboarding and provider config defaults, fixing inflated usage cost reporting. (#21792)
- Heartbeat/Cron: restore interval heartbeat behavior so missing `HEARTBEAT.md` no longer suppresses runs (only effectively empty files skip), preserving prompt-driven and tagged-cron execution paths.
- WhatsApp/Cron/Heartbeat: enforce allowlisted routing for implicit scheduled/system delivery by merging pairing-store + configured `allowFrom` recipients, selecting authorized recipients when last-route context points to a non-allowlisted chat, and preventing heartbeat fan-out to recent unauthorized chats.
- Heartbeat/Active hours: constrain active-hours `24` sentinel parsing to `24:00` in time validation so invalid values like `24:30` are rejected early. (#21410) thanks @adhitShet.
@@ -93,7 +109,6 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- iOS/Watch: refresh iOS and watch app icon assets with the lobster icon set to keep phone/watch branding aligned. (#21997) Thanks @mbelinky.
- CLI/Onboarding: fix Anthropic-compatible custom provider verification by normalizing base URLs to avoid duplicate `/v1` paths during setup checks. (#21336) Thanks @17jmumford.
- iOS/Gateway/Tools: prefer uniquely connected node matches when duplicate display names exist, surface actionable `nodes invoke` pairing-required guidance with request IDs, and refresh active iOS gateway registration after location-capability setting changes so capability updates apply immediately. (#22120) thanks @mbelinky.
- iOS/Talk: prefetch incremental ElevenLabs TTS audio for upcoming segments during playback to reduce inter-sentence pauses, keep prefetch cancellation aligned with interrupt/reset flows, and treat expected speech-recognition task cancellation as non-error lifecycle behavior. (#22833) Thanks @ngutman.
- Gateway/Auth: require `gateway.trustedProxies` to include a loopback proxy address when `auth.mode="trusted-proxy"` and `bind="loopback"`, preventing same-host proxy misconfiguration from silently blocking auth. (#22082, follow-up to #20097) thanks @mbelinky.
- Gateway/Auth: allow trusted-proxy mode with loopback bind for same-host reverse-proxy deployments, while still requiring configured `gateway.trustedProxies`. (#20097) thanks @xinhuagu.
- Gateway/Auth: allow authenticated clients across roles/scopes to call `health` while preserving role and scope enforcement for non-health methods. (#19699) thanks @Nachx639.
@@ -105,7 +120,6 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Gateway/Pairing: tolerate legacy paired devices missing `roles`/`scopes` metadata in websocket upgrade checks and backfill metadata on reconnect. (#21447, fixes #21236) Thanks @joshavant.
- Gateway/Pairing/CLI: align read-scope compatibility in pairing/device-token checks and add local `openclaw devices` fallback recovery for loopback `pairing required` deadlocks, with explicit fallback notice to unblock approval bootstrap flows. (#21616) Thanks @shakkernerd.
- Cron: honor `cron.maxConcurrentRuns` in the timer loop so due jobs can execute up to the configured parallelism instead of always running serially. (#11595) Thanks @Takhoffman.
- Cron/Isolated delivery: persist `lastDelivered` in cron job state and run logs for isolated-session runs so delivery failures are visible even when execution status is `ok`. (#19154) Thanks @simonemacario.
- Agents/Compaction: restore embedded compaction safeguard/context-pruning extension loading in production by wiring bundled extension factories into the resource loader instead of runtime file-path resolution. (#22349) Thanks @Glucksberg.
- Agents/Subagents: restore announce-chain delivery to agent injection, defer nested announce output until descendant follow-up content is ready, and prevent descendant deferrals from consuming announce retry budget so deep chains do not drop final completions. (#22223) Thanks @tyler6204.
- Agents/System Prompt: label allowlisted senders as authorized senders to avoid implying ownership. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
@@ -126,7 +140,6 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Anthropic/Agents: preserve required pi-ai default OAuth beta headers when `context1m` injects `anthropic-beta`, preventing 401 auth failures for `sk-ant-oat-*` tokens. (#19789, fixes #19769) Thanks @minupla.
- Security/Exec: block unquoted heredoc body expansion tokens in shell allowlist analysis, reject unterminated heredocs, and require explicit approval for allowlisted heredoc execution on gateway hosts to prevent heredoc substitution allowlist bypass. Thanks @torturado for reporting.
- macOS/Security: evaluate `system.run` allowlists per shell segment in macOS node runtime and companion exec host (including chained shell operators), fail closed on shell/process substitution parsing, and require explicit approval on unsafe parse cases to prevent allowlist bypass via `rawCommand` chaining. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Security/Archive: block ZIP extraction through pre-existing destination symlinks by validating destination path segments and using no-follow file opens for writes, preventing symlink-pivot writes outside the extraction root. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- WhatsApp/Security: enforce allowlist JID authorization for reaction actions so authenticated callers cannot target non-allowlisted chats by forging `chatJid` + valid `messageId` pairs. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
- ACP/Security: escape control and delimiter characters in ACP `resource_link` title/URI metadata before prompt interpolation to prevent metadata-driven prompt injection through resource links. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
- TTS/Security: make model-driven provider switching opt-in by default (`messages.tts.modelOverrides.allowProvider=false` unless explicitly enabled), while keeping voice/style overrides available, to reduce prompt-injection-driven provider hops and unexpected TTS cost escalation. Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
@@ -136,7 +149,6 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Gateway/Security: remove shared-IP fallback for canvas endpoints and require token or session capability for canvas access. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
- Gateway/Security: require secure context and paired-device checks for Control UI auth even when `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth` is set, and align audit messaging with the hardened behavior. (#20684) Thanks @coygeek and @Vasco0x4 for reporting.
- Gateway/Security: scope tokenless Tailscale forwarded-header auth to Control UI websocket auth only, so HTTP gateway routes still require token/password even on trusted hosts. Thanks @zpbrent for reporting.
- Gateway/Security: require device identity for `role: node` websocket connections even when shared-token auth succeeds, preventing unpaired device-less clients from invoking `node.event`. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Docker/Security: run E2E and install-sh test images as non-root by adding appuser directives. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
- Skills/Security: sanitize skill env overrides to block unsafe runtime injection variables and only allow sensitive keys when declared in skill metadata, with warnings for suspicious values. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
- Security/Commands: block prototype-key injection in runtime `/debug` overrides and require own-property checks for gated command flags (`bash`, `config`, `debug`) so inherited prototype values cannot enable privileged commands. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.