fix(sandbox): support Windows drive-letter bind sources

Accept drive-absolute Windows sandbox Docker bind sources in config and runtime validation while keeping blocked-path and allowed-root comparisons case-insensitive for Windows drive paths.

Also remove a stale WhatsApp setup import that blocked extension lint after the rebase.

Co-authored-by: 6607changchun <84566142+6607changchun@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brad Groux <3053586+BradGroux@users.noreply.github.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Plugins/ClawHub: annotate 429 errors from ClawHub with the reset window from `RateLimit-Reset`/`Retry-After` and append a `Sign in for higher rate limits.` hint when the request was unauthenticated, so users can see when downloads will recover and how to lift the cap. Thanks @romneyda.
 - Plugins/runtime state: add `registerIfAbsent` for atomic keyed-store dedupe claims that return whether a plugin successfully claimed a key without overwriting an existing live value. Thanks @amknight.
 - Plugin SDK: add plugin-owned `SessionEntry` slot projection and scoped trusted-policy session extension reads. (#75609; replaces part of #73384/#74483) Thanks @100yenadmin.
+- Sandbox/Windows: accept drive-absolute Docker bind sources while keeping sandbox blocked-path and allowed-root policy comparisons Windows-case-insensitive. (#42174) Thanks @6607changchun.
 
 ### Fixes
 

extensions/whatsapp/src/setup-finalize.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 import path from "node:path";
 import {
   DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_ID,
-  normalizeE164,
   pathExists,
   splitSetupEntries,
   type DmPolicy,

src/agents/sandbox/host-paths.test.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
 import {
+  getSandboxHostPathPolicyKey,
+  isSandboxHostPathAbsolute,
   normalizeSandboxHostPath,
   resolveSandboxHostPathViaExistingAncestor,
 } from "./host-paths.js";
@@ -11,6 +13,33 @@ describe("normalizeSandboxHostPath", () => {
   it("normalizes dot segments and strips trailing slash", () => {
     expect(normalizeSandboxHostPath("/tmp/a/../b//")).toBe("/tmp/b");
   });
+
+  it("normalizes Windows drive-letter paths without losing the drive root", () => {
+    expect(normalizeSandboxHostPath("c:\\Users\\Kai\\..\\Project\\")).toBe("C:/Users/Project");
+    expect(normalizeSandboxHostPath("d:/")).toBe("D:/");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("isSandboxHostPathAbsolute", () => {
+  it("accepts POSIX and drive-absolute Windows paths", () => {
+    expect(isSandboxHostPathAbsolute("/tmp/project")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSandboxHostPathAbsolute("C:/Users/kai/project")).toBe(true);
+    expect(isSandboxHostPathAbsolute("C:\\Users\\kai\\project")).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects relative paths, named volumes, and drive-relative Windows paths", () => {
+    expect(isSandboxHostPathAbsolute("relative/path")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isSandboxHostPathAbsolute("my-volume")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isSandboxHostPathAbsolute("C:relative\\path")).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("getSandboxHostPathPolicyKey", () => {
+  it("compares Windows drive-letter paths case-insensitively", () => {
+    expect(getSandboxHostPathPolicyKey("c:\\Users\\Kai\\.SSH\\config")).toBe(
+      "c:/users/kai/.ssh/config",
+    );
+  });
 });
 
 describe("resolveSandboxHostPathViaExistingAncestor", () => {
@@ -18,6 +47,16 @@ describe("resolveSandboxHostPathViaExistingAncestor", () => {
     expect(resolveSandboxHostPathViaExistingAncestor("relative/path")).toBe("relative/path");
   });
 
+  it("normalizes Windows paths without resolving them through POSIX cwd on non-Windows hosts", () => {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    expect(resolveSandboxHostPathViaExistingAncestor("C:/Users/kai/project")).toBe(
+      "C:/Users/kai/project",
+    );
+  });
+
   it("resolves symlink parents when the final leaf does not exist", () => {
     if (process.platform === "win32") {
       return;

src/agents/sandbox/host-paths.ts

@@ -19,16 +19,42 @@ function stripWindowsNamespacePrefix(input: string): string {
   return input;
 }
 
+export function isWindowsDriveAbsolutePath(raw: string): boolean {
+  return /^[A-Za-z]:[\\/]/.test(stripWindowsNamespacePrefix(raw.trim()));
+}
+
+export function isSandboxHostPathAbsolute(raw: string): boolean {
+  const trimmed = stripWindowsNamespacePrefix(raw.trim());
+  return trimmed.startsWith("/") || isWindowsDriveAbsolutePath(trimmed);
+}
+
 /**
- * Normalize a POSIX host path: resolve `.`, `..`, collapse `//`, strip trailing `/`.
+ * Normalize a host path: resolve `.`, `..`, collapse `//`, strip trailing `/`.
+ * Windows drive-letter paths preserve the drive root and uppercase the drive letter.
  */
 export function normalizeSandboxHostPath(raw: string): string {
   const trimmed = stripWindowsNamespacePrefix(raw.trim());
   if (!trimmed) {
     return "/";
   }
-  const normalized = posix.normalize(trimmed.replaceAll("\\", "/"));
-  return normalized.replace(/\/+$/, "") || "/";
+  let normalTrimmed = trimmed.replaceAll("\\", "/");
+  if (isWindowsDriveAbsolutePath(normalTrimmed)) {
+    normalTrimmed = normalTrimmed.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + normalTrimmed.slice(1);
+  }
+  const normalized = posix.normalize(normalTrimmed);
+  const withoutTrailingSlash = normalized.replace(/\/+$/, "") || "/";
+  if (/^[A-Z]:$/.test(withoutTrailingSlash)) {
+    return `${withoutTrailingSlash}/`;
+  }
+  return withoutTrailingSlash;
+}
+
+export function getSandboxHostPathPolicyKey(raw: string): string {
+  const normalized = normalizeSandboxHostPath(raw);
+  if (isWindowsDriveAbsolutePath(normalized)) {
+    return normalized.toLowerCase();
+  }
+  return normalized;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -36,8 +62,11 @@ export function normalizeSandboxHostPath(raw: string): string {
  * even when the final source leaf does not exist yet.
  */
 export function resolveSandboxHostPathViaExistingAncestor(sourcePath: string): string {
-  if (!sourcePath.startsWith("/")) {
+  if (!isSandboxHostPathAbsolute(sourcePath)) {
     return sourcePath;
   }
+  if (isWindowsDriveAbsolutePath(sourcePath) && process.platform !== "win32") {
+    return normalizeSandboxHostPath(sourcePath);
+  }
   return normalizeSandboxHostPath(resolvePathViaExistingAncestorSync(sourcePath));
 }

src/agents/sandbox/validate-sandbox-security.test.ts

@@ -174,6 +174,25 @@ describe("validateBindMounts", () => {
     expect(() => validateBindMounts(["/home/tester/.netrc:/mnt/netrc:ro"])).toThrow(/blocked path/);
   });
 
+  it("allows drive-absolute Windows bind sources", () => {
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["D:/data/openclaw/src:/src:ro"])).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateBindMounts(["D:\\data\\openclaw\\output:/output:rw"])).not.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it("compares Windows allowed roots case-insensitively", () => {
+    expect(() =>
+      validateBindMounts(["d:/DATA/OpenClaw/src:/src:ro"], {
+        allowedSourceRoots: ["D:/data/openclaw"],
+      }),
+    ).not.toThrow();
+
+    expect(() =>
+      validateBindMounts(["D:/other/project:/src:ro"], {
+        allowedSourceRoots: ["d:/data/openclaw"],
+      }),
+    ).toThrow(/outside allowed roots/);
+  });
+
   it("blocks credential binds through canonical home aliases", () => {
     if (process.platform === "win32") {
       return;
@@ -193,14 +212,7 @@ describe("validateBindMounts", () => {
 
   it("blocks symlink escapes into blocked directories", () => {
     if (process.platform === "win32") {
-      // Symlinks to non-existent targets like /etc require
-      // SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege on Windows.  The Windows branch of this
-      // test does not need a real symlink — it only asserts that Windows source
-      // paths are rejected as non-POSIX.
-      const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "openclaw-sbx-"));
-      const fakePath = join(dir, "etc-link", "passwd");
-      const run = () => validateBindMounts([`${fakePath}:/mnt/passwd:ro`]);
-      expect(run).toThrow(/non-absolute source path/);
+      // Symlink setup for blocked POSIX targets like /etc is POSIX-only.
       return;
     }
 
@@ -213,7 +225,7 @@ describe("validateBindMounts", () => {
 
   it("blocks symlink-parent escapes with non-existent leaf outside allowed roots", () => {
     if (process.platform === "win32") {
-      // Windows source paths (e.g. C:\\...) are intentionally rejected as non-POSIX.
+      // Windows symlink semantics differ; POSIX symlink escape coverage runs on POSIX hosts.
       return;
     }
     const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "openclaw-sbx-"));
@@ -233,7 +245,7 @@ describe("validateBindMounts", () => {
 
   it("blocks symlink-parent escapes into blocked paths when leaf does not exist", () => {
     if (process.platform === "win32") {
-      // Windows source paths (e.g. C:\\...) are intentionally rejected as non-POSIX.
+      // Symlink setup for blocked POSIX targets like /var/run is POSIX-only.
       return;
     }
     const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "openclaw-sbx-"));

src/agents/sandbox/validate-sandbox-security.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ import { normalizeOptionalLowercaseString } from "../../shared/string-coerce.js"
 import { splitSandboxBindSpec } from "./bind-spec.js";
 import { SANDBOX_AGENT_WORKSPACE_MOUNT } from "./constants.js";
 import {
+  getSandboxHostPathPolicyKey,
+  isSandboxHostPathAbsolute,
   normalizeSandboxHostPath,
   resolveSandboxHostPathViaExistingAncestor,
 } from "./host-paths.js";
@@ -101,6 +103,7 @@ function parseBindTargetPath(bind: string): string {
 
 /**
  * Normalize a POSIX path: resolve `.`, `..`, collapse `//`, strip trailing `/`.
+ * If it starts with the drive letter, convert it to the upper case.
  */
 function normalizeHostPath(raw: string): string {
   return normalizeSandboxHostPath(raw);
@@ -115,10 +118,9 @@ function normalizeHostPath(raw: string): string {
  */
 export function getBlockedBindReason(bind: string): BlockedBindReason | null {
   const sourceRaw = parseBindSourcePath(bind);
-  if (!sourceRaw.startsWith("/")) {
+  if (!isSandboxHostPathAbsolute(sourceRaw)) {
     return { kind: "non_absolute", sourcePath: sourceRaw };
   }
-
   const normalized = normalizeHostPath(sourceRaw);
   const blockedHostPaths = getBlockedHostPaths();
   const directReason = getBlockedReasonForSourcePath(normalized, blockedHostPaths);
@@ -141,8 +143,10 @@ function getBlockedReasonForSourcePath(
   if (sourceNormalized === "/") {
     return { kind: "covers", blockedPath: "/" };
   }
+  const sourceKey = getSandboxHostPathPolicyKey(sourceNormalized);
   for (const blocked of blockedHostPaths) {
-    if (sourceNormalized === blocked || sourceNormalized.startsWith(blocked + "/")) {
+    const blockedKey = getSandboxHostPathPolicyKey(blocked);
+    if (sourceKey === blockedKey || sourceKey.startsWith(`${blockedKey}/`)) {
       return { kind: "targets", blockedPath: blocked };
     }
   }
@@ -193,7 +197,7 @@ function normalizeAllowedRoots(roots: string[] | undefined): string[] {
   }
   const normalized = roots
     .map((entry) => entry.trim())
-    .filter((entry) => entry.startsWith("/"))
+    .filter(isSandboxHostPathAbsolute)
     .map(normalizeHostPath);
   const expanded = new Set<string>();
   for (const root of normalized) {
@@ -210,7 +214,9 @@ function isPathInsidePosix(root: string, target: string): boolean {
   if (root === "/") {
     return true;
   }
-  return target === root || target.startsWith(`${root}/`);
+  const rootKey = getSandboxHostPathPolicyKey(root);
+  const targetKey = getSandboxHostPathPolicyKey(target);
+  return targetKey === rootKey || targetKey.startsWith(`${rootKey}/`);
 }
 
 function getOutsideAllowedRootsReason(
@@ -274,7 +280,7 @@ function formatBindBlockedError(params: { bind: string; reason: BlockedBindReaso
   if (params.reason.kind === "non_absolute") {
     return new Error(
       `Sandbox security: bind mount "${params.bind}" uses a non-absolute source path ` +
-        `"${params.reason.sourcePath}". Only absolute POSIX paths are supported for sandbox binds.`,
+        `"${params.reason.sourcePath}". Only absolute POSIX or Windows drive-letter paths are supported for sandbox binds.`,
     );
   }
   if (params.reason.kind === "outside_allowed_roots") {

src/config/config.sandbox-docker.test.ts

@@ -62,6 +62,42 @@ describe("sandbox docker config", () => {
     }
   });
 
+  it("accepts Windows drive-letter binds in sandbox.docker config", () => {
+    const res = validateConfigObject({
+      agents: {
+        defaults: {
+          sandbox: {
+            docker: {
+              binds: ["D:/data/openclaw/src:/src:ro", "D:\\data\\openclaw\\output:/output:rw"],
+            },
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    });
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (res.ok) {
+      expect(res.config.agents?.defaults?.sandbox?.docker?.binds).toEqual([
+        "D:/data/openclaw/src:/src:ro",
+        "D:\\data\\openclaw\\output:/output:rw",
+      ]);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("rejects drive-relative Windows binds in sandbox.docker config", () => {
+    const res = validateConfigObject({
+      agents: {
+        defaults: {
+          sandbox: {
+            docker: {
+              binds: ["D:relative\\path:/src:ro"],
+            },
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    });
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+
   it("accepts non-empty Docker GPU passthrough config", () => {
     const res = validateConfigObject({
       agents: {

src/config/zod-schema.agent-runtime.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 import { z } from "zod";
+import { splitSandboxBindSpec } from "../agents/sandbox/bind-spec.js";
+import { isSandboxHostPathAbsolute } from "../agents/sandbox/host-paths.js";
 import { getBlockedNetworkModeReason } from "../agents/sandbox/network-mode.js";
 import { parseDurationMs } from "../cli/parse-duration.js";
 import {
@@ -158,15 +160,16 @@ const SandboxDockerSchema = z
           });
           continue;
         }
-        const firstColon = bind.indexOf(":");
-        const source = (firstColon <= 0 ? bind : bind.slice(0, firstColon)).trim();
-        if (!source.startsWith("/")) {
+
+        const parsed = splitSandboxBindSpec(bind);
+        const source = (parsed ? parsed.host : bind).trim();
+        if (!isSandboxHostPathAbsolute(source)) {
           ctx.addIssue({
             code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
             path: ["binds", i],
             message:
               `Sandbox security: bind mount "${bind}" uses a non-absolute source path "${source}". ` +
-              "Only absolute POSIX paths are supported for sandbox binds.",
+              "Only absolute POSIX or Windows drive-letter paths are supported for sandbox binds.",
           });
         }
       }

src/security/audit-sandbox-docker-config.test.ts

@@ -126,6 +126,23 @@ describe("security audit sandbox docker config", () => {
             },
           ],
         },
+        {
+          name: "Windows drive-letter bind is absolute",
+          cfg: {
+            agents: {
+              defaults: {
+                sandbox: {
+                  mode: "all",
+                  docker: {
+                    binds: ["D:/data/openclaw/src:/src:ro"],
+                  },
+                },
+              },
+            },
+          } as OpenClawConfig,
+          expectedFindings: [],
+          expectedAbsent: ["sandbox.bind_mount_non_absolute"],
+        },
         {
           name: "container namespace join network mode",
           cfg: {