docs(security): clarify dangerous control-ui bypass policy

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-02-22 10:10:57 +01:00
parent b9e9fbc97c
commit de2e5c7b74
2 changed files with 5 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ OpenClaw's web interface (Gateway Control UI + HTTP endpoints) is intended for *
- Recommended: keep the Gateway **loopback-only** (`127.0.0.1` / `::1`).
- Config: `gateway.bind="loopback"` (default).
- CLI: `openclaw gateway run --bind loopback`.
- `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth` is intended for localhost-only break-glass use.
- OpenClaw keeps deployment flexibility by design and does not hard-forbid non-local setups.
- Non-local and other risky configurations are surfaced by `openclaw security audit` as dangerous findings.
- This operator-selected tradeoff is by design and not, by itself, a security vulnerability.
- Canvas host note: network-visible canvas is **intentional** for trusted node scenarios (LAN/tailnet).
- Expected setup: non-loopback bind + Gateway auth (token/password/trusted-proxy) + firewall/tailnet controls.
- Expected routes: `/__openclaw__/canvas/`, `/__openclaw__/a2ui/`.