fix(agents): redact Control UI tool payload secrets (#72319)

Fixes #72283.

- Redacts Control UI tool start args, partial/final result payloads, derived exec output, and patch summaries before event emission.
- Forces tool/UI payload redaction to include built-in patterns plus configured custom `logging.redactPatterns`.
- Covers object, details-only, primitive string, and top-level array tool-result shapes.

Tests:
- `pnpm test src/agents/pi-embedded-subscribe.tools.test.ts src/agents/pi-embedded-subscribe.handlers.tools.test.ts`
- `pnpm check:changed`

Co-authored-by: volcano303 <75143900+volcano303@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Val Alexander <bunsthedev@gmail.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 
 ### Fixes
 
+- Control UI/Agents: redact tool-call args, partial/final results, derived exec output, and configured custom secret patterns before streaming tool events to the Control UI, so tool output cannot expose provider or channel credentials. Fixes #72283. (#72319) Thanks @volcano303 and @BunsDev.
 - CLI/model probes: fail local `infer model run` probes when the provider returns no text output, so unreachable local providers and empty completions no longer look like successful smoke tests. Refs #73023. Thanks @pavelyortho-cyber.
 - CLI/Ollama: run local `infer model run` through the lean provider completion path and skip global model discovery for one-shot local probes, so Ollama smoke tests no longer pay full chat-agent/tool startup cost or hang before the native `/api/chat` request. Fixes #72851. Thanks @TotalRes2020.
 - Doctor/gateway services: ignore launchd/systemd companion services that only reference the gateway as a dependency, suppress inactive Linux extra-service warnings, and avoid rewriting a running systemd gateway command/entrypoint during doctor repair. Carries forward #39118. Thanks @therk.

src/agents/pi-embedded-subscribe.handlers.tools.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 import type { AgentEvent } from "@mariozechner/pi-agent-core";
-import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import {
+  onAgentEvent as registerAgentEventListener,
+  resetAgentEventsForTest,
+} from "../infra/agent-events.js";
 import type { MessagingToolSend } from "./pi-embedded-messaging.types.js";
 import {
   handleToolExecutionEnd,
@@ -959,3 +963,147 @@ describe("messaging tool media URL tracking", () => {
     expect(ctx.state.pendingMessagingMediaUrls.has("tool-m3")).toBe(false);
   });
 });
+
+describe("control UI credential redaction (issue #72283)", () => {
+  afterEach(() => {
+    resetAgentEventsForTest();
+  });
+
+  it("redacts secrets in args before emitting the tool start event", async () => {
+    const events: Array<{ stream?: string; data?: Record<string, unknown> }> = [];
+    registerAgentEventListener((evt) => {
+      events.push(evt as never);
+    });
+    const { ctx } = createTestContext();
+
+    await handleToolExecutionStart(
+      ctx as never,
+      {
+        type: "tool_execution_start",
+        toolName: "gateway",
+        toolCallId: "tool-secret-args",
+        args: {
+          action: "config.apply",
+          raw: 'apiKey: "sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ"',
+          headers: { Authorization: "Bearer abcdef0123456789QWERTY=" },
+        },
+      } as never,
+    );
+
+    const startEvent = events.find(
+      (evt) => evt.stream === "tool" && (evt.data as { phase?: string })?.phase === "start",
+    );
+    expect(startEvent).toBeDefined();
+    const emittedArgs = (startEvent?.data as { args?: Record<string, unknown> })?.args ?? {};
+    const serialized = JSON.stringify(emittedArgs);
+    expect(serialized).not.toContain("sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ");
+    expect(serialized).not.toContain("abcdef0123456789QWERTY=");
+    expect(serialized).toContain("config.apply");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts secrets in exec aggregated stdout before emitting command_output", async () => {
+    const { ctx, onAgentEvent } = createTestContext();
+
+    await handleToolExecutionStart(
+      ctx as never,
+      {
+        type: "tool_execution_start",
+        toolName: "exec",
+        toolCallId: "tool-exec-secret",
+        args: { command: "cat ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json" },
+      } as never,
+    );
+
+    await handleToolExecutionEnd(
+      ctx as never,
+      {
+        type: "tool_execution_end",
+        toolName: "exec",
+        toolCallId: "tool-exec-secret",
+        isError: false,
+        result: {
+          details: {
+            status: "completed",
+            aggregated:
+              'OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789\napiKey: "ghp_abcdefghij1234567890"',
+            exitCode: 0,
+            durationMs: 12,
+            cwd: "/tmp/work",
+          },
+        },
+      } as never,
+    );
+
+    const commandOutputCalls = onAgentEvent.mock.calls
+      .map((call) => call[0])
+      .filter((arg: unknown) => (arg as { stream?: string })?.stream === "command_output");
+    expect(commandOutputCalls.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    const lastOutput = commandOutputCalls.at(-1) as { data?: { output?: string } } | undefined;
+    expect(lastOutput?.data?.output).toBeDefined();
+    expect(lastOutput?.data?.output).not.toContain("sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789");
+    expect(lastOutput?.data?.output).not.toContain("ghp_abcdefghij1234567890");
+    expect(lastOutput?.data?.output).toContain("OPENROUTER_API_KEY=");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts details-only results before emitting the tool result event", async () => {
+    const events: Array<{ stream?: string; data?: Record<string, unknown> }> = [];
+    registerAgentEventListener((evt) => {
+      events.push(evt as never);
+    });
+    const { ctx } = createTestContext();
+
+    await handleToolExecutionEnd(
+      ctx as never,
+      {
+        type: "tool_execution_end",
+        toolName: "gateway",
+        toolCallId: "tool-details-secret",
+        isError: false,
+        result: {
+          details: {
+            config: { apiKey: "sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ", model: "gpt-4" },
+          },
+        },
+      } as never,
+    );
+
+    const resultEvent = events.find(
+      (evt) => evt.stream === "tool" && (evt.data as { phase?: string })?.phase === "result",
+    );
+    expect(resultEvent).toBeDefined();
+    const serialized = JSON.stringify(resultEvent?.data?.result);
+    expect(serialized).not.toContain("sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ");
+    expect(serialized).toContain("gpt-4");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts primitive string results before emitting the tool result event", async () => {
+    const events: Array<{ stream?: string; data?: Record<string, unknown> }> = [];
+    registerAgentEventListener((evt) => {
+      events.push(evt as never);
+    });
+    const { ctx } = createTestContext();
+
+    await handleToolExecutionEnd(
+      ctx as never,
+      {
+        type: "tool_execution_end",
+        toolName: "gateway",
+        toolCallId: "tool-string-secret",
+        isError: false,
+        result: "OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789",
+      } as never,
+    );
+
+    const resultEvent = events.find(
+      (evt) => evt.stream === "tool" && (evt.data as { phase?: string })?.phase === "result",
+    );
+    expect(resultEvent).toBeDefined();
+    const emittedResult = resultEvent?.data?.result;
+    expect(typeof emittedResult).toBe("string");
+    if (typeof emittedResult !== "string") {
+      throw new Error("expected string result");
+    }
+    expect(emittedResult).not.toContain("sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789");
+    expect(emittedResult).toContain("OPENROUTER_API_KEY=");
+  });
+});

src/agents/pi-embedded-subscribe.handlers.tools.ts

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ import {
   filterToolResultMediaUrls,
   isToolResultError,
   isToolResultTimedOut,
+  sanitizeToolArgs,
   sanitizeToolResult,
 } from "./pi-embedded-subscribe.tools.js";
 import { inferToolMetaFromArgs } from "./pi-embedded-utils.js";
@@ -634,7 +635,7 @@ export function handleToolExecutionStart(
         phase: "start",
         name: toolName,
         toolCallId,
-        args: args as Record<string, unknown>,
+        args: sanitizeToolArgs(args) as Record<string, unknown>,
       },
     });
     const itemData: AgentItemEventData = {
@@ -945,7 +946,8 @@ export async function handleToolExecutionEnd(
   });
 
   if (isExecToolName(toolName)) {
-    const execDetails = readExecToolDetails(result);
+    // Use sanitizedResult so `aggregated` is redacted before reaching command_output.
+    const execDetails = readExecToolDetails(sanitizedResult);
     const commandItemId = buildCommandItemId(toolCallId);
     if (
       execDetails?.status === "approval-pending" ||
@@ -1083,7 +1085,7 @@ export async function handleToolExecutionEnd(
   }
 
   if (isPatchToolName(toolName)) {
-    const patchSummary = readApplyPatchSummary(result);
+    const patchSummary = readApplyPatchSummary(sanitizedResult);
     const patchItemId = buildPatchItemId(toolCallId);
     const summaryText = patchSummary ? buildPatchSummaryText(patchSummary) : undefined;
     emitTrackedItemEvent(ctx, {

src/agents/pi-embedded-subscribe.tools.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
-import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
-import { extractToolErrorMessage } from "./pi-embedded-subscribe.tools.js";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import * as loggingConfigModule from "../logging/config.js";
+import {
+  extractToolErrorMessage,
+  sanitizeToolArgs,
+  sanitizeToolResult,
+} from "./pi-embedded-subscribe.tools.js";
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.restoreAllMocks();
+});
 
 describe("extractToolErrorMessage", () => {
   it("ignores non-error status values", () => {
@@ -34,3 +43,178 @@ describe("extractToolErrorMessage", () => {
     ).toBe("SYSTEM_RUN_DENIED: approval required");
   });
 });
+
+function getTextContent(result: unknown, index = 0): string {
+  const record = result as { content: Array<{ text: string }> };
+  return record.content[index].text;
+}
+
+describe("sanitizeToolResult", () => {
+  it("redacts JSON-style apiKey fields in text content blocks", () => {
+    const result = {
+      content: [
+        {
+          type: "text",
+          text: '{"apiKey":"sk-1234567890abcdef","model":"gpt-4"}',
+        },
+      ],
+    };
+    const text = getTextContent(sanitizeToolResult(result));
+    expect(text).not.toContain("sk-1234567890abcdef");
+    expect(text).toContain("model");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts ENV-style credential assignments", () => {
+    const result = {
+      content: [
+        {
+          type: "text",
+          text: "OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789\nMODEL=gpt-4",
+        },
+      ],
+    };
+    const text = getTextContent(sanitizeToolResult(result));
+    expect(text).not.toContain("sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789");
+    expect(text).toContain("MODEL=gpt-4");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts Bearer authorization tokens", () => {
+    const result = {
+      content: [{ type: "text", text: "Authorization: Bearer abcdef0123456789QWERTY=" }],
+    };
+    const text = getTextContent(sanitizeToolResult(result));
+    expect(text).not.toContain("abcdef0123456789QWERTY=");
+  });
+
+  it("preserves image content stripping behavior", () => {
+    const result = {
+      content: [{ type: "image", data: "base64imagedata", mimeType: "image/png" }],
+    };
+    const sanitized = sanitizeToolResult(result) as {
+      content: Array<{ data?: string; bytes?: number; omitted?: boolean }>;
+    };
+    expect(sanitized.content[0].data).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(sanitized.content[0].omitted).toBe(true);
+    expect(sanitized.content[0].bytes).toBe("base64imagedata".length);
+  });
+
+  it("redacts secrets inside result.details (e.g. exec aggregated stdout)", () => {
+    const result = {
+      content: [{ type: "text", text: "ok" }],
+      details: {
+        status: "completed",
+        aggregated:
+          'OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789\napiKey: "ghp_abcdefghij1234567890"',
+        exitCode: 0,
+        cwd: "/tmp/work",
+      },
+    };
+    const sanitized = sanitizeToolResult(result) as {
+      details: { status: string; aggregated: string; exitCode: number; cwd: string };
+    };
+    expect(sanitized.details.aggregated).not.toContain("sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789");
+    expect(sanitized.details.aggregated).not.toContain("ghp_abcdefghij1234567890");
+    expect(sanitized.details.status).toBe("completed");
+    expect(sanitized.details.exitCode).toBe(0);
+    expect(sanitized.details.cwd).toBe("/tmp/work");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts secrets at the top level outside content/details", () => {
+    const result = {
+      output: "OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789",
+      metadata: {
+        token: "ghp_abcdefghij1234567890ABCDEF",
+        nested: { auth: "Bearer abcdef0123456789QWERTY=" },
+      },
+      summary: "ok",
+    };
+    const sanitized = sanitizeToolResult(result) as {
+      output: string;
+      metadata: { token: string; nested: { auth: string } };
+      summary: string;
+    };
+    expect(sanitized.output).not.toContain("sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789");
+    expect(sanitized.metadata.token).not.toContain("ghp_abcdefghij1234567890ABCDEF");
+    expect(sanitized.metadata.nested.auth).not.toContain("abcdef0123456789QWERTY=");
+    expect(sanitized.summary).toBe("ok");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts a details-only result with no content array", () => {
+    const result = {
+      details: {
+        config: { apiKey: "sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ", model: "gpt-4" },
+      },
+    };
+    const sanitized = sanitizeToolResult(result) as {
+      details: { config: { apiKey: string; model: string } };
+    };
+    expect(sanitized.details.config.apiKey).not.toContain("sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ");
+    expect(sanitized.details.config.model).toBe("gpt-4");
+  });
+
+  it("redacts primitive string results", () => {
+    const sanitized = sanitizeToolResult("OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789") as string;
+
+    expect(sanitized).not.toContain("sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789");
+    expect(sanitized).toContain("OPENROUTER_API_KEY=");
+  });
+
+  it("preserves top-level arrays while redacting nested strings", () => {
+    const sanitized = sanitizeToolResult([
+      { output: "Authorization: Bearer abcdef0123456789QWERTY=" },
+      "apiKey=sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ",
+    ]) as Array<{ output: string } | string>;
+
+    expect(Array.isArray(sanitized)).toBe(true);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(sanitized)).not.toContain("abcdef0123456789QWERTY=");
+    expect(JSON.stringify(sanitized)).not.toContain("sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ");
+    expect((sanitized[0] as { output: string }).output).toContain("Authorization: Bearer");
+  });
+
+  it("applies configured redact patterns to Control UI tool payloads", () => {
+    vi.spyOn(loggingConfigModule, "readLoggingConfig").mockReturnValue({
+      redactSensitive: "off",
+      redactPatterns: [String.raw`\bcustom-secret-[A-Za-z0-9]+\b`],
+    });
+
+    const result = {
+      content: [{ type: "text", text: "value custom-secret-abc123" }],
+    };
+    const text = getTextContent(sanitizeToolResult(result));
+
+    expect(text).not.toContain("custom-secret-abc123");
+    expect(text).toContain("custom…c123");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("sanitizeToolArgs", () => {
+  it("redacts string-valued credentials nested anywhere in args", () => {
+    const args = {
+      apiKey: "sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ",
+      headers: { Authorization: "Bearer abcdef0123456789QWERTY=" },
+      command: "OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789 ./run.sh",
+      flags: ["--api-key", "sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ"],
+    };
+    const sanitized = sanitizeToolArgs(args) as {
+      apiKey: string;
+      headers: { Authorization: string };
+      command: string;
+      flags: string[];
+    };
+    expect(sanitized.apiKey).not.toContain("sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ");
+    expect(sanitized.headers.Authorization).not.toContain("abcdef0123456789QWERTY=");
+    expect(sanitized.command).not.toContain("sk-or-v1-abcdef0123456789");
+    expect(sanitized.flags.join(" ")).not.toContain("sk-1234567890abcdefXYZ");
+    expect(sanitized.flags[0]).toBe("--api-key");
+  });
+
+  it("passes through null/undefined and non-string primitives unchanged", () => {
+    expect(sanitizeToolArgs(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(sanitizeToolArgs(null)).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeToolArgs(42)).toBe(42);
+    expect(sanitizeToolArgs({ count: 3, file_path: "/tmp/x.txt" })).toEqual({
+      count: 3,
+      file_path: "/tmp/x.txt",
+    });
+  });
+});

src/agents/pi-embedded-subscribe.tools.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { getChannelPlugin, normalizeChannelId } from "../channels/plugins/index.js";
 import { normalizeTargetForProvider } from "../infra/outbound/target-normalization.js";
+import { redactToolPayloadText } from "../logging/redact.js";
 import { splitMediaFromOutput } from "../media/parse.js";
 import { pluginRegistrationContractRegistry } from "../plugins/contracts/registry.js";
 import {
@@ -114,34 +115,84 @@ function isHostDenialToolText(text: string): boolean {
   return normalized.toLowerCase().includes("approval cannot safely bind");
 }
 
+function redactStringsDeep(value: unknown, seen = new WeakSet<object>()): unknown {
+  if (typeof value === "string") {
+    return redactToolPayloadText(value);
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    if (seen.has(value)) {
+      return "[Circular]";
+    }
+    seen.add(value);
+    return value.map((item) => redactStringsDeep(item, seen));
+  }
+  if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+    if (seen.has(value)) {
+      return "[Circular]";
+    }
+    seen.add(value);
+    const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+    for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {
+      out[key] = redactStringsDeep(child, seen);
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+export function sanitizeToolArgs(args: unknown): unknown {
+  return redactStringsDeep(args);
+}
+
 export function sanitizeToolResult(result: unknown): unknown {
+  if (typeof result === "string") {
+    return redactToolPayloadText(result);
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(result)) {
+    return redactStringsDeep(result);
+  }
   if (!result || typeof result !== "object") {
     return result;
   }
   const record = result as Record<string, unknown>;
-  const content = Array.isArray(record.content) ? record.content : null;
-  if (!content) {
-    return record;
+  // Strip image data first so the deep redaction pass doesn't waste work
+  // scanning base64 payloads (and so we capture the original byte counts).
+  const preCleaned: Record<string, unknown> = { ...record };
+  const originalContent = Array.isArray(record.content) ? record.content : null;
+  if (originalContent) {
+    preCleaned.content = originalContent.map((item) => {
+      if (!item || typeof item !== "object") {
+        return item;
+      }
+      const entry = item as Record<string, unknown>;
+      if (readStringValue(entry.type) === "image") {
+        const data = readStringValue(entry.data);
+        const bytes = data ? data.length : undefined;
+        const cleaned = { ...entry };
+        delete cleaned.data;
+        return Object.assign({}, cleaned, { bytes, omitted: true });
+      }
+      return entry;
+    });
   }
-  const sanitized = content.map((item) => {
-    if (!item || typeof item !== "object") {
-      return item;
-    }
-    const entry = item as Record<string, unknown>;
-    const type = readStringValue(entry.type);
-    if (type === "text" && typeof entry.text === "string") {
-      return Object.assign({}, entry, { text: truncateToolText(entry.text) });
-    }
-    if (type === "image") {
-      const data = readStringValue(entry.data);
-      const bytes = data ? data.length : undefined;
-      const cleaned = { ...entry };
-      delete cleaned.data;
-      return Object.assign({}, cleaned, { bytes, omitted: true });
-    }
-    return entry;
-  });
-  return { ...record, content: sanitized };
+  // Deep-redact the entire result so any top-level or nested string is
+  // protected, not just `details` and text content blocks.
+  const baseline = redactStringsDeep(preCleaned) as Record<string, unknown>;
+  const out: Record<string, unknown> = { ...baseline };
+  const content = Array.isArray(baseline.content) ? baseline.content : null;
+  if (content) {
+    out.content = content.map((item) => {
+      if (!item || typeof item !== "object") {
+        return item;
+      }
+      const entry = item as Record<string, unknown>;
+      if (readStringValue(entry.type) === "text" && typeof entry.text === "string") {
+        return Object.assign({}, entry, { text: truncateToolText(entry.text) });
+      }
+      return entry;
+    });
+  }
+  return out;
 }
 
 export function extractToolResultText(result: unknown): string | undefined {

src/logging/redact.ts

@@ -165,6 +165,22 @@ export function redactToolDetail(detail: string): string {
   return redactSensitiveText(detail, resolved);
 }
 
+// Forces tools-mode regardless of `logging.redactSensitive` (which governs log
+// output, not UI surfaces), and merges user `logging.redactPatterns` with the
+// built-in defaults so both apply.
+export function redactToolPayloadText(text: string): string {
+  if (!text) {
+    return text;
+  }
+  const cfg = readLoggingConfig();
+  const userPatterns = cfg?.redactPatterns;
+  const patterns =
+    userPatterns && userPatterns.length > 0
+      ? [...userPatterns, ...DEFAULT_REDACT_PATTERNS]
+      : undefined;
+  return redactSensitiveText(text, { mode: "tools", patterns });
+}
+
 export function getDefaultRedactPatterns(): string[] {
   return [...DEFAULT_REDACT_PATTERNS];
 }