* fix(agents): gate WS text delta emission on valid phase value, not map key existence
When output_item.added arrives without phase metadata, outputItemPhaseById
stores undefined. The previous .has() check returned true for undefined
values, bypassing the buffering gate and leaking commentary as unphased
visible content.
Fix: change .has() to .get() !== undefined on both delta and done handlers.
Fixes#61477
* docs: note WS phase buffering fix (#61954) (thanks @100yenadmin)
* test(agents): cover phaseless WS output_text.done buffering (#61954)
* test(commands): fix session-store import path for tsgo (#61968)
---------
Co-authored-by: Eva <eva@100yen.org>
When users visit the Control UI with ?token=<token>, they see
"device identity required" with no hint about the correct URL format.
This change:
- Detects when token is read from query string vs URL fragment
- Warns via console when ?token= is used
- Shows an inline hint in the overview error area directing users
to use #token=<token> instead
Fixes#54842
- Remove mistakenly committed openclaw-2026-04-03.log
- Add 'has-copy' CSS class to chat bubbles when copy button is present,
so the .chat-bubble.has-copy padding-right rule actually applies
Increase right padding on .chat-bubble.has-copy from 36px to 62px to
accommodate both copy and canvas action buttons without obscuring text.
Fixes#61514
Fixes#61476
Untagged text blocks in mixed assistant messages were forced to undefined
phase when any sibling had an explicit textSignature phase. Now they
correctly inherit the message-level assistantMessagePhase, preventing
commentary leaks during history replay.
Removes the hasExplicitBlockPhase scan — untagged blocks always inherit
m.phase. Blocks with explicit textSignature.phase still use their own.
94/94 tests pass. Regression test added for mixed explicit/untagged blocks.
* fix(msteams): add SSRF validation to file consent upload URL
The uploadToConsentUrl() function previously accepted any URL from the
fileConsent/invoke response without validation. A malicious Teams tenant
user could craft an invoke activity with an attacker-controlled uploadUrl,
causing the bot to PUT file data to arbitrary destinations (SSRF).
This commit adds validateConsentUploadUrl() which enforces:
1. HTTPS-only protocol
2. Hostname must match a strict allowlist of Microsoft/SharePoint
domains (sharepoint.com, graph.microsoft.com, onedrive.com, etc.)
3. DNS resolution check rejects private/reserved IPs (RFC 1918,
loopback, link-local) to prevent DNS rebinding attacks
The CONSENT_UPLOAD_HOST_ALLOWLIST is intentionally narrower than the
existing DEFAULT_MEDIA_HOST_ALLOWLIST, excluding overly broad domains
like blob.core.windows.net and trafficmanager.net that any Azure
customer can create endpoints under.
Includes 47 tests covering IPv4/IPv6 private IP detection, protocol
enforcement, hostname allowlist matching, DNS failure handling, and
end-to-end upload validation.
* fix(msteams): validate all DNS answers for consent uploads
* fix(msteams): restore changelog header
---------
Co-authored-by: Brad Groux <bradgroux@users.noreply.github.com>
Fixes#61377
The provider attribution code only recognized api.x.ai as the xAI-native
endpoint. Some users have api.grok.x.ai configured (or it appears in
certain DNS/config scenarios) which would not resolve as xAI-native,
causing web_search tool failures.
This change adds api.grok.x.ai as an alias for xAI-native endpoint
classification alongside api.x.ai.
