When a non-default accountId is specified but not found in the accounts
config, resolveTelegramToken() falls through to channel-level defaults
(botToken, tokenFile, env) — silently routing messages via the wrong
bot's token. This is a cross-bot message leak with no error or warning.
Root cause: extensions/telegram/src/token.ts:44-46, resolveAccountCfg()
returns undefined for unknown accountIds but code continues to fallbacks.
Introduced in e5bca0832f when Telegram moved to extensions/.
Fix: return { token: "", source: "none" } with a diagnostic log when
a non-default accountId is not found. Existing behavior for known
accounts (with or without per-account tokens) preserved.
Test: added "does not fall through when non-default accountId not in
config" — 1/1 new, 10/10 existing unaffected.
Closes#49383
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: HCL <chenglunhu@gmail.com>
Fixes#35822 — Bot Framework conversation.id format is incompatible with
Graph API /chats/{chatId}. Added resolveGraphChatId() to look up the
Graph-native chat ID via GET /me/chats, cached in the conversation store.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add updateActivity/deleteActivity to MSTeamsAdapter
- Add onReactionsAdded/onReactionsRemoved to MSTeamsActivityHandler
- Implement directory self() to return bot identity from appId credential
- Add tests for self() in channel.directory.test.ts
When a route-level (teams/channel) allowlist was configured but the sender
allowlist (allowFrom/groupAllowFrom) was empty, resolveSenderScopedGroupPolicy
would downgrade the effective group policy from "allowlist" to "open", allowing
any Teams user to interact with the bot.
The fix: when channelGate.allowlistConfigured is true and effectiveGroupAllowFrom
is empty, preserve the configured groupPolicy ("allowlist") rather than letting
it be downgraded to "open". This ensures an empty sender allowlist with an active
route allowlist means deny-all rather than allow-all.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(azure): replace ARM template deployment with pure az CLI commands
Rewrites the Azure install guide to use individual az CLI commands
instead of referencing ARM templates in infra/azure/templates/ (removed
upstream). Each Azure resource (NSG, VNet, subnets, VM, Bastion) is now
created with explicit az commands, preserving the same security posture
(Bastion-only SSH, no public IP, NSG hardening).
Also addresses BradGroux review feedback from #47898:
- Add cost considerations section (Bastion ~$140/mo, VM ~$55/mo)
- Add cleanup/teardown section (az group delete)
- Remove stale /install/azure/azure redirect from docs.json
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(azure): split into multiple Steps blocks for richer TOC
Add Quick path and What you need sections. Split the single Steps
block into three (Configure deployment, Deploy Azure resources,
Install OpenClaw) so H2 headers appear in the Mintlify sidebar TOC.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(azure): remove Quick path section
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(azure): fix cost section LaTeX rendering, remove comparison
Escape dollar signs to prevent Mintlify LaTeX interpretation.
Also escape underscores in VM SKU name within bold text.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(azure): add caveat that deallocated VM stops Gateway
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(azure): simplify install step with clearer description
Download then run pattern (no sudo). Clarify that installer handles
Node LTS, dependencies, OpenClaw install, and onboarding wizard.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(azure): add Bastion provisioning latency note
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(azure): use deployment variables in cost and cleanup sections
Replace hardcoded rg-openclaw/vm-openclaw with variables in
deallocate/start and group delete commands so users who customized
names in step 3 get correct commands.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(azure): fix formatting (oxfmt)
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs: add delegate architecture guide for organizational deployments
Adds a guide for running OpenClaw as a named delegate for organizations.
Covers three capability tiers (read-only, send-on-behalf, proactive),
M365 and Google Workspace delegation setup, security guardrails, and
integration with multi-agent routing.
AI-assisted: Claude Code (Opus 4.6)
Based on: Production deployment at a 501(c)(3) nonprofit
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: address review — add Google DWD warning, fix canvas in deny list
- Add security warning for Google Workspace domain-wide delegation
matching the existing M365 application access policy warning
- Add "canvas" to the security guardrails tool deny list for
consistency with the full example and multi-agent.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: fix Tier 1 description to match read-only permissions
Remove "draft replies (saved to Drafts folder)" from Tier 1 since
saving drafts requires write access. Tier 1 is strictly read-only —
the agent summarizes and flags via chat, human acts on the mailbox.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: fix oxfmt formatting for delegate-architecture and docs.json
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: fix broken links to /automation/standing-orders
Standing orders is a deployment pattern, not an existing doc page.
Replaced with inline descriptions and links to /automation/cron-jobs
and #security-guardrails anchor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: move hardening to prerequisites before identity provider setup
Restructure per community feedback: isolation, tool restrictions,
sandbox, hard blocks, and audit trail now come BEFORE granting any
credentials. The most dangerous step (tenant-wide permissions) no
longer precedes the most important step (scoping and isolation).
Also strengthened M365 and Google Workspace security warnings with
actionable verification steps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: add standing orders guide and fix broken links
Add docs/automation/standing-orders.md covering:
- Why standing orders (agent autonomy vs human bottleneck)
- Anatomy of a standing order (scope, triggers, gates, escalation)
- Integration with cron jobs for time-based enforcement
- Execute-Verify-Report pattern for execution discipline
- Three production-tested examples (content, finance, monitoring)
- Multi-program architecture for complex agents
- Best practices (do's and don'ts)
Update delegate-architecture.md to link standing orders references
to the new page instead of dead links.
Add standing-orders to Automation nav group in docs.json (en + zh-CN).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: address review feedback on standing-orders
- P1: Clarify that standing orders should go in AGENTS.md (auto-injected)
rather than arbitrary subdirectory files. Add Tip callout explaining
which workspace files are bootstrapped.
- P2: Remove dead /concepts/personality-files link, replace with
/concepts/agent-workspace which covers bootstrap files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
