* fix(security): redact sensitive data in OTEL log exports (CWE-532)
The diagnostics-otel plugin exports ALL application logs to external
OTLP collectors without filtering. This leaks API keys, tokens, and
other sensitive data to third-party observability platforms.
Changes:
- Export redactSensitiveText from plugin-sdk for extension use
- Apply redaction to log messages before OTEL export
- Apply redaction to string attribute values
- Add tests for API key and token redaction
The existing redactSensitiveText function handles common patterns:
- API keys (sk-*, ghp_*, gsk_*, AIza*, etc.)
- Bearer tokens
- PEM private keys
- ENV-style assignments (KEY=value)
- JSON credential fields
Fixes#12542
* fix: also redact error/reason in trace spans
Address Greptile feedback:
- Redact evt.error in webhook.error span attributes and status
- Redact evt.reason in message.processed span attributes
- Redact evt.error in message.processed span status
* fix: handle undefined evt.error in type guard
* fix: redact session.state reason in OTEL metrics
Addresses Greptile feedback - session.state reason field now goes
through redactSensitiveText() like message.processed reason.
* test(diagnostics-otel): update service context for stateDir API change
* OTEL diagnostics: redact sensitive values before export
* OTEL diagnostics tests: cover message, attribute, and session reason redaction
* Changelog: note OTEL sensitive-data redaction fix
* Changelog: move OTEL redaction entry to current unreleased
---------
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
* security(cli): redact sensitive values in config get output
`runConfigGet()` reads raw config values but never applies redaction
before printing. When a user runs `openclaw config get gateway.token`
the real credential is printed to the terminal, leaking it into shell
history, scrollback buffers, and screenshots.
Use the existing `redactConfigObject()` (from redact-snapshot.ts,
already used by the Web UI path) to scrub sensitive fields before
`getAtPath()` resolves the requested key.
Fixes#13683
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* CLI/Config: add redaction regression test and changelog
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
* feat(tui): add OSC 8 hyperlinks to make wrapped URLs clickable
Long URLs that exceed terminal width get broken across lines by pi-tui's
word wrapping, making them unclickable. Post-process rendered markdown
output to add OSC 8 terminal hyperlink sequences around URL fragments,
so each line fragment links to the full URL. Gracefully degrades on
terminals without OSC 8 support.
* tui: harden OSC8 URL extraction and prefix resolution
* tui: add changelog entry for OSC 8 markdown hyperlinks
---------
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
* fix(msteams): add SSRF protection to attachment downloads via redirect and DNS validation
The attachment download flow in fetchWithAuthFallback() followed
redirects automatically on the initial fetch without any allowlist
or IP validation. This allowed DNS rebinding attacks where an
allowlisted domain (e.g. evil.trafficmanager.net) could redirect
or resolve to a private IP like 169.254.169.254, bypassing the
hostname allowlist entirely (issue #11811).
This commit adds three layers of SSRF protection:
1. safeFetch() in shared.ts: a redirect-safe fetch wrapper that uses
redirect: "manual" and validates every redirect hop against the
hostname allowlist AND DNS-resolved IP before following it.
2. isPrivateOrReservedIP() + resolveAndValidateIP() in shared.ts:
rejects RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, and IPv6 private ranges
for both initial URLs and redirect targets.
3. graph.ts SharePoint redirect handling now also uses redirect:
"manual" and validates resolved IPs, not just hostnames.
The initial fetch in fetchWithAuthFallback now goes through safeFetch
instead of a bare fetch(), ensuring redirects are never followed
without validation.
Includes 38 new tests covering IP validation, DNS resolution checks,
redirect following, DNS rebinding attacks, redirect loops, and
protocol downgrade blocking.
* fix: address review feedback on SSRF protection
- Replace hand-rolled isPrivateOrReservedIP with SDK's isPrivateIpAddress
which handles IPv4-mapped IPv6, expanded notation, NAT64, 6to4, Teredo,
octal IPv4, and fails closed on parse errors
- Add redirect: "manual" to auth retry redirect fetch in download.ts to
prevent chained redirect attacks bypassing SSRF checks
- Add redirect: "manual" to SharePoint redirect fetch in graph.ts to
prevent the same chained redirect bypass
- Update test expectations for SDK's fail-closed behavior on malformed IPs
- Add expanded IPv6 loopback (0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1) test case
* fix: type fetchMock as typeof fetch to fix TS tuple index error
* msteams: harden attachment auth and graph redirect fetch flow
* changelog(msteams): credit redirect-safeFetch hardening contributors
---------
Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
