The HTML challenge fix already keeps standalone CDN block pages out of the DNS transport path. This follow-up caches the HTML classification so status-prefixed non-HTML failures do not pay for the same scan twice and the control flow stays simpler.
Constraint: Keep behavior identical for both status-prefixed HTML pages and standalone HTML challenge pages
Rejected: Inline the helper into the status branch only | would duplicate the standalone HTML branch logic
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: If this formatter grows more branches, keep a single HTML classification result and reuse it through the decision tree
Tested: oxfmt --check src/shared/assistant-error-format.ts
Tested: node scripts/test-projects.mjs src/agents/pi-embedded-helpers.formatassistanterrortext.test.ts src/agents/pi-embedded-helpers.isbillingerrormessage.test.ts
Cloudflare challenge pages from chatgpt.com/backend-api can arrive as raw HTML without an HTTP status prefix. The transport sanitizer scanned for generic "dns" substrings before HTML detection, so these pages could surface as DNS lookup failures instead of the existing HTML/CDN block message.
Constraint: Must preserve DNS transport classification for real ENOTFOUND/getaddrinfo failures
Rejected: Treat every bare HTML document as an upstream HTML error | too broad for arbitrary model text/errors
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep standalone HTML challenge detection ahead of generic transport keyword matching so CDN block pages do not regress into DNS copy
Tested: oxfmt --check on changed files; targeted node --import tsx verification for standalone Cloudflare HTML classification and DNS control case
Not-tested: Full Vitest shard run in this environment
* test(security): add coverage tests before security fixes
- scan-paths.ts: 100% line coverage (new test file, previously zero)
- windows-acl.ts: 100% line coverage (SID bypass, whoami throw, no-user null return)
- external-content.ts: 99% (line 248 defensive overlap guard, unreachable)
- skill-scanner.ts: 93% (lines 293-294/330/571 are defensive guards for
future extensibility, unreachable with current rules/patterns)
200+ tests covering TOCTOU paths, cache invalidation, forced-file escapes,
dir-entry-cache hit, SID world-bypass, diacritic-strip fallback,
fullwidth homoglyph markers, and more.
* fix(security): 5 security hardening fixes in src/security/
scan-paths: default requireRealpath to false (safe). All production callers
already pass requireRealpath: true; default callers are now secure.
windows-acl: block world-equivalent SIDs (S-1-1-0 Everyone etc.) from being
added to trusted set via USERSID env var.
windows-acl: log resolveCurrentUserSid failures instead of bare catch{}.
audit-extra: wrap JSON.parse in readPluginManifestExtensions with try-catch.
Malformed package.json returns [] instead of crashing the audit.
audit-extra: depth guard in listWorkspaceSkillMarkdownFiles to prevent
resource exhaustion from deep symlink cycles.
audit-extra: 2s timeout on fs.realpath in collectWorkspaceSkillSymlinkEscapeFindings
to protect against hanging on slow/network filesystems.
audit-extra: warn about phantom entries in plugins.allow that don't match
any installed plugin (pre-approval exploitation vector).
media-understanding/types: add allowPrivateNetwork to transport overrides
(duplicate of PR #66967, required for tsgo to pass here).
* fix(security): address security review findings in audit-extra.async.ts
Issue 1 — Symlink escape audit bypass on realpath timeout:
When realpathWithTimeout returns null (timeout or failure), the previous code
called 'continue', silently skipping the escape check. An attacker with a
symlink to a slow/network filesystem could hang realpath to prevent escape
detection. Now treats unverifiable symlinks as potential escapes and includes
them in the finding.
Issue 2 — Malformed package.json hides extension entrypoints from deep scan:
readPluginManifestExtensions previously swallowed JSON.parse errors and
returned [], which a malicious plugin could exploit by crafting a malformed
package.json to hide its openclaw.extensions entrypoints from the deep code
scanner. Now re-throws the parse error (with cause) so the caller in
collectPluginsCodeSafetyFindings can surface a warn finding and alert the
user, while still scanning the plugin directory via getCodeSafetySummary.
* fix(security): address PR review findings (P1 + P2)
P1 — BFS realpath in listWorkspaceSkillMarkdownFiles lacks timeout:
Extract realpathWithTimeout to module scope so the BFS dequeue loop
uses the same 2 s guard as the outer escape-detection callers. Previously
only the per-workspace and per-skill-file realpaths had the timeout;
a hanging NFS/SMB directory entry inside the BFS could still block
indefinitely.
P1 (acknowledged limitation) — Promise.race leaves the underlying
fs.realpath call running after timeout. fs.realpath cannot be cancelled
once submitted to libuv. Callers are sequential (one await at a time),
so at most one worker thread is occupied; the OS will eventually time
out the stuck call. This is documented in the module-level JSDoc.
P2 — Phantom allowlist check incorrectly flags bundled plugin IDs:
listChannelPlugins() returns bundled channel plugin IDs (telegram,
discord, browser, etc.) that are never in stateDir/extensions.
Add bundledPluginIds exclusion so the phantom-entry finding is scoped
to user-installed extension IDs only.
P2 — Rename MAX_SYMLINK_DEPTH / depthGuard to MAX_TOTAL_DIR_VISITS /
totalDirVisits to accurately reflect that the guard caps total BFS
iterations (2_000 * 20 = 40_000), not per-path symlink depth.
* fix(security): clean up realpathWithTimeout timer and add regression tests
- Clear the timer handle when fs.realpath resolves before the deadline,
preventing timer accumulation during large audit runs with many files.
- Add .unref() on the timer so it cannot hold the process alive while
waiting on a potentially hanging NFS/SMB path.
Regression tests added for three audit-extra.async security fixes:
- manifest parse error: malformed plugin package.json surfaces
plugins.code_safety.manifest_parse_error (audit-extra.async.test.ts)
- phantom allowlist with bundled exclusion: bundled channel plugin IDs
are excluded from plugins.allow_phantom_entries warnings; non-installed
non-bundled IDs are correctly reported (audit-plugins-phantom.test.ts)
- unverifiable realpath escape: fs.realpath failure / timeout produces a
skills.workspace.symlink_escape finding with 'realpath timed out' in
the detail (audit-workspace-skill-escape.test.ts)
* chore(security): add TODO for structured logger in windows-acl resolveCurrentUserSid
console.warn is acceptable short-term but may be noisy on constrained
Windows hosts; note the follow-up in-code so it is not lost.
* chore: drop unrelated formatting churn from security PR
Restores extensions/memory-lancedb/config.ts and
src/agents/pi-embedded-helpers/errors.ts to their origin/main state.
These were line-wrap-only formatting changes with no relation to the
security fixes in this branch.
* fix(security): address Codex P2 review findings
1. Normalize plugins.allow entries through normalizePluginId before
phantom-entry filtering so that bundled plugin aliases and legacy IDs
are correctly excluded. Without this, valid allow entries that resolve
via alias normalization could generate false-positive phantom warnings.
2. Surface a skills.workspace.scan_truncated warn finding when the BFS
visit cap (MAX_TOTAL_DIR_VISITS) is hit mid-traversal. Previously the
scanner silently returned partial results, allowing escaped SKILL.md
symlinks in the unvisited tree to go undetected.
listWorkspaceSkillMarkdownFiles now returns {skillFilePaths, truncated}
and collectWorkspaceSkillSymlinkEscapeFindings emits the new finding
when truncated is true.
Regression test added for the truncation path using a mocked readdir
that fills the queue past the cap (40 001 fake entries) and a mocked
realpath for zero-I/O iteration speed.
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
