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* fix(security): use icacls /sid for locale-independent Windows ACL audit On non-English Windows editions (Russian, Chinese, etc.) icacls prints account names in the system locale. When Node.js reads the output in a different code page the strings are garbled (e.g. "NT AUTHORITY\???????" for "NT AUTHORITY\СИСТЕМА"), causing summarizeWindowsAcl to classify SYSTEM and Administrators as untrusted and flag the config files as "others writable" — a false-positive security alert. Fix: 1. Pass /sid to icacls so it outputs security identifiers (*S-1-5-X-...) instead of locale-dependent account names. 2. Extend SID_RE to accept the leading * that icacls prepends to SIDs in /sid mode: /^\*?s-\d+-\d+(-\d+)+$/i 3. Strip the * before looking up the bare SID in TRUSTED_SIDS / the per-user USERSID set so *S-1-5-18 is correctly classified as SYSTEM (trusted) and *S-1-5-32-544 as Administrators (trusted). Tests: - Update the inspectWindowsAcl "returns parsed ACL entries" assertion to expect the /sid flag in the icacls call. - Add "classifies *S-1-5-18 (icacls /sid prefix form of SYSTEM) as trusted" SID classification test. - Add "classifies *S-1-5-32-544 (icacls /sid Administrators) as trusted". - Add inspectWindowsAcl end-to-end test with /sid-format mock output (*S-1-5-18, *S-1-5-32-544, user SID) — all three classified as trusted. Fixes #35834 * fix(security): classify world-equivalent SIDs as 'world' when using icacls /sid When icacls is invoked with /sid, world-equivalent principals like Everyone, Authenticated Users, and BUILTIN\Users are emitted as raw SIDs (*S-1-1-0, *S-1-5-11, *S-1-5-32-545). classifyPrincipal() had no SID-based mapping for these, so they fell through to the generic 'group' category instead of 'world', silently downgrading security findings that should trigger world-write/world-readable alerts. Fix: add a WORLD_SIDS constant and check it before falling back to 'group'. Add three regression tests to lock in the behaviour. * Security: resolve owner SID fallback for Windows ACL audit --------- Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
643 lines
23 KiB
TypeScript
643 lines
23 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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import type { WindowsAclEntry, WindowsAclSummary } from "./windows-acl.js";
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const MOCK_USERNAME = "MockUser";
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vi.mock("node:os", () => ({
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default: { userInfo: () => ({ username: MOCK_USERNAME }) },
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userInfo: () => ({ username: MOCK_USERNAME }),
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}));
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const {
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createIcaclsResetCommand,
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formatIcaclsResetCommand,
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formatWindowsAclSummary,
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inspectWindowsAcl,
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parseIcaclsOutput,
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resolveWindowsUserPrincipal,
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summarizeWindowsAcl,
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} = await import("./windows-acl.js");
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function aclEntry(params: {
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principal: string;
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rights?: string[];
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rawRights?: string;
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canRead?: boolean;
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canWrite?: boolean;
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}): WindowsAclEntry {
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return {
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principal: params.principal,
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rights: params.rights ?? ["F"],
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rawRights: params.rawRights ?? "(F)",
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canRead: params.canRead ?? true,
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canWrite: params.canWrite ?? true,
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};
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}
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function expectSinglePrincipal(entries: WindowsAclEntry[], principal: string): void {
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expect(entries).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(entries[0].principal).toBe(principal);
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}
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function expectTrustedOnly(
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entries: WindowsAclEntry[],
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options?: { env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; expectedTrusted?: number },
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): void {
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, options?.env);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(options?.expectedTrusted ?? 1);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(0);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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}
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function expectInspectSuccess(
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result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof inspectWindowsAcl>>,
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expectedEntries: number,
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): void {
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expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
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expect(result.entries).toHaveLength(expectedEntries);
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}
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describe("windows-acl", () => {
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describe("resolveWindowsUserPrincipal", () => {
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it("returns DOMAIN\\USERNAME when both are present", () => {
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const env = { USERNAME: "TestUser", USERDOMAIN: "WORKGROUP" };
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expect(resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(env)).toBe("WORKGROUP\\TestUser");
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});
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it("returns just USERNAME when USERDOMAIN is not present", () => {
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const env = { USERNAME: "TestUser" };
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expect(resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(env)).toBe("TestUser");
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});
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it("trims whitespace from values", () => {
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const env = { USERNAME: " TestUser ", USERDOMAIN: " WORKGROUP " };
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expect(resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(env)).toBe("WORKGROUP\\TestUser");
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});
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it("falls back to os.userInfo when USERNAME is empty", () => {
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// When USERNAME env is empty, falls back to os.userInfo().username
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const env = { USERNAME: "", USERDOMAIN: "WORKGROUP" };
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const result = resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(env);
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// Should return a username (from os.userInfo fallback) with WORKGROUP domain
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expect(result).toBe(`WORKGROUP\\${MOCK_USERNAME}`);
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});
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});
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describe("parseIcaclsOutput", () => {
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it("parses standard icacls output", () => {
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const output = `C:\\test\\file.txt BUILTIN\\Administrators:(F)
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NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(F)
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WORKGROUP\\TestUser:(R)
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Successfully processed 1 files`;
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const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(output, "C:\\test\\file.txt");
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expect(entries).toHaveLength(3);
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expect(entries[0]).toEqual({
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principal: "BUILTIN\\Administrators",
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rights: ["F"],
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rawRights: "(F)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: true,
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});
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});
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it("parses entries with inheritance flags", () => {
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const output = `C:\\test\\dir BUILTIN\\Users:(OI)(CI)(R)`;
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const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(output, "C:\\test\\dir");
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expect(entries).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(entries[0].rights).toEqual(["R"]);
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expect(entries[0].canRead).toBe(true);
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expect(entries[0].canWrite).toBe(false);
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});
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it("filters out DENY entries", () => {
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const output = `C:\\test\\file.txt BUILTIN\\Users:(DENY)(W)
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BUILTIN\\Administrators:(F)`;
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const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(output, "C:\\test\\file.txt");
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expectSinglePrincipal(entries, "BUILTIN\\Administrators");
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});
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it("skips status messages", () => {
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const output = `Successfully processed 1 files
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Processed file: C:\\test\\file.txt
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Failed processing 0 files
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No mapping between account names`;
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const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(output, "C:\\test\\file.txt");
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expect(entries).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("skips localized (non-English) status lines that have no parenthesised token", () => {
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const output =
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"C:\\Users\\karte\\.openclaw NT AUTHORITY\\\u0421\u0418\u0421\u0422\u0415\u041c\u0410:(OI)(CI)(F)\n" +
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"\u0423\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0448\u043d\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e 1 \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b\u043e\u0432; " +
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"\u043d\u0435 \u0443\u0434\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0441\u044c \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u0430\u0442\u044c 0 \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b\u043e\u0432";
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const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(output, "C:\\Users\\karte\\.openclaw");
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expect(entries).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(entries[0].principal).toBe("NT AUTHORITY\\\u0421\u0418\u0421\u0422\u0415\u041c\u0410");
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});
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it("parses SID-format principals", () => {
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const output =
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"C:\\test\\file.txt S-1-5-18:(F)\n" +
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" S-1-5-21-1824257776-4070701511-781240313-1001:(F)";
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const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(output, "C:\\test\\file.txt");
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expect(entries).toHaveLength(2);
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expect(entries[0].principal).toBe("S-1-5-18");
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expect(entries[1].principal).toBe("S-1-5-21-1824257776-4070701511-781240313-1001");
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});
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it("ignores malformed ACL lines that contain ':' but no rights tokens", () => {
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const output = `C:\\test\\file.txt random:message
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C:\\test\\file.txt BUILTIN\\Administrators:(F)`;
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const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(output, "C:\\test\\file.txt");
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expectSinglePrincipal(entries, "BUILTIN\\Administrators");
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});
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it("handles quoted target paths", () => {
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const output = `"C:\\path with spaces\\file.txt" BUILTIN\\Administrators:(F)`;
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const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(output, "C:\\path with spaces\\file.txt");
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expect(entries).toHaveLength(1);
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});
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it("detects write permissions correctly", () => {
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// F = Full control (read + write)
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// M = Modify (read + write)
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// W = Write
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// D = Delete (considered write)
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// R = Read only
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const testCases = [
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{ rights: "(F)", canWrite: true, canRead: true },
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{ rights: "(M)", canWrite: true, canRead: true },
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{ rights: "(W)", canWrite: true, canRead: false },
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{ rights: "(D)", canWrite: true, canRead: false },
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{ rights: "(R)", canWrite: false, canRead: true },
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{ rights: "(RX)", canWrite: false, canRead: true },
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];
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for (const tc of testCases) {
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const output = `C:\\test\\file.txt BUILTIN\\Users:${tc.rights}`;
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const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(output, "C:\\test\\file.txt");
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expect(entries[0].canWrite).toBe(tc.canWrite);
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expect(entries[0].canRead).toBe(tc.canRead);
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}
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});
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});
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describe("summarizeWindowsAcl", () => {
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it("classifies trusted principals", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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aclEntry({ principal: "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM" }),
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aclEntry({ principal: "BUILTIN\\Administrators" }),
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(2);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(0);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies world principals", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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aclEntry({
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principal: "Everyone",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canWrite: false,
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}),
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aclEntry({
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principal: "BUILTIN\\Users",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canWrite: false,
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}),
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(0);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(2);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies current user as trusted", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [aclEntry({ principal: "WORKGROUP\\TestUser" })];
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const env = { USERNAME: "TestUser", USERDOMAIN: "WORKGROUP" };
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, env);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(1);
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});
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it("classifies unknown principals as group", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "DOMAIN\\SomeOtherUser",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: false,
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},
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];
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const env = { USERNAME: "TestUser", USERDOMAIN: "WORKGROUP" };
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, env);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(1);
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});
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});
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describe("summarizeWindowsAcl — SID-based classification", () => {
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it("classifies SYSTEM SID (S-1-5-18) as trusted", () => {
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expectTrustedOnly([aclEntry({ principal: "S-1-5-18" })]);
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});
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it("classifies *S-1-5-18 (icacls /sid prefix form of SYSTEM) as trusted (refs #35834)", () => {
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// icacls /sid output prefixes SIDs with *, e.g. *S-1-5-18 instead of
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// S-1-5-18. Without this fix the asterisk caused SID_RE to not match
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// and the SYSTEM entry was misclassified as "group" (untrusted).
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expectTrustedOnly([aclEntry({ principal: "*S-1-5-18" })]);
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});
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it("classifies *S-1-5-32-544 (icacls /sid Administrators) as trusted", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [aclEntry({ principal: "*S-1-5-32-544" })];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies BUILTIN\\Administrators SID (S-1-5-32-544) as trusted", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [aclEntry({ principal: "S-1-5-32-544" })];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies caller SID from USERSID env var as trusted", () => {
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const callerSid = "S-1-5-21-1824257776-4070701511-781240313-1001";
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expectTrustedOnly([aclEntry({ principal: callerSid })], {
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env: { USERSID: callerSid },
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});
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});
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it("matches SIDs case-insensitively and trims USERSID", () => {
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expectTrustedOnly(
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[aclEntry({ principal: "s-1-5-21-1824257776-4070701511-781240313-1001" })],
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{ env: { USERSID: " S-1-5-21-1824257776-4070701511-781240313-1001 " } },
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);
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});
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it("does not trust *-prefixed Everyone via USERSID", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "*S-1-1-0",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: false,
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},
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, { USERSID: "*S-1-1-0" });
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies unknown SID as group (not world)", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "S-1-5-21-9999-9999-9999-500",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: false,
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},
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(0);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies Everyone SID (S-1-1-0) as world, not group", () => {
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// When icacls is run with /sid, "Everyone" becomes *S-1-1-0.
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// It must be classified as "world" to preserve security-audit severity.
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "*S-1-1-0",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: false,
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},
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies Authenticated Users SID (S-1-5-11) as world, not group", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "*S-1-5-11",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: false,
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},
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("classifies BUILTIN\\Users SID (S-1-5-32-545) as world, not group", () => {
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "*S-1-5-32-545",
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rights: ["R"],
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rawRights: "(R)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: false,
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},
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];
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it("full scenario: SYSTEM SID + owner SID only → no findings", () => {
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const ownerSid = "S-1-5-21-1824257776-4070701511-781240313-1001";
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const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
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{
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principal: "S-1-5-18",
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rights: ["F"],
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rawRights: "(OI)(CI)(F)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: true,
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},
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{
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principal: ownerSid,
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rights: ["F"],
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rawRights: "(OI)(CI)(F)",
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canRead: true,
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canWrite: true,
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},
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];
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const env = { USERSID: ownerSid };
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const summary = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, env);
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expect(summary.trusted).toHaveLength(2);
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expect(summary.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(0);
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expect(summary.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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});
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describe("inspectWindowsAcl", () => {
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it("returns parsed ACL entries on success", async () => {
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const mockExec = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
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stdout: `C:\\test\\file.txt BUILTIN\\Administrators:(F)
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NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(F)`,
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stderr: "",
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});
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const result = await inspectWindowsAcl("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
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exec: mockExec,
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});
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expectInspectSuccess(result, 2);
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// /sid is passed so that account names are printed as SIDs, making the
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// audit locale-independent (fixes #35834).
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expect(mockExec).toHaveBeenCalledWith("icacls", ["C:\\test\\file.txt", "/sid"]);
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});
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it("classifies *S-1-5-18 (SID form of SYSTEM from /sid) as trusted", async () => {
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// When icacls is called with /sid it outputs *S-X-X-X instead of
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// locale-dependent names like "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM" or the Russian
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// garbled equivalent.
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const mockExec = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
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stdout:
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"C:\\test\\file.txt *S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001:(F)\n *S-1-5-18:(F)\n *S-1-5-32-544:(F)",
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stderr: "",
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});
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const result = await inspectWindowsAcl("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
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exec: mockExec,
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env: { USERSID: "S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001" },
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});
|
|
expectInspectSuccess(result, 3);
|
|
// All three entries (current user, SYSTEM, Administrators) must be trusted.
|
|
expect(result.trusted).toHaveLength(3);
|
|
expect(result.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
|
|
expect(result.untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(0);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("resolves current user SID via whoami when USERSID is missing", async () => {
|
|
const mockExec = vi
|
|
.fn()
|
|
.mockResolvedValueOnce({
|
|
stdout:
|
|
"C:\\test\\file.txt *S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001:(F)\n *S-1-5-18:(F)",
|
|
stderr: "",
|
|
})
|
|
.mockResolvedValueOnce({
|
|
stdout: '"mock-host\\\\MockUser","S-1-5-21-111-222-333-1001"\r\n',
|
|
stderr: "",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await inspectWindowsAcl("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
|
|
exec: mockExec,
|
|
env: { USERNAME: "MockUser", USERDOMAIN: "mock-host" },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
expectInspectSuccess(result, 2);
|
|
expect(result.trusted).toHaveLength(2);
|
|
expect(result.untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
|
|
expect(mockExec).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(1, "icacls", ["C:\\test\\file.txt", "/sid"]);
|
|
expect(mockExec).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(2, "whoami", ["/user", "/fo", "csv", "/nh"]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("returns error state on exec failure", async () => {
|
|
const mockExec = vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error("icacls not found"));
|
|
|
|
const result = await inspectWindowsAcl("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
|
|
exec: mockExec,
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(result.error).toContain("icacls not found");
|
|
expect(result.entries).toHaveLength(0);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("combines stdout and stderr for parsing", async () => {
|
|
const mockExec = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
|
|
stdout: "C:\\test\\file.txt BUILTIN\\Administrators:(F)",
|
|
stderr: "C:\\test\\file.txt NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(F)",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await inspectWindowsAcl("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
|
|
exec: mockExec,
|
|
});
|
|
expectInspectSuccess(result, 2);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("formatWindowsAclSummary", () => {
|
|
it("returns 'unknown' for failed summary", () => {
|
|
const summary: WindowsAclSummary = {
|
|
ok: false,
|
|
entries: [],
|
|
trusted: [],
|
|
untrustedWorld: [],
|
|
untrustedGroup: [],
|
|
error: "icacls failed",
|
|
};
|
|
expect(formatWindowsAclSummary(summary)).toBe("unknown");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("returns 'trusted-only' when no untrusted entries", () => {
|
|
const summary: WindowsAclSummary = {
|
|
ok: true,
|
|
entries: [],
|
|
trusted: [
|
|
{
|
|
principal: "BUILTIN\\Administrators",
|
|
rights: ["F"],
|
|
rawRights: "(F)",
|
|
canRead: true,
|
|
canWrite: true,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
untrustedWorld: [],
|
|
untrustedGroup: [],
|
|
};
|
|
expect(formatWindowsAclSummary(summary)).toBe("trusted-only");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("formats untrusted entries", () => {
|
|
const summary: WindowsAclSummary = {
|
|
ok: true,
|
|
entries: [],
|
|
trusted: [],
|
|
untrustedWorld: [
|
|
{
|
|
principal: "Everyone",
|
|
rights: ["R"],
|
|
rawRights: "(R)",
|
|
canRead: true,
|
|
canWrite: false,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
untrustedGroup: [
|
|
{
|
|
principal: "DOMAIN\\OtherUser",
|
|
rights: ["M"],
|
|
rawRights: "(M)",
|
|
canRead: true,
|
|
canWrite: true,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
};
|
|
const result = formatWindowsAclSummary(summary);
|
|
expect(result).toBe("Everyone:(R), DOMAIN\\OtherUser:(M)");
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("formatIcaclsResetCommand", () => {
|
|
it("generates command for files", () => {
|
|
const env = { USERNAME: "TestUser", USERDOMAIN: "WORKGROUP" };
|
|
const result = formatIcaclsResetCommand("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
|
|
isDir: false,
|
|
env,
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result).toBe(
|
|
'icacls "C:\\test\\file.txt" /inheritance:r /grant:r "WORKGROUP\\TestUser:F" /grant:r "*S-1-5-18:F"',
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("generates command for directories with inheritance flags", () => {
|
|
const env = { USERNAME: "TestUser", USERDOMAIN: "WORKGROUP" };
|
|
const result = formatIcaclsResetCommand("C:\\test\\dir", {
|
|
isDir: true,
|
|
env,
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result).toContain("(OI)(CI)F");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("uses system username when env is empty (falls back to os.userInfo)", () => {
|
|
// When env is empty, resolveWindowsUserPrincipal falls back to os.userInfo().username
|
|
const result = formatIcaclsResetCommand("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
|
|
isDir: false,
|
|
env: {},
|
|
});
|
|
// Should contain the actual system username from os.userInfo
|
|
expect(result).toContain(`"${MOCK_USERNAME}:F"`);
|
|
expect(result).not.toContain("%USERNAME%");
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("createIcaclsResetCommand", () => {
|
|
it("returns structured command object", () => {
|
|
const env = { USERNAME: "TestUser", USERDOMAIN: "WORKGROUP" };
|
|
const result = createIcaclsResetCommand("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
|
|
isDir: false,
|
|
env,
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
|
|
expect(result?.command).toBe("icacls");
|
|
expect(result?.args).toContain("C:\\test\\file.txt");
|
|
expect(result?.args).toContain("/inheritance:r");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("returns command with system username when env is empty (falls back to os.userInfo)", () => {
|
|
// When env is empty, resolveWindowsUserPrincipal falls back to os.userInfo().username
|
|
const result = createIcaclsResetCommand("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
|
|
isDir: false,
|
|
env: {},
|
|
});
|
|
// Should return a valid command using the system username
|
|
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
|
|
expect(result?.command).toBe("icacls");
|
|
expect(result?.args).toContain(`${MOCK_USERNAME}:F`);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("includes display string matching formatIcaclsResetCommand", () => {
|
|
const env = { USERNAME: "TestUser", USERDOMAIN: "WORKGROUP" };
|
|
const result = createIcaclsResetCommand("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
|
|
isDir: false,
|
|
env,
|
|
});
|
|
const expected = formatIcaclsResetCommand("C:\\test\\file.txt", {
|
|
isDir: false,
|
|
env,
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result?.display).toBe(expected);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("summarizeWindowsAcl — localized SYSTEM account names", () => {
|
|
it("classifies French SYSTEM (AUTORITE NT\\Système) as trusted", () => {
|
|
expectTrustedOnly([aclEntry({ principal: "AUTORITE NT\\Système" })]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("classifies German SYSTEM (NT-AUTORITÄT\\SYSTEM) as trusted", () => {
|
|
expectTrustedOnly([aclEntry({ principal: "NT-AUTORITÄT\\SYSTEM" })]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("classifies Spanish SYSTEM (AUTORIDAD NT\\SYSTEM) as trusted", () => {
|
|
expectTrustedOnly([aclEntry({ principal: "AUTORIDAD NT\\SYSTEM" })]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("French Windows full scenario: user + Système only → no untrusted", () => {
|
|
const entries: WindowsAclEntry[] = [
|
|
aclEntry({ principal: "MYPC\\Pierre" }),
|
|
aclEntry({ principal: "AUTORITE NT\\Système" }),
|
|
];
|
|
const env = { USERNAME: "Pierre", USERDOMAIN: "MYPC" };
|
|
const { trusted, untrustedWorld, untrustedGroup } = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, env);
|
|
expect(trusted).toHaveLength(2);
|
|
expect(untrustedWorld).toHaveLength(0);
|
|
expect(untrustedGroup).toHaveLength(0);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("formatIcaclsResetCommand — uses SID for SYSTEM", () => {
|
|
it("uses *S-1-5-18 instead of SYSTEM in reset command", () => {
|
|
const cmd = formatIcaclsResetCommand("C:\\test.json", {
|
|
isDir: false,
|
|
env: { USERNAME: "TestUser", USERDOMAIN: "PC" },
|
|
});
|
|
expect(cmd).toContain("*S-1-5-18:F");
|
|
expect(cmd).not.toContain("SYSTEM:F");
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|