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Source-grounded rewrite of 529 published docs pages with per-unit information-loss verification: 1,713 factual corrections cited to src/**, generated surfaces regenerated, frontmatter titles preserved for i18n, release notes pages untouched. All docs gates green. Closes #100141
75 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
75 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
---
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summary: "How OpenClaw handles local file access safely, and why the optional fs-safe Python helper is off by default"
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read_when:
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- Changing file access, archive extraction, workspace storage, or plugin filesystem helpers
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title: "Secure file operations"
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---
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OpenClaw uses [`@openclaw/fs-safe`](https://github.com/openclaw/fs-safe) for security-sensitive local file operations: root-bounded reads/writes, atomic replacement, archive extraction, temp workspaces, JSON state, and secret-file handling.
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It is a **library guardrail** for trusted OpenClaw code that receives untrusted path names, not a sandbox. Host filesystem permissions, OS users, containers, and the agent/tool policy still define the real blast radius.
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## Default: no Python helper
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OpenClaw sets the fs-safe POSIX Python helper to **off** by default:
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- the gateway should not spawn a persistent Python sidecar unless an operator opts in;
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- most installs do not need the extra parent-directory mutation hardening;
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- disabling Python keeps runtime behavior predictable across desktop, Docker, CI, and bundled-app environments.
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OpenClaw only changes the _default_. An explicit setting always wins:
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```bash
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# Default OpenClaw behavior: Node-only fs-safe fallbacks.
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OPENCLAW_FS_SAFE_PYTHON_MODE=off
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# Opt into the helper when available, falling back if unavailable.
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OPENCLAW_FS_SAFE_PYTHON_MODE=auto
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# Fail closed if the helper cannot start.
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OPENCLAW_FS_SAFE_PYTHON_MODE=require
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# Optional explicit interpreter path.
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OPENCLAW_FS_SAFE_PYTHON=/usr/bin/python3
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```
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The generic fs-safe env names also work: `FS_SAFE_PYTHON_MODE` and `FS_SAFE_PYTHON`.
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Use `require` (not `auto`) when the helper is part of your security posture; `auto` silently falls back to Node-only behavior if the helper cannot start.
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## What stays protected without Python
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With the helper off, OpenClaw still gets fs-safe's Node-only guardrails:
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- rejects relative-path escapes (`..`), absolute paths, and path separators where only bare names are allowed;
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- resolves operations through a trusted root handle instead of ad-hoc `path.resolve(...).startsWith(...)` checks;
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- refuses symlink and hardlink patterns on APIs that require that policy;
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- opens files with identity checks where the API returns or consumes file contents;
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- writes state/config files via atomic sibling-temp + rename;
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- enforces byte limits for reads and archive extraction;
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- applies private file modes for secrets and state files where the API requires them.
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This covers OpenClaw's normal threat model: trusted gateway code handling untrusted model/plugin/channel path input inside a single trusted operator boundary.
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## What Python adds
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On POSIX, the optional helper keeps one persistent Python process and uses fd-relative filesystem operations for parent-directory mutations: rename, remove, mkdir, stat/list, and some write paths.
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That narrows same-UID race windows where another process swaps a parent directory between validation and mutation — defense in depth on hosts where untrusted local processes can modify the same directories OpenClaw operates in.
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If your deployment has that risk and Python is guaranteed to exist, set:
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```bash
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OPENCLAW_FS_SAFE_PYTHON_MODE=require
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```
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## Plugin and core guidance
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- Plugin-facing file access should go through `openclaw/plugin-sdk/*` helpers, not raw `fs`, when a path comes from a message, model output, config, or plugin input.
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- Core code should use the fs-safe wrappers under `src/infra/*` so OpenClaw's process policy applies consistently.
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- Archive extraction should use the fs-safe archive helpers with explicit size, entry-count, link, and destination limits.
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- Secrets should use OpenClaw secret helpers or fs-safe secret/private-state helpers; do not hand-roll mode checks around `fs.writeFile`.
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- For hostile local-user isolation, do not rely on fs-safe alone. Run separate gateways under separate OS users/hosts, or use sandboxing.
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Related: [Security](/gateway/security), [Sandboxing](/gateway/sandboxing), [Exec approvals](/tools/exec-approvals), [Secrets](/gateway/secrets).
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